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Abstract	
This	thesis	is	a	political	history	of	the	emergence	and	evolution	of	selected	radical,	left,	student	and	workers	movements	in	Victoria	between	1965	and	1975.	It	examines	the	development	of	radical	alliances,	demonstrations	and	public	actions	using	documentary	materials	and	oral	accounts	provided	during	interviews.	It	argues	that	the	radical	left	movement	in	Victoria	began	within	the	Monash	University	Labor	Club,	which	subsequently	generated	radical	groups	outside	the	university.		During	this	timeframe,	both	military	conscription	for	the	Vietnam	War	and	the	war	itself	became	focal	points	for	oppositional	political	mobilisation	in	Victoria.	In	1967,	the	Monash	Labor	Club’s	disruptive	campaign	against	university	authority	was	sufficiently	popular	for	the	club	to	turn	its	attention	to	disrupting	the	war	effort.	Soon,	its	locus	of	operations	shifted	into	the	general	anti-war	movement	and	the	Labor	Club	established	new,	non-student,	and	avowedly	communist	and	revolutionary	organisations.	Roughly	termed	the	“Maoists,”	by	1970	these	organisations	coalesced	into	the	Worker	Student	Alliance	(WSA),	which	grew	rapidly	to	become	a	“left-wing”	body	that	challenged	the	leadership	of	the	established	“left”	organisations.	The	cessation	of	Australia’s	involvement	in	the	Vietnam	War	removed	a	major	cause	for	radical	action	and,	despite	the	generation	of	some	important	campaigns	to	replace	it,	the	WSA	dissolved	itself	in	1974.	 	
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Introduction	
The	aim	of	this	research	is	to	capture	a	history	of	the	radical	flank	of	anti-war	and	left-wing	politics	in	Melbourne	during	the	period	from	1965	until	1975.	A	further	aim	is	to	contribute	to	knowledge	and	understanding	of	the	effects	of	war	on	the	society.	Specifically,	the	thesis	examines	the	Monash	Labor	Club	and	its	main	extramural	offshoot,	the	Worker	Student	Alliance	(WSA).	It	investigates	political	and	social	developments	in	these	groups	through	the	meanings	that	their	actions	had	for	“left”	activism,	for	the	radical	causes	that	they	adopted	and	for	the	authorities	whose	power	they	sought	to	disrupt.		As	the	campaigning	of	these	groups	was	mainly	by	way	of	public	demonstrations	and	physical	protest	actions	rather	than	by	propaganda	or	the	influencing	of	centres	of	nominal	power	such	as	unions,	councils	or	parliamentary	parties,	then	this	history	is	about	the	meanings	made	by	those	actions.	As	a	political	history,	it	acknowledges	that	the	ideas	and	actions	of	these	organisations	were	shaped	by	their	location	in	a	political	environment.	These	political	youth	organisations	are	traced	from	birth	to	death	over	a	considerable	period.	Therefore,	it	supplements	the	existing	literature	that	mainly	consists	of	generalised	accounts,	analyses	of	single	campaigns	or	is	attached	to	histories	of	other	related	subjects.	This	study	is	a	genealogy	of	radical,	left	wing	thought	and	action	among	an	identifiable	movement	of	young	people.	It	has	four	central	questions.	First,	in	the	mid-1960s,	what	were	the	political	and	social	expectations	that	triggered	the	revolt	of	these	young	people?	Second,	what	ideas	gave	muscle	to	their	political	actions?	Third,	how	did	those	ideas	develop	in	response	to	the	groups’	own	needs	and	to	those	of	the	radical	and	anti-war	movements?	Fourth,	what	made	this	movement	so	different	from	other	radical	groups	and	parties?		Collectively,	these	groups	were	often	designated	as	the	“Maoists.”	They	consisted	of	the	Monash	Labor	Club,	the	WSA	and	several	associated	smaller	groups	that	often	shared	members,	leaders,	ideals	and	methods	in	common.	These	were	formed	on	the	basis	that	different	fields	of	operation	required	different	organisational	forms	but	
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the	exemplar	for	their	ideas	and	methods	was	the	Monash	Labor	Club.	By	their	strident	opposition	to	the	reconfiguration	of	Australian	capitalism	in	which	the	Vietnam	War	exemplified	most	unambiguously	the	growth	of	American	influence,	these	organisations	occupied	a	substantial	position	within	the	more	radical	discourses	of	postwar	politics.		
The	Setting	
In	Australia,	the	rise	of	political	student	activism	in	the	mid-1960s	occurred	following	twenty	years	of	postwar	capitalist	economic	expansion	that	brought	with	it	a	new	generation	of	“baby	boomers”	whose	world	differed	markedly	from	that	of	their	parents.	Where	their	parents	had	been	raised	in	the	era	of	the	Great	Depression	and	then	reached	their	maturity	managing	life	in	wartime,	the	baby	boomers’	experiences	consisted	of	increased	welfare	state	services,	increased	provision	of	secondary	and	university	education	and	a	rebuilt	society,	which,	although	controlled	by	their	parents’	generation,	presented	a	vision	of	a	brighter	future.	This	is	not	to	construct	some	sort	of	“generation	gap”	theory	to	explain	the	“youth	revolt.”	Rather,	this	thesis	will	argue	that	student	activism	arose,	not	in	opposition	to	their	parents	but	as	an	expression	of	the	agency	of	the	new	generation	in	the	struggle	for	discursive	strategic	power	in	the	social	transformation	that	followed	World	War	II	(WWII).	At	about	1965,	when	the	Monash	Labor	Club	and	similar	“left”	student	organisations	were	only	beginning	to	assert	themselves	in	the	militant,	left	movement,	the	radical	theorists	of	French	post-structuralism	and	British	culturalism	were	hardly	known	in	Australian	radical	consciousness.	This	is	especially	applicable	in	Melbourne	where	the	“old	left”	still	sought	ascendancy	in	left	academia	and	in	radical	unionism	through	the	influence	of	the	Communist	Party	of	Australia	(CPA)	and	the	left	wing	of	the	Australian	Labor	Party	(ALP).	However,	their	inflexible	and	patronising	methods	and	the	bureaucratic	style	of	these	parties	made	them	an	uninspiring	prospect	for	young	people.	It	is	shown	in	this	study	that	the	upsurge	of	protest	and	the	indulgence	in	what	young	protesters	termed	the	“revolutionary”	or	“anti-imperialist	movement”—the	
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turn	towards	radical	communism—was	generated	by	and	in	clusters	of	young	people	within	their	own	demographic	cohort.	It	was	not	some	form	of	leitmotif	appropriated	from	elsewhere	or	from	other	parties.	It	is	true	that	there	was	an	international	upsurge	in	the	activities	of	such	students	and	young	people	and	there	are	commonalities	about	their	respective	causes.	The	upsurges	of	radicalism	in	the	West	and	in	the	Cultural	Revolution	in	China	during	the	mid-1960s	were	certainly	coeval	but	that	is	not	evidence	of	common	causation.	In	both	China	and	Europe,	the	new	radicalism	had	roots	in	growing	discontent	with	the	bureaucracy,	reformism	and	outright	conservatism	of	the	old	left.	It	could	be	said	that	in	Europe	and	particularly	in	France,	frustration	at	the	domination	of	communist	and	workers’	movements	by	the	Soviet	Union	had	stirred	left	academia,	students	and	workers	to	seek	a	new	theoretical	foundation	for	action.	The	situation	in	China	held	special	significance	for	the	groups	at	the	centre	of	this	thesis.	There,	the	same	ossification	of	Communist	Party	leadership	had	occurred	but	opposition	to	it	had	the	support	of	the	revolutionary	icons	of	the	party.	Discontent	with	the	old	was	utilised	by	an	identifiable	group	of	leaders	within	the	Central	Committee	of	the	Communist	Party	itself;	the	Soviet	Union	was	denounced	as	“revisionist”	while	its	leadership	was	reviled	and	the	Cultural	Revolution	was	waged	for	the	whole	period	that	this	thesis	covers.	In	the	United	States	(US),	the	upsurge	of	the	youth	revolt	had	different	roots	again.	Efforts	by	the	National	Association	for	the	Advancement	of	Coloured	Peoples	to	bring	equality	for	African	Americans	had	proceeded	by	such	invisibly	small	increments	that	young	activists	formed	the	Black	Panthers	Party	to	radically	affect	the	rate	of	change.	Concurrently,	the	drafting	of	young	men	into	the	US	Army	to	fight	in	the	Vietnam	War	brought	an	upsurge	of	opposition	similar	to	that	occurring	in	Australia.	In	similar	fashion	too,	the	young	American	radicals	organised	themselves	with	minimal	overt	reference	to	the	pre-existing	communist	movements.	As	will	be	seen	in	Chapter	2,	the	initiating	of	radical	organisation	and	action	in	Melbourne	occurred	in	the	pre-existing	social	movements	of	the	anti-apartheid	and	anti-war	movements	and	in	the	reformist	youth	arm	of	the	ALP	by	students	whose	political	alignments	were,	in	the	first	instance,	with	the	most	outspoken,	
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parliamentary	politicians	of	that	party.	In	the	following	chapters,	the	hiatus	of	their	detachment	from	that	reformist	discourse	is	discussed	as	they	searched	for	forms	of	organisation,	expression	and	action	that	would	best	destroy	public	confidence	in	the	shibboleths	of	bourgeois	hegemony	carried	by	the	university,	governments	and	the	political	parties	including	the	Communist	Party.	In	the	mid-1960s,	that	hegemony	was	perhaps	most	stridently	expressed	in	public	support	for	the	Vietnam	War.1	It	was	in	the	erosion	of	such	support	that	the	young	radicals	found	their	most	effective	actions	to	be	those	that	challenged	the	state	power	itself.	When	WSA	members	were	targeted	for	arrest	in	demonstrations,	they	read	that	as	confirmation	that	at	least	the	police	force	had	recognised	it	too.	Frances	Fox	Piven	and	Richard	Cloward	maintain	that	the	influence	social	movements	may	exert	“does	not	result	from	organisation,	but	from	mass	protest	and	the	disruptive	consequences	of	protest.”2	Putting	this	as	a	binary	opposition	of	disruption	versus	organisation	is	a	tenuous	proposition	when	considering	the	actions	of	the	young,	radical	activists	at	the	focus	of	this	thesis.	As	will	be	seen,	it	was	not	a	matter	of	organisation	or	disruption;	they	concentrated	on	disruption	and	they	organised	intensively	to	serve	that	purpose.	While	their	behaviour	may	have	had	the	appearance	of	simply	opposing	everything,	knocking	down	previous	certainties	and	believing	in	nothing	in	the	fervour	of	iconoclastic	anarchy,	this	thesis	shows,	in	its	investigation	of	their	organisation	and	inner	workings,	that	the	opposite	is	the	case.		As	an	example,	one	of	the	most	outstanding	and	most	disruptive	campaigns	of	the	Monash	Labor	Club	was	the	campaign	to	raise	money	for	the	enemy	in	the	Vietnam	War,	the	National	Liberation	Front	of	South	Vietnam	(NLF).	As	this	thesis	demonstrates,	this	campaign	did	not	arise	without	a	great	deal	of	organisation.	It	also	provided	a	focus	whereby	a	narrow	social	movement	in	opposition	to	some	limited	evils	of	capitalist	society	could	be	transformed	into	a	politically	conscious																																																									1	For	example,	in	September	1965	the	Morgan	Gallup	Poll	reported:	“56	per	cent	of	Australians	polled	in	favour	of	Australian	involvement	in	Vietnam;	28	per	cent	in	favour	of	withdrawal;	10	per	cent	undecided.”	Australian	War	Memorial,	“Impressions:	Australians	in	Vietnam,”	accessed	7	May	2018,	https://www.awm.gov.au/sites/default/files/exhibitions/impressions/chronology.pdf.	2	Frances	Fox	Piven	and	Richard	Cloward,	Poor	People’s	Movements:	Why	They	Succeed,	How	They	
Fail	(New	York:	Vintage,	1979),	36.	
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one	whose	objective	was	the	destruction	of	capitalist	hegemony	itself.	According	to	Gramsci,	what	turns	a	social	movement	into	an	explicitly	political,	anti-hegemonic	body	capable	of	challenging	the	state	power	itself	is	the	operation	of	conscious	intellectual	and	political	agents	who	organise	the	movement	for	those	ends.3	It	is	the	endeavours	of	the	radical	young	students	and	workers	to	become	those	politically	conscious	agents	that	constitute	the	substance	of	this	thesis.	
Method	and	Methodology	
The	events,	actions	and	practices	and	their	meanings	that	are	the	constituent	molecules	of	this	thesis	are	accessed	through	both	archival	documents	and	orally	expressed	memories	of	a	dozen	activists	from	the	time.	Here,	documents,	as	the	most	convenient	language	mode	for	the	purposes	of	record,	function	as	an	evidence	base	for	examining	the	events,	plans	and	opinions	that	comprise	subjectivisms	expressed	at	the	time	under	examination.	In	the	trivial	sense	of	being	physical	records	of	dates,	times	and	places,	documents	are	objective	artefacts	but	the	plans,	exhortations	and	reports	they	contain	remain	the	subjectivities	of	their	authors.		It	had	been	my	intention	to	use	many	more	oral	testimonies	than	appear	here.	However,	after	conducting	interviews,	I	found	the	reminiscences	of	the	respondents	to	be	non-specific	about	substantial	detail;	they	rarely	focused	on	the	intricacies	of	what	may	have	been	said	or	written	at	a	particular	time,	place	or	sequence	of	events.	This	may	be	a	consequence	of	the	timing	of	interviews.	Nevertheless,	some	parts	of	oral	testimonies	are	present	in	this	thesis	to	complete	the	record	where	it	was	deficient	or	to	indicate	the	nature	of	some	interpersonal	and	collective	relationships.	Conversely,	documentary	artefacts	are	replete	with	dates,	times,	addresses,	speeches,	demands	and	details	from	which	the	subjectivities	of	their	producers	or	audiences	may	be	inferred.	The	superabundance	of	documentary	evidence	here	is	not	to	denigrate	oral	history	at	all	and	it	is	with	some	regret	that	I	have	not	been	able	to	use	more	of	it.																																																										3	Antonio	Gramsci,	Selections	from	the	Prison	Notebooks	of	Antonio	Gramsci,	(New	York:	International	Publishers,	1971),	333.	
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The	Documents	
The	documents	used	as	evidence	here	were	gathered	by	me	and	other	activists	at	the	time	of	their	production	or	use	and	retained	until	this	time	in	their	personal	collections.	Others	were	drawn	from	the	archives	of	the	State	Library	of	Victoria	and	the	University	of	Melbourne	Archives.	They	are	of	several	kinds	as	befits	their	several	functions:	conference	and	planning	papers,	minutes,	and	the	internal	bulletins	of	radical	organisations	have	the	function	of	expressing	identity,	attitudes	and	values.	They	may	be	referential	and	are	often	transactional	in	terms	of	the	organisation	of	events	and	of	the	maintenance	of	group	structure	and	solidarity.	Conversely,	leaflets,	pamphlets,	posters,	and	a	political	group’s	external	newsletters	and	newspapers	have	a	propaganda	function	that	enables	social	communication	and	the	expression	of	identity.	They	also	often	contain	referential	or	transactional	material	but	only	rarely	perform	a	phatic	function.	As	pieces	of	political	language,	all	of	the	written	resources	consulted,	especially	those	used	for	propaganda	purposes,	have	a	conative	function	in	that	they	allude	to	action	that	is	planned	or	to	steps	that	should	be	taken.4		By	their	nature,	political	writings	read	at	this	distance	in	time	are	replete	with	connotations	that	may	no	longer	have	the	meaning	that	they	once	had.	However,	the	use	of	rodomontade	or	understatement	in	a	piece	of	writing	had	a	purpose	whose	discovery	now	makes	the	historical	record	more	valuable.	The	written	resources	that	form	an	evidence	base	in	this	thesis	were	produced	to	satisfy	the	political	needs	of	their	authors	and	not	for	the	sake	of	history.	Even	though,	as	John	Tosh	has	written,	“the	most	revealing	source	is	that	which	was	written	with	no	thought	for	posterity,”	sources	still	need	the	mediation	of	the	present	day	writer	to	ensure	that	they	make	sense	when	reported	in	today’s	language.5	Written	or	printed	documents	from	the	1960s	may	often	contain	contemporary	formal	usage.	For	example,	the	words	“militant”	and	“radical”	in	the	1960s	often	had	positive	connotations	when	related	to	unionism	or	religion	or	to	how	evil	is	to	be																																																									4	Sara	Thorne,	Mastering	Advanced	English	Language,	(London:	MacMillan,	1997).	5	John	Tosh,	The	Pursuit	of	History,	5th	ed.	(Harlow,	United	Kingdom:	Pearson	Educational,	2010),	93.	
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opposed.	They	had	not	been	given	the	pejorative	connotations	of	today	as	relating	to	“militant	Islam”	or	“radicalised	youth”	joining	foreign	fighters.	Brian	Brivati	explains:	Some	[documents]	speak	to	us	from	the	past,	and	the	meaning	of	their	words	can	change	and	play	different	roles	in	political	discourse	as	time	goes	by:	it	is	a	great	mistake	to	see	language	as	something	that	is	fixed	and	static.	Others	are	from	a	particular	time	and	place,	and	their	importance	is	directly	related	to	that	time	and	place:	they	change	because	we	who	analyse	them	change.6	In	the	making	of	meaning,	those	words	that	once	were	taboo	and	their	euphemisms	also	change	with	the	advance	of	time.	These	changes	are	often	consequent	upon	changes	in	the	law	and	in	social	acceptance;	for	example,	abortion	and	homosexuality,	both	of	which	were	illegal	in	the	1960s.	In	his	1961	writings,	E.	H.	Carr	dealt	with	this	matter	as	one	of	practical	importance:		No	document	can	tell	us	more	than	what	the	author	thought—what	he	[sic]	thought	had	happened,	what	he	thought	ought	to	happen	or	would	happen,	or	perhaps	only	what	he	wanted	others	to	think	he	thought,	or	even	only	what	he	himself	thought	he	thought.	None	of	this	means	anything	until	the	historian	has	got	to	work	on	it	and	deciphered	it.7	The	author	was	a	participant	in	the	construction	of	the	social	movements	and	in	the	practices,	events	and	actions	that	are	the	substance	of	this	thesis.	This	has	both	positive	and	negative	implications.	On	the	positive	side,	the	written	word	in	the	language	of	social	movements	and	the	vernacular	of	the	1960	are	familiar	to	me.	These	were	the	languages	that	I	used	then	and	the	deciphering	of	these	writings	now	can	be	more	accurate	because	of	that.	Conversely,	what	I	write	here	is	the	result	of	my	subjective	interpretation	of	those	documents	only	partly	tempered	by	my	knowledge	of	the	discourses	and	political	stances	that	conditioned	their	production.		For	those	Australians	too	young	or	too	recently	arrived,	access	to	memory	of	the	Vietnam	War	and	its	opponents	is	through	the	heavily	mediated	narratives	of	print,	films,	television	and	the	internet.	For	those	in	Australia	at	the	time,	Ann	Curthoys																																																									6	Brian	Brivati,	“Using	Contemporary	Written	Sources,”	Contemporary	History	Handbook,	eds.,	Brian	Brivati,	Julia	Buxton	and	Anthony	Seldon	(Manchester:	Manchester	University	Press,	1996).	7	E.	H.	Carr,	What	is	History?	(Melbourne:	Penguin	Australia,	2008),	16.		
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writes,	“these	narratives	become	entwined	with	other	memories,	with	those	personal	and	private	pictures	in	our	mind’s	eye.	We	can	no	longer	keep	track	of	which	is	which,	we	have	no	‘pure’	memory	to	rely	on.”8	Keeping	track,	unscrambling	memories	and	comparing	testimonies	with	each	other	and	with	documentary	and	artefact	evidence,	is	the	function	of	the	historian.	In	any	social	or	political	pursuit,	plans	and	policies	are	formed	on	the	basis	of	what	their	makers	believed	was	the	situation	at	the	time.	The	fact	that	we	now	know	that	the	situation	was	different	changes	neither	the	origin	nor	the	outcome	of	the	plans	and	policies.	If	we	then	pick	up	similar,	or	different,	stories	from	others,	then	we	understand	more	of	the	total	story	that	is	untold	in	“official”	histories	of	campaigns	and	leaders.	As	Portelli	puts	it:	“Subjectivity	is	as	much	the	business	of	history	as	are	the	more	visible	‘facts.’	What	informants	believe	is	indeed	a	historical	fact	(that	is,	the	fact	that	they	believe	it),	as	much	as	what	really	happened.”9		
What	Is	in	the	Chapters?	
This	thesis	consists	of	an	introduction,	eight	chapters	and	a	conclusion	arranged	chronologically	according	to	events,	representations	and	campaigns.		The	first	chapter	discusses	theoretical	approaches	to	the	historiography	of	how	ideas	develop	within	social	and	political	movements.	It	discusses	the	merits	of	various	approaches	to	discourse	as	a	foundation	concept	and	rejects	those	that	would	destroy	the	notion	of	human	agency.	It	recognises	that	a	Gramscian	concept	of	hegemony	is	of	great	value	in	positioning	discourse	in	the	development	of	ideas	and	practices.	This	chapter	examines	some	of	the	literature	relating	to	this	study	and	to	the	fundamental	basis	of	the	actions	of	the	youth	revolt.	Chapter	2	is	an	introduction	to	the	Monash	Labor	Club,	its	personalities	and	its	1967	activities	in	the	creation	of	a	counter-discourse	to	that	of	the	university.	Its	campaign	against	the	granting	of	an	honorary	degree	to	the	Premier	of	Victoria,	Sir																																																									8	Ann	Curthoys,	Freedom	Ride:	A	Freedom	Rider	Remembers	(Crows	Nest,	NSW:	Allen	and	Unwin,	2002),	113.	9	Alessandro	Portelli,	“What	Makes	Oral	History	Different,”	in	The	Oral	History	Reader,	2nd	ed,	edited	by	Rober	Perks	and	Alistair	Thomson	(Oxford:	Routledge,	2006),	36.	
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Henry	Bolte,	mutated	into	opposition	to	the	Vietnam	War	and	the	raising	of	a	campaign	to	provide	funds	to	support	the	“enemy,”	the	NLF.	The	felt	need	to	widen	its	influence	against	the	pro-war	hegemony	made	it	inevitable	that	the	club	would	move	the	locus	of	its	operation	into	the	wider	community	and	into	the	general	anti-war	movement.	In	Chapter	3,	the	Monash	Labor	Club’s	organisation	and	its	gathering	band	of	supporters	became	known	as	Maoists	and	their	avocation	of	what	were	seen	by	many	as	dangerous	strategies	outraged	the	members	of	the	“old”	peace	movement.	In	particular,	the	club	clashed	with	activists	from	the	ALP	over	the	latter’s	agenda	of	parliamentary	tactics;	however,	the	club’s	most	censorious	criticism	was	heaped	upon	the	CPA	for	following	the	ALP	and	refusing	to	identify	imperialism	as	the	cause	of	the	war.	This	conflict,	carrying-on	well	into	1968,	is	exemplified	here	by	a	contrast	between	the	styles	of	demonstration	organised	by	the	“old”	and	by	the	“new”	section	of	the	peace	movement.	The	end	of	1968	brought	the	establishment	of	the	“Bakery”	in	Prahran	as	an	off	campus	centre	for	“revolutionary	activity.”	Chapter	4	describes	the	early	operations	of	the	Bakery	in	providing	a	focus	for	the	many	like-minded	activists	who	were	not	Monash	students	but	industrial	workers,	teachers,	public	servants	and	secondary	school	students.	Some	had	emerged	from	the	ALP	or	the	CPA	but	at	this	stage,	only	the	Communist	Party	of	Australia	(Marxist-Leninist)	(CPA	(ML))	began	to	show	an	interest	in	what	went	on	there.	To	organise	Bakery	activities,	the	Revolutionary	Socialists	organisation	was	established.	Before	the	end	of	1969,	a	short-lived,	semi-clandestine	organisation	called	the	Young	Communist	League	(YCL)	was	formed	with	the	objective	of	discussing	and	influencing	action	according	to	Marxist-Leninist	principles.	The	YCL	reconstructed	itself	and	formed	a	strong	circle	of	influence	that	more	explicitly	raised	issues	of	communism	and	discussions	of	Lenin,	Marx	and	Maoism;	all	within	the	Monash	Labor	Club	and	Bakery’s	sphere	of	activism.	Chapter	5	considers	the	growth	of	the	WSA,	formed	at	the	beginning	of	1970	to	replace	the	Revolutionary	Socialists.	This	chapter	outlines	some	political	attitudes	in	the	formation	of	the	Vietnam	Moratorium	movement.		
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Chapter	6	outlines	the	growth	of	the	WSA	during	1971	when	it	became	recognised	as	an	independent	entity	in	left-wing	politics.	Its	skirmishes	with	the	CPA	continued	within	the	Moratorium	movement	even	as	Australia’s	involvement	in	the	Vietnam	War	began	to	wind	down.	Ahead	of	the	loss	of	a	central	focus,	the	WSA	closed	the	Bakery	and	rearranged	itself	into	a	centrally	organised	body	with	locality-situated	branches.	At	Monash	University,	the	Labor	Club	dealt	with	the	punitive	reaction	to	its	previous	activities	as	the	media	focus	shifted	to	the	La	Trobe	University	Labor	Club	and	the	police	reaction	to	its	Moratorium	campaigning.	In	concert	with	those	Labor	clubs,	the	WSA	drew	closer	to	the	CPA	(ML).	While	the	changes	to	the	WSA	structure	are	covered	in	the	above,	in	Chapter	7,	the	many	issues	of	theoretical	concern	to	the	WSA	and	Monash	Labor	Club	members	are	discussed	along	with	their	controversies	within	the	peace	movement.	These	theoretical	concerns	were	about	fundamentals	such	as	“the	orientation	of	the	youth	movement”	while	organisational	matters	received	scant	attention.	The	testing	of	the	resolve	of	the	WSA	in	its	new-found	leadership	role	came	soon	enough	with	the	arrest	and	trials	of	Albert	Langer.	Chapter	8	discusses	the	generation	of	major	campaigns	of	1972	and	1973	that	replaced	the	anti–Vietnam	War	mobilisations.	These	included	anti-Nazi	activities	and	trials,	and	the	anti-US	bases	campaign.	This	chapter	discusses	why	and	how,	at	the	time	of	its	maximum	size	and	when	it	was	involved	in	a	bewildering	array	of	important	political	campaigns,	the	WSA	came	to	an	end.
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Chapter	1:	Political	and	Ideological	Narrative	Form	
This	chapter	outlines	the	theoretical	approach	to	historical	analysis	used	in	this	thesis	and	I	indicate	the	approach	that	informs	this	thesis.	Other	issues	discussed	in	this	chapter	relate	to	the	historiography	of	historically	recent	events	and	to	the	nature	of	available	evidence.	
A	Framework	for	This	Study	
The	Worker	Student	Alliance	(WSA)	and	Monash	Labor	Club	members	spoke	and	wrote	of	“ideology”	in	terms	that	reflected	its	use	in	the	patois	of	1960s	Melbourne	“left”	politics.	They	rarely	theorised	this	term	and	their	view	of	it	might	approximate	to	Marx’s	1859	generalisation:	“the	legal,	political,	religious,	aesthetic	or	philosophic—in	short,	ideological	forms	in	which	men	become	conscious	of	this	conflict	and	fight	it	out.”1	The	evolving	versions	of	ideology	found	in	Louis	Althusser’s	work	are	not	evident	in	any	of	the	radical	writings	of	Victorian	students	at	this	time.2	Gramsci	used	the	term	“hegemony,”	being	the	ability	of	the	class	in	whose	interest	the	state	operates	to	determine	the	nature	of	the	discourse	in	which	all	other	classes	must	participate.	Even	though	the	state	will	always	hold	a	reserve	power	of	force,	hegemony	enables	the	maintenance	of	compliance	in	the	population	without	its	generalised	use.	The	term	“hegemony”	was	sometimes	raised	in	Monash	Labor	Club	or	WSA	ranks	but	mostly	they	used	the	term	“ideology,”	which	to	them	meant	much	the	same	thing.	For	example:	“[the	revolutionary	struggle]	is	a	question	of	fighting	the	consensus	itself	…	the	whole	conformist	ideology	and	culture	which	the	relations	of	production	create.”3	In	clarifying	the	meanings	made	by	the	conscious	actions	of	the	subjects	of	this	thesis,	I	have	used	the	concept	of	“discourse”	whether	those	actions	were	in																																																									1	Karl	Marx,	A	Contribution	to	the	Critique	of	Political	Economy	Moscow:	Progress	Publishers,	1977).	This	version	accessed	29	March	2018,	1.	(https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1859/critique-pol-economy/preface.htm.	2	For	example,	Louis	Althusser,	“Ideology	and	Ideological	State	Apparatuses.”	In	Lenin	and	
Philosophy	and	other	Essays.	(New	York:	Monthly	Review	Press,	1971).	Too	late	to	be	of	use.	3	WSA	Bulletin,	no.	2,	May	1971,	item	3,	3.	The	context	of	this	quotation	appears	in	Chapter	7	of	this	thesis.	
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opposition	to	or	in	favour	of	the	ruling	hegemony.	For	this,	a	definition	of	discourse	must	preserve	the	notion	that	social	practices	are	constitutive	of	discourse,	and	that	it	is	the	human	subject	that	holds	the	initiative.	Stuart	Hall	provides	a	formulation	that	is	useful	for	this	study:	Discourses	are	ways	of	referring	to	or	constructing	knowledge	about	a	particular	topic	of	practice:	a	cluster	(or	formation)	of	ideas,	images	and	practices,	which	provide	ways	of	talking	about,	forms	of	knowledge	and	conduct	associated	with,	a	particular	topic,	social	activity	or	institutional	site	in	society.	These	discursive	formations,	as	they	are	known,	define	what	is	and	is	not	appropriate	in	our	formulation	of,	and	our	practices	in	relation	to,	a	particular	subject	or	site	of	social	activity;	what	knowledge	is	considered	useful,	relevant	and	“true”	in	that	context;	and	what	sorts	of	persons	or	“subjects”	embody	its	characteristics.4	Hall’s	positioning	of	the	subject	as	the	source	of	discourse	opens	the	way	for	cultural	and	political	intention	to	become	a	consideration	in	discussing	power	relations	and	strategies	in	discursive	formations.	It	also	means	that	strategies,	practices,	actions,	effects	and	results	can	be	historicised	in	association	with	the	purposeful	reasonings	of	their	protagonists	and	antagonists.	While	the	ruling	hegemony	in	any	discursive	formation	does	not	always	need	a	special	grouping	for	its	generation	and	maintenance,	opposition	to	it	does.	For	this	Gramsci	introduces	the	need	for	conscious,	intellectual	agency	in	the	construction	of	resistance	and	opposition:	Critical	understanding	of	self	takes	place	therefore	through	a	struggle	of	political	“hegemonies”	and	of	opposite	directions,	first	in	the	ethical	field	and	then	in	that	of	politics	proper,	in	order	to	arrive	at	the	working	out	at	a	higher	level	of	one’s	own	conception	of	reality.	Consciousness	of	being	part	of	a	particular	hegemonic	force	(that	is	to	say,	political	consciousness)	is	the	first	stage	towards	a	further	progressive	self-consciousness	in	which	theory	and	practice	will	finally	be	one.5		
																																																								4	Stuart	Hall,	Representation,	Cultural	Representations	and	Signifying	Practices	(Milton	Keynes,	:	The	Open	University,	1997)	9.	Sage	Publications	version	accessed	from	https://fotografiaeteoria.files.wordpress.com/2015/05/the_work_of_representation__stuart_hall.pdf.	See	also	Stuart	Hall,	“The	West	and	the	Rest,	Discourse	and	Power,”	in	The	Indigenous	
Experience,	Global	Perspectives,	eds.	Roger	Maaka	and	Chris	Andersen	(Toronto,	Canadian	Scholars	Press,	2006),	165.	Hall’s	essay	is	a	reprint	of	“The	West	and	the	Rest,”	published	in	1992.	5	Gramsci,	Selections	from	the	Prison	Notebooks,	333.	
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Gramsci	enunciated	a	process	by	which	human	agency	developed;	that	is,	in	the	form	of	what	he	called	“organic	intellectuals”	who	are	the	theorists	and	organisers	of	classes	or	groups	of	people	in	their	ideological	contestations.6	As	he	was	a	leader	and	founder	of	the	Italian	Communist	Party	and	in	one	of	Mussolini’s	gaols	at	the	time	of	writing	Prison	Notebooks,	we	may	read	Gramsci	in	two	ways:	as	the	writings	of	a	communist	leader	or	as	the	writings	of	a	social	theorist.	In	this	thesis,	both	readings	are	used.	Gramsci	maintained	that,	far	from	expecting	a	discursive	formation	to	be	the	agent	of	its	own	resistance	or	for	leadership	to	spontaneously	arise,	the	conscious,	intellectual	efforts	of	a	body	of	people	is	needed	to	organise	it:	A	human	mass	does	not	“distinguish”	itself,	does	not	become	independent	in	its	own	right	without,	in	the	widest	sense,	organising	itself;	and	there	is	no	organisation	without	intellectuals,	that	is	without	organizers	and	leaders,	in	other	words,	without	the	theory–practice	nexus	being	distinguished	concretely	by	the	existence	of	a	group	of	people	“specialized”	in	conceptual	and	philosophical	elaboration	of	ideas.7	As	will	be	seen	in	this	thesis,	the	groups	of	young	radicals	that	formed	the	university	Labor	clubs	of	Melbourne	and	their	off	campus	descendant	bodies,	attempted	to	be	those	“organic	intellectuals”	in	their	practices	and	actions.	Their	attempts	to	concretely	encapsulate	the	“conceptual	and	philosophical”	fundamentals	of	resistance	and	opposition	to	the	domination	of	what	they	saw	as	“bourgeois	ideology”	were	given	meaning	by	their	actions	and	practices	as	much	as	in	their	expression	through	language.	This	thesis	concerns	also	the	omnipresence	of	the	conflict	over	power	and	political	leadership	within	the	discourse	of	resistance	and	opposition	itself.	These	organised	young	radicals	saw	“bourgeois	ideology”	as	existing	at	all	levels	of	society	and	did	not	stop	at	the	boundaries	of	their	own	memberships	or	those	of	the	peace	movement	and	other	“left”	social	movements.8	This	is	shown	particularly	in	Chapter	5;	however,	throughout	this	thesis	such	ideological	permeation	is	examined	through	Monash	Labor	Club	and	WSA	internal																																																									6	Ibid.,	16.	7	Ibid.,	334.	8	For	example,	“it	[the	proletariat]	must	meet	head-on	every	challenge	of	the	bourgeoisie	in	the	ideological	field	…	At	present,	our	objective	is	to	struggle	against	and	overthrow	those	persons	in	authority	who	are	taking	the	capitalist	road.”	“Decision	of	the	Central	Committee	of	the	Chinese	Communist	Party	Concerning	the	Great	Proletarian	Cultural	Revolution,”	(adopted	8	August	1966,)	Peking	Review	9,	no.	33	(12	August	1966):	6–11.	
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documents,	and	through	their	actions,	counteractions	and	condemnations	of	the	Communist	Party	and	the	“left”	activist	members	of	the	Labor	Party	and	trades	unions	in	various	social	movements	as	harbingers	of	“bourgeois	ideology”	and,	thus,	as	temporary	and	vacillating	allies.	The	epistemic	feature	of	this	thesis	is	the	building	of	historical	narratives	that	have	Hall’s	insistence	upon	meaning	and	the	pre-eminence	of	human	agency	in	their	construction,	resistance	and	demolition.	As	meaning	within	discourse	is	carried	by	practices	and	actions,	this	thesis	details	the	words,	actions,	practices,	events	and	results	of	discursive	struggle,	not	merely	as	markers	of	chronological	sequence	but	also	as	statements	of	belief	or	intention.	It	relies	upon	documentary	and	oral	evidence,	not	simply	as	empirical	data	but	also	as	the	record	of	political	and	hegemonic	dichotomies	whose	resolution	is	reached	not	by	compromise	and	cooperation	but	by	sharp	and	conscious	contradiction.	
Historiography	
Stories	of	the	so-called	“youth	revolt”	and	its	expression	in	the	counter-hegemonic	activism	of	university	students	and	others	in	the	late	1960s	and	early	1970s	can	be	found	in	popular	histories	and	journalistic	reminiscences.	Substantial	studies	of	the	phenomenon	exist	in	treatments	of	the	anti–Vietnam	War	movement	and	as	contributions	in	other	histories	of	the	period.	Within	this	there	are	few	detailed	studies	that	centre	on	the	emergence	of	specifically	communistic,	left-wing	movements	among	young	people	and	even	fewer	that	deal	with	that	emergence	in	the	state	of	Victoria.	Among	these,	Michael	Hyde’s	It	is	Right	to	Rebel,	Barry	York’s	
Student	Revolt!	and	Ken	Mansell’s	shorter	“The	Yeast	is	Red”	are	all	written	by	participants	in	this	upsurge;	Hyde	and	Mansell	were	at	Monash	University	and	York	was	at	La	Trobe	University.9	Hyde’s	book	was	published	in	1972,	barely	one	year	after	the	activities	it	describes.	As	an	edited	collection	of	contributions	from	unnamed	other	Monash	activists,	it	is	a	rambling	chronicle	of	events	full	of																																																									9	Michael	Hyde,	ed.,	It	is	Right	to	Rebel	(Canberra,	The	Diplomat	Series,	1972);	Barry	York,	
Student	Revolt!	La	Trobe	University	1967	to	1973	(Campbell,	ACT:	Nicholas	Press,	1989);	Ken	Mansell,	“The	Yeast	is	Red:	A	History	of	the	Bakery,	Off	Campus	Centre	of	the	Monash	Labor	Club,	1968–1971,”	in	Disobedience.	The	University	as	a	Site	of	Political	Potential,	eds.,	Emily	Floyd	and	Ken	Mansell	(Clayton,	Monash	University	Museum,	2013).	
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indispensable	detail	that	has	been	useful	in	completing	the	narratives	of	several	of	the	chapters	that	follow.	Of	similar	but	lesser	utility	is	Mansell’s	exposition,	which	he	presents	as	a	case	study	and	thus	skirts	the	hypothesising	of	the	generation	of	student	revolt	beyond	a	brief	summary	of	social	and	political	origins	of	the	“new	left”	and	description	of	the	social	context.	York’s	book,	published	in	1989,	is	likewise	replete	with	detail	that	relates	more	directly	to	later	developments	in	the	radical	student	movement	at	La	Trobe	University	at	the	time	of	the	Moratorium	demonstrations.	York	holds	that,	in	the	search	for	single	causes,	there	is	no	adequate	theory	for	the	analysis	of	the	emergence	of	1960s	student	activism.	However,	as	student	movements	fit	Gusfield’s	definition	of	social	movements—that	is,	comprised	of	“socially	shared	activities	and	beliefs	directed	towards	the	demand	for	change	in	some	aspect	of	the	social	order”10—it	is	offered	as	a	useful	starting	point.	Although	dismissive	of	the	existence	of	a	theoretical	framework	for	causal	analysis,	York	presents	a	range	of	historical	instances	as	collectively	instrumental	in	the	emergence	of	the	revolt:	the	teen	market,	television,	youth	culture,	and	the	unresponsiveness	and	obsolescence	of	institutions.	Of	major	importance	was	the	American	waging	of	the	Vietnam	War,	which	was	“the	precondition	for	an	end	to	Cold	War	hegemony	over	political	life	and	an	end	to	the	end	of	ideology.”11	From	this	allusion	to	the	1960	claims	of	Daniel	Bell	among	others	that	the	world	had	run	out	of	political	ideas	in	the	1950s,	it	may	be	inferred	that,	at	the	very	least,	York	sought	to	restore	“ideology”	to	its	role	as	an	important	consideration	in	the	analysis	of	the	subject.	Nevertheless,	as	the	course	of	analysis	is	affected	by	the	analyst’s	view	of	its	origin,	some	comment	is	warranted.	York	points	to	the	failures	of	the	both	“common	sense”	and	academic	analysts,	as	well	as	“orthodox	Marxists,”	to	either	predict	or	explain	the	emergence	of	the	“youth	revolt.”	Instead,	rather	than	being	due	to	“the	natural	rebelliousness	of	youth,”	the	“generation	gap,”	“permissive	child-rearing”	or	other	conventional	explanations,	he	states	his	view	that	it	was	multi-causal	and	moral	in	nature	in	that	it	“acted	almost	exclusively	from	moral	motives,”	there	being																																																									10	York,	Student	Revolt,	11–12.	11	Ibid.,	18.	The	reference	to	Bell	is	from	Daniel	Bell,	The	End	of	Ideology	(Harvard	University	Press,	1960).	
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“little	self-gain	for	the	student,	no	higher	wages	or	overtime	to	result	from	victory.”	However,	its	intellectual	resources	were	international	and	even	a	partially	accurate	list	culled	from	The	Australian	newspaper—Regis	Debray,	Guevara,	Sartre	and	the	French	existentialists,	Trotsky,	Marcuse—indicates	that	these	were	unmistakably	“Marxist.”12	In	similar	vein,	Lani	Russell,	in	her	thesis,	“Today	the	Students	Tomorrow	the	Workers,”	turns	to	Marxism	for	her	explanation	of	the	emergence	of	the	“youth	revolt”	despite	the	failure	of	Marxists	to	do	so.13	She	bases	her	analyses	on	capitalist	society	as	having,	as	the	very	base	of	its	existence,	an	owning	class	that	holds	hegemony	over	those	who	must	sell	their	labour	power	to	survive.	As	in	this	thesis,	Russell	uses	the	Gramscian	notion	of	“hegemony”	to	explain	the	permeations	of	capitalist	domination	in	all	spheres	of	society,	including,	of	course,	the	student	movement.	Even	so,	her	observation	that	“these	thinkers,	Gramsci	in	particular,	were	eagerly	digested	by	many	student	radicals	in	the	1960s”	does	not	accord	with	my	observations	stated	later	in	this	thesis.14	A	further	difference	between	my	thesis	and	Russell’s	on	the	use	of	Gramsci	concerns	her	understanding	of	his	notion	of	hegemony.	She	writes:	“capitalist	domination	is	maintained	in	Western	societies	through	the	hegemony	of	capitalist	ideology	rather	than	through	open	repression.”15	The	words	“rather	than”	imply	that	the	modern	state	has	given	up	its	capacity	for	violence	in	favour	of	more	benign	influences	and	I	cannot	see	this	sitting	well	with	Gramsci	languishing	in	a	fascist	prison	cell,	nor	with	our	subject	radical	groups	who,	as	will	be	seen	in	this	thesis,	prepared	their	activities	and	actions	to	take	account	of	the	state’s	use	of	both	aspects.	Russell	is	right	to	be	ambivalent	about	explanations	of	the	youth	revolt	that	use	social	movement	theory.	However,	after	citing	Burgmann	and	Milner	who	argue	that	new	social	movement	radicals	“tended	increasingly	to	deny	the	relevance	of	class	
																																																								12	York,	Student	Revolt,	19–20.	York’s	listing	here	is	from	The	Australian	newspaper,	26	June	1968.	13	Lani	Russell,	“Today	the	Students,	Tomorrow	the	Workers!	Radical	Student	Politics	and	the	Australian	Labour	Movement	1960-72”	(PhD	thesis,	University	of	Technology	Sydney,	1999).	14	Ibid.,	21.	15	Ibid.	
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altogether,”	Russell	turns	to	Maheu’s	collection	of	essays	on	the	topic	to	write	that	it	“demonstrates	that	the	concept	of	class	remains,	or	perhaps	is	becoming	again,	a	provocative	one	for	these	thinkers.”16	Then	again,	in	closing	her	ideas	on	this	matter,	she	challenges	the	“New	Social	Movement/Contemporary	Social	Movement	model	of	the	sixties”	and	rejects	the	suggestion	that	the	Australian	student	movement	and	the	other	social	movements	that	arose	then	were	“post-class”	or	“post-capitalist.”17	Support	for	this	and	for	York’s	anti-pluralist	views	can	be	found	in	Piven	and	Cloward	who	argue	that:		In	the	1960s	the	dominant	pluralist	tradition	was	discredited	…	by	outbreaks	of	defiance	among	minorities	and	students	…	there	were	not	two	systems	of	power	but	that	the	power	rooted	in	wealth	and	force	overwhelmed	the	power	of	the	…	[electoral]	…	franchise.18	Instead	of	rejecting	social	movements	out	of	hand,	Russell	recognises	that	they	exist—for	example,	the	peace	movement	and	student	movements	in	general—and	she	treats	them	as	convenient	shorthand	for	identifiable	entities	in	prosecuting	aspects	of	the	class	struggle	and	not	as	capable	of	operating	independently	of	class	forces.	This	is	the	approach	taken	by	York	and	by	this	thesis.	This	approach	opens	scrutiny	of	omnipresent	bourgeois	hegemony	as	it	permeates	all	social	movements.	The	internal	contradictions	that	drive	their	representations,	activities	and	projects	are	the	constituents	of	their	character,	not	as	independent	kingdoms	but	only	in	relation	to	the	hegemonic	structures	in	which	they	operate.	As	for	Burgmann,	social	movements	are	of	interest	to	this	thesis	only	because	they	are	significant	for	understanding	the	process	by	which	“a	collection	of	individuals	becomes,	for	political	purposes,	a	unified	subject.”19	This	view	of	the	study	of	the	internal	contradictions	of	social	movements	as	indistinguishable	from	the	study	of	their	objectives	and	the	politics	of	their	situation,	and	hence	of	class,	is	supported	by	Maddison	and	Scalmer:	“Recent	understandings																																																									16	Ibid.,	24.	The	reference	is	to	L.	Maheu	ed.,	Social	Movements	and	Social	Classes:	the	Future	of	
Collective	Action	(London,	Sage,	1995).	17	Russell,	“Today	the	Students,”	38.	18	Piven	and	Cloward,	Poor	People’s	Movements,	2.	19	Verity	Burgmann,	Power	and	Protest,	Movements	for	Change	in	Australian	Society	(Sydney:	Allen	and	Unwin,	1993),	19.	
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emphasise	that	a	social	movement	is	a	process	rather	than	a	unified	actor	and	that	it	is	a	product	rather	than	a	precondition	of	political	struggle.”20	They	write	of	instances	of	intra	movement	struggle	that	are	applicable	to	the	situation	to	be	discovered	in	this	thesis.	For	example,	within	the	peace	movement,	both	revolutionaries	and	reformers	may	have	a	division	of	labour	whereby	“radicals	demand	attention	and	provoke	antipathy.	Their	adventures	shake	up	the	powerful	and	foment	controversy	…	Reformists	offer	a	sane,	rational	alternative.	They	cool	passions	with	sensible	suggestions.”21	Governments,	in	fear	of	the	revolutionaries,	will	bargain	with	the	reformists	and	thus	“strategic	divisions	within	the	movement	can	become,	briefly,	a	kind	of	political	resource.”22	This	brings	the	question	of	“frames”	and	“framing”	that	forms	part	of	some	social	movement	theories.	Essentially,	“frames”	are	ways	of	categorising	and	describing	the	objects	of	experience	that	affect	the	meanings	they	have	for	agents	who	act	according	to	their	grasp	of	those	meanings.23	Framing,	writes	Crossley,	“is	crucial	to	mobilisation	and	the	sustaining	of	activism.”24	Framing	is	performed	in	the	many	fields	in	which	an	agent	operates	so	that	if	mobilisation	and	activism	are	to	be	maintained	then	it	becomes	a	preoccupation	for	the	movement	itself.	Framing	thus	risks	the	subsumption	of	culture	and	meaning	to	become	the	main	object	of	analysis	itself.25	In	practical	terms,	this	means	analysis	of	“what	they	say”	at	the	expense	of	“what	they	do.”	However,	there	is	a	more	casual	sense	in	which	“frames”	are	simply	ways	of	talking	about	issues	that	are	important	for	the	social	movement.	This	is	the	sense	that	it	is	used	in	this	thesis—that	is,	to	identify	how	the	content	and	form	of	expressing	activist	appeals	affected	the	action	that	resulted	from	them.	
																																																								20	Sarah	Maddison	and	Sean	Scalmer,	Activist	Wisdom,	Practical	Knowledge	and	Creative	Tensions	
in	Social	Movements	(Sydney:	University	of	New	South	Wales	Press,	2006),	256.	21	Maddison	and	Scalmer,	Activist	Wisdom,	151.	22	Ibid.	23	Nick	Crossley,	Making	Sense	of	Social	Movements	(Buckingham:	Open	University	Press,	2002),	133.	24	Ibid.,	134.	The	reference	to	Goffman	is	Erving	Goffman,	Frame	Analysis	(Cambridge,	MA:	Harvard	University	Press,	1974).	25	Crossley,	Making	Sense	of	Social	Movements,	143.	
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About	Student	Movements	
York,	Hyde,	Curthoys,	Robins	and	Mansell	have	provided	detailed	and	very	valuable	insights	into	the	activities,	politics	and	values	of	sections	of	radical	student	movements	or	of	particular	1960s	campaigns	of	social	movements.26	Others,	such	as	Russell,	Maddison	and	Scalmer,	and	Noone,	have	analysed	the	formation,	development	and	character	of	these	movements	as	studies	of	the	phenomenon	as	a	whole.	This	thesis	is	alone	in	that	it	deals	with	the	genesis,	growth	and	demise	of	a	single	entity:	the	Monash	Labor	Club	as	it	mutated	into	the	Revolutionary	Socialists	and	then	the	WSA.	I	was	a	founding	member	and	participant	in	the	last	two	mentioned	groups	and	this	puts	me	in	something	of	a	privileged	position	in	that	I	have	personal	knowledge	of	other	participants,	of	the	events	and	campaigns	that	they	conducted	or	tried	to	influence,	and	of	their	interactions	in	the	process	of	doing	so.	However,	this	thesis	is	not	about	me	or	even	my	experiences;	its	main	character	is	the	Monash	Labor	Club	–	WSA	membership	that	grew	to	such	a	size	and	complexity	of	operation	that	one	person	could	not	know	the	details	of	everything	within	it.	This	is	not	a	personal	memoir	and	my	recollections	should	not	be	privileged	over	those	of	others	or	the	documentary	record.	As	a	consequence,	I	have	used	my	knowledge	of	the	movements’	internal	workings	and	personnel	to	make	both	documentary	evidence	and	the	recollections	of	others	available	for	analysis.	I	do	reinsert	myself	into	the	thesis	at	moments	when	clarifications	are	needed	or	when	I	am	able	to	fill	a	gap	in	the	narrative.	Other	writers	have	dealt	with	the	privileges	and	limitations	of	a	participant	study	in	different	ways.	Curthoys,	in	her	study	of	the	Freedom	Ride	for	Aboriginal	rights,	inserts	her	own	memories	as	confirmation	of	other	peoples’	statements	and	describes	events	from	her	own	memory	without	the	need	for	confirmation	from	others.	This	was	especially	necessary	when	discussing	her	own	feelings	at	the	time	of	the	events	in	question,	as	her	book	concerns	a	campaign	that	united	many																																																									26	Curthoys,	Freedom	Ride;	Val	Noone,	Disturbing	the	War,	Melbourne	Catholics	and	Vietnam	(Melbourne,	Spectrum	Publications,	1993);	Daniel	Robins,	Melbourne’s	Maoists:	The	Rise	of	the	
Monash	University	Labor	Club,	1965-1967 ,	(Melbourne,	Victoria	University,	2005).	
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politically	disparate	participants.	By	contrast,	this	thesis	is	about	the	events	and	program	of	action	of	an	identifiable	radical	social	group	that	attempted	to	maintain	a	unified	political	and	ideological	position	in	the	many	campaigns	it	ran.	Michael	Hyde’s	book,	All	Along	the	Watchtower,	is	different	again.27	It	is	an	intensely	personal	memoir	based	on	a	close	study	of	how	events	affected	relationships	among	radical	young	people.	Although	the	positioning	of	himself	at	the	centre	of	the	narrative	adds	to	its	authenticity	it	excludes	the	voice	of	others	and	necessarily	limits	Hyde’s	purview	so	that	scant	attention	can	be	given	to	organisations	and	groups	with	which	Hyde	was	not	associated.	Val	Noone,	in	Disturbing	the	War,	inserts	himself	only	in	distanced	confirmation	of	others’	recollections	or	actions.	Using	his	own	recollections	might	have	added	authenticity	but	doing	so	would	have	centred	the	reader’s	interpretations	around	the	experiences	of	the	writer	who	becomes	the	most	important	character	in	the	narrative.		
Meanings	Expressed	by	Marches,	Demonstrations,	Occupations	and	
Sit-Ins	
To	a	great	extent,	the	historical	narratives	of	this	thesis	are	carried	by	demonstrations,	occupations	and	physical	protest	actions.	These	are	included	not	because	they	mark	points	in	time,	but	because	they	carry	meaning;	along	with	oral	and	written	terms,	they	are	expressions	constitutive	of	radical	discourse.	They	are	part	of	the	language	of	protest.	The	salient	meanings	that	street	demonstrations	and	physical	protests	in	public	places	carried	are	explored	in	this	section.	In	the	three	volume	history	of	the	investigatory	activities	of	Australia’s	secret	security	apparatus,	The	Official	History	of	ASIO,	John	Blaxland	denotes	the	years	from	the	late	1960s	to	the	mid-1970s	as	The	Protest	Years.	He	clearly	distinguishes	those	years	from	the	period	of	the	“Cold	War”	(1949–1963),	which	was	the	subject	of	the	first	volume	written	by	his	collaborator,	David	Horner.28	During	the	Cold	War,	the	Australian	Security	Intelligence	Organisation’s	(ASIO)	principle	concern	was	the																																																									27	Michael	Hyde,	All	Along	the	Watchtower:	Memoir	of	a	Sixties	Revolutionary	(Carlton,	Victoria:	The	Vulgar	Press,	2010).	28	John	Blaxland,	The	Protest	Years:	The	Official	History	of	ASIO,	Volume	2	(Sydney:	Allen	and	Unwin,	2015);	David	Horner,	The	Spy	Catchers:	The	Official	History	of	ASIO,	Volume	1	(Sydney:	Allen	and	Unwin,	2014).	
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investigation	of	foreign,	mainly	Soviet,	intelligence	activities	in	Australia	and,	as	part	of	that,	the	scrutiny	of	Australian	communists.	By	the	mid-1960s,	ASIO’s	focus	shifted	to	homegrown	dissent	and,	in	particular,	to	the	protest	movement.	Consisting	in	large	part	of	young	people	who	had	not	experienced	direct	Cold	War	surveillance	and	intimidation,	this	movement	began	to	assert	itself	with	marches	and	demonstrations	in	a	manner	that	seemed	impossible	only	a	decade	earlier.	In	discussing	the	re-emergence	of	protest	“performances”	such	as	demonstrations	and	rallies	in	the	mid-1960s	after	the	“long	absence”	of	the	Cold	War,	Scalmer	quotes	former	member	of	the	Communist	Party	of	Australia	Dorothy	Dalton	as	saying:	I	didn’t	find	it	easy	to	march.	Communists	were	the	big	bogey	in	Australia	and	seen	as	undermining	the	political	system,	but	Communists	were	not	law-breakers.	Those	years	of	[Cold	War]	experience	did	not	prepare	us	for	that	type	of	action.29		According	to	Scalmer,	over	the	1965–1966	years,	“demonstrations,	marches,	teach-ins,	pickets	and	protests	all	increased	in	number,”	and	new	forms	of	political	performance	became	routine.30	In	discussing	the	reasons	for	this	increase,	Scalmer	emphasises	the	influence	of	the	mass	media:	“Since	the	1960s,	political	actors	have	not	performed	for	those	directly	present.	On	the	contrary,	they	have	mainly	performed	for	an	audience	of	television	watchers,	radio	listeners	and	newspaper	readers.”31	Thus,	to	Scalmer,	the	use	of	a	performative	“gimmick”	became	a	very	important	concept	in	explaining	growth	in	the	instances	of	protest	actions.	In	her	investigation	of	change	in	the	Australian	protest	movement,	Verity	Burgmann	emphasises	the	needs	of	social	movements	as	generators	of	social	and	political	manifestations	that	require	the	mustering	of	live	human	bodies	for	their	effect.	Quoting	from	Dieter	Rucht,	her	definition	of	a	social	group	is	“an	action	system	of	mobilized	networks	of	individuals,	groups	and	organisations	which,	based	on	a	shared	collective	identity,	attempt	to	promote	social	change	predominantly	by																																																									29	Sean	Scalmer,	Dissent	Events,	Protest,	The	Media	and	the	Political	Gimmick	in	Australia	(Sydney:	University	of	New	South	Wales	Press,	2002),	44.	30	Ibid.,	45.	31	Ibid.,	41.	
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means	of	collective	protest.”32	By	looking	beyond	their	structure	to	what	social	groups	do,	Donatella	della	Porta	has	added	the	dimension	of	“conflictual	collective	action”	by	means	of	“an	oppositional	relationship	between	actors	who	seek	control	of	the	same	stake—be	it	political,	economic,	or	cultural	power.”33	It	is	in	this	conflictual	feature	that	the	performative	language	of	demonstrations	and	physical	protests	makes	its	meanings	known	among	and	beyond	participants.	As	social	movements,	the	Monash	Labor	Club,	the	WSA	and	their	associated	activist	groups	treated	performance	for	the	mass	media	as	important	for	the	timing	and	staging	of	demonstrations	only.	The	most	important	elements	were	the	political	understandings	and	expressions	of	demonstrators	and	their	direct	audience.	These	were	the	determinants	of	the	value	of	the	action.	It	is	shown	in	Chapter	7	that	in	demonstrations	where	the	WSA	was	involved,	the	conflictual	situations	of	which	della	Porta	writes	had	appeared	to	increase	in	severity	and	frequency	by	mid-1971.	By	then,	members	of	the	WSA	were	well	aware	that	demonstrations	involved	confronting	the	power	of	the	state	forces.	Thus	they	used	that	awareness	to	construct	the	message	and	purpose	of	demonstrations	and	physical	protest	actions.	Erving	Goffman,	writing	in	1964,	explained	the	phenomenon:		The	modern	state	…	claims	final	authority	for	the	control	of	hazard	and	threat	to	life,	limb	and	property	…	[it]	provides	stand-by	arrangements	for	stepping	in	when	local	mechanisms	of	social	control	fail	to	keep	breakdowns	of	interaction	order	within	certain	limits.34		However,	no	matter	how	draconian	or	benign	the	policing	is,	the	interaction	order—that	is,	the	communications,	messages	given,	means	of	organising	and	meanings	made	in	any	public	gathering	of	bodies	for	political	purposes—is	the	creation	of	the	participants,	and	state	forces	cannot	attach	their	own	meaning	to	it	except	with	the	permission	of	the	participants.	Should	such	permission	be	obtained,	for	example,	for	an	Anzac	Day	march,	then	the	demonstration	may	retain	its	cultural	power	but	it																																																									32	Verity	Burgmann,	Power,	Profit	and	Protest:	Australian	Social	Movements	and	Globalisation	(Sydney,	Allen	and	Unwin,	2003),	3.	33	Donatella	della	Porta	and	Mario	Diani,	Social	Movements:	An	Introduction,	2nd	ed.	(Malden,	USA:	Blackwell	Publishing,	2006),	21.	34	Erving	Goffman,	“Social	Interaction	and	Social	Structure,”	in	The	Goffman	Reader,	eds.,	Charles	Lemert	and	Ann	Branaman	(Oxford,	Blackwell	Publishers,	1997),	242.	This	article	was	first	published	in	American	Anthropologist	(1964).	
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ceases	to	be	a	challenge	to	the	state	power	and	becomes	a	political	nullity.	Goffman	expresses	this	as:	The	interaction	order	prevailing	even	in	the	most	public	places	is	not	the	creation	of	the	apparatus	of	a	state.	Certainly	most	of	this	order	comes	into	being	and	is	sustained	from	below	as	it	were	…	Nonetheless	the	state	has	effectively	established	legitimacy	and	priority	here,	monopolizing	the	use	of	heavy	arms	and	militarily	disciplined	cadres	as	an	ultimate	sanction.35		This	statement	can	be	compared	with	what	would	be	more	familiar	to	WSA	members,	that	is,	Lenin’s	use	of	Engels’	words	in	State	and	Revolution:		A	power,	seemingly	standing	above	society,	that	would	alleviate	the	[class]	conflict	and	keep	it	within	the	bounds	of	“order”;	and	this	power,	arisen	out	of	society	but	placing	itself	above	it,	and	alienating	itself	more	and	more	from	it,	is	the	state.36		It	is	a	necessary	corollary	of	this	analysis	that	the	maintenance	of	the	independence	of	a	demonstration	from	state	interference	or	determination	challenges	the	legitimacy	and	priority	of	the	state	and	is	crucial,	not	only	to	the	success	of	a	political	demonstration	but	also	to	its	existence	as	a	demonstration.	Thus,	a	refusal	to	cooperate	with	authorities	and	police	on	such	matters	had	become	common	practice,	not	only	in	the	WSA	but	also,	eventually,	in	activist	organisations	such	as	the	Moratorium.	Obviously	a	demonstration	is	more	successful	if	press,	radio	and	television	coverage	can	be	maximised;	however,	except	for	those	who	are	“famous	for	being	famous”	or	those,	like	politicians	standing	for	election,	who	need	to	get	their	names	known,	the	media	are	not	responsible	for	generating	the	primary	political	meaning.	It	is	in	the	contest	itself	that	the	point	of	a	protest	can	be	made	clear	to	the	intended	audience	and	in	which	the	intellectual	and	emotional	attachment	of	the	demonstrators	to	the	cause	can	be	confirmed	and	strengthened.	Judith	Butler	writes	of	demonstrations:	“We	miss	something	of	the	point	of	public	demonstrations,	if	we	fail	to	see	that	the	very	public	character	of	the	space	is	being	disputed	and	even	fought	over	when	
																																																								35	Ibid.	36	V.	I.	Lenin,	The	State	and	Revolution,	selected	works	(Moscow:	Progress	Publishers,	1968),	266.	
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these	crowds	gather.”37	The	meanings	to	be	ascribed	to	or	taken	from	a	demonstration	are	the	creation	of	the	participants;	however,	they	also	require	an	oppositional	presence	for	a	contest	to	occur	and	to	make	those	meanings	take	political	form.	In	the	events	that	constitute	the	subject	matter	of	this	thesis—the	anti-war	movement,	strikes,	picket	lines,	university	occupations	and	demonstrations	of	many	kinds—that	oppositional	presence	was	consistently	the	Victoria	Police.	Even	a	single-issue	social	movement	with	limited	aims,	such	as	the	Moratorium	movement,	confronts	the	state	power	to	establish	its	right	to	occupy	public	space.	In	so	doing,	it	may	incur	losses	in	the	form	of	arrests	and	broken	bodies	but	once	the	event	is	over	and	the	courts	and	hospitals	have	dealt	with	the	consequences,	it	is	what	happens	next	that	measures	its	effectiveness.	Victory	for	the	demonstrators	may	entail	the	partial	or	complete	adoption	of	their	demands	or	may	even	consist	of	a	rise	in	community	consciousness	sufficient	to	encourage	them	to	do	it	all	again.	Defeat	for	the	demonstrators	may	entail	a	growth	of	public	antipathy	or	a	loss	of	public	sympathy	for	their	cause.	This	may	result	when	they	have	attacked	the	wrong	target,	when	their	protest	is	insufficiently	propagandised	beforehand	or	when	their	action	has	disrupted	the	public	to	a	disproportionate	degree.	Defeat	for	the	demonstrators	may	also	result	from	an	overwhelming	use	of	state	forces	or	from	a	demonstrated	rise	of	public	antipathy	to	their	cause	such	that	the	mass	of	the	protesters	is	dispersed	or	generally	decides	that	the	effort	is	just	not	worth	the	trouble	of	going	any	further.	However,	for	a	social	group	whose	objective	is	to	upend	the	state	power	itself,	each	demonstration	is	an	exercise	in	delegitimising	the	state	power	and	normalising	opposition	to	it.	Erving	Goffman	has	expressed	this	as:		Podium	addresses,	meetings,	processions—not	to	speak	of	specialized	forms	like	picket	lines	or	sit-down	strikes—can	be	read	by	governing	officials	as	an	affront	to	the	security	of	the	state	and	forcibly	disbanded	on	these	grounds	although,	indeed,	no	appreciable	threat	to	public	order	in	the	substantive	sense	may	be	involved.	And	on	the	other	side,	breaches	of	public	order	may	be	performed	not	only	for	self	gain,	but	as	a	pointed																																																									37	Judith	Butler,	Bodies	in	Alliance	and	the	Politics	of	the	Street	(Vienna:	European	Institute	for	Progressive	Cultural	Policies,	2011),	accessed	27	October	2017,	http://eipcp.net/transversal/1011/butler/en/print.	
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challenge	to	the	authority	of	the	state—symbolical	acts	read	as	a	taunt	and	employed	in	anticipation	of	this	reading.38		Judith	Butler	builds	on	her	previous	works	on	the	conceptualisation	of	gender	to	theorise	the	demonstrator	and	demonstrations.39	She	characterises	collective,	bodily,	protest	actions	as	performative	acts	that	challenge	the	state	power	by	occupying	and	using	spaces	for	purposes	that	are	different	from	those	that	the	hegemonic	state	holds	to	be	legitimate.	The	actions	of	protesters	construct	a	subversive	discourse	that	is	linguistic	but	non-verbal	and	has	a	theatrical	nature.	In	turn,	this	discourse	creates	subject	positions	for	protesters	that	dispute	the	legitimacy	of	the	hegemonic	state	and	its	claim	of	natural	authority.	When	police	attack	the	members	of	a	demonstration	to	prevent	it,	disperse	it	or	to	arrest	its	“ringleaders,”	they	are	attacking	the	right	of	citizens	to	gather.	Butler	explores	the	meanings	made	in	such	unwilled	situations:		To	attack	the	body	is	to	attack	the	right	itself,	since	the	right	is	precisely	what	is	exercised	by	the	body	on	the	street.	Although	the	bodies	on	the	street	are	vocalizing	their	opposition	to	the	legitimacy	of	the	state	…	The	persistence	of	the	body	calls	that	legitimacy	into	question	…	Where	the	legitimacy	of	the	state	is	brought	into	question	precisely	by	that	way	of	appearing	in	public,	the	body	itself	exercises	a	right	that	is	no	right;	in	other	words,	it	exercises	a	right	that	is	being	actively	contested	and	destroyed	by	military	force,	and	which,	in	its	resistance	to	force,	articulates	its	persistence,	and	its	right	to	persistence.40	For	Goffman	too,	the	act	of	demonstrating	is	performative	but	in	its	metaphorical	sense	rather	than	in	its	language	sense.	He	focuses	on	“interaction	order,”	or	the	ways	that	people	act	when	they	are	in	the	presence	of	others	and	how	they	play	different	roles	in	different	settings	in	the	manner	of	theatrical	performance.41	He	writes:	“A	‘performance’	may,	be	defined	as	all	the	activity	of	a	given	participant	on	a	
																																																								38	Goffman,	“Social	Interaction	and	Social	Structure,”	242.	39	See:	Judith	Butler,	Bodies	that	Matter:	On	the	Discursive	Limits	of	"Sex"	(New	York,	Routledge,	1993),	and	Excitable	Speech:	A	Politics	of	the	Performative	(New	York,	Routledge,	1997).	40	Butler,	Bodies	in	Alliance	and	the	Politics	of	the	Street,	4–5.	41	Erving	Goffman,	“Frames	and	the	Organization	of	Experience,”	in	The	Goffman	Reader,	eds.,	Charles	Lemert	and	Ann	Branaman	(Oxford,	Blackwell	Publishers,	1997),	242.	
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given	occasion	which	serves	to	influence	in	any	way	any	of	the	other	participants.”42	Although	Goffman	is	concerned	with	the	symbolic	meaning	of	demonstrations	and	not	with	the	values	implied	in	the	creation	of	a	subversive	discourse,	he	is	at	one	with	Butler	in	describing	them	as	confronting	to	the	security	of	the	state.	The	practice	of	deliberately	using	physical	protest	actions	as	planned	confrontations	of	the	power	of	the	state	is	explored	further	in	Chapters	3	and	7	of	this	thesis.	Sean	Scalmer,	in	his	book	Dissent	Events,	accepts	that	demonstrations	are	performative	actions	but	he	characterises	them	neither	in	terms	of	language	nor	“interaction	order.”	Rather,	their	dominant	aspect	lies	in	the	“relations	between	political	actors	and	the	media	on	the	one	side,	and	political	actors	and	the	state	on	the	other.”	Further,	he	argues	that	“since	at	least	the	1960s	…	they	have	mainly	performed	for	an	audience	of	television	watchers,	radio	listeners	and	newspaper	readers.”43	Viewed	in	this	way,	demonstrations	are	no	longer	to	be	seen	as	a	metaphor	of	performance,	they	are	performance.	Butler	also	recognises	the	importance	of	the	media	in	modern	protest	actions	and,	while	not	contradicting	Scalmer,	she	sees	the	media	as	more	constitutive	of	the	scene	itself:		Indeed,	the	media	is	the	scene	or	the	space	in	its	extended	and	replicable	visual	and	audible	dimensions	...	the	media	extends	the	scene	visually	and	audibly	and	participates	in	the	delimitation	and	transposability	of	the	scene.	Put	differently,	the	media	constitutes	the	scene	in	a	time	and	place	that	includes	and	exceeds	its	local	instantiation.44	In	Power,	Profit	and	Protest,	Verity	Burgmann	develops	the	idea	of	protest	actions	as	the	carriers	of	the	discourse	of	social	movements:	“articulation—the	public	expression	of	grievances—is	a	crucial	component	in	effective	agitation:	and	agitation	facilitates	articulation	by	securing	the	means	by	which	the	oppressed	can	be	heard.”45	However,	this	is	no	diffuse	notion	of	discourse;	it	is	focused	on	political	mutiny,	as	Burgmann	writes:	“Serious	political	activism	is	contained	within	the	carnivalesque,	and	these	theatrical	tactics	draw	on	previous	generations	of																																																									42	Erving	Goffman,	Presentation	of	Self	in	Everyday	Life	(New	York,	Doubleday	Anchor	Books,	1959),	25.	43	Scalmer,	Dissent	Events,	40–41.	44	Butler,	Bodies	in	Alliance	and	the	Politics	of	the	Street,	8.	45	Burgmann,	Power,	Profit	and	Protest,	8.		
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protest.”46	Protest	actions	have	their	own	histories;	they	are	not	just	performances	for	the	media	but	are	constructed	by	social	movements	using	the	techniques	of	popularisation	and	agitation	from	the	repository	of	methods	and	political	understandings	of	previous	protest	activities	and	the	activists	that	generate	them.	This	first	chapter	has	outlined	this	study’s	approach	to	discourse	whereby	practices	and	actions	are	considered,	like	language,	to	be	carriers	of	meaning.	Discourse,	as	it	is	used	here	preserves	human	agency	in	the	generation	of	and	resistance	to	discursive	power	situated	in	a	Gramscian	setting	of	bourgeois	hegemony.	This	chapter	has	introduced	the	young	radicals	at	the	centre	of	the	thesis	as	forming	a	group	of	people	specialised	in	the	‘conceptual	and	philosophical’	ideas	of	anti-imperialism	and	socialism.	Having	no	other	access	to	power,	their	actions,	in	persistently	and	deliberately	confronting	the	power	of	the	state	took	on	the	character	revolutionary	action.		Some	of	the	works	by	other	writers	on	the	topic	of	radical	actions	related	to	the	1960s	have	been	discussed	above.	These	have	provided	insights;	such	as	“social	movement”	theory,	“framing,”	the	“performativity”	of	physical	protest	action	and	Gramscian	“hegemony.”	By	these	insights,	radical	organisations	may	be	realistically	understood	and	represented.		
																																																								46	Ibid.	
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Chapter	2:	A	Short	Course	in	the	School	of	
Revolution	
Upon	emerging	from	the	Cold	War	period,	it	is	reasonable	to	expect	that	young	workers	dissatisfied	with	the	conditions	of	their	existence	at	the	bottom	of	the	wage	scale	and	lacking	in	social	power	would	be	prominent	agents	for	social	and	political	change.	Instead,	the	1965–1975	decade	of	youth	revolt	developed	most	stridently	among	the	more	privileged	“baby	boomers”:	university	students.1		As	will	be	shown	below,	ideas	and	strategies	of	rebellion	did	not	spontaneously	generate	themselves	but	were	built	on	the	beliefs	and	accomplishments	of	the	previously	functioning	activist	movement.	The	material	carriers	of	these	ideas	were	the	campaigners	from	older,	radical	movements	mostly	clustered	in	the	Communist	Party	of	Australia	(CPA)	and	the	Australian	Labor	Party	(ALP),	but	this	is	where	their	contribution	ended.	The	young	radicals	made	a	clear	break	with	the	old	and	this,	as	we	shall	see,	became	one	the	markers	of	that	decade.	The	radical	actions	of	the	Labor	Club	gave	Monash	University	a	notoriety	that	it	had	tried	to	avoid	in	its	short	life	until	then.	From	its	origin,	the	Monash	Labor	Club	was	part	of	a	national	organisation	called	the	Australian	Student	Labor	Federation	(ASLF).	This	was	strongly	associated	with	the	ALP	and	many	of	the	Labor	Club’s	leading	members,	including	Albert	Langer,	Dave	Nadel	and	Ian	Morgan,	were	active	in	the	youth	arm	of	the	ALP,	the	Young	Labor	Association	(YLA).2	This	chapter	describes	some	of	the	means	whereby	this	substantial	grouping	of	young	people	was	able	to	break	its	adherence	to	the	political	discourses	of	erstwhile	allegiances	and	to	frame	the	process	of	establishing	an	effective	counter-discourse	that	had	a	material	effect	well	beyond	the	university.	
																																																								1	A	full	treatment	of	this	phenomenon	is	contained	in	Chapters	2	and	3	of	York,	Student	Revolt.	2	See,	for	example,	Young	Labor	Association,	“To	All	Anti-War	Demonstrators,”	single-sided	leaflet,	n.d.,	c.	1966,	accessed	15	February	2016,	http://www.reasoninrevolt.net.au/bib/PR0001702.htm.	
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In	1966,	Dave	Nadel	became	president	of	the	Monash	Labor	Club	and	Albert	Langer,	still	an	active	member	of	Young	Labor,	became	vice-president.	By	early	1967,	the	experience	of	Labor’s	defeat	in	the	1966	elections	and	the	open	displays	of	police	and	US	power	at	the	Johnson	and	Ky	demonstrations,	caused	the	Monash	Labor	Club	to	move	rapidly	towards	a	radical	position.	The	speed	of	this	ideological	movement	can	be	seen	in	a	1966	leaflet	containing	Dave	Nadel,	Ian	Morgan	and	Albert	Langer’s	promotion	and	endorsement	of	the	YLA	among	students	at	Monash:	If	the	Labor	Movement	is	not	to	slide	into	a	pro-War	position	as	a	result	of	pressure	from	the	Right,	it	is	essential	that	peace	supporters	take	an	active	part	in	Labor	Party	affairs.	If	dramatic	demonstrations	are	to	have	a	maximum	effect,	they	must	be	accompanied	by	quiet	political	activity.3	Nadel	and	Morgan	had	signed	as	president	and	secretary	of	the	Monash	Labor	Club	and	Langer	as	recruiting	officer	of	the	YLA.	As	will	be	seen,	they	were	not	to	hold	those	views	for	very	much	longer.	
The	Discourses	of	Monash	University	
The	first	students	at	Monash	University	began	their	studies	at	the	foundation	campus	in	Clayton	in	1961.4	As	young	proto-radicals	entered	the	university	in	the	mid-1960s,	their	experiences	seemed	to	be	just	as	ordinary	as	all	other	aspiring	learners.	The	discourses	of	personal	progress,	peer	and	parental	expectations	and	the	requirements	of	society	at	large	impinged	upon	all.	The	most	conspicuous	political	and	social	issue	that	they	dealt	with	was	the	advent	of	conscription	for	service	in	the	Vietnam	War	and	the	war	itself.	In	1967,	Monash	University,	with	7000	students,	was	still	an	infant.	Established	by	an	Act	of	Parliament	in	1958	and	opened	by	Premier	Henry	Bolte	three	years	later,	the	first	students	arrived	in	1961.	For	the	prior	106	years,	Melbourne	University	had	catered	for	the	population	of	Victoria	but	the	postwar	“baby	boom”	made	that	impossible.	In	1957,	the	Australian	Government’s	“Murray	Report”	into	universities	predicted	that,	between	1957	and	1962,	the	population	of	15–19-year-olds	and	20–																																																								3	Young	Labor	Association,	“To	All	Anti-War	Demonstrators.”		4	Monash	University,	“Our	History,”	accessed	20	June	2018,	https://www.monash.edu/it/about-us/our-history.	
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25-year-olds	would	rise	to	36	per	cent	and	18.9	per	cent,	respectively.	The	report	also	noted	“there	had	been	a	rise	in	the	proportion	of	boys	and	girls	who	are	remaining	at	school	to	matriculation	level	and	thus	qualifying	for	entry	to	the	universities.”5		In	those	early	days	of	the	1960s,	official,	university	publications	expressed	a	discourse	of	earnest	endeavour	in	the	making	of	universities	in	the	image	of	sandstone	institutions.	In	this,	they	had	the	fairly	easy	compliance	of	the	student	body.	Student	publications	of	the	early	1960s	were	replete	with	liberal	philosophising	and	positivist	views	of	what	university	students’	attitudes	should	be.	The	editorial	of	the	1963	Monash	University	student	magazine,	Orpheus,	is	typical.	It	reads	in	part:		Self-imposed	challenge	is	not	only	a	symptom	of	intellectual	healthiness;	it	offers	also	a	short-cut	to	the	position	of	readily	being	able	to	think	for	oneself	which	is	discerned	as	part	of	a	university’s	ultimate	goal.	And	this,	in	addition,	is	one	criterion	on	which	to	judge	the	value	of	a	contribution	to	a	university	magazine.6		The	fact	that	Monash	University	was	new	and	in	competition	with	only	one	Victorian	“sandstone”	institution,	Melbourne	University,	predisposed	it	to	require	that	a	formal	and	responsible	discourse	as	befits	respectable	institutions	be	nourished	by	its	principals,	staff	and	student	bodies.	As	the	new	institution	in	Victoria,	with	so	few	graduates,	it	was	yet	to	prove	itself	in	the	worlds	of	the	professions	and	to	shake	off	the	pejorative	nickname,	“The	Farm.”	Vice-Chancellor	Matheson	told	students:		Our	Act	requires	that	“the	standard	for	graduation	in	the	University	shall	be	at	least	as	high	as	prevails	in	the	University	of	Melbourne.”	…	[B]efore	long	our	degrees	will	begin	to	have	a	certain	reputation	which	will	depend	upon	your	reputation.7	
																																																								5	Australia,	Committee	on	Australian	Universities,	Report	of	the	Committee	on	Australian	
Universities	(Murray	Report)	(Canberra:	Government	Printer,	1957),	81.	6	Ken	Mogg	and	Iain	Topliss,	“Editorial,”	Orpheus,	1963,	7,	accessed	21	April	2016	http://www.adm.monash.edu.au/records-archives/assets/docs/pdf/orpheus/1963.pdf.	7	James	Matheson	speaking	at	the	first	graduation	ceremony	of	Monash	University.	Monash	
University	Gazette	I,	no.	1,	July	1964,	4,	accessed	17	April	2016,	http://www.adm.monash.edu.au/records-archives/assets/docs/pdf/gazette/vol1-no1.pdf.	
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Unlike	today’s	universities,	early	Monash	was	dominated	by	males	to	females	in	a	ratio	of	two	to	one.	This	reflected	attitudes	to	education	in	the	general	community	as	did	the	fact	that	the	university	ran	a	“Miss	Monash”	quest	every	year	from	1962.8	This	was	acceptable	to	the	university	and	to	the	students	until	late	in	the	decade	when	ideas	of	women’s	liberation	began	to	enter	the	realm	of	political	agitation.	The	quest	was	terminated	in	1969.	The	university	had	also	to	satisfy	the	demand	for	a	more	liberal	approach	to	education	and	to	rebut	the	accusations	that	it	was	merely	a	degree	factory	or	job	training	body.	Thus,	when	the	new	Union	Building	was	opened	by	the	Victorian	governor,	“His	Excellency,	Major-General	Sir	Rohan	Delacombe	K.C.M.G.,	K.B.E., C.B.,	D.S.O.,	K.St.J.”	in	April	1965,	the	warden	of	the	union,	G.	P.	T	Sweeney	declared:	The	University,	in	trying	to	encourage	the	development	of	the	personality	of	the	individuals	…	[the]	Union	facilities	in	which	staff	and	students	can	together	share	interests	in	which	there	may	come	that	meeting	of	minds	that	prompts	tolerance	and	broad-mindedness	and	from	which	the	ability	to	live	with	other	people,	whilst	perhaps	disagreeing	with	their	views,	becomes,	too,	a	part	of	everyday	existence.9	The	university	had	adopted	an	approach	that,	to	the	warden	at	least,	seemed	appropriate	for	an	institution	that	was	building	its	position	in	the	university	system.	Much	of	this	was	done	through	the	symbolism	of	aristocracy,	wealth	and	power.	So,	for	example,	in	1966,	we	see	the	university	making	much	of	the	donation	of	a	mace	by	Sir	Archie	Michaelis,	and	the	conferring	of	honorary	degrees	on	“His	Excellency	the	Right	Honourable	Lord	Casey,	Governor	General	of	Australia”	and	on	Nobel	Prize	winner,	Professor	Carl	Cori.	10	The	purpose	of	pointing	these	out	is	not	to	make	any	moral	judgement	of	the	university	but	to	show	the	nature	of	the	leading	discourse	that	students	encountered	in	their	dealings	with	officialdom.	Gaining	support	by	charming	wealth	and	power	is,	after	all,	part	of	the	job	of	officialdom.	
																																																								8	Graeme	Davidson	and	Kate	Murphy,	University	Unlimited:	The	Monash	Story	(Melbourne:	Allen	and	Unwin,	2012),	115.	9	Monash	University	Gazette	II,	no.	1,	August	1965,	4,	accessed	17	April	2016	http://www.adm.monash.edu.au/records-archives/assets/docs/pdf/gazette/vol2-no1.pdf.	10	Monash	University	Gazette	III,	no.	1,	August	1966,	4,	accessed	18	April	2016,	http://www.adm.monash.edu.au/records-archives/assets/docs/pdf/gazette/vol3-no1.pdf.	
42	
At	this	stage,	the	student	body	seemed	accepting	of	the	necessity	of	such	a	discourse,	but	this	was	not	to	last.	While	I	do	not	claim	that	the	Students’	Representative	Council	(SRC)	really	reflected	the	consensus	at	Monash,	its	annual	magazine,	
Orpheus,	demonstrates	what	was	at	least	acceptable	to	the	students	at	large.	The	1964	issue	gave	over	its	editorial	space	to	a	very	long	essay,	“The	Purpose	of	a	University,”	by	Peter	Smart.	The	essay	draws	upon	an	assemblage	of	early	and	conservative	writers	on	the	subject—from	Cardinal	Newman	and	F.	R.	Leavis	to	R.	G.	Menzies—and	considers	universities	in	general	to	say	how	the	new	university	should	operate:	What	we	need	today	is	a	guide	to	existence.	Religion	and	the	traditional	morality	have	collapsed.	The	world	seems	formless	and	even	hostile.	The	University	has	it	in	its	power	to	assist	in	the	regeneration	of	civilisation.		The	University	is	conservative	…	It	is	suspicious	of	what	is	new	or	what	is	different	to	its	way	of	thinking	…	We	have	seen	that	its	purposes	are	to	be	of	service	to	the	community	by	training	professional	men,	accompanied	by	intellectual	training	and	the	enquiry	after	truth	…	Australian	students	are	dissatisfied	with	their	universities	because	they	do	nothing	more	than	train	their	intellects.	Partly	this	is	because	of	the	growing	impersonality	of	the	University.11		By	1966–1967,	the	emergence	of	a	rebellious	spirit	among	students	was	sufficient	to	be	recognised	in	the	editorial	of	Orpheus: 
Monash,	like	Orpheus,	is	emerging	from	the	underworld	of	amorphic	and	apathetic	thought.	There	is	becoming	apparent	a	distinctly	defined	trend	of	opinion,	both	in	students	and	staff	…	that	we	are	becoming	a	vital	University.	Perhaps	it	is	because	we	are	a	young	institution	that	the	nature	of	this	movement	tends	to	be	against	conventional	and	traditional	values	…	There	is	a	strong,	though	still	small,	core	of	those	who	refuse	to	sacrifice	their	integrity	to	the	demands	of	a	society	that	in	their	opinion	is	based	on	a	set	of	invalid	first	principles.	They	are	not	afraid	to	protest	when	they	see	that	injustice	has	been	committed,	they	are	not	afraid	to	voice	their	disgust	with	the	state	of	the	world	in	which	they	live,	and	they	are	willing	to	offer	rational	alternatives.	Let	us	face	it.	The	old	world	must	give	way	to	the	new.12																																																									11	Peter	Smart,	“The	Purpose	of	a	University,”	Orpheus,	1964,	25,	accessed	18	April	2016,	http://www.adm.monash.edu.au/records-archives/assets/docs/pdf/orpheus/1964.pdf.	12	Helene	Barnes,	Jean	Bedford	and	Delwyn	Freestone,	eds.,	Orpheus,	1965/66,	7,	accessed	19	April	2016.	http://www.adm.monash.edu.au/records-archives/assets/docs/pdf/orpheus/1965.pdf.	
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This	is	a	liberal	position	in	that	it	salutes	individual	enlightenment	and	seeks	to	perfect	rather	than	overthrow	the	discourse	of	traditional	academy.	However,	it	was	at	the	extremities	of	this	liberal	discourse	that	the	Monash	Labor	Club	gained	the	kudos	and	its	members	gained	the	confidence	to	begin	the	construction	of	a	counter-discourse.	This	was	the	campaign	against	the	university’s	award	of	an	honorary	degree	to	the	Liberal	Premier	of	Victoria,	Henry	Bolte.	
The	Discourse	Changes	
In	May	1967,	the	university	continued	its	deferential	discourse	by	conferring	three	honorary	degrees.	The	first	two	recipients,	William	Henry	Connolly,	chairman	of	the	State	Electricity	Commission,	and	Dame	Mabel	Brooks,	who	presided	over	the	management	of	the	Queen	Victoria	Hospital	(which	had	a	newly	forged	relationship	with	the	university),	were	uncontroversial.	The	third	degree	is	the	one	that	should	have	brought	the	university	to	the	realisation	that	the	discourse	of	inveigling	favour	from	power,	which	had	been	ignored	by	the	student	body	up	until	that	time,	clashed	with	the	changed	moral	values	of	students	and	ran	counter	to	their	view	of	appropriate	power	relationships.	This	was	the	proposed	conferring	of	an	honorary	degree	on	the	Premier	of	Victoria,	Sir	Henry	Bolte.13	At	this	stage,	the	uneasy	attachment	of	student	discourses	to	official	discourse	became	acrimonious	and	disputatious.	In	the	Victorian	community,	there	had	been	considerable	opposition	to	the	hanging	of	Ronald	Ryan,	convicted	murderer.	Even	senior	members	of	the	Liberal	Party,	such	as	Tony	Staley	who	was	destined	to	become	a	minister	in	the	federal	Liberal	government,	opposed	Ryan’s	sentence.	Yet,	Bolte	persisted	and	required	that	Ryan,	who	had	been	found	guilty	of	killing	a	prison	officer,	should	be	executed	by	hanging.	Monash’s	gift	of	conferment	of	a	degree	upon	the	premier	surprised	many.	No	announcement	of	the	conferment	was	made	until	1967,	even	though	Monash’s	vice-chancellor,	Louis	Matheson,	wrote	to	Bolte	offering	him	the	award	on	1	December	1966.	Bolte’s	letter	of	acceptance	was	dated	6	December.	On	12	December	1966,																																																									13	Monash	University	Gazette	IV,	no.	1,	September	1967,	16,	accessed	18	April	2016,	http://www.adm.monash.edu.au/records-archives/assets/docs/pdf/gazette/vol3-no1.pdf.	
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Ronald	Ryan,	the	last	man	to	be	hanged	in	Australia,	was	sentenced	to	death.	This	was	an	incendiary	issue	among	both	students	and	staff	of	the	university	and	the	association	of	it	with	the	Bolte	degree	became	a	cause	célèbre.	While	it	is	not	unusual	for	such	announcements	to	be	delayed,	the	interval	provided	a	convenient	agitational	point	for	its	opponents.	Michael	Hyde	writes:	“Feeling	against	the	award	was	strong—not	only	because	of	its	amazingly	ill	conceived	timing	…	but	because	of	the	plainly	nervous	fashion	in	which	the	administration	went	about	its	bestowal.”	Further,	according	to	Hyde,	in	an	off-the-record	interview	with	the	editors	of	the	university	student	newspaper,	Lots	Wife,	Vice-Chancellor	Matheson	appealed	to	their	loyalty	by	explaining	that	Sir	Henry	was	sensitive	and	might	penalise	Monash	if	there	was	trouble	over	the	issue.14		On	9	March	1967,	during	orientation	week	at	the	start	of	the	first	term	and	five	weeks	after	the	hanging	of	Ronald	Ryan,	the	Monash	Labor	Club	published	the	second	issue	of	its	new	bulletin	Print,	which	stated	that,	at	a	meeting	of	the	Professorial	Board,	the	vice-chancellor	had	“asked	that	standing	orders	be	suspended	and	that	no	minutes	be	taken”	and	then	told	the	board	of	the	honorary	degree	to	be	given	to	Bolte.	As	the	meeting	progressed,	opposition	to	the	award	mounted	until	“Professor	Andrew,	Dean	of	the	Faculty	of	Medicine,	spoke	…	and	refused	to	associate	the	Faculty	of	Medicine	with	an	honorary	degree	for	the	premier.”15	The	deans	of	every	other	faculty	then	followed	with	refusals	all	round.	This	“rebellion	of	the	Deans”	was	overcome	by	the	use	of	Honorary	Doctor	of	Letters,	which	required	no	faculty	endorsement.	This	account	may	be	apocryphal;	however,	true	or	not,	tales	of	rejection	by	such	powerful	people	was	powerful	propaganda.	So	began	a	series	of	confrontations	,	the	first	sally	of	which	came	from	Vice-Chancellor	Matheson	in	a	letter	to	Lots	Wife:		Dear	Sir,	The	second	edition,	1967	of	the	above	broadsheet,	[Lots	Wife]	included	the	statement	that	“it	would	appear	that	pressure	has	been	brought	to	bear	on	the	editors	of	Print	to	desist	from	comment	…”	
																																																								14	Hyde,	It	is	Right	to	Rebel,	13,	14.	15	Print,	no.	1,	9	March	1967,	1.	
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What	actually	happened	was	that	I	saw	Messrs.	Cassidy	and	Nadel	…	and	told	them	if	they	published	statements	that	might	be	construed	by	the	Court	libelous	…	they	might	render	themselves	liable	to	be	brought	before	the	University’s	Disciplinary	Committee	on	a	charge	of	misconduct.16	Although	clothed	in	refined,	legal	sounding	phrases,	the	threat	was	undisguised	and	broke	the	previously	accommodating	association	between	student	and	university	discourses.	The	relationship	had	been	converted	from	paternal	toleration	of	student	criticism	and	imperfections	to	the	assertion	of	disciplinary	power.		Even	so,	the	Monash	Labor	Club	gave	Matheson	a	way	out	by	making	the	assumption	that	he	did	not	really	want	to	give	the	degree	to	Bolte,	and	had	only	agreed	by	putting	“the	good	of	the	university	before	…	[his]	personal	feelings”	and	because	if	he	did	not	“give	in,	Monash	will	suffer	financially.”17	Later,	the	Labor	Club	appears	to	have	tried	to	excuse	Matheson	by	reporting	an	unsubstantiated	and	probably	scurrilous	rumour	that	two	senior	university	office	holders,	one	of	whom	was	inebriated	and	the	other	extremely	ambitious,	had	offered	the	degree	to	Bolte	at	a	party.18	Thus,	the	Honorary	Degrees	Committee	was	said	to	have	been	coopted	and	unable	to	withdraw	the	offer	without	drastic	ramifications.	The	point	to	be	made	here	is	that,	at	this	early	stage,	the	most	radical	students	did	not	seek	to	breach	the	liberal	discourse	of	the	university.	To	gauge	student	opinion,	the	SRC	conducted	a	survey	that	showed	that	while	68	per	cent	opposed	the	award,	51	per	cent	felt	that	it	was	not	the	role	of	the	SRC	to	centrally	organise	a	demonstration.	However,	the	central	decision	did	not	preclude	its	subcommittees	from	acting	and	the	Monash	Labor	Club,	operating	through	its	Anti-Bolte	Sub-Committee,	organised	instead.19	Preparations	began	straightaway.	Badges	proclaiming	“No	Degree	for	Hangman”	sold	out	quickly,	and	posters,	articles	in	Print,	rowdy	meetings	and	other	publicity	were	effective	enough	for	the	university	to	move	the	conferring	ceremony	from	Monash	to	the	Melbourne	Town	Hall	and	for	it	to	be	postponed	until	the	university	vacation	in	mid-May.																																																									16	Hyde,	It	is	Right	to	Rebel,	16.	17	Print,	no.	1,	9	March	1967,	quoted	in	Hyde,	It	is	Right	to	Rebel,	14.	18	Hyde,	It	is	Right	to	Rebel,	16.	19	Ibid.,	18.	
46	
The	demonstration	took	place	on	the	last	academic	day	before	the	official	ceremony.	In	a	lecture	theatre,	the	Monash	Labor	Club	conferred	a	degree	on	“Sir	Henry	Pig,	a	piglet	which	showed	its	displeasure	by	defecating	on	the	rostrum.	Sir	Pig	then	led	off	three	hundred	demonstrators	to	the	Council	Room	where	the	relationship	of	the	university	to	the	State	was	discussed.”20	Hyde’s	description	here	may	be	hyperbolic;	nevertheless,	Bolte	and	the	university	had	been	ridiculed	and	the	media	coverage	around	the	nation	was	extensive.	The	action	had	established	an	insolent	radicalism	that	had	perverse	appeal	and	an	attitude	of	daring	larrikinism	was	made	acceptable	to	the	student	body.	The	necessity	of	capturing	the	media	was	an	important	implication	of	the	process	and	this	action	stimulated	the	emergence	of	the	truly	radical	operation	that	came	to	mark	the	operations	of	the	Monash	Labor	Club	in	the	wider	political	arena.	Although	club	members	might	not	yet	have	seen	themselves	as	a	part	of	the	labour	movement,	their	earlier	adherence	to	a	Labor	organisation	positioned	them	firmly	in	that	tradition—a	tradition	that	they	were	about	to	breach.	Sean	Scalmer	writes	of	this	clear	break	with	old	methods:		Public	interest	was	not	won	by	a	series	of	small,	local	actions	but	through	a	spectacular	activity	or	a	blaze	of	subsequent	media	coverage.	Organisation,	the	traditional	tool	of	the	labour	movement,	was	less	important	than	public	communication	through	the	conduit	of	the	press.21		While	the	earlier	labour	movement	had	certainly	taken	dramatic	actions,	the	importance	of	gaining	attention	by	spectacular	activity	increased	when	television	became	the	dominant	media	in	people’s	lives.	Where	older	generations	of	labour	campaigners	had	been	trained	by	the	strictures	of	the	Cold	War	ascendancy	to	“not	stick	their	necks	out,”	younger	activists	had	no	such	fears.	For	these	younger	activists,	a	clear	distinction	could	be	made	between	the	orthodox	reformer	and	the	true	radical.	Orthodox	reformers	take	steps	that	are	already	acceptable	to	and	expected	by	those	they	hope	to	attract	and	that	are	not	so	exceptional	as	to	overly	rouse	their	opponents.	Conversely,	radicals	have	no	interest	in	maintaining	the	existing	discourse;	they	act	to	create	a	new	one.	Public	upset,	exposure	and	spectacle																																																									20	Ibid.	21	Scalmer,	Dissent	Events.	See	elsewhere	for	a	discussion	of	organisation	versus	disruption.	
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are	the	stock-in-trade	of	the	radical	whose	aim	is	not	to	soften	the	dominant	discourse	but	to	overthrow	it.22	The	Monash	Labor	Club,	having	seized	the	leadership	so	usefully	ceded	by	the	SRC,	had	captured	the	imagination	of	the	students	and,	within	weeks,	started	on	a	new	campaign	that	was	not	only	to	infuriate	the	university	but	also	to	shock	the	nation.	This	time	it	was	not	only	the	university	that	they	confronted	but	the	Victoria	and	Commonwealth	Police,	federal	politicians	of	all	persuasions	and	the	mainstream	media.	This	campaign	was	the	one	that	secured	the	names	of	Monash	University,	Monash	Labor	Club,	Peter	Price,	Michael	Hyde	and	Albert	Langer	in	Australian	history.	It	also	antagonised	the	older	peace	and	anti-war	movement,	including	ALP	and	CPA	activists,	that	had	been	conditioned	by	years	of	defence	against	the	anti-communist	crusades	of	the	Cold	War.	It	challenged	them	to	break	the	yoke	of	their	submission	to	the	need	for	a	Labor	government23	and	to	take	the	fight	directly	to	the	proponents	of	war.		This	was	the	campaign	to	raise	unspecified	monetary	aid	for	the	“enemy”—the	National	Liberation	Front	of	South	Vietnam	(NLF)—in	the	very	real	Vietnam	War	in	which	Australian	Army	regulars	and	conscripts	were	engaged	alongside	the	US	Army.		Escalation	from	opposing	an	honorary	degree	to	collecting	money	for	the	enemy	is	dramatic	and	represents	a	qualitative	change	from	a	liberal	campaign	restrained	by	the	desire	to	make	an	existing	legal	system	more	just	(by	removing	capital	punishment)	to	a	radical	campaign	aimed	at	the	very	basis	of	state	power	(the	monopoly	of	the	use	of	military	force).	Humanitarian	and	medical	aid	had	previously																																																									22	Ibid.	3.	23	An	expression	of	this	policy	was	to	be	found	even	in	the	leading	bodies	of	the	CPA	itself.	The	
Statement	by	National	Committee,	Communist	Party	of	Australia	read	in	part:		If	the	Government	refuses	to	reverse	its	policy	[on	the	war],	the	people	should	demand	its	resignation	and	replace	it	by	a	government	pledged	to	take	a	new	line.	The	Labor	Party	policy	for	an	end	to	the	Vietnam	war	and	withdrawal	of	Australian	troops,	clearly	stated	by	the	1967	Federal	Conference,	has	proved	despite	its	weaknesses	and	inconsistencies,	much	closer	to	reality	than	the	Government’s	policy.	
Tribune	(Sydney)	14	February	1968,	accessed	11	August	2016,	http://www.reasoninrevolt.net.au.	
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been	raised	by	religious	and	peace	groups	in	Australia,	Britain	and	even	the	US.	The	raising	of	the	vast	amounts	of	aid	needed	for	military	purposes	was	left	for	the	Soviet	Union,	China	and	the	countries	in	that	bloc.	Monetary	aid	is	blatantly	flexible	and	in	practical	application,	medical	purposes	are	not	distinguishable	from	military	purposes.	Although	the	raising	of	military	aid	had	very	little	substance	in	practical	terms,	it	still	connoted	the	provocative	undermining	of	the	state	by	its	own	citizens.	
Money	for	the	NLF	
The	Monash	Labor	Club	alone	cannot	claim	the	idea	of	raising	money	for	the	NLF.	On	25	May	1965,	soon	after	the	deployment	of	an	initial	battalion	(800)	of	Australian	combat	troops	to	Vietnam,	the	National	Conference	of	the	ASLF	in	Canberra	resolved	to	support	the	NLF	or	“Viet	Cong”	as	they	were	commonly	known.	About	thirty	students	blocked	a	Canberra	city	street	in	a	sit-down	protest.24	The	Monash	delegation	had	voted	for	that	resolution	and	three	of	them,	including	Dave	Nadel,	were	among	those	arrested	at	the	demonstration.	As	a	consequence	of	that	conference,	both	the	Sydney	ALP	Club	and	Monash	Labor	Club	took	up	the	call;	however,	their	members’	adherence	to	ALP	sentiment	and	politics	was	so	strong	that	aid	was	restricted	to	medical	assistance.	It	was	not	until	1967	that	this	was	breached	in	earnest	at	Monash.		The	ALP	was	opposed	to	conscription	and	to	sending	Australian	troops	into	the	Vietnam	War,	its	actions	against	the	war	were	led	by	the	then	leader	of	the	party,	Arthur	Calwell,	supported	by	other	federal	personalities	of	the	“left”	such	as	Tom	Uren	and	Jim	Cairns,	and	its	anti-war	credentials	were	weakened	by	the	persistent	estrangement	of	the	pretender	to	leadership,	E.	G.	Whitlam.	Mary	Elizabeth	Calwell	recalls	that	attitude	well:		We	had	one	leader,	my	father,	from	1962	to	February	1967	and	you	have	an	arrogant,	opportunistic	disloyal	deputy	leader	who	worked	from	early	
																																																								24	Melbourne	Shrine	of	Remembrance,	Attitudes	to	the	Vietnam	War,	VCE	Education	Program,	14,	accessed	11	February	2016,	http://www.shrine.org.au/Shrine/Files/dc/dc8b4c54-ca76-488d-9ffe-4c11ec2852fc.pdf		
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1964	to	destabilise	the	party	to	achieve	his	objective	of	being	leader	…	He	was	really	quite	uninterested	in	the	Vietnam	War.25	Frank	Bongiorno,	commenting	on	Jenny	Hocking’s	biography	of	Whitlam,	suggests	a	more	benign	view	of	his	approach	to	the	war	effort:		Whitlam	was	not	prominent	in	street	protest.	Indeed,	Hocking	suggests	that	he	was	rather	unsettled	by	it,	for	“as	a	determined	believer	in	the	institution	of	parliament	and	the	practice	of	parliamentary	democracy,	he	would	not	condone	any	suggestion	that	the	will	of	the	people	expressed	through	the	ballot	box	should	be	usurped	by	the	will	of	the	people	expressed	through	mass	protest.”26	Whitlam’s	dissention	within	the	leadership	of	the	ALP	became	more	obvious	when,	in	January	1967,	South	Vietnamese	leader	Marshall	Ky	and	his	wife	Madame	Nu	arrived	on	an	official	visit	at	the	invitation	of	the	federal	Liberal	government.	“Mr	Calwell	decided	that	he	wasn’t	going	…	[to	the	reception]	…	himself	and	requested	that	Mr	Whitlam	be	enabled	to	go.”27	Whitlam	had	previously	met	with	Ky	and	had	been	an	official	dinner	guest	of	the	Republic	of	Vietnam’s	foreign	minister	in	Saigon.28	Meanwhile,	the	Victorian	Central	Executive	of	the	ALP	led	the	whole	party	in	organising	three	protest	marches	against	Ky’s	visit	to	Canberra,	Sydney	and	Melbourne	with	Calwell	as	the	keynote	speaker;	all	federal	and	state	Labor	parliamentarians	were	asked	to	attend	and	lend	their	support.29	At	the	first,	in	Canberra	outside	Parliament	House,	only	four	of	the	parliamentary	Labor	Party	took	part.30	Outside,	a	disappointed	Calwell	repeated	his	earlier	statements	that	“Ky	is	a	Fascist.	I	repeat	it—he	is	a	murderer,	a	miserable	little	butcher,	a	gangster	Quisling.”31		
																																																								25	Mary	Elizabeth	Calwell,	interview	by	author,	8	March	2016.		26	Frank	Bongiorno,	“Whitlam,	the	1960s	and	the	Program,”	Inside	Story,	(October	21,	2014):	2.	27	Extract	from	Press	Briefing	by	the	Prime	Minister,	Harold	Holt,	Parliament	House,	Canberra,	11	January	1967,	accessed	11	August	2016,	https://pmtranscripts.dpmc.gov.au/sites/default/files/original/00001463.pdf.	28	Daily	Telegraph,	12	January	1967,	quoted	in	Phillip	Deery,	“Arthur’s	Last	Hurrah:	Whitlam	and	the	Ky	Visit	to	Australia,”	The	Recorder	(Melbourne	Branch	of	the	Australian	Society	for	the	Study	of	Labour	History),	no.	283	(July	2015):	2–3.		29	Deery,	“Arthur’s	Last	Hurrah,”	1.	30	Ibid.	31	Ibid.,	2–3.	
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Earlier	in	1966,	Whitlam,	after	visiting	Australian	troops	in	Vietnam,	declared	that,	in	his	opinion,	a	military	victory	in	Vietnam	was	achievable.	This	flew	in	the	face	of	Calwell’s	view	that:	Humiliation	[in	Vietnam]	for	America	could	come	in	one	of	two	ways—either	by	outright	defeat,	which	is	unlikely,	or	by	her	becoming	interminably	bogged	down	in	the	awful	morass	of	this	war,	as	France	was	for	ten	years.	That	situation	would	in	turn	lead	to	one	of	two	things—withdrawal	through	despair,	or	all	out	war,	through	despair.	Both	these	would	be	equally	disastrous.32 Young	radicals	were	just	as	capable	of	reading	ALP	vacillation	as	Liberal	Prime	Minister	Harold	Holt	who	wrote	to	US	President	Lyndon	Johnson	in	August	of	1966:		The	Opposition	has	shown	itself	to	be	hopelessly	confused	and	divided	on	the	issues	of	Vietnam	and	National	Service.	Opposition	Leader,	Calwell,	keeps	speaking	of	a	“dirty,	cruel,	unwinnable	war.”	But	the	deputy	leader,	Whitlam,	who	has	recently	returned	from	Vietnam,	has	asserted	that	a	military	victory	may	be	secured	within	one	or	two	years.33	The	ALP’s	Federal	Conference	that	year	expressed	general	opposition	to	the	continuation	of	the	war	and	Australian	involvement	in	it	but	there	was	no	call	for	the	immediate	withdrawal	of	Australian	conscripts.	However,	on	the	issue	of	aiding	the	NLF,	it	had	been	obvious	from	the	outset	that	the	ALP	could	never	give	it	support.	The	NLF	was	in	the	communist	camp	and	Calwell’s	abovementioned	speech	was	quite	clear	on	the	matter:		On	large-scale	military	commitments	…	[the	government’s	decision]	blinds	and	obscures	the	real	nature	of	the	problem	of	Communist	expansion	…	[this	decision]	will	contribute	to	that	spirit	of	defeatism	and	impotence	in	the	face	of	Communism.	That	is	the	greatest	enemy	we	have	to	fear.34		
																																																								32	Arthur	Calwell,	Address	to	the	House	of	Representatives	(4	May	1965),	accessed	7	March	2016,	http://australianpolitics.com/1965/05/04/calwell-response-to-vietnam-commitment.html.	33	Harold	Holt	to	Lyndon	Baines	Johnson,	29	August	1966,	Personal	Papers	of	Prime	Minister	Holt,	Correspondence	between	the	Australian	Prime	Minister,	Mr	Holt,	and	US	President,	item	no.	1,	series	no.	A7854,	document	79,	National	Archives	of	Australia	(hereafter	NAA),	quoted	in	Nell	Duly,	“A	Question	of	Loyalty:	The	Effect	of	the	American	Alliance	on	the	1966	Australian	Federal	Election”	(BA	(hons)	thesis,	Sydney	University,	2011),	44.		34	Calwell,	Address	to	the	House	of	Representatives.	
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That	the	ALP	was	sensitive	to	the	charge	of	being	“soft	on	communism”	sprang	largely	from	the	ongoing	actions	within	the	party	of	strongly	anti-communist	Catholics	who	had	been	formed	into	an	organisation,	the	National	Civic	Council	(NCC),	by	catholic	layman	and	one-time	editor	of	the	Catholic	Worker,	B.	A.	Santamaria.	As	a	consequence	of	their	actions,	NCC	groups	were	excluded	from	the	conferences	of	the	ALP	and	thus	formed	the	Australian	Labor	Party	(Anti-Communist)	in	1955,	which	became	the	Democratic	Labor	Party	(DLP)	in	1957.	In	the	1950s	and	1960s,	the	DLP	campaigned	in	elections	against	ALP	candidates,	invariably	accusing	them	of	being	communist	fellow	travellers	or	under	communist	direction.	The	DLP	had	never	any	chance	of	forming	a	government	in	its	own	right	but	is	often	credited	with	keeping	the	ALP	out	of	government.35	In	terms	of	parliamentary	discourse	then,	it	was	seen	as	electoral	suicide	for	the	ALP	to	appear	soft	on	communism.	When,	during	the	Canberra	anti-Ky	demonstration,	ALP	member	of	parliament,	Tom	Uren,	prevented	photographs	of	Calwell	being	taken	with	demonstrators	holding	Vietcong	flags,	the	message	was	clear	to	NLF	supporters.36		Fully	aware	that	it	would	face	opposition	from	the	party	that	gave	it	its	name,	the	Labor	Club’s	decision	to	set	up	an	autonomous	committee	to	raise	funds	for	direct	financial	aid	to	the	NLF	and	medical	aid	to	war	victims	in	NLF	areas	was	not	taken	lightly.	Much	of	the	framing	of	the	campaign	occurred	in	Print,	the	club’s	newsletter.	For	example,	the	leading	article	of	the	30	March	1967	issue	said	in	part:		In	the	United	States	civil	rights	groups	like	the	Students	Non-Violent	Coordinating	Committee	support	the	NLF.	And	last	year,	in	Australia,	the	Australian	Student	Labor	Federation,	the	Victorian	Young	Labor	Association,	and	a	General	Meeting	of	the	Monash	Labor	Club	supported	the	aims	of	the	NLF.	Below,	Print	publishes	the	official	programme	of	the	NLF	so	readers	can	see	just	what	it	is	that	the	Liberal	government	is	so	frightened	of	that	it	has	to	
																																																								35	Mary	Elizabeth	Calwell,	I	Am	Bound	to	be	True	(Melbourne:	Morning	Star	Publications,	2012),	118–125.	This	is	an	insider’s	account	of	the	“split”	by	the	daughter	of	Arthur	Calwell.	36	Deery,	“Arthur’s	Last	Hurrah,”	2.	
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send	twenty	year	olds	to	do	its	fighting	for	it	…	[There	followed	ten	points	of	the	program	of	the	SVNLF	(NLF).]37		Aspects	of	the	Vietnam	War	and	of	anti-war	activities	increasingly	featured	in	each	issue	over	the	next	months.	Print	no.	15	contained	a	lengthy	article	on	“Mary	McCarthy’s	reports	in	the	New	York	Review	of	Books	on	her	recent	visit	to	Vietnam	[that]	may	shock	those	who	thought	concentration	camps	ended	with	Hitler.”38	Issue	no.	19	carried	an	article	that	expressed	Labor	Club	misgivings	about	the	general	state	of	the	anti-war	movement:	“The	demonstration	to	‘celebrate’	American	Independence	Day	outside	the	American	Consulate	…	suffered	from	a	lack	of	revolutionary	zeal	…	Several	attempts	to	fire	the	movement	with	such	spirit	were	strangled	at	birth	by	the	abysmally	docile	leadership.”39	In	the	three	weeks	leading	up	to	the	decision	to	monetarily	support	the	NLF,	Print	contained	longer	articles	on	the	war:	no.	20,	on	the	generalship	of	the	war	(i.e.,	General	Westmoreland);	no.	21,	on	aid	to	the	NLF;	and	no.	22,	expanded	to	double	its	normal	size,	announced	the	decision	to	raise	money	aid	for	the	NLF	and	advertised	the	next	general	meeting	of	the	Labor	Club	in	which	a	motion	of	rescission	was	to	be	put	by	some	members.	This	issue	also	exposed	some	of	the	first	extreme	reactions	against	the	NLF	fund:	letters	including	words	such	as	“ATTENTION	COMMOS,	YOUR	DOOM	IS	SEALED!”	and	“‘Dear’	Messrs.	Nadel,	Price,	Osmond,	&	Coy	…	you	may	be	shot	by	a	bullet	marked	‘Monash	Patriotic	Australians’	…	a	Viet	Cong	mutilation	would	suit	you	better.”40	The	final	decision	to	raise	the	fund	had	been	the	culmination	of	a	series	of	five	Labor	Club	meetings	attended	by	between	50	and	80	members.	41	Michael	Hyde	wrote	that,	at	the	last	of	these	meetings,	on	21	July	1967:	The	most	intense	argument	revolved	around	the	sending	of	medical	aid	as	opposed	to	unspecified	aid,	the	preferred	position	of	the	Labor	Club																																																									37	Print,	no.	6,	30	March	1967,	1.	Authorised	by	Darce	Cassidy,	Monash	University	Labor	Club.	(Syntax	of	this	extract	is	in	the	original.)	38	Print,	no.	15,	15	May	1967,	1.	39	Print,	no.	19,	6	July	1967,	2.	40	Print,	no.	22,	27	July	1967,	2.	41	Hyde,	It	is	Right	to	Rebel,	22.	
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leadership.	But	money	for	medical	aid	had	already	been	collected	by	the	Sydney	University	Labor	Club—and	had	virtually	gone	unnoticed.	By	contrast,	“unspecified	aid”	signalled	to	the	NLF	and	to	the	world,	“Here’s	some	money—use	it	whatever	way	you	wish.	Use	it	for	weapons	if	that’s	what	you	need.”42	By	making	a	splash	in	the	media,	the	club’s	tactic	was	to	shock	passive	opponents	of	conscription	and	war	into	activity.	The	raising	of	only	medical	aid	was	seen	as	passivity	that	yielded	nothing.	The	news	media	reacted	in	the	desired	and	anticipated	manner,	taking	its	lead	from	the	Returned	Services	League	(RSL),43	the	DLP	and	its	associates	in	the	NCC.	The	Minister	for	Defence	said	that	Monash	Labor	Club	members	were	“unworthy”	of	citizenship.	The	State	Council	of	the	Liberal	Party	said	they	should	be	sent	to	Vietnam	or	to	jail.	The	DLP	declared	support	for	the	NLF	to	be	open	treachery.	The	Liberal	Club	called	the	Labor	Club’s	decision	“particularly	poor	taste”	since	“whether	it	be	right	or	wrong,	we	are	fighting	in	Vietnam	and	presumably	fighting	the	NLF.”44	
The	Sun	newspaper	was	particularly	well	informed	about	planned	student	meetings.	Departing	from	journalistic	even	handedness,	it	gave	pre-publicity	to	the	calling	of	a	special	student	meeting	by	members	of	the	DLP	Club	to	be	held	in	the	Alexander	Theatre	at	Monash	University.	The	Sun	printed	the	substantive	resolution	to	be	moved	by	Paul	D’Astoli	and	John	Bailey,	leaders	of	the	DLP	Club:		We	the	students	of	Monash	University,	meeting	here	today,	wish	to	disassociate	ourselves	from	the	Labor	Club	for	the	ill	repute	they	have	brought	on	both	the	students	of	Monash	University	and	the	University	itself,	by	offering	material	aid	to	the	N.L.F.		Irrespective	of	the	commitment	of	Australian	troops	to	Vietnam,	the	troops	themselves	(many	of	them	National	Servicemen)	deserve	the	full	material	support	of	the	Australian	people.45	For	the	DLP	Club,	the	meeting	was	a	debacle.	It	attracted	over	400	students	and	the	resolution	was	defeated:	224	votes	to	186.	Subsequent	motions	“supported	most																																																									42	Michael	Hyde,	“Getting	Out	of	the	Boat,”	Overland,	no.	199	(Winter	2010),	accessed	27	March	2016,	https://overland.org.au/author/michael-hyde/.	43	The	Herald,	25	July	1967,	9.	44	Hyde,	“Getting	Out	of	the	Boat.”	45	The	Sun,	27	July	1967,	7.	
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strongly	the	Labor	Club’s	right	to	any	political	views”	and	opposed	any	restriction	on	the	“use	of	University	facilities	to	any	University	Club.”	The	meeting	went	on	to	declare	that	it	“opposes	the	war	and	urges	the	Australian	government	to	do	all	in	its	power	to	seek	a	peaceful	solution	to	the	war	by	recognizing	the	N.L.F.	as	a	legitimate	party	to	negotiations.”46	While	no	motion	to	support	the	campaign	to	provide	unspecified	aid	to	the	NLF	was	put,	the	meeting	was	an	energiser	for	the	Labor	Club.	The	following	extracts	from	
Print	no.	23	explain	why:	When	we	first	decided	to	establish	a	fund	for	aid	to	the	N.L.F.	we	expected	to	be	isolated	at	first	and	that	we	might	eventually	raise	as	much	as	$500.	We	were	isolated	at	first	more	than	expected	and	more	violently	than	we	expected.	But	since	Thursday’s	meeting	the	support	has	been	incredible.	The	800	[sic]	people	at	the	meeting	declared	that	we	had	every	right	to	take	any	political	stand	we	like.		…	[A]	most	interesting	development	has	been	the	general	shift	to	the	left	of	University	opinion.	Instead	of	our	extreme	position	causing	a	reaction	to	the	right	as	some	people	expected	it	has	allowed	people	to	remain	moderates	while	adopting	a	much	harder	line.	Thus,	people	who	were	previously	saying	“well	of	course	I	don’t	agree	really	with	the	war	but	I	couldn’t	possibly	support	the	N.L.F.”	or	even	“I	don’t	object	to	medical	aid	to	the	N.L.F.	because	they	are	in	the	right	but	I	don’t	agree	with	providing	military	aid	while	our	troops	are	fighting.”	Since	last	week	the	Labor	Club	has	had	an	incredible	amount	of	publicity	and	surprisingly	enough	the	press	has	not	been	nearly	as	vicious	to	us	as	they	could	have	been	(note	the	change	in	attitude	from	Monday	to	Friday).	At	Monash	this	has	meant	that	any	time	last	week	if	there	was	a	group	of	students	talking	together	they	were	talking	about	Viet	Nam—a	situation	that	the	Labor	Club	could	hardly	object	to!47	Most	of	the	violence	referred	to	in	the	above	quotation	came	in	the	form	of	anonymous	letters	and	death	threats	addressed	to	individuals	such	as	Peter	Price	and	Martha	Campbell	who	had	had	direct	influence	in	formulating	the	unspecified	aid	policy.	Particularly	abusive	and	vicious	were	those	directed	at	female	activists	including	this	one	to	Martha	Campbell	who	was	the	Labor	Club	president:	Dear	Mrs.	Martha,	(Slut)																																																									46	Print,	no.	23,	31	July	1967,	1.	47	Print,	no.	23,	31	July	1967,	1–2.	Authorised	by	Keith	Jepson	for	the	Monash	Labor	Club.	
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You	should	be	rooted	and	burnt.	Sluts	like	you	should	be	locked	up.	If	ever	I	see	you	at	Monash	or	anywhere	for	that	matter	I	will	personally	cut	your	bloody	throat,	you	wouldn’t	even	make	a	good	whore	for	the	Abbo’s.	Our	blokes	are	being	killed	overseas	while	you,	you	harlot	are	sending	the	Viet	Cong	money.	I	write	to	you	on	shit	paper	to	a	bit	of	shit.	Yours	truly,	Aussie.	P.S.	I	know	you	so	watch	out.48	The	response	of	the	Labor	Club	was	to	give	as	much	publicity	to	such	threats	as	possible	in	a	way	that	showed	to	any	who	might	be	considering	opposing	the	campaign	the	type	of	person	they	would	be	allied	with.	That	this	strategy	bore	fruit	was	demonstrated	amply	by	one	of	the	consequential	resolutions	carried	in	the	Alexander	Theatre	meeting	referred	to	above.	This	resolution	called	on	the	SRC	“to	institute	civil	and	criminal	proceedings	against	any	person	or	persons	who,	in	their	opinion	have	assaulted	any	person	within	the	University	because	of	the	opinions	they	express.”	Ironically,	headlines	in	the	daily	newspapers	were	far	more	strident	in	condemning	the	Labor	Club	than	their	senior	writers.	An	example	of	this	was	Douglas	Wilkie	in	his	regular	column	“As	I	See	It”	in	The	Sun	under	the	heading	“Frontiers	of	Treason.”	In	this	relatively	long	article,	Wilkie	smudges	the	definition	of	treason	with	allusions	going	back	to	the	Boer	War	and	the	selling	of	wheat	to	China	for	its	diversion	to	“succour”	Nasser’s	terrorists	who	“are	killing	British	soldiers	in	Aden.”	After	a	half-hearted	slap	at	the	radicals	he	writes:	“But	until	the	anomalies	of	an	undeclared	war	(itself	a	breach	of	international	law),	and	all	the	humbug	and	hypocrisy	that	go	with	it	are	removed,	it	will	become	harder	and	harder	to	define	the	frontiers	of	‘treason.’”49	However,	articles	that	moved	behind	the	headlines	like	this	were	rarely	to	be	found	in	the	daily	newspapers.	The	Labor	Club	made	its	position	on	treason	clear	in	a	broadsheet-sized	pamphlet,	Which	way	TREASON?	(Figure	1).50	
																																																								48	Hyde,	It	is	Right	to	Rebel,	27.	49	The	Sun,	28	July	1967,	23.	50	Which	Way	TREASON?	Committee	for	Aid	to	the	National	Liberation	Front,	28	August	1967.	
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Figure	1:	Four-page	broadsheet,	Which	Way	TREASON?,	28	August	1967	In	this	manner,	the	Labor	Club	had	continued	the	role	of	the	syndicalists	and	socialists	against	the	“Great	War”	and	conscription	as	described	by	Verity	Burgmann.51	By	radical	campaigning	for	what	many	saw	as	outlandish	demands,	
																																																								51	Verity	Burgmann,	“Syndicalist	and	Socialist	Anti-Militarism	1911–18:	How	the	Radical	Flank	Helped	Defeat	Conscription,”	in	Fighting	against	War:	Peace	Activism	in	the	Twentieth	Century,	eds.,	Phillip	Deery	and	Julie	Kimber	(Melbourne:	Leftbank	Press,	2015).	Burgmann	has	further	explained	the	value	of	a	radical	flank	to	social	movements	in	other	contexts	in	“Imagining	the	
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they	acted	as	a	radical	flank	that	helped	create	political	space	for	the	more	moderate	movement.	A	radical	flank	strategy	requires	ongoing	regeneration	rather	than	a	single	flash	of	outlandish	action.		In	this	chapter,	the	actions	of	the	Monash	Labor	Club	can	be	seen	as	constituting	a	learning	process;	by	turning	unexceptional	and	liberal	outrage	at	the	hanging	of	Ronald	Ryan	into	an	offensive	against	the	symbols	of	state	power,	the	club	learned	that	outlandish	action	built	its	numbers	rather	than	repelled	them.	In	the	midst	of	a	general	mood	of	opposition	to	the	Vietnam	War,	it	recognised	that,	provided	it	was	sustained	over	time,	action	that	directly	confronted	the	power	of	the	state,	such	as	supporting	the	NLF,	would	garner	even	more	support.	Further,	if	the	reactions	of	state	authorities	could	be	extended	over	time,	numerous	opportunities	for	a	radical	flank	strategy	to	be	regenerated	would	be	provided.	Postscript:	the	Federal	Parliament,	with	the	support	of	the	Labor	Opposition,	eventually	enacted	the	Defence	Forces	Protection	Bill.	However,	by	that	time,	public	support	for	the	Vietnam	War	had	swung	to	opposition	and	it	was	never	used	in	that	context.	Monash	University	did	take	punitive	action	against	Labor	Club	activists	and	thus	extended	the	opportunities	for	radical	campaigning	into	the	following	years.	
																																																																																																																																																																					End	of	Capitalism:	‘The	Practical-Political	Value	of	Utopian	Thinking’	for	the	Climate	Movement,”	paper	presented	to	the	Australian	Political	Studies	Association	Conference,	September	2012.	
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Chapter	3:	Monash	Labor	Club	Beyond	the	Campus	
This	chapter	concerns	the	progression	of	politics	and	ideas	in	the	Monash	Labor	Club’s	extension	of	operations	from	the	university	campus	to	the	wider	fields	of	anti-war	and	working-class	political	activity	during	1968.	As	covered	in	Chapter	2,	the	Labor	Club	had	taken	a	broader,	radical	view	of	some	key	issues	that	concerned	young	people.	By	concentrating	the	preponderance	of	its	efforts	on	the	Bolte	degree	and	the	funds	for	the	National	Liberation	Front	of	South	Vietnam	(NLF)	campaigns,	the	club	had	become	notorious.		This	chapter	examines	the	discourse	of	radical	and	militant	action	as	it	developed	through	the	planning	and	experience	of	two	major	but	differing	demonstrations:	the	May	“sit-in”	in	Canberra	and	the	American	Independence	Day	protest	in	July.	These	have	been	chosen	because	their	planning	and	execution	by	young,	newly	radicalised	militants	contrasts	starkly	with	the	political	motives	and	practical	experiences	of	the	older	and	more	established	peace	movement.		This	chapter	positions	the	young	Melbourne	rebels	within	the	worldwide	surge	of	radical	political	developments	in	1968.	However,	those	upsurges	of	agitation	and	action	were	not	the	determinants	of	the	politics	of	Melbourne	radicals	in	general	or	of	the	Labor	Club	in	particular.	This	view	departs	from	that	held	by	others;	for	example,	Nick	Irving,	who	concentrates	on	the	importation	into	the	Moratorium	movement	of	the	“violence”	of	the	American	anti-war	experience	by	what	he	terms	the	“new	left.”1	This	is	an	insufficient	explanation,	as	the	Labor	Club	activism	of	which	he	writes	predated	both	the	American	experience	and	the	Moratoriums	in	Australia.	A	further	example	of	Irving’s	misreading	of	international,	radical	terminology	is	to	apply	the	term	“new	left”	to	organisations	such	as	the	Monash	Labor	Club.	It	expressly	rejected	this	term,	partly	because	the	Communist	Party	of	Australia	(CPA)	had	lifted	it	from	the	British	New	Left	Review	for	its	own	uses	and	partly	because	it	was	a	term	devoid	of	useful	meaning	to	young	radicals.																																																									1	Nick	Irving,	“Couldn’t	We	Actually	Try	and	Do	This	in	Australia?	Reading	the	Vietnam	Moratorium	in	Its	Do	This	Global	Context,”	in	Fighting	against	War,	Peace	Activism	in	the	
Twentieth	Century,	eds.,	Phillip	Deery	and	Julie	Kimber	(Melbourne:	Leftbank	Press,	2015),	268.		
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In	his	2002	study,	Sean	Scalmer	mentions	the	theme	of	“external	origins	of	radicalism”:		Some	radical	students,	like	Michael	Hamel-Green,	began	to	restudy	the	campaigns	of	Gandhi,	Martin	Luther	King	and	the	CND	[Campaign	for	Nuclear	Disarmament]	…	other	Australians	learnt	of	and	generously	praised	the	action	of	those	British	students	who	had	donated	aid	to	the	National	Liberation	Front.	Such	actions	seemed	“very	important.”	Perhaps	Australians,	too,	needed	to	take	up	these	campaigns.2		However,	this	mention	is	only	recognising	a	fact	of	chronology	en	passant.	It	is	not	a	statement	of	causality	and	Scalmer	takes	it	no	further.	On	the	contrary,	he	ascribes	developments	in	the	radical	expression	contained	in	demonstrations	as	fitting	a	schematic	sequence	that	progresses	from	“staging”	in	the	theatrical	sense	to	“contest”	between	protesters	and	authorities,	most	commonly	police,	and	finally	“disruption,”	that	is,	action	that	“involves	deliberate	illegality	of	some	kind	…	or	…	draws	direct,	reported,	negative	reaction	from	the	police	…	or	…	prevents	the	routine	use	of	a	particular	space	by	other	actors.”3	Scalmer	estimates	that,	in	Melbourne,	“by	the	early	1970s,	many	protesters	had	begun	to	embrace	the	new	role	of	contestation.”4	As	this	chapter	will	show,	the	stage	of	disruption	had	already	been	reached	at	Monash	University	in	1967	and	in	the	streets	by	1968.	Television	was	only	twelve	years	old	in	1968	and	it	had	brought	the	world	into	living	rooms,	something	that	older	generations	had	not	experienced.	To	the	young	radical,	world	events	seemed	to	have	come	to	a	crisis	point:	In	January–March,	the	Tet	Offensive	exposed	the	failures	of	the	American	war	effort	in	Vietnam,	provided	a	boost	to	the	anti-war	movement	and	strewed	spores	of	doubt	in	hitherto	acquiescent	populations.	In	quick	succession,	students	occupied	Rome	University	and	rioted	in	Warsaw.	In	April,	Martin	Luther	King	was	assassinated;	German	anarchist	student	Rudi	Dutsche	was	shot;	Columbia	University	was	occupied;	and,	in	China,	Tsinghua	University	was	occupied	after	a	severe	confrontation.	On	10	May,	barricades	were	constructed	in	Paris	and	factories	were	occupied,	giving	radical	students	unprecedented	experience	of	student–worker	alliance.	On	17	May,	Catholic																																																									2	Scalmer,	Dissent	Events.	3	Ibid.,	64–65.	4	Ibid.,	56.	
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priest	Philip	Berrigan	led	others	into	a	draft	board	office,	removed	records	and,	in	front	of	television	cameras,	set	them	on	fire	with	homemade	napalm.	In	June,	Bobby	Kennedy	was	shot	dead	and,	by	August,	the	Chicago	Convention,	where	he	had	been	a	contender	for	the	presidency,	was	rocked	by	tumultuous	demonstrations,	the	resulting	police	riots	played	out	on	world	television.	Throughout	those	formative	years	of	1966–1969,	the	high	points	of	the	Cultural	Revolution	in	China	were	periodically	reported	in	Melbourne’s	newspapers	as	the	revolt	of	the	young	against	a	bureaucracy	that	had	become	complacent	and	conservative.	While	the	activities	of	the	Red	Guards	were	seldom	treated	sympathetically,	the	message	to	youth	in	the	Little	Red	Book	of	Mao’s	quotations	came	through	clearly:	“The	World	is	yours,	as	well	as	ours,	but	in	the	last	analysis,	it	is	yours.	You	young	people,	full	of	vigour	and	vitality,	are	in	the	bloom	of	life,	like	the	sun	at	eight	or	nine	in	the	morning.	Our	hope	is	placed	on	you.”5	In	all	of	these	examples,	the	common	factor	is	the	revolt	of	the	young.	As	could	be	expected,	these	events	had	an	effect	on	the	developing	understanding	and	plans	of	the	radical	movement.	However,	the	needs	of	campaigns	against	war	and	conscription,	and	for	education	and	workers’	rights,	had	their	own	dynamics,	which	required	plans	and	solutions	that	could	not	be	simply	adopted	from	somewhere	else.	
Increasingly	Maoist	
The	nature	of	the	Monash	Labor	Club’s	propaganda	and	newsletters,	particularly	
Print,	was	to	welcome	membership	and	contributions	from	any	ideological	trend.	This	is	shown	by	the	variety	of	sources,	causes	and	activities	that	were	supported	in	the	pages	of	Print	and	at	its	bookshop,	such	as	this	advertisement:	LABOR	CLUB	BOOKSTALL—Open	today!	Help	save	jovial	Bobby	Gould	[a	Trotskyist	at	the	time].	Buy	“Vietnam	Action”—the	most	up-to-date	digest	of	material	on	Vietnam.	Also	on	sale	a	fine	selection	of	Fabian,	Social	Democratic,	Revisionist,	Maoist	and	Trotskyist	literature.6		
																																																								5	Mao	Zedong,	Quotations	from	Chairman	Mao	Tse-Tung	(Peking,	Foreign	Languages	Press,	1967).	6	“Advertisement,”	Print,	no.	21,	20	July	1967,	2.	
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Thus,	supporters	of	the	conservative	side	of	the	Australian	Labor	Party	(ALP)	often	found	themselves	on	the	side	of	the	most	experienced	and	outrageous	anarchists	or	Trotskyites.	This	means	also	that,	with	a	membership	reaching	over	300	students,	there	was	a	necessity	for	rancorous	ideological	disputation	to	be	worked	through	so	that	life	remained	lively	within	the	club.	From	the	outset,	anyone	who	wished	to	participate	in	the	club’s	activities	could	be	a	member.	Even	though	the	early	constitution	stipulated	that	members	would	support	the	program	of	the	ALP	and	that	membership	of	the	Communist	Party	was	proscribed,	there	is	no	evidence	that	such	rules	were	enforced;	CPA	members	were	not	quizzed	nor	did	anyone	have	any	qualms	about	excoriating	the	Labor	Party	and	its	leadership.	The	same	could	not	be	said	of	those	who	espoused	the	positions	of	the		National	Civic	Council;	they	were	attacked	by	all	other	tendencies	with	the	effect	that	eventually	they	formed	their	own	political	club,	the	Democratic	(or	Democratic	Labor	Party	(DLP))	Club.	In	the	early	years	of	1966–1967,	whatever	set	political	positions	they	brought	with	them,	involvement	of	members	in	vigorous	campaigning	meant	that	their	ideas	were	continually	developing	and	changing.	As	described	in	Michael	Hyde’s	It	is	Right	to	
Rebel,	the	main	positions	represented,	at	least	fleetingly,	within	the	club	in	the	years	1966–1969	were	the	ALP’s	social	democratic	wing	associated	with	Labor	parliamentarian,	Dr	Jim	Cairns;	the	CPA	grouping	around	Mark	Taft,	son	of	the	secretary	of	the	CPA;	Trotskyism	of	various	tendencies;	and	the	initially	miniscule	Maoist	tendency	that	experienced	“snowball”	growth	to	become	the	main	and	leading	influence.7	Until	1968,	the	political	education	of	members	had	proceeded	from	the	needs	of	action	in	the	club’s	various	campaigns.	These	campaigns,	particularly	when	they	concerned	the	Vietnam	War,	moved	the	membership	further	and	further	towards	acceptance	of	socialist	and	communist	ideas,	bypassing	both	the	liberal	and	the	social	democratic	ideals	of	the	Labor	Party	and	sidelining	the	CPA,	which	seemed	still	to	be	cowed	by	the	fears	engendered	by	the	Communist	Party	Dissolution	Act	
1950,	the	Petrov	Commission	and	other	Cold	War	attacks.	By	1968,	after	successfully																																																									7	Hyde,	It	is	Right	to	Rebel.	
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challenging	the	authorities	by	raising	money	for	the	NLF,	club	members	could	promote	revolutionary	actions	in	Australia	and	receive	no	objection	from	members.	This	is	not	to	say	that	members	were	not	concerned	about	the	apparent	political	blindness	of	such	pragmatism.	The	establishment	of	a	regular	Friday	night	political	discussion	gathering	off	campus	in	Caulfield	(called	the	“Caulfield	Cong”),	regular	articles	on	revolutionary	politics	in	Print	and	a	regular	supply	of	revolutionary	books	at	the	Monash	Labor	Club	bookstall	acted	to	remedy	the	situation.		In	July	1968,	the	Labor	Club	published	its	very	first	theoretical	journal,	Analysis.	Its	editorial	said	in	part:		Our	aim	in	producing	the	magazine	is	to	try	to	raise	the	theoretical	level	of	Monash	Labor	Club	members	and	ensure	that	the	experience	we	have	gained	in	the	course	of	agitational	work	is	summed	up	and	used	to	increase	our	political	effectiveness.8		The	first	issue	began	that	process	with	articles	such	as	“Reflections	on	Violence”	by	Georges	Sorel,9	which	dealt	with	the	aftermath	of	the	4	July	demonstration;	“From	Petrograd	to	Saigon”	by	Goran	Therborn,	reprinted	from	the	New	Left	Review;	and	“Universities	and	Student	Rebels”	by	Albert	Langer,	which	dealt	with	the	class	position	of	students	and	the	intelligentsia	in	an	advanced	capitalist	society.	As	alluded	to	in	Chapter	2	above,	many	of	the	mid-1960s	activists	and	organisers	of	the	Monash	Labor	Club	had	been	members	in	the	youth	arm	of	the	ALP—the	Young	Labor	Association	(YLA)—and	many	held	some	allegiance	to	federal	parliamentarian	and	contender	for	ALP	leadership,	Dr	Jim	Cairns.	Of	those	who	had	joined	the	Monash	Labor	Club	in	1966,	Dave	Nadel,	Darce	Cassidy	and	Albert	Langer	seem	to	have	been	the	organising	core.		Cassidy	had	previously	been	active	at	Sydney	University	where	he	had	been	the	secretary	of	the	Sydney	University	ALP	Club	from	1963	to	1965	and	editor	of	its	newsletter,	Wednesday	Commentary.	He	had	played	an	important	organising	and	practical	role	in	the	Freedom	Ride	that,	in	February,	1965,	had	successfully	campaigned	for	Aboriginal	rights	by	publicising	the	need	for	desegregation	of																																																									8	Monash	Labor	Club,	“Editorial,”	Analysis,	no.	1,	July	1968,	1.		9	“Georges	Sorel”	is	a	pseudonym.	
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theatres	and	recreational	facilities	in	New	South	Wales	country	towns	like	Walgett	and	Moree.	It	was	as	editor	of	Wednesday	Commentary	that	he	developed	the	practice	of	“guerrilla	journalism”	that	he	brought	to	Monash	University	with	his	editorship	of	the	Labor	Club’s	newsletter	Print,	whose	name	he	changed	from	Left	
Hook	for	the	first	edition	in	1967.	Dave	Nadel	was	also	no	stranger	to	political	organisation.	In	May	1965,	as	a	delegate	for	the	Monash	Labor	Club	at	the	National	Conference	of	the	Australian	Student	Labor	Federation	in	Canberra,	he	had	voted	for	the	successful	resolution	to	support	the	NLF.	In	the	subsequent	demonstration,	he	was	one	of	the	three	students	arrested	for	sitting	down	on	the	roadway.	He	had	been	an	active	member	of	Young	Labor,	had	had	some	admiration	for	Cairns	and	was	aligned	with	Trotskyist	groups.	Although,	at	times,	he	was	attracted	to	attributes	of	the	Cultural	Revolution	in	China,	he	retained	his	Trotskyism	while	working	more	closely	with	Maoists	than	with	any	other	tendency.10	Like	Cassidy,	he	had	excellent	journalistic	skills,	which	he	used	extensively	in	Print.	He	was	also	an	organiser;	in	1967,	he	was	president	of	the	Monash	Labor	Club,	a	member	of	the	Students’	Representative	Council	(SRC)	and	SRC	Committee	member.	Aged	seventeen	in	1966,	Albert	Langer	had	previously	been	involved	in	protest	politics	for	three	or	four	years	with	the	YLA,	specifically	in	the	“Youth	Against	Apartheid”	campaign.	Still	active	in	the	YLA,	he	joined	the	Monash	Labor	Club	and,	intensely	interested	in	the	Cultural	Revolution	in	China,	the	Australia	China	Society.	Along	with	Jack	Goddard	who,	according	to	the	Australian	Security	Intelligence	Organisation	(ASIO),	also	had	an	abiding	interest	in	China,	he	visited	China	with	the	Australia	China	Society	in	April	1967.11	Langer	took	the	experience	of	this	trip	seriously	and,	within	a	very	short	time,	had	begun	to	apply	Maoist	principles	to	the	practices	of	the	Monash	Labor	Club.	A	brilliant	orator	and	convincing	writer,	he	was	elected	vice-president	of	the	club,	which,	by	the	end	of	1967,	had	taken	on	some	of	the	Maoist	character	for	which	it	is	still	famous.	According	to	an	antagonist,	“the	Monash	Labor	Club	executive,	by	taking	the	initiative	on	almost	every	occasion,																																																									10	Dave	Nadel,	interviewed	by	author,	6	May	2016.	11	ASIO,	Langer,	Albert	vol	1,	1965–1967,	Series	Number	A6119,	Control	symbol	3931,	Access	status	Open	with	exception,	Barcode	9052222.	NAA.	
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monopolised	attention	and	formed	the	nucleus	of	an	activist	group	of	between	one	and	two	hundred.”12	In	fact,	by	1968	the	club	had	over	300	members.		The	years	1966,	1967	and	1968	saw	the	Monash	Labor	Club’s	numbers	swollen	by	a	bevy	of	student	activists	who	were	just	as	capable	and	willing	as	the	three	mentioned	above:	Kerry	Miller,	Michael	Hyde,	Peter	Price,	Jill	Scannell,	Warren	Osmond,	Chrissy	Sandford,	Kaye	Barry,	Alison	Isaac,	Jim	Bacon,	Martha	Campbell,	Ian	Morgan,	Bill	Dowling	and	more.	These	students	were	not	as	prominent	in	the	public	eye	as	Nadel,	Cassidy	and	Langer,	except	perhaps	for	Hyde.	Their	contribution	and	commitment	to	the	frenetically	paced	campaigning	consigned	ideas	of	leadership	contention	to	insignificance.	In	practical	terms,	this	meant	that	whoever	was	leading	a	particular	aspect	of	a	campaign	was,	for	the	time	being,	leading	the	club.	The	progression	of	ideas	can	be	seen	in	the	pages	of	Print.	In	1967,	the	articles	had,	in	general,	been	concerned	with	agitation	over	a	succession	of	campaigns,	first	about	the	conferring	of	an	honorary	degree	to	Premier	Henry	Bolte,	followed	by	aid	to	the	NLF.	As	the	year	progressed,	so	did	the	articles:	from	simple	organisational	information	and	news	to	explanatory	material	designed	to	inform	and	teach	students	about	the	nature	of	the	Vietnam	War,	conscription	and	the	role	of	“US	imperialism”	in	that	war.	Occasionally,	there	were	references	to	what	was	understood	to	be	left-wing	theory;	however,	these	were	always	attached	to	some	practical	issue	of	importance	to	the	club’s	campaigns.	The	style	of	the	newsletter	remained	cheeky	and	often	insolent	and	consistently	contained	articles	that	made	politicians,	imperialists	and	university	officials	into	figures	of	fun	and	derision.	Cassidy	had	read	his	audience	well	and	the	paper	was	a	sought	after	item	on	campus.	Yet,	Print	was	not	the	only	means	of	propaganda.	Most	issues	contained	small	advertisements	for	the	political	discussion	sessions	held	at	the	“Caulfield	Cong”	on	Friday	nights.13	The	topics	for	these	sessions	invariably	related	to	Marxist	and																																																									12	Paul	Francis	Perry,	The	Rise	and	Fall	of	Practically	Everybody:	An	Account	of	...	Political	Activity	
at	Monash	University,	1965–72	(Balaclava	Victoria:	P.	F.	Perry,	1973).	13	See	Chapter	4	above	for	a	description	of	the	“Caulfield	Cong.”	
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Leninist	theory,	imperialism,	Australian	class	analysis	and,	occasionally,	the	practical	needs	of	politics	in	Australia.	The	Labor	Club	also	ran	a	bookstall	in	the	Union	Building	that	often	featured	posters	of	Che	Guevara,	Viet	Cong	flags,	and	works	of	radical	Marxism	including	the	works	of	Chairman	Mao.	
Into	1968	
New	Year’s	Day	1968	promised	more	protest:	the	Vietnam	War	continued	and	so	did	conscription,	the	Liberal	Party	remained	in	power	and	the	anti-war	movement	remained	piecemeal	and	passive.	Then,	on	31	January,	the	Tet	Offensive	in	South	Vietnam	shattered	the	imaginings	of	war	advocates	and	those	who,	like	Whitlam,	had	claimed	that	the	war	was	“winnable.”	Reflecting	on	this	time,	Ken	Mansell,	then	a	Monash	student	and	member	of	the	Labor	Club,	writes:		To	the	Monash	Labor	Club,	Tet	represented	a	further	indictment	of	the	Gorton	Government’s	position	and	a	vindication	of	their	own	position.	A	revitalised	anti-Vietnam	movement	advanced	on	a	wider	front	with	students	taking	up	a	leading	position	and	using	increasingly	militant	tactics	of	resistance.14	However,	the	effect	of	the	Tet	Offensive	was	not	immediately	apparent.	After	all,	there	was	little	the	peace	movement	could	do	immediately	except	applaud;	the	formulation	of	plans	and	policies	to	take	account	of	the	new	situation	took	some	time.	The	Monash	student	rebels	were	still	to	return	to	the	university	to	face	the	aftermath	of	their	“aid	to	the	NLF”	campaign.	
Comparison	of	Two	Protests	
Owing	to	the	nature	of	the	club’s	campaigns	and	the	stage	of	development	of	the	club	itself,	the	activities	of	the	Monash	Labor	Club	during	1967	mainly	occurred	on	campus	and	cooperation	with	other	groups	outside	were	a	minor	aspect	of	their	work.	However,	with	developments	in	the	Vietnam	War	and	the	acceleration	of	the	conscription	campaign	in	Australia	at	the	beginning	of	1968,	the	club	sought	outside	allies.	This	forced	the	club	to	work	out	its	political	and	practical	stance	and	argue	for	its	position	as	an	organisation	equal	to	other	organisations	in	the	peace	movement.																																																									14	Mansell,	“The	Yeast	is	Red,”	32.	
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The	contrast	between	the	new	and	inexperienced,	represented	by	the	Monash	Labor	Club,	versus	the	more	serious	and	experienced	amalgam	of	church,	union	and	peace	groups	is	unambiguously	demonstrated	in	the	comparison	of	two	anti-war	actions	in	1968:	the	sit-in	mobilisation	in	May	and	the	US	Independence	Day	rally	on	4	July.	In	terms	of	off	campus	activity,	the	Caulfield	Cong	continued	and	Monash	Labor	Club	members	began	to	become	involved	with	general	peace	movement	activities.	A	major	event	in	the	peace	movement’s	calendar	was	the	“National	Mobilization”	(Against	Conscription)	that	took	place	on	Saturday	18	and	Sunday	19	May.	This	was	to	be	a	massive	“non-violent	sit-in”	at	the	prime	minister’s	residence,	the	Lodge.	It	aimed	at	having	“about	500	people	from	all	states	who	are	prepared	to	go	to	Canberra	and	allow	themselves	to	be	arrested.”15	Buses	would	bring	demonstrators	to	arrive	at	least	by	10	am	on	Sunday	19	May.	The	arguments	for	participation	revolved	about	moral	aversion	to	war	and	its	effects.	The	mobilisation	was	made	topical	by	the	cases	of	draft	resisters	Dennis	O’Donnell	and	Desmond	Phillipson	who	had	been	incarcerated	after	applying	for	recognition	of	their	conscientious	objection	to,	and	refusal	to	cooperate	in	the	war	effort.	While	Phillipson	had	claimed	pacifist	beliefs,	O’Donnell’s	objection	was	simply	based	on	the	belief	that	“the	war	in	Vietnam	is	wrong	in	the	same	way	that	Hitler’s	war	was	wrong.”16		The	National	Mobilization’s	organising	committee	consisted	of	the	Draft	Resistance	Movement	(the	precursor	to	the	Draft	Resisters’	Union),	Melbourne	and	Monash	Universities’	Pacifist	Societies,	Melbourne	and	Monash	Universities’	Labor	clubs,	the	Student	Christian	Movement,	the	Save	Our	Sons	movement	and	twenty	other	organisations.	In	the	event	itself,	the	Monash	Labor	Club	contributed	participants	in	large	numbers	who	were	willing	to	fully	comply	with	the	requirements	of	the	“civil	disobedience	strictures	of	the	campaign	and	who	felt	“strongly	enough	about	this	to	be	prepared	to	go	to	prison	in	non-violent,	but	effective	confrontation.”17	For																																																									15	Draft	Resistance	Movement,	Melbourne	University	Pacifist	Society,	National	Mobilization,	leaflet	advertising	impending	mobilization	event,	April	1968,	2,	author’s	collection.	16	Ibid.,	1.	17	Ibid.,	2.	
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individuals	who	had	signed	up	for	the	action,	the	message	of	passive	non-violence	was	reinforced	by	two	sets	of	instructions	about	how	to	conduct	themselves.	The	first,	For	All	Demonstrators,	set	out	the	details	of	the	assembly	and	“procession”	from	Parliament	House	to	the	sit-in	location	at	the	Lodge.	It	included	a	sketch	map	and	notes	from	“Civil	Disobedience	Co-ordinator”	Michael	Hamel-Green	that	warned	of	agents	provocateur	and	police	who	might	goad	demonstrators	into	“(a)	intemperate	statements	…	(d)	excited	or	undignified	behaviour	…	(f)	mutual	recrimination	among	leaders.”	The	notes	also	warned	that	if	“incidents	do	develop,	refrain	from	shouting	or	screaming	at	opponents	and	police	and	allow	marshalls	to	handle	the	situation.”	This	was	followed	by	what	some	participants	may	have	understood	to	be	a	threat:	“There	are	not	sufficient	resources	to	pay	the	fines	of	those	who	provoke	police	or	return	provocations.”18	While	the	Monash	Labor	Club	had	developed	quite	different	forms	of	action	during	1967,	it	held	Hamel-Green	in	high	regard	and	actively	accommodated	the	tactic	of	passive	resistance.	On	arrival	in	Canberra,	demonstrators	received	further	instruction	in	passive	resistance.	An	information	sheet	advised	them	that	they	should	already	have	“considered	the	consequences	to	their	careers	and	job	prospects”	and	warned	that,	when	participating	in	the	sit-in	at	the	front	gates	of	the	Lodge,	they	must	not	spread	“out	onto	Adelaide	Ave.	in	such	a	way	as	to	impede	the	mainstream	of	traffic.”	They	were	further	warned	that,	when	the	police	took	hold	of	them,	they	should	consider	“walking	on	[their]	own	feet	to	the	police	van	[or]	remaining	limp	all	the	way,”	and	were	advised	that	the	latter	risked	“the	additional	charge	of	resisting	arrest.”	Once	inside	the	van,	demonstrators	were	urged	to	“continue	singing	[and]	talk	quietly	and	reassuringly	to	any	who	have	become	distressed	in	the	course	of	being	arrested.”19	Monash	Labor	Club	activists	who	had	been	through	the	challenges	of	raising	money	for	the	NLF	and	the	consequent	backlash	of	authorities	found	the	protest	rather	tame	and	the	empty	residence	of	the	prime	minister	an	uninspiring	target.	However,																																																									18	Michael	Hamel-Green,	For	All	Demonstrators	(Melbourne:	National	Mobilization	Committee,	May	1968),	accessed	7	October	2016,	http://www.reasoninrevolt.net.au/objects/images/image_viewer.html?d0706,1,1,S.	A	set	of	instructions	for	participants.	19	National	Mobilization	Committee,	FOR	ALL	CIVIL	DISOBEDIENCE	PARTICIPANTS,	Canberra,	19	May	1968,	accessed	7	October	2016,	http://www.reasoninrevolt.net.au/objects/pdf/d0727.pdf.	Mimeographed	instructions	for	participants	in	the	National	Mobilization	against	conscription.	
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the	benefits	of	the	demonstration	were	obvious	enough:	new	recruits	to	the	anti-war	cause	from	beyond	the	university	student	population.	The	stated	aims	of	the	mobilisation	were	to	force	the	government	to:	a) release	all	conscientious	objectors	and	refrain	from	imprisoning	future	conscientious	objectors	and	draft	resisters,	b) reject	the	proposed	amendments	to	the	National	Service	Act,		c) repeal	the	National	Service	Act.20	At	the	sit-in,	the	hopes	of	the	organisers	for	a	large	number	of	arrests	were	realised	but	not	quite	in	the	expected	manner.	The	planned	activities	failed	to	excite	police	action	so	demonstrators	spilled	onto	the	roadway.	The	report	in	The	Canberra	Times	carries	the	substance	of	the	event:	As	about	50	of	them	sat	in	front	of	cars	attempting	to	use	the	road,	Inspector	Kennedy	told	the	Vietcong	flag-waving,	chanting	demonstrators	that	they	were	committing	a	breach	of	the	ACT	Traffic	Ordinance	by	obstructing	traffic	and	that	if	they	did	not	move	he	would	have	to	order	their	arrest.	The	sitters	sat	firm.	“Arrest	us,”	several	shouted.	“That’s	what	we	came	here	for”	…	An	ACT	police	wagon	was	loaded	with	the	first	of	the	demonstrators	who	were	picked	gently	from	the	ground,	two	or	three	policemen	to	each	sitter,	and	carried	to	the	wagon.	A	NSW	police	wagon,	borrowed	for	the	occasion,	and	a	chartered	Department	of	the	Interior	bus	were	then	filled.	As	each	demonstrator	was	removed	another	took	his	place	until	69	had	been	arrested	and	sent	to	police	headquarters	to	be	charged.	They	included	20	women.	Co-operation	between	the	police	and	the	demonstrators	reached	its	peak	when	the	sitters	began	to	walk	voluntarily	to	the	waiting	vans.	“It’s	never	been	like	this	in	any	other	demonstration	I’ve	ever	been	in,”	one	student	said	as	he	waited	to	join	the	prisoners	in	the	bus.	“It	sort	of	takes	the	steam	out	of	it.”21	This	article,	subtitled	“The	Politest	Protest,”	which	took	up	the	majority	of	page	1,	carried	pictures	of	the	sit-in,	one	of	which	is	included	below	(Figure	2).	In	the	whole	report,	there	was	no	reference	to	the	aims	of	the	demonstration,	and	the	Vietnam																																																									20	Hamel-Green,	For	All	Demonstrators,	2.	21	“Obliging	Police	Arrest	69,”	The	Canberra	Times,	20	May	20,1968,	1.	
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War	and	conscription	were	mentioned	only	by	their	association	with	the	words	“Vietcong	flags”	and	“draft	dodgers.”22	
	
Figure	2:	“The	Politest	Protest,”	The	Canberra	Times,	20	May	1968,	1	In	stark	contrast	to	the	content	and	tenor	of	the	above	article,	two	others	on	the	same	page	delivered	very	different	messages	about	the	Vietnam	War	and	civil	unrest	in	France:	“Vietcong	Rockets	Blast	Saigon”	recorded	the	advance	of	the	revolutionary	forces	right	into	“seven	of	the	city’s	nine	police	precincts”	with	the	deaths	of	twelve	Vietnamese,	while	“DE	GAULLE	TAKES	OVER	TROUBLES”	reported	that	the	French	president	had	just	flown	back	to	Paris	to	take	personal	control	of	the	situation	amid	reports	of	tank	and	troop	movements	around	Paris	and	the	arrival	of	Foreign	Legion	and	paratrooper	units	in	suburban	barracks.	One	million	workers	were	on	strike	and	the	Cannes	Film	Festival	was	cancelled	after	several	hundred	film	workers	seized	the	festival	hall	in	support	of	the	strike	movement.23	In	comparison,	
																																																								22	Ibid.	23	“De	Gaulle	Takes	Over	Troubles,”	The	Canberra	Times,	20	May	1968,	1.	
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the	Canberra	sit-in	seemed	an	idyllic	example	of	police–citizen	cooperation	in	which	the	anti-conscription	message	vanished.	The	anti-conscription	message	squeezed	through	on	page	7	of	the	same	newspaper	with	a	pictorial	report	of	the	demonstration	that	initiated	the	action	on	the	morning	of	the	sit-in.	The	report	carried	two	photographs:	one	of	a	demonstrator	with	a	Viet	Cong	flag	and	the	other	of	demonstrators	marching	on	the	street	in	front	of	Parliament	House	carrying	placards	relating	to	conscription	and	advocating	the	release	of	draft	resister	Simon	Townsend.	There	is	one	banner	to	be	seen,	that	of	the	Monash	Labor	Club.24	The	sit-in	may	have	reaffirmed	the	resolve	of	the	demonstrators;	however,	it	failed	to	raise	media	talk	of	either	the	war	or	conscription.	The	case	of	Dennis	O’Donnell	received	no	mention	at	all.	Perhaps	in	an	effort	to	salvage	some	publicity,	the	combined	university	Labor	clubs	demanded,	and	got,	the	use	of	the	lock-up	as	the	venue	for	the	opening	of	their	conference.	On	page	1,	The	Canberra	Times	reported	the	student	meeting	in	the	same	genteel	manner	as	it	had	the	whole	demonstration.	The	report’s	subheading	is	reproduced	here	and	the	text	below	(Figure	3).		
	
Figure	3:	“Student	Talks	in	Gaol,”	The	Canberra	Times,	20	May	1968,	1	STUDENT	TALKS	IN	GAOL	A	spokesman	for	the	Australian	Student	Labor	Federation,	which	is	due	to	begin	its	annual	convention	in	Sydney	today,	said	last	night	that	as	38	of	the	delegates	were	in	the	cells	they	had	decided	to	hold	the	opening	sessions	in	Canberra—in	the	lock-up.	The	police	provided	a	table	and	chairs.25	Of	the	sixty-seven	persons	arrested,	thirty-two	came	from	Victoria.	This	number	included	Michael	Hamel-Green,	to	whose	leadership	can	be	attributed	the	technical																																																									24	Ibid.,	7.	25	Ibid.	
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success	of	organising	so	many	people	to	travel	all	the	way	to	Canberra	and	to	take	action	that	they	knew	would	place	themselves	at	risk.	Also	arrested	were	leaders	of	the	Monash	Labor	Club,	Michael	Hyde,	Albert	Langer,	Kerry	Miller	and	Jill	Jolliffe.	Their	previous	experiences	in	provoking	headlines	about	the	Vietnam	War	and	US	imperialism	were	of	a	different	order	of	magnitude	to	those	of	the	sit-in.	In	Melbourne,	The	Age	newspaper	mentioned	the	demonstration	in	a	similar	fashion	to	The	Canberra	Times.	Its	headline,	“Canberra	Sit-In	Puts	61	in	Gaol,”	and	its	leading	article	reported	on	the	quaintness	of	the	sit-in	and	almost	completely	missed	the	purposes	of	the	action	except	to	say	that	it	was	“in	protest	against	Federal	legislation	to	close	loopholes	in	the	National	Service	Act.”	In	the	same	article,	Michael	Hyde	is	reported	as	saying	that	“Monash	students	had	demonstrated	despite	proposed	new	disciplinary	measures	at	the	university	which	made	the	students	liable	to	fines	for	‘activities’	prejudicial	to	the	university.”26	These	were	the	“disciplinary	measures”	instituted	in	the	wake	of	the	“Money	for	the	NLF”	campaign.	While	the	sit-in	had	certainly	attracted	the	print	media’s	attention,	the	focus	was	on	the	novelty	of	the	action,	not	conscription,	the	Vietnam	War	and	US	and	Australian	complicity	in	its	prosecution.	
4	July	1968	
Upon	their	return	to	Melbourne,	and	with	knowledge	of	those	genteel	headlines	foremost	in	their	minds,	the	Monash	Labor	Club	set	about	creating	new	headlines;	this	time	in	the	context	of	a	demonstration	in	counterpoise	to	the	4	July	celebrations	of	American	Independence	Day.	The	fact	that	4	July	was	a	day	when	US	officialdom	roused	feelings	of	pride	in	the	greatness	of	the	“American	Dream”	made	it	an	obvious	target	for	anti-war	protest.	Pre-existing	anti-war	groups	such	as	the	Congress	for	International	Cooperation	and	Disarmament	(CICD)	had	made	use	of	the	day	before	1968	but	had	attracted	little	attention.	These	older	groups	consisting	of	union,	ALP,	church	and	CPA	activists,	and	their	memberships	were	sustained	by	activities,	services	and	meetings	that	suited	their	support	base	and	successfully	built	group	solidarity.	They	had	little	use	for																																																									26	Hugh	Armfield,	“Canberra	Sit-In	Puts	61	in	Gaol,”	The	Age,	20	May	1968,	1.	
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outlandish	activity	that	might	get	out	of	control	and	attract	too	much	attention.	To	them,	Sean	Scalmer’s	notion	that	“public	interest	was	not	won	by	a	series	of	small,	local	actions	but	through	a	spectacular	activity	or	a	blaze	of	subsequent	media	coverage,”27	would	bring	too	many	imponderables.	However,	in	the	universities,	the	situation	was	reversed.	The	three28	university	Labor	clubs,	already	breaking	free	from	their	Young	Labor	origins,	had	transitory	memberships	that	relied	on	activity	for	the	attraction	of	new	members	and	the	sustenance	of	current	cohorts.	The	fact	that	conscription	was	targeted	at	those	of	university	age	was	a	further	reason	for	a	more	militant	approach	to	be	taken.	The	4	July	demonstration	of	the	previous	year,	1967,	had	been	an	archetype	of	the	form	of	protest	that	belonged	to	the	era	prior	to	the	advent	of	mass	media.	It	had	been	arranged	as	if	to	avoid	the	“spectacular	activity”	of	which	Scalmer	wrote.29	Tightly	organised	by	the	“Vietnam	Day	Committee,”	a	coalition	of	peace	groups	from	churches,	unions	and	the	CICD,	it	consisted	of	an	“Independence	Day	Vigil	and	Rally	on	the	theme	of	Independence	for	All.”	The	vigil	was	to	begin	on	3	July,	continue	overnight	until	a	mass	demonstration	on	4	July	between	5.00	pm	and	6.30	pm,	which	would	then	march	to	the	Assembly	Hall	in	Collins	Street	for	a	rally	at	8.00	pm.	At	the	Assembly	Hall,	the	crowd	was	to	be	addressed	by	Senator	J.	Keeffe	(ALP),	Dr	Jim	Cairns	MHR	and	Francis	James,	the	managing	editor	of	the	Anglican	newspaper.	For	further	activity,	the	Vietnam	Day	Committee	urged	the	writing	of	letters	to	the	US	Consul	Mr	W.	Wieland.30	While	the	demonstration	took	place	as	planned,	it	garnered	no	apparent	public	interest.	On	the	next	day,	5	July	1967,	The	Herald,	The	Sun	and	
The	Age	newspapers	carried	no	reports	of	it.	However,	American	Independence	Day	was	mentioned	in	The	Age	in	a	related	context.	Sir	James	Plimsoll,	the	secretary	of	the	Department	of	External	Affairs	had,	as	guest	speaker	at	the	American	Independence	Day	luncheon,	assured	his	listeners	that:	“Australia	and	America	were	not	simply	trying	to	win	the	war	or	preserve	Vietnamese	independence.	‘We	stand	for	something	much	wider—the	establishment	of	independence	and	security																																																									27	Scalmer,	Dissent	Events.	28	La	Trobe	University	made	up	the	third.	It	had	started	enrolling	students	in	1967	and	by	1968	had	a	Labor	Club	of	its	own.	29	Scalmer,	Dissent	Events.	30	Vietnam	Day	Committee,	leaflet	advertising	rally,	4	July	1967,	author’s	collection.		
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throughout	South-East	Asia,’	he	declared.”31	The	Age	had	clearly	estimated	that	an	affirmative	address	contained	more	news	value	than	a	mild	oppositional	demonstration.	
Moving	on	to	1968	
The	Print	issue	published	on	the	morning	of	4	July	left	nothing	mysterious	in	its	lead	article	about	the	demonstration	that	was	to	occur	that	afternoon.	Written	by	Michael	Hyde,	the	article,	entitled	“ROLL	UP	FOR	THE	MAGICAL	MYSTERY	TOUR,”	states:	Melbourne	will	see	the	biggest	demonstration	against	the	US	international	Police	State	since	Johnson	had	the	audacity	to	show	his	face	here.	Poster	carrying	processions	are	out—crash	helmets	are	the	order	of	the	day.	The	American	Embassy	is	to	be	held	in	siege,	and	to	this	effect	snipers	have	lined	windows	of	the	Chevron,	a	mortar	post	has	been	set	up	in	Fawkner	Park	and	a	napalm	loaded	helicopter	has	been	supplied,	courtesy	of	Dowd	(sic)	Chemicals	and	Ansett.	But	seriously	folks,	Bolte’s	brutes	(yes	the	cops)	are	bound	to	resent	this	…	most	likely	the	blatant	brutality	of	the	Victoria	Police	will	be	admirably	displayed	…	So	come	protected.	Leather	and	helmets	are	recommended.	Girls	wear	bras.	Slacks	and	tie	up	your	hair.	But	most	important	of	all	come.	…	It	begins	at	4.30	outside	the	American	Embassy	opposite	the	Chevron	…	a	bus	will	be	travelling	to	it	from	the	Monash—book	at	the	Labor	Club	bookstall.32	While	the	references	to	snipers,	mortars	and	napalm	were	ironical	asides,	they	simultaneously	carried	semiotic	allusions	to	the	Vietnam	War	and	the	violence	of	the	US	war	effort.	The	inference	could	thus	be	drawn	that	the	violence	of	the	war	would	be	applied	to	demonstrators	via	the	agency	of	the	Victoria	Police.	Even	though	Print	decried	the	visiting	of	personal	violence	upon	demonstrators,	there	was	no	hint	in	this	article	of	the	pacifism	that	governed	the	Canberra	sit-in.	Rather,	the	emphasis	was	on	active	defensive	measures;	it	was	implied	that	resisting	arrest	was	quite	in	order.	Further,	while	there	was	no	hint	of	any	intention	to	do	personal	violence,	it	was	implied	that	violence	to	a	building	and	flag	was	quite	in	order.	
																																																								31	“Reassurance	on	US	Link,”	The	Age,	5	July	1967,	4.	32	Print,	4	July	1968,	1.	(Emphasis	in	original.)	
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Quite	apart	from	the	pages	of	Print,	the	Monash	Labor	Club	mustered	student	participants	for	the	event	in	the	traditional	way,	via	posters,	leaflets,	meetings	and	through	other	student	organisations.	For	the	event	itself,	smoke	bombs	and	paint	bombs	were	constructed,	skyrockets	were	prepared	for	launch	on	the	lawn	at	the	park,	and	tombowlers33	for	the	horses	and	thick,	wired-up	doweling	for	the	tram	tracks	were	prepared.34	Students	from	other	universities,	especially	from	Melbourne	University,	prepared	in	a	similar	manner.	Provision	for	bail	money	was	made.	Other	anti-war	organisations,	including	some	unions	and	the	CICD	led	by	Sam	Goldbloom	and	Monash	University	academic	Max	Teichmann,	prepared	as	well.	Demonstrators	arrived	at	the	appointed	times	at	the	front	of	the	US	Consulate,	a	single-storey	office	complex	with	very	large	plate	glass	windows	partly	protected	by	shrubbery.	The	shrubbery	is	clearly	shown	in	the	film	that	ASIO	made	of	the	demonstrators’	arrival.	The	film	concentrates	on	members	of	the	CPA	and	very	few	members	of	the	student	contingent	are	shown.	This	is	understandable,	as	the	objective	of	ASIO	was	to	record	the	comings	and	goings	of	known	communists	and	the	position	in	front	of	the	consulate	was	an	easy	shot	from	their	static	position	in	the	Chevron	Hotel	opposite	(Figure	4).35	
																																																								33	A	tombowler	is	a	very	large	marble	about	the	size	of	a	table	tennis	ball.	34	Karl	Armstrong,	email	to	author,	19	October	2016.	35	ASIO,	“Vietnam	Coordinating	Committee,	July	4	Demonstration,	US	Consulate,	Commercial	Road,”	film	still	from	Persons	of	Interest,	smartstreetfilms.com.au,	Facebook	page,	accessed	28	November	2016,	https://www.facebook.com/personsofinteresttheasiofiles/.	
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Figure	4:	Communist	Party	banner	and	demonstrators	crowd	footpath	
between	the	main	demonstration	and	the	US	Consulate,	4	July	196836			The	very	large	crowd	of	demonstrators	completely	blocked	the	street	(Commercial	Road)	in	front	of	the	consulate	and	there	was	much	milling	about	as	leaders	of	the	various	peace	groups	attempted	to	address	the	crowd.	The	performance	occurred	as	planned,	smoke	and	crowds	surged	back	and	forth	and	skyrockets	added	to	the	spectacle.	However,	the	tombowlers	were	not	used	and	there	was	no	need	for	the	dowel	to	stop	the	trams	because	the	Tramways	Union	refused	to	allow	their	workers	to	drive	into	the	commotion.		As	the	daylight	dimmed	and	smoke	from	the	home	made	smoke	bombs	began	to	swirl,	a	posse	of	mounted	police	rode	at	speed,	long	batons	swinging	into	the	crowd.	Several	times	they	wheeled	around	and	charged	again,	sometimes	spinning	the	horses	around	for	maximum	effect.	The	Age	reported:	
																																																								36	Film	still	from	Persons	of	Interest,	smartstreetfilms.com.au,	Facebook	page,	accessed	28	November	2016,	https://www.facebook.com/personsofinteresttheasiofiles/.		
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For	the	first	time	in	25	years,	mounted	troopers	last	night	were	ordered	at	full	canter	into	violent	crowds	in	front	of	the	U.S.	Consulate-General	in	Commercial	Road,	Prahran.	The	horses,	rearing	and	frothing	from	fright	sent	men	and	women	reeling	to	the	bitumen.	Other	people	were	trampled	under	foot	by	protesters	as	they	tried	to	escape	the	horses.	The	horses	charged	into	the	crowd	at	least	a	dozen	times	to	the	aid	of	police	fighting	savagely	with	demonstrators	close	to	the	building.37	In	the	noise	and	spectacle,	and	from	the	cover	of	the	crowd,	missiles	and	stones	of	appropriate	size	were	hurled	with	sufficient	force	to	smash	some	of	the	glass	windows.	The	next	day,	The	Herald	reported	on	the	damage:	At	least	18	holes	pockmarked	the	glass	façade	…	a	large	blotch	of	red	paint	over	the	front	entrance	showed	where	a	paint	bomb	hit	it.	The	glass	damage	is	so	extensive	that	…	almost	the	whole	of	the	glass	front	will	have	to	be	replaced.38		A	successful	dash	to	win	the	US	flag	was	made	by	Dave	Rubin,	a	wharf	worker.	In	the	process,	a	policeman’s	hand	was	cut	by	what	The	Age	insinuated	was	a	razor	but	which	The	Sydney	Morning	Herald	recorded	was	broken	glass.39	Rubin	was	arrested	and	was	one	of	only	two	to	be	charged	with	riot.	The	other	was	Albert	Langer	in	a	separate	incident	later	that	night.	
The	Age	asserted	that	some	groups	of	people	“tried	to	get	near	the	building	with	four	gallon	cans	of	petrol.”	To	back	up	their	assertion,	the	paper	claimed	that	police	had	“confiscated	four	large	cans.”40	Nevertheless,	many	demonstrators	were	arrested	(none	was	charged	with	arson)	and	bundled	into	waiting	divisional	vans,	most	of	which	were	surrounded	by	protesters,	some	sitting	in	front	on	the	driveway	calling	for	the	release	of	the	prisoners.	By	this	time,	the	demonstration	was	a	melee	that	seemed	to	have	a	life	of	its	own,	with	leaders	of	the	various	groups	issuing	contradictory	calls	for	order	or	action.	The	loudest	calls	seemed	to	come	from	CICD	leader	Sam	Goldbloom	and	Monash	academic	Max	Teichmann	who	urged	the																																																									37	Jack	Darmody,	“Troopers	Ride	Down	Anti-War	Rioters,”	The	Age,	5	July	1968,	1.	38	“Fine	Not	Paid—Student	Gaoled,”	The	Herald,	5	July	1968,	3.	39	“Mounted	Charge	Ends	Mass	Student	Riot,”	The	Sydney	Morning	Herald,	5	July	1968,	1.	40	Darmody,	“Troopers	Ride	Down	Anti-War	Rioters.”	
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demonstrators	to	march	to	the	city	and	to	Assembly	Hall	in	Collins	Street	where	a	prearranged	meeting	was	to	be	held.	At	first,	such	calls	met	with	howls	of	derision	and	nobody	moved.	However,	soon	it	was	pointed	out	that	those	arrested	were	to	be	taken	to	police	headquarters	in	the	city	and	that	a	march	should	certainly	go	there.	Very	quickly,	the	road	at	the	consulate	emptied	as	the	march	proceeded	down	the	middle	of	the	main	road,	through	the	city	via	the	US-owned	Southern	Cross	Hotel	where	a	further	confrontation	with	police	led	to	further	arrests.	From	there	the	march,	numbering	about	1000	protesters,	proceeded	to	the	Russell	Street	police	headquarters	where	those	arrested	had	been	taken	for	processing	before	their	transfer	across	the	road	to	the	watch	house.	As	delegations	were	refused	entry,	the	crowd	milled	about	and	had	the	appearance	of,	if	not	the	reality	of,	an	attempt	to	rush	the	doors	en	masse.	The	police	were	ready	and	in	the	ensuing	confrontation	more	arrests	were	made.	The	
Age	put	it	this	way:		500	demonstrators	tried	to	storm	Russell	Street	police	headquarters	…	[where]	…	police	armed	with	batons	charged	the	demonstrators	to	break	them	up.	Demonstrators	both	men	and	women	and	police	emerged	from	the	riots	covered	with	blood	and	with	torn	clothes.41	
The	Sydney	Morning	Herald	reported	the	second	demonstration	in	more	detail:	A	wild	march	by	about	1,000	demonstrators	from	the	consulate	into	the	city	started	about	5.30	p.m.	By	the	time	they	reached	Flinders	Street	their	numbers	had	swelled	to	about	2,000	…	Rocks	were	hurled	at	the	City	Watchhouse	and	Police	Headquarters	as	police	fought	to	clear	the	area	…	Students	charged	the	Watchhouse,	punching	and	battering	police	with	placards	and	flags.	In	the	wild	melee	that	followed,	demonstrators,	many	of	them	women,	and	police	were	knocked	to	the	ground	as	mounted	police	charged	through	their	ranks.	After	about	10	minutes	they	were	finally	forced	into	La	Trobe	Street	and	flanked	by	about	100	policemen,	they	marched	to	Assembly	Hall.42	
																																																								41	Ibid.	42	“Mounted	Charge	Ends	Mass	Student	Riot.,”	The	Sydney	Morning	Herald,	July	5,	1968,	1.	
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Except	for	the	riot	charges,	most	arrests	were	for	offensive	behaviour;	however,	one	of	those	arrested,	Harry	Van	Moorst	from	the	Melbourne	University	Labor	Club,	was	also	charged	with	failing	to	pay	a	fine	outstanding	from	the	Canberra	sit-in.43	The	newspapers	reacted	as	expected	and	as	planned.	The	Herald	headlines	included	“Rylah	to	Police:	You	Must	Get	Tough”	on	page	1;	“Fine	Not	Paid—Student	Gaoled”	on	page	3;	and,	on	page	9,	“Stop	Govt.	Aid	to	Student	Rioters—Say	RSL	and	DLP.”	The	latter	article	contained	reactions	from	the	Prime	Minister,	John	Gorton,	the	leader	of	the	Country	Party,	George	Moss,	the	Returned	Services	League	(RSL)	and	the	state	secretary	of	the	DLP,	Jim	Brosnan.	The	radical	wing	of	the	anti-war	movement	had	tried	to	provoke	a	reaction	that	would	keep	the	issue	alive.	It	had	succeeded.		Whereas	The	Herald	proposed	that	it	was	the	demonstrators	who	were	at	fault	for	the	“violence,”	The	Age	could	be	read	both	ways.	Its	page	1	banner	headline	read,	“Troopers	Ride	Down	Anti-War	Rioters,”	and	was	subtitled	“Wild	Mobs	Storm	U.S.	Consulate,	Police	Headquarters.”44	This	front-page	leading	article	has	already	been	quoted	above,	and	subsequent	articles	and	editions	vacillated	between	understanding	and	antipathy	towards	demonstrators.	The	events	of	this	demonstration	reverberated	for	some	months	in	the	two	major	daily	newspapers.45	For	example,	on	9	July,	The	Age	carried	the	front-page	article	“PM	Acts	to	‘Tame’	Protesters”	and	on	10	July,	under	a	special	section	on	“The	Student	Revolt”	on	page	3,	“Govt.	Checks	Powers	on	Mob	Violence.”	In	the	same	edition,	the	letters	page	had	half	of	its	space	given	over	to	the	matter.46	To	the	media,	this	was	a	topic	that	would	sell	newspapers;	however,	to	the	radicals,	it	was	a	matter	of	carrying	their	message	beyond	the	demonstrators	to	the	population	of	Australia	and,	beyond	that,	to	inform	decision-makers	internationally,	particularly	in	the	US	and	Vietnam,	that	the	continuation	or	expansion	of	the	war	would	not	be	gladly	received	in	Australia.	
																																																								43	“Fine	Not	Paid—Student	Gaoled.”	44	Darmody,	“Troopers	Ride	Down	Anti-War	Rioters.”	45	Melbourne	had	two	major	daily	newspaper	groups,	The	Herald-Sun	with	The	Herald	as	the	afternoon	broadsheet	and	The	Age,	which	was	a	morning	broadsheet.	46	The	Age	(Melbourne),	10	July	1968.	
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To	that	end,	the	choice	of	venue	was	important.	A	neutral	venue	such	as	a	park	or	the	City	Square	would	have	missed	the	point	of	demonstrating	on	American	Independence	Day,	as	would	the	targeting	of	Australian	government	buildings.	There	were	US-owned	buildings	such	as	the	Pan	Am	building	in	the	city,	but	to	make	the	point	that	the	US	was	the	source	of	the	war,	the	US	Consulate	offices	signified	most	forcefully	the	point	that	the	radicals	were	hoping	to	make.	This	outweighed	the	disadvantage	that	the	consulate	was	several	kilometres	from	the	city	centre	and,	thus,	presented	minor	transport	difficulties.	Television	and	the	print	media	could	not	avoid	mention	of	the	US	and	the	reason	why	its	consulate	was	under	attack,	as	evident	in	newspaper	headlines	on	the	day	after	the	protest.	For	example,	The	Age	reported	that	“Wild	Mobs	Storm	U.S.	Consulate”	and	“U.S.	Flag	Burnt.”	The	Sydney	
Morning	Herald	carried	a	picture	of	the	events	at	the	consulate	with	captions	and	sub-headings	such	as	“Rioting	Crowd	outside	the	American	Consulate.”	In	the	Australian	Capital	Territory,	The	Canberra	Times	associated	the	demonstration	solely	with	the	Monash	Labor	Club,	a	subheading	reporting	that	“Police	Blame	Monash	Mob,”	under	which	it	was	explained	that:	“A	senior	police	officer	later	blamed	Monash	University	students	for	causing	the	riot.	‘The	demonstration	had	been	quite	peaceful	until	busloads	of	the	Monash	mob	arrived,’	he	said.”47	Targeting	the	US	Consulate	and	engulfing	it	with	placards,	banners,	and	NLF	and	North	Vietnamese	flags	meant	that	the	visual	media	could	not	ignore	the	central	issue	of	the	Vietnam	War.	Newspapers,	jealous	of	their	journalistic	integrity,	also	could	not	omit	mention	of	the	war.	For	example,	The	Age	reported	that	“hundreds	of	anti-Vietnam	demonstrators	fought”48	and	commented	on	the	“offensive	behaviour	after	an	anti-Vietnam	demonstration,”	while	The	Herald	reported	on	the	“offensive	behaviour	after	an	anti-Vietnam	demonstration	last	night.”49		Due	to	the	efforts	of	the	peace	movement,	the	association	in	the	public	mind	of	demonstrators	with	opposition	to	the	Vietnam	War	had	been	building	over	several	years.	This	demonstration,	despite	the	understandable	indignation	of	the	more	established	peace	groups,	completed	that	association	by	coopting	both	the																																																									47	“45	Arrests	in	Anti-US	Riots,”	The	Canberra	Times,	5	July	1968,	1.	48	Darmody,	“Troopers	Ride	Down	Anti-War	Rioters.”	49	“Fine	Not	Paid—Student	Gaoled.”	
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moderates	and	their	pro-war	antagonists	to	do	the	job	for	them.	If	it	had	been	a	practice	of	The	Herald	to	minimise	the	use	of	the	word	“Vietnam,”	it	could	not	avoid	the	use	of	signifiers	of	the	war	in	later	articles.	For	example,	reports	of	Labor	MHR,	Dr	Jim	Cairns’	comments	in	opposition	to	demonstrator	violence	signified	the	war	because	of	his	famous	opposition	to	it.50	The	use	of	opponents	of	the	demonstrators	had	the	same	effect,	for	example	“Stop	Govt.	Aid	to	Student	Rioters—Say	RSL	and	DLP.”51	As	both	of	these	organisations	(the	RSL	and	DLP)	were	well-known	supporters	of	the	Vietnam	War,	their	inclusion	in	a	headline	or	television	newscast	in	association	with	“protester,”	“student”	or	“demonstrator”	signified	that	the	issue	was	the	“Vietnam	War.”	The	federal	Liberal	Country	Party	government,	having	failed	to	take	decisive	action	over	the	collection	of	money	for	the	NLF,	was	quick	to	formulate	a	response	to	calls	from	the	RSL	and	DLP	for	federal	action.	Sir	William	Hall,	president	of	the	RSL,	said	that	“taxpayers’	benefits	received	by	university	students	should	be	revoked	if	students	were	convicted	of	serious	offences	as	a	result	of	demonstrations.”	As	if	in	response,	Prime	Minister	John	Gorton	was	reported	as	telling	“the	Federal	Attorney-General,	Mr.	Bowen,	to	consult	urgently	with	States	to	prevent	further	violence.”52	On	9	July,	The	Age	reported:	PM	Acts	to	“Tame”	Protesters	[Headline]	CANBERRA—Federal	action	to	curb	mob	violence	by	demonstrators	will	be	planned	by	the	Prime	Minister	(Mr.	Gorton.)	and	the	Attorney-General	(Mr.	Bowen)	this	week.	Mr.	Bowen	will	fly	to	Canberra	for	discussions	with	the	Prime	Minister	in	a	day	or	two.	He	worked	through	the	weekend	on	an	examination	of	courses	of	action	open	to	the	Federal	Government	to	impose	severe	penalties	on	demonstrators	guilty	of	violence.53	
																																																								50	The	Herald,	5	July	1968,	3.	51	“Stop	Govt.	Aid	to	Student	Rioters—Say	RSL	and	DLP,”	The	Herald,	6	July	1968,	9.	(Underlining	in	the	original.)	52	Ibid.	53	Hugh	Armfield,	“PM	Acts	to	‘Tame’	Protesters,”	The	Age,	9	July	1968,	1.	
81	
The	federal	response	was	not	restricted	to	the	Melbourne	demonstration,	as	there	had	been	demonstrations	in	every	state	capital.	This	included	usually	unassuming	Hobart	where	“yesterday	police	dragged	50	demonstrating	students	from	a	sit	in	in	Hobart’s	Department	of	Labor	and	National	Service	offices.”	In	Sydney,	“blows	were	exchanged	when	demonstrators	tried	to	block	the	path	of	the	Prime	Minister’s	car	after	Mr.	Gorton	had	left	a	Cabinet	meeting.”54	However,	a	close	reading	of	official	responses	reveals	that	both	federal	and	state	governments	estimated	that	the	spate	of	vigorous	protesting	with	its	disregard	for	property	and	resistance	to	police	would	die	away.	On	9	July	1968,	The	Age	reported	that:	The	Victorian	Government	has	adopted	a	“wait	and	see”	attitude	…	[Cabinet]	spent	yesterday	discussing	the	demonstrations	…	Ministers	were	reluctant	to	commit	themselves	to	a	firm	course	…	Sir	Arthur	Rylah	[Victorian	Chief	Secretary]	had	talks	on	Sunday	with	the	Federal	Attorney	General.55	However,	the	Federal	Government	was	not	in	any	hurry.	Despite	The	Age	reporting	that	Prime	Minister	Gorton	and	Attorney-General	Bowen	were	treating	action	on	“violent	demonstrations	…	as	a	matter	of	urgency,”	the	action	had	become	muted:	“By	the	time	Mr.	Bowen	reports	to	Mr.	Gorton	this	week	he	will	have	contacted	authorities	in	all	states.”56	As	continued	media	attention	to	these	Australia-wide	actions	meant	that,	increasingly,	American	Independence	Day	would	become	a	signifier	of	the	Vietnam	War,	conscription	and	of	domination	by	American	power,	it	was	not	in	the	government’s	interest	to	keep	that	signifier	in	the	public	eye.	Therefore,	it	gradually	disappeared	from	the	headlines	and	television	newscasts.	
Protesters	Happy	
In	its	immediate	response	to	the	demonstration,	the	Monash	Labor	Club	was	modest	in	its	reportage	and	commentary.	This	is	not	surprising;	after	all,	the	nature	of	the	event	and	the	response	of	the	police	were	what	it	had	prepared	for.	The	issue	of	
Print	on	5	July	saw	no	reason	to	recount	the	event.	It	had	already	been	covered	sufficiently	in	the	morning	newspapers	and	on	the	evening	television.	Instead,	its																																																									54	Ibid.	55	“Cabinet	Talks	on	Flare-Up	Here,”	The	Age,	9	July	1968,	1.	56	Hugh	Armfield,	“PM	Acts	to	‘Tame’	Protesters,”	The	Age,	9	July	1968,	1.	
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first	article	was	an	anticipatory	riposte	to	its	opponents.	“Last	night	the	US	Consul	General	[said]	‘I	doubt	if	peace	will	be	brought	to	Vietnam	through	demonstrations.’	He	is	right.	Every	NLF	rocket	is	worth	more	than	last	night’s	demonstration.”	The	same	article	carried	an	early	shot	at	the	media:	“The	Press	has	already	begun	to	moralise	about	‘political	violence’	while	they	conveniently	ignore	the	‘political	violence’	that	the	United	States	has	used	in	Latin	America,	Vietnam	and	elsewhere.”	The	article	concluded	with	a	caution	against	reliance	upon	the	Labor	Party:	“The	Labor	Party	does	not	support	independence	for	Vietnam	…	[it]	supports	the	American	Alliance	…	there	is	no	parliamentary	means	of	withdrawing	Australian	troops	from	Vietnam	because	the	Labor	Party	does	not	support	that	policy.”57	The	same	issue	of	Print	contained	a	particularly	vehement	rebuke	of	the	leaders	of	the	pre-existing	anti-war	movement,	CICD	Chairperson	Sam	Goldbloom	and	Monash’s	own	Max	Teichman:		The	so	called	“leaders”	of	the	anti	war	movement	showed	their	true	colours	last	night.	They	tried	to	break	up	the	demonstration	and	they	tried	to	stop	bail	money	being	collected.	Sam	Goldbloom	and	Max	Teichman	were	two	of	those	involved.	Monash	lecturer	Teichman	demonstrated	that	he	is	in	reality	a	mock	leftist	by	joining	the	police	at	last	night’s	demonstration.	Teichman	used	a	police	loudhailer	to	try	to	break	up	the	demonstration.	But	just	about	no	one	took	any	notice	of	him.	IT	WAS	NOT	A	MOCK	DEMONSTRATION	LAST	NIGHT.58	This	rebuke,	which	signalled	the	Monash	Labor	Club’s	willingness	to	air	differences	in	the	anti-war	movement	stridently	and	in	public,	became	a	hallmark	of	the	club	and	the	Revolutionary	Socialists	turned	Worker	Student	Alliance	that	it	engendered.		In	the	week	following	the	4	July	demonstration,	the	Monash	Labor	Club	relied	on	the	daily	press	to	keep	the	issue	alive,	so	much	so	that	the	next	issue	of	Print	contained	a	satire	lampooning	the	actions	and	statements	of	government	and	the	media	that	reported	them:		The	President	of	the	Monash	Labor	Club,	Mr.	Michael	Hyde,	said	today	that	the	violence	of	the	government	must	end:	or	else	…																																																									57	Michael	Hyde,	“Play	Up,	and	Play	the	Game?”	Print,	5	July	1968.	58	Michael	Hyde,	“Which	Side	Are	You	On?”	Print,	5	July	1968.	
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Mr.	Hyde	said	that	he	did	not	want	to	interfere	with	the	right	to	dissent	…	However,	the	government	is	not	entitled	to	resort	to	violence	as	it	has	done	in	Vietnam	…		“If	politicians	continue	to	act	in	this	irresponsible	and	anti	democratic	manner	some	thought	will	have	to	be	given	to	cancellation	of	privileges	like	V.I.P.	flights	and	overseas	junkets.”	…	Mr.	Hyde	said	that	he	would	be	flying	to	Sydney	where	he	would	attend	a	conference	of	socialist	students	to	discuss	ways	of	ending	government	violence.59	By	the	end	of	July	1968,	the	press	and	government	furore	had	begun	to	wane	but	the	issue	was	kept	alive	at	Monash	University.	The	29	July	issue	of	Print,	under	the	heading	“Anyone	for	a	Peaceful	Riot?,”	called	for	support	for	some	of	those	arrested	at	the	beginning	of	the	month:		Tomorrow	(Tuesday)	at	10.00am.,	15	people	will	appear	in	the	Prahran	Court	…	committal	proceedings	for	rioting	…	They	represent	Monash,	La	Trobe	and	Melbourne	students,	unionists	and	“outsiders”	…	It	is	the	mistaken	belief	of	men	like	Gorton	and	Bolte	that	if	a	few	dissenters	are	severely	and	savagely	victimised	then	no-one	will	be	prepared	in	future	to	stand	up	to	the	government	…	it	is	of	vital	importance	[to	be	at]	Prahran	Court	on	Tuesday	to	demonstrate	to	the	government	that	we	are	not	prepared	to	submit	to	police	state	activities.60		The	Monash	Labor	Club	took	advantage	of	this	issue	of	Print	to	announce	the	publication	of	its	first	theoretical	journal,	Analysis:		Son	of	Print,		Birth	Announcement	…	Analysis,	the	Labor	Club’s	theoretical	journal	has	been	born.	Already	it	has	repudiated	its	parent,	Print	and	started	producing	serious	articles.	So	if	you’re	tired	of	Print’s	“childish,	rerelevant	[sic]	and	extremist	style”	then	…	[contribute]	…	learned	dissertation	…	A	seminar	will	be	held	next	week	to	discuss	the	articles	contained	in	this	issue…	Contents	…	[include]	an	analysis	of	the	July	4	festivities.	61	
																																																								59	“Government	Violence	Must	End,”	Print,	10	July	1968.	60	“Anyone	for	a	Peaceful	Protest?”	Print,	29	July	1968.	61	“Son	of	Print,”	Print,	29	July	1968.	(Emphasis	in	original.)	See	page	3	above	for	further	reference	to	this	magazine.	
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The	article	referred	to	above,	“Reflections	on	Violence”	by	pseudonymous	Georges	Sorel,	began	with	the	characteristic	sarcasm	that	had	become	expected	of	the	Monash	Labor	Club:		The	July	4	anti-war	demonstration	was	an	enormous	success.	In	a	complex	dialectical	manner	it	has	created	a	tremendous	number	of	pacifists	…	Sir	Henry	Bolte,	whose	lust	for	the	life	of	Ronald	Ryan	was	all	consuming,	now	finds	himself	horrified	by	a	broken	window	…	John	Gorton	who	enjoys	violence	on	TV	just	as	much	as	he	has	been	pleased	to	practice	it	on	the	Vietnamese,	is	shocked	by	a	punch-up.62	The	body	of	the	article	considered	the	role	that	violence	played	in	maintaining	or	resisting	the	capitalist	order.	Sorel	referred	to	John	Locke’s	idea	that	the	foundation	of	representative	government	is	to	be	found	in	the	concept	of	“tacit	consent,”	and	provided	an	example	of	this	in	operation:		In	the	absence	of	your	active	refusal	to	consent	the	Government	has	the	right	to	conscript	you	into	policies	to	which	you	object.	The	corollary	of	this	is	that	active	resistance	is	necessary	in	order	to	remove	oneself	from	the	power	of	government.	Conclusions	about	the	degree	of	violence	that	may	then	be	used	were	reduced	to	two	questions:	Is	it	valid	in	a	democracy	where	there	are	other	means	of	changing	political	opinion?	Is	it	desirable	at	this	time?	The	first	question	was	answered	with	reference	to	the	lack	of	equality	and	access	that	maintains	a	capitalist	society:	“Does	the	illiterate	Gurindji	tribesman	have	the	same	say	as	Sir	Frank	Packer?	Of	course	not.”63	The	second	was	a	question	of	tactics.	Such	predictable	remarks	notwithstanding,	the	article	makes	an	important	contribution	to	the	discursive	task	of	melding	a	large,	disparate	group	of	radical	individuals	into	a	potent	group	of	committed	activists.	There	was	no	pandering	to	thoughtless	activism:		A	lot	of	people	have	declared	themselves	in	favour	of	the	violence	on	July	4.	Such	abstract	approval	is	anarchistic	and	devoid	of	sense	…		
																																																								62	Georges	Sorel,	“Reflections	on	Violence,”	Analysis,	no.	1,	July	1968,	1.	63	Ibid.,	2.	
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The	least	satisfactory	justification	…	is	that	it	makes	the	participants	more	militant.	THIS	IS	SIMPLY	NOT	TRUE.	The	consequence	of	a	broken	collar-bone	is	discretion	…	It	treats	the	masses	with	contempt	…	A	blind	man	can	distinguish	between	police	brutality	and	revolutionary	violence.	And	it	is	the	desire	of	revolutionaries	that	he	should	be	able	to	so	distinguish.	However,	this	criticism	was	no	throwing	up	of	hands	in	despair.	“Sorel”	took	the	question	of	the	violence	of	the	day	as	an	item	necessary	for	the	progression	of	the	discourse:		Endless	discussion	will	never	lead	to	action.	But	it	is	also	true	that	action	alone	will	never	generate	more	than	spontaneity	…	A	spontaneous	awareness	of	the	state	has	automatically	followed	from	the	July	4	demonstration.	What	can	only	come	from	a	previously	articulated	theoretical	position	is	a	theoretical	understanding	of	why	the	state	acts	the	way	it	does	and	why	it	must	always	do	so.	The	fact	of	violence	has	made	the	theory	of	violence	an	issue.	It	will	remain	inchoate	unless	a	full	theoretical	explanation	is	provided.	These	notes	can	be	no	more	than	a	starting	point.	The	classic	writings	of	Marx,	Engels,	Lenin,	Stalin	and	Mao	on	the	nature	of	the	state	must	be	included	in	any	worthwhile	analysis.64	In	addressing	the	question	of	the	violence	on	4	July	not	as	a	matter	of	emotion	but	as	one	of	the	nature	of	the	bourgeois	state	in	a	logical	intersect	of	theory	and	practice,	“Sorel”	positioned	his	readers	not	just	as	naive	greenhorns	with	radical	motivations	but	also	as	those	already	belonging	to	the	camp	of	aspirant	Marxists.	The	recommendation	of	the	study	of	Marxist	classics	would	confirm	that	notion.	
Framing	the	Notion	of	Worker–Student	Cooperation	
Published	at	the	end	of	July	1968	in	the	first	issue	of	Analysis,	“Reflections	on	Violence”	suggested	that	an	alliance	of	students	and	workers	was	a	necessary	and	practical	move	that	the	Monash	Labor	Club	needed	to	make	to	overcome	“new”	repressive	manifestation	of	the	state:	“We	can	only	progress	to	the	next	stage	politically	in	working	alliance	with	the	working-class	…	Up	to	now	our	contact	has	been	artificial.	Now	workers	and	students	face	the	courts	on	a	joint	issue.”65	The	necessity	for	student	rebels	to	at	least	coordinate	action	with	workers	was	acted	upon.	On	1	August	1968,	Print	carried	a	main	article	that	announced:																																																									64	Ibid.,	3.	(Emphasis	in	original.)	65	Ibid.,	4.	
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Recent	events	have	demonstrated	that	although	students	can	exert	pressure	for	social	change,	as	an	alienated	group	they	can	be	rendered	powerless.	It	is	from	the	workers	that	telling	pressure	can	come;	students	and	workers	coordinated	should	prove	a	most	effective	force.	With	this	in	mind,	the	[Monash]	Labor	Club	has	set	up	a	sub-committee	to	promote	increases	[in]	worker–student	liaison.	Letters	…	with	offers	of	cooperation	on	broad	social	issues	concerning	both	groups	were	sent	to	all	Victorian	Trade	Unions.	Later,	personal	representation	was	made	to	the	Trades	Hall.66	While	this	initiative	in	the	developing	discourse	may	have	seemed	naive	at	the	time,	some	success	was	claimed:	“Many	of	the	unions	have	expressed	strong	interest	in	the	scheme,	several	have	invited	students	to	address	meetings	of	their	members.”67	The	discussion	about	worker–student	links	continued	in	Monash	Labor	Club	meetings,	in	the	topics	addressed	by	guest	speakers	and	in	the	pages	of	Analysis	where,	in	late	1968,	Warren	Osmond	observed:		[Where]	we	can	work	more	effectively	is	to	heighten	students’	awareness	of	themselves	as	potential	employees	…	Through	the	SWCC	[Student	Worker	Coordinating	Committee]	and	other	means,	(e.g.	PAC),	we	must	bring	blue-collar	and	white-collar	unionists	on	campus,	introducing	students	to	the	principles	of	militant	trade	unionism,	and	break	down	the	feelings	of	status	and	snobbery	that	prevent	the	recognition	of	the	fact	of	class	struggle	in	our	society.	In	doing	this,	we	must	constantly	put	forward	the	ideal	of	a	society	in	which	the	division	between	worker	and	student	is	non-existent.68	Here,	while	it	may	have	been	a	matter	of	practical	necessity,	the	idea	of	worker–student	coordination	was	expressed	as,	and	limited	to,	cooperation	between	students	and	organised	unionists.	Osmond’s	argument,	that	to	heighten	student	awareness	they	needed	to	be	introduced	to	“the	principles	of	militant	trade	unionism,”	was	more	aligned	to	the	arguments	of	the	CPA	than	to	the	“Maoist”	guise	increasingly	adopted	by	the	Monash	Labor	Club.	The	first	union	to	respond	to	the	letter	mentioned	above	was	the	Waterside	Workers’	Federation	(WWF)	with	an	invitation	to	address	a	“job	delegates”	meeting.	The	WWF	secretary,	Ted	Bull,	was	then	vice-chairman	of	the	Maoist,	Communist																																																									66	“Theory	+	Practical	Experience	=	Effective	Solidarity,”	Print,	1	August	1968,	1.	67	Ibid.	68	Warren	Osmond,	“Universities:	The	Critical	Weakness,”	Analysis,	August	1968,	25.	
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Party	of	Australia	(Marxist-Leninist)	(CPA	(ML)).	The	argument	of	the	CPA	(ML)	was	that,	as	the	essence	of	trade	unionism,	even	the	most	militant,	was	to	restrict	workers’	struggle	to	the	striving	for	economic	betterment,	it	stood	as	a	prop	for	capitalism.	Later	discussions	drew	these	differences	into	focus	when,	at	the	end	of	the	year,	decisions	had	to	be	taken	about	political	and	organisational	forms	that	the	student–worker	relationship	could	take.	At	this	time,	in	mid-1968,	the	conflict	between	the	two	parties—CPA	and	CPA	(ML)	at	Monash	University—was	still	developing	and	adherents	of	both	sides	shared	the	activities,	platforms	and	publications	of	the	Monash	Labor	Club.	Rather	than	become	an	appendage	to	the	trade	unions,	the	idea	of	the	Monash	Labor	Club	extending	political	activities	beyond	the	campus	by	way	of	the	establishment	of	a	separate	and	independent	organisation	gathered	momentum.	Such	an	organisation	would	be	independent	of	both	the	Labor	Club	and	the	unions.	The	opportunity	to	give	it	material	form	was	provided	by	a	happy	series	of	connections	in	Greville	Street,	Prahran.	In	May	1968,	young	radicals,	Valerie	Palmer,	Valentine	Franks	and	Peter	Bland	rented	a	shop	front	and	residence	to	use	as	a	home.	Bland,	faced	with	the	prospect	of	conscription,	began	putting	Vietnam	War	material	in	the	window.	This	attracted	Monash	student	Jill	Jolliffe	who	lived	across	the	road.69	Jolliffe	had	had	experience	in	the	bookstall	at	Monash	and,	by	the	end	of	July,	she	and	others	from	the	Monash	Labor	Club,	including	Humphrey	McQueen	and	Jill	Scannell,	had	inspected	the	place	and	found	it	to	be	“appropriate.”70	By	August,	Palmer,	Franks	and	Bland	had	moved	out	and	Jolliffe	had	moved	in;	her	new	bookshop,	which	she	named	“Alice’s	Restaurant	Bookshop,”	began	trading	in	September.	Although	Jolliffe	had	the	proprietorship	of	Alice’s	Restaurant	Bookshop,	it	turned	out	to	be	a	convenient	venue	for	some	of	the	Monash	Labor	Club’s	off	campus	meetings.	This	suited	Jolliffe,	as	it	provided	a	supply	of	customers	and	invaluable	publicity.	Taking	advantage	of	this	happy	symbiosis,	the	Monash	Labor	Club	held	meetings	at	the	bookshop.	By	fortuitous	coincidence,	a	disused	bakery	was	offered	for	lease	just	two	doors	up	from	Alice’s	Restaurant	Bookshop.	By	December	1968,	Monash	Labor																																																									69	Mansell,	“The	Yeast	is	Red,”	34.	70	Ibid.,	35.	
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Club	members	“posing	as	respectable	art	teachers	approached	the	owner,	took	out	a	two-year	lease,	filled	the	show	window	with	pottery	and	prints,	and	began	to	clean.”71	It	was	Darce	Cassidy	who	held	the	lease	on	behalf	of	the	club.	The	building	was	double	storied.	The	ground	floor	consisted	of	a	shopfront	room,	a	workroom	with	a	huge	oven,	and	several	other	rooms,	one	large	enough	for	meetings.	Upstairs	there	were	bedrooms,	a	kitchen	and	a	living	room.	There	was	also	a	cellar	in	the	basement.	The	establishment	became	simultaneously	“digs,”	workspace	and	meeting	centre	for	budding	revolutionaries.	Immediately,	it	began	to	fulfil	its	purposes,	which	were	to	attract	other	young	radicals	who	were	not	Monash	students	and	to	establish	a	body	of	radical	socialists	that	could	exist	in	its	own	right.	The	latter	became	the	loosely	organised	“Revolutionary	Socialists”	whose	founding	is	described	in	the	next	chapter.	Rebellious	young	secondary	students	discovered	a	place	where	they	could	meet	together	and	where	sympathetic	mentors	would	help	them	to	foment	rebellion	in	their	schools.	These	secondary	students	formed	themselves	into	loose	organisations	that	they	variously	called	“Socialist	Secondary	Students”	or	“Students	In	Dissent”	or	just	“SID	Kids.”		
The	Demonstrating	Continues	and	Lessons	Are	Learned	
For	the	old	anti-war	movement,	the	complications	visited	upon	it	by	the	loss	of	control	in	the	4	July	demonstration	led	to	a	reassessment	of	itself	and	of	the	function	and	nature	of	demonstrations	in	the	umbrella	organisation	for	anti-war	groups,	the	Vietnam	Co-ordinating	Committee	(VCC).	This	committee	was	made	up	of	union	representatives,	church	groups,	peace	associations	and	student	groups.	It	endeavoured	to	conduct	discussions	about	the	war	and	to	publicise,	synchronise	and	rationalise	the	events	planned	by	its	constituents.	In	December	1968,	its	office	bearers	included	David	Pope	and	Keith	Stodden	from	the	CICD,	Harry	Van	Moorst	
																																																								71	Ibid.,	37.	
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from	the	newly	formed	Students	for	a	Democratic	Society	(SDS)	and	Monash	Labor	Club	members	Roger	Holdsworth	and	Dave	Nadel.72	On	25	October,	the	VCC	held	a	demonstration	outside	Dow	Chemicals73	head	office	in	St	Kilda	Road	and	attempted	to	burn	a	dummy	as	a	symbol	of	what	was	happening	in	Vietnam.	The	demonstration	was	meant	to	proceed	to	the	US	Consulate	to	present	the	remains	of	the	dummy	to	the	consul.	Taking	note	of	the	4	July	experience,	the	committee	had	negotiated	with	the	police	and	“agreement	…	[was]	reached	by	the	two	[VCC]	executive	members	and	the	Assistant	Commissioner	[Traffic	Operations]”	that	the	police	would	allow	the	“napalming”	of	the	dummy,	the	carrying	of	placards	and	flags,	the	use	of	loudspeakers	and	a	march	up	the	centre	of	St	Kilda	Road.	However,	this	is	not	what	transpired.	Instead,	as	the	VCC	reported,	the	police	formed	a	cordon	around	the	dummy	and,	when	it	was	finally	lit,	had	the	fire	brigade	waiting	to	put	it	out;	police	destroyed	placards	and	flags	“without	any	reason	whatsoever”;	police	used	“their	vans	and	‘courtesy’	cars	as	battering	rams,	[forcing]	the	demonstrators	to	walk	on	the	footpath”;	and	“on	four	occasions	the	police	ripped	the	cords	from	the	loudspeakers.”74	The	reversal	of	police	undertakings	might	have	been	expected;	after	all,	as	reported	in	The	Herald	in	the	wake	of	the	4	July	protest,	the	Victorian	government	minister	in	charge	of	police	had	told	police	to	take	the	“strongest	possible	action”	and	that	they	had	handled	the	4	July	demonstration	with	“perhaps	too	much	tolerance.”75	That	it	
was	expected	by	the	Monash	and	Melbourne	University	radicals	is	one	reason	why	this	demonstration	marks	a	moment	when	their	contributions	to	the	action	discourse	was	taken	seriously,	if	hesitantly,	by	the	mainstream	anti-war	movement.	Following	the	25	October	demonstration,	the	VCC	called	upon	its	constituent	bodies	to	provide	written	contributions	on	how	to	proceed	with	demonstrations	in	the	future.	These	were	published	in	the	December	edition	of	its	newsletter,	Viet	Protest	
																																																								72	John	Layfield,	“Secretary’s	Report,”	Viet	Protest	News,	no.	19,	December	1968,	accessed	12	May	2016,	http://www.reasoninrevolt.net.au/objects/images/image_viewer.html?d0726,8,1,S.	73	Dow	Chemicals	were	the	American	manufacturers	of	Napalm	used	in	Vietnam.	74	“Demonstrations—Oct.	25,”	Viet	Protest	News,	no.	19,	December	1968,	3.	75	“Rylah	to	Police:	You	Must	Get	Tough,”	The	Herald	(Melbourne),	5	July	1968,	1.	
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News.	Among	the	authors	were	John	Lloyd	for	the	CICD	and	Albert	Langer	for	the	Monash	Labor	Club.	Their	contributions	were	similar	in	some	respects	but	it	is	in	their	differences	that	the	state	of	the	action	discourse	becomes	clearer.	Lloyd’s	paper	recognised	that	demonstrations	were	“not	a	simple	release	of	frustration”	but	must	be	understood	as	a	political	tool:	Demonstrations	have	a	threefold	purpose:		1.	To	cause	a	creative	tension	in	the	minds	of	the	people	who	witness	the	demonstration	…		2.	…	to	produce	public	debate	…	that	will	lead	to	a	change	in	public	opinion	…		3.	…	to	have	the	capacity	of	putting	the	government	on	the	defensive	…	When	the	government	is	trying	to	defend	its	cause,	it	is	likely	to	reveal	its	own	weaknesses.76	Lloyd	also	had	some	words	of	caution:		When	a	government	can	direct	public	attention	from	the	object	of	the	demonstration	…	to	the	demonstrators’	methods	(throwing	mud-pies	etc.)	the	initiative	has	been	stolen	from	the	demonstrators.	Or	if	the	demonstrations	can	be	easily	dismissed	(“those	long-haired	students	again,”)	the	cause	is	seriously	impeded.	Civil	disobedience	may	certainly	be	warranted	on	some	occasions,	but	the	plans	need	to	be	announced	before	the	event	in	order	to	prevent	placing	people	who	are	not	prepared	for	each	action	in	an	unfortunate	situation.77	In	this	view	of	demonstrations,	Lloyd	and	the	CICD	ascribed	a	broader	role	to	demonstrations	than	simple	confidence	building.	However,	even	though	he	and	CICD	knew	well	the	benefits	to	be	had	by	use	of	the	mass	media,	this	was	trammelled	by	the	lack	of	recognition	of	the	opportunities	offered	by	the	mass	media	that	surrounded	them.	In	his	words	of	caution,	Lloyd	belittled	the	role	of	spectacle	in	attracting	the	media,	thereby	missing	a	mechanism	to	generate	public	debate	and	attention	that	he	said	was	so	important.	Lloyd	also	made	the	assumption	that	all	demonstrators	are,	or	should	be,	of	like	mind,	and	have	a	uniform	view	of	the	war	and	of	the	reasons	for	opposing	it.	Following	on	from	this,	what	was	needed	was	an	ideal	policy	on	demonstrations	to	which	everyone	would	agree	and	adhere.																																																										76	John	Lloyd,	“Demonstrations,”	Viet	Protest	News,	no.	19,	December	1968,	4.	77	Ibid.	
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Rather	than	treating	protest	actions	as	separate	entities	with	their	own	dynamics,	Langer’s	contrariwise	contribution	estimated	that	the	dilemma	over	the	nature	of	demonstrations	would	only	be	solved	in	the	interplay	of	the	discursive	positions	taken	within	the	anti-war	movement	itself.	He	addressed	the	question	of	differences	within	the	anti-war	movement	in	a	characteristically	direct	manner:		[The]	definite	division	…	between	the	“moderates”	and	the	“militants”	…	is	a	serious	and	deep	division	which	covers	the	whole	field	of	strategy	and	tactics	and	stems	from	differing	views	as	to	the	nature	of	the	movement	and	the	nature	of	the	war	itself.	The	moderates	tend	to	view	the	war	as	a	mistake,	either	for	strategic	reasons	or	because	of	its	“inhumane”	character.	They	point	out	that	the	official	explanations	for	the	war	are	lies	and	base	their	anti-war	propaganda	on	this	and	on	the	“atrocities.”	They	try	to	seek	a	political	solution	to	the	war	through	compromise	and	negotiations,	and	regard	support	for	a	victory	to	the	NLF	and	North	Vietnam	as	“one-sided.”	They	seek	to	achieve	political	change	within	the	present	social	system—either	through	a	strong	anti-war	movement	putting	pressure	on	the	government,	or	through	the	election	of	an	ALP	government	committed	to	their	policies,	or	both	…		Allied	with	the	moderates	is	a	tendency	which	regards	the	anti-war	movement	not	having	a	definite	political	goal	and	working	to	achieve	it,	but	primarily	as	a	means	of	clearing	their	consciences.	These	people	favour	“non-violent	sit-ins,”	“civil	disobedience”	and	so	on,	and	are	prepared	to	“go	to	gaol	for	their	beliefs”	…	The	difference	between	moderates	and	militants	is	not	one	of	age	or	temperament,	but	of	political	outlook.	The	militants	believe	that	the	war	is	a	natural	consequence	of	the	imperialist	nature	of	US	capitalism,	and	that	its	atrocities	are	a	natural	consequence	of	the	war	…	They	say	that	the	war	can	end	in	only	one	way—with	the	defeat	and	withdrawal	of	the	Americans.	Any	advocacy	of	a	compromise	settlement	is	seen	as	a	betrayal	of	the	Vietnamese	people.	The	anti-war	movement	in	Australia	is	a	component	part	of	the	general	struggle	to	end	American	domination.	Its	objectives	can	be	achieved	by:	1. Making	the	war	as	unpleasant	as	possible	for	the	government	by	disruptive	demonstrations,	resistance	to	conscription,	etc.	2. Mobilising	a	widespread	mass	movement	against	the	war	by	linking	it	with	issues	of	direct	concern	to	ordinary	Australians,	e.g.	increased	exploitation	of	Australian	workers	due	to	war	expenditure,	use	of	young	Australians	as	cannon	fodder	for	American	interests.	…	We	should	…	give	clear-cut	support	to	the	Vietnamese	people’s	struggle	on	the	grounds	that	they	are	right.	In	particular	we	should	point	out	that	
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the	NLF	and	North	Vietnam	are	winning	the	war,	and	that	it	is	therefore	pointless	to	go	on	fighting.	It	is	still	true	that	the	moderates	dominate	the	established	peace	organisations,	but	the	rank	and	file	has	left	the	leaders	far	behind.	This	is	because	a	whole	series	of	experiences	has	shown	the	militants	to	be	right,	e.g.	Whitlam’s	victory	in	the	ALP	and	the	withdrawal	of	that	party	from	its	Vietnam	policy,	and	the	NLF	victories	at	the	Tet	offensive.	Lately	the	sponsors	of	the	“Stop	the	Bombing—Negotiate”	slogan	have	been	shown	up	completely—Johnson	HAS	stopped	the	bombing	and	IS	negotiating,	and	so	what?	…	Demonstrations	themselves	are	not	very	important	…	The	role	which	demonstrations	do	play	in	winning	mass	support	is	by	gaining	publicity	…	To	attract	the	attention	of	the	mass	media,	any	large	mass	demonstration	should	be	as	militant	as	possible	and	cause	as	much	chaos	as	possible	…	It	is	clear	that	the	police	intend	to	apply	as	much	violence	and	intimidation	as	possible	at	mass	demos.	We	should	therefore	be	prepared	to	organize	our	own	resistance	when	necessary.78	There	is	a	remarkable	concurrence	between	these	two	contributions	in	terms	of	the	immediate	need	for	demonstrations:	namely,	to	create	difficulties	for	the	government	in	the	continuation	of	the	war;	change	public	opinion	from	support	to	opposition	to	the	war;	and	raise	a	mass	movement	of	as	many	people	as	possible	in	pursuit	of	those	aims.	The	differences	lay	in	the	purposes	of	the	demonstrators	and	the	practical	realities	of	achieving	those	purposes—that	is,	in	the	nature	of	the	demonstrations	themselves	and	in	the	conduct	of	the	demonstrators.	Where	Lloyd	hoped	to	keep	activities	under	control	and	under	the	threshold	of	social	disapprobation,	Langer	recognised	the	impossibility	of	controlling	all	the	occurrences	of	a	demonstration,	wished	to	give	rein	to	the	creativity	of	demonstrators	and	felt	that	chaos	was	far	more	effective	than	order.	Langer’s	view,	that	the	practices	and	policies	of	the	CICD	and	the	rest	of	the	old	anti-war	movement	stemmed	from	their	Manichaean	view	of	the	causes	of	the	war	and	of	their	continual	adjustment	of	anti-war	activity	to	the	needs	of	the	ALP,	was	a	strongly	held	position	of	the	Monash	Labor	Club.	I	have	given	more	space	here	to	Albert	Langer’s	arguments	than	those	of	John	Lloyd.	This	is	as	it	should	be,	as	this	is	not	a	contest	between	the	two	but	an	explanation	of																																																									78	Albert	Langer,	“Demonstrations,”	Viet	Protest	News,	no.	19,	December	1968,	6–8.	(Capitalisation	in	the	original.)	
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the	positions	in	the	discourse	taken	by	the	bodies	and	stances	they	represented:	the	CICD	and	the	older,	experienced	peace	movement	in	relation	to	the	Monash	Labor	Club	and	the	younger,	inexperienced	newcomers	to	the	anti-conscription	and	anti-war	movement.	It	is	significant	that	the	radical	young	militants	had	already,	by	1968,	rejected	both	the	ALP	and	the	CPA	as	vehicles	for	their	protests	and,	to	a	large	extent,	saw	both	of	these	old	parties	as	organisations	that	held	them	back.		The	differences	between	Lloyd’s	and	Langer’s	contributions	are	unambiguous;	however,	the	fact	of	the	VCC’s	willing	organisation	of	a	demonstration	of	the	nature	of	the	napalming	of	a	dummy	with	a	repeat	march	to	the	US	Consulate	and	its	castigation	of	the	police	attack	upon	them	was	a	signal	that	the	older	movement	had	shifted	ground	and	was	more	accepting	of	the	idea	of	disruption	as	a	valid	means	of	protest.	In	the	words	of	Scalmer,	“the	utility	of	the	more	unadorned	and	simple	forms	of	staging	was	also	being	undermined	…	Organisers	of	vigils	and	rallies	came	to	accept	that	their	actions	would	not	now	produce	a	‘spectacular	outcome’.”79	The	VCC’s	report	on	the	25	October	demonstration	stated:	We	have	tried	cooperation	with	the	police—it	doesn’t	work!	…	they	obviously	prefer	to	push	us	around	rather	than	cooperate	with	us	…	We	are	not	going	to	be	pushed	around	any	more.	To	prevent	violence	and	disorder	in	future	demonstrations	the	VCC	will	provide	its	own	police	force	and	will	request	the	regular	police	to	keep	clear	of	the	demonstrators.80	The	VCC,	at	its	21	November	meeting,	adopted	a	set	of	general	principles	regarding	the	conduct	of	demonstrations.	They	included:	1.	That	no	precise	form	of	demonstration	be	excluded	…	2.	Before	a	demonstration	the	plans	and	objects	should	be	set	out	for	…	component	bodies	of	the	VCC	and	the	resulting	consensus	should	be	the	program	3.	That	the	appointed	leaders	and	marshals	are	then	answerable	to	the	accepted	plans	and	objects	of	the	demonstration.	This	set	of	principles	was	a	signal	that	the	old	practice	of	holding	centrally	organised	vigils	and	static,	celebrity	meetings	in	Assembly	Hall	was	at	an	end.	The	culture	of	peace	luminaries	calling	upon	their	middle-class	followers	to	happy	clap	the	war																																																									79	Scalmer,	Dissent	Events,	49.	80	Layfield,	“Secretary’s	Report,”	3.	
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away	was	at	an	end.	The	form	of	demonstration	would	have	to	be	argued	out	on	the	floor.	It	was	here	that	the	younger	students	and	rebel	workers	excelled.	
Guerrilla	Journalism	
The	standing	of	the	Monash	Labor	Club	as	a	body	of	activists	who	could	combine	militancy	with	sufficient	political	openness	to	attract	a	large	membership	is	due	in	no	small	part	to	the	practice	of	what	became	known	as	“guerrilla	journalism”	in	their	publications.	The	term	“guerrilla	journalism”	was	coined	by	Darce	Cassidy	in	relation	to	the	experiences	he	had	with	both	Wednesday	Commentary	at	Sydney	University	and	Print	at	Monash	University.	He	explained	the	concept	in	an	article	in	the	second	edition	of	Analysis	in	1968.81		Recounting	the	experiences	of	Labor	clubs	in	both	universities,	Cassidy	described	how	their	difficulties	in	the	field	of	student	publication	became	the	spur	to	the	development	of	an	innovative	style	of	publication.	These	difficulties	included	a	lack	of	resources	and	competition	from	official	and	substantial	university	and	faculty	publications	but	mainly	stemmed	from	competition	with	the	fully	funded	and	established	student	weeklies,	Honi	Soit	(Sydney)	and	Lots	Wife	(Monash).	These	publications	were	subject	to	fourfold	censorship:	by	the	SRC’s	director	of	student	publications	(Sydney),	by	commercial	printers,	by	the	state	and	by	the	university	administration	that	could	withhold	funds.		The	answer	to	these	problems	lay,	not	in	a	“viewspaper”	whose	function	was	to	be	a	forum	for	discussion,	but	in	a	proactive	publication	where	“we	could	win	on	the	news	front,	and	we	could	be	more	outspoken.”82	To	remain	topical,	deadlines	were	to	be	twelve	hours	before	publication	and,	on	special	occasions,	three	hours.	
Wednesday	Commentary	and	Print	“specialized	in	zany	eye-catching	headlines”	and	carried	mostly	short	items	that	sometimes	bordered	on	obscenity,	often	broke	taboos	and	were	generally	written	with	a	view	to	provoking	authorities.	When	the	Premier	of	New	South	Wales,	Mr	Askin,	said	in	the	Legislative	Assembly,	“[Wednesday	Commentary]	is	the	filthiest	thing	that	I	have	ever	seen	on	paper	and	it																																																									81	Darce	Cassidy,	“Guerilla	Journalism,”	Analysis,	no.	2,	1968,	16.	82	Ibid.,	18.	
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makes	Lady	Chatterley’s	Lover	look	like	a	very	modest	publication	indeed,”	Cassidy	observed	that:		WC’s	name	was	made	…	[but]	although	people	began	to	read	WC	…	they	only	continued	to	do	so	because	it	was	brightly	written,	easy	to	read,	outrageous	and	up	to	date.	It	was	the	only	real	NEWSpaper	in	the	university.83	The	character	of	Wednesday	Commentary	was	transferred	to	the	Monash	Labor	Club’s	fortnightly	newsletter	Left	Hook	when	Cassidy	became	its	editor	at	the	beginning	of	1967.	It	was	reduced	from	two	stapled	foolscap	sheets	to	one	and	became	a	weekly	news	organ	with	shorter	articles	and	more	provocative	headlines.	Cassidy	explained	that:	The	name	Left	Hook	had	branded	it	as	a	polemical	sheet	rather	than	as	a	guerrilla	newspaper…	The	name	was	changed	to	Print.	This	had	the	advantage	of	not	meaning	anything	in	itself	…	[but]	…	it	came	to	connote	the	sort	of	material	that	the	newspaper	contained.	To	ensure	independence	from	the	student	union,	a	gestetner	was	purchased	on	time	payment	and	placed	in	the	Monash	Labor	Club	headquarters	where	it	could	be	used	at	any	time	at	all.	There	are	limitations	on	guerrilla	journalism.	Criticisms	of	Print	included	that	“it	was	too	extreme,	too	rash,	too	preoccupied	with	stirring	and	polemicising	instead	of	providing	a	rational	analysis.”	Cassidy	answered	these	with	the	following	observation:	It	asks	too	much	of	a	humble	publication	like	Print,	which	can	do	one	job	(that	of	agitating	within	the	university	on	a	popular	level)	…	Within	the	University	use	should	be	made	of	the	official	student	viewspaper	(Lot’s	
Wife)	and	other	student	publications	…	or	of	the	Labor	Club’s	Analysis	…	there	are	numerous	journals	outside	the	university	which	will	accept	left	wing	material,	Outlook,	Dissent,	Arena,	Australian	Left	Review	are	some	of	these.84	
																																																								83	Ibid.,	19.	84	Ibid.,	21.	
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Chapter	4:	The	4	July	Testing	Ground	and	the	Left	
Turn	
Chapter	3	described	the	discovery	of	a	former	bakery	as	the	site	for	an	off	campus	headquarters	for	the	Monash	Labor	Club,	which	became	known	as	the	“Bakery.”	Immediately	upon	the	signing	of	the	lease,	the	Bakery	began	operations,	which	consisted	of	cleaning,	decorating	and	publicising	the	place.	The	interior	had	been	rather	dowdy	and	the	years	of	bakery	activity	had	left	grime	and	flour	dust	in	every	crevice.	By	the	beginning	of	1969,	the	upstairs	area	was	a	little	cleaner	but	still	dilapidated;	nevertheless,	five	students,	including	Ken	Mansell,	initially	occupied	the	rooms	and	made	it	into	a	liveable	space.	Within	a	short	time,	the	building	was	hosting	general	meetings	of	the	Monash	Labor	Club,	meetings	of	the	Students	In	Dissent	(SID	Kids),	ad	hoc	committees	such	as	the	July	4	Action	Committee,	and	a	series	of	educational	forums	or	classes	nominally	run	by	the	newly	formed	Revolutionary	Socialists.1	Late	on	Saturday	mornings,	a	lunch	and	discussion	session	was	conducted	in	the	front	room	with	bread,	salads	and	cold	meats	provided	by	the	Revolutionary	Socialists	and	to	which	all	and	sundry	were	invited.	It	was	at	one	of	these	lunches	that	I	had	my	first	meeting	with	the	group.	It	was	a	strange	experience.	The	topic	for	discussion	was	the	defence	of	Dave	Rubin	and	Albert	Langer	in	their	coming	trials	for	their	actions	in	the	4	July	demonstration	of	the	previous	year.	However,	it	was	no	mere	discussion;	rather,	it	was	a	shouting	match	between	Langer	and	Rubin	about	the	conduct	of	their	trials,	whether	it	should	be	a	joint	defence	and	what	the	line	of	defence	should	be.	Langer	wanted	to	use	the	new-found	energy	and	energetics	of	the	anti-imperialist	movement,	while	Rubin	preferred	the	tried	tactics	of	the	Communist	Party	of	Australia	(CPA)	(of	which	he	was	a	member).	The	argument	ended	with	a	decision	to	pursue	separate	lines	of	defence.	
																																																								1	Mansell,	“The	Yeast	is	Red,”	41.	
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The	Revolutionary	Socialists	
The	purpose	of	establishing	the	Bakery,	was	to	facilitate	a	closer	working	relationship	between	student	and	worker	activists,	thereby	escalating	the	influence	of	revolutionary	anti-imperialist	politics	in	the	community	at	large.	The	organisational	form	this	move	took	was	the	creation	of	a	new	body,	the	“Revolutionary	Socialists.”	The	first	edition	of	Half	Baked,	the	newsletter	of	the	Revolutionary	Socialists,	advertised:		WORKING	BEE	AT	THE	BAKERY	(Where	the	Yeast	is	Red)	The	newly	acquired	headquarters	of	the	Revolutionary	Socialists	at	the	Bakery,	120	Greville	St.	Prahran	needs	cleaning,	decorating	and	some	alterations	to	make	it	a	suitable	centre	of	activity.	There	will	be	a	working	bee	on	Saturday	afternoon	(March	1)	and	all	of	Sunday.	Volunteers	are	requested.	When	completed	the	Bakery	will	offer	the	following	facilities	to	the	Melbourne	left:	*	Coffee	shop/small	meeting	room.	*	Room	for	films,	parties	and	large	meetings.	*	Office	for	university	newspapers,	high	school	underground	newspapers	and	other	publications.	Complete	with	typewriters	and	telephone.	*	Work	area	for	making	posters,	collating	magazines	etc	*	Gestetner	room	and	Gestetner.2	This	edition	also	advertised	Alice’s	Restaurant,	an	equal	pay	for	women	demonstration,	a	party	to	raise	money	for	the	defence	of	Albert	Langer	and	Dave	Rubin,	a	meeting	in	support	of	John	Zarb	who	was	then	in	gaol	for	refusing	to	take	part	in	the	Vietnam	War,	a	little	notice	about	Print	becoming	a	daily	newsletter	and	a	series	of	classes	at	the	Bakery	for	all	comers	on	“The	State”	to	begin	in	March.	The	front	page	of	the	newsletter	is	reproduced	below	(Figure	5).	
																																																								2	Half	Baked	(Prahran,	Melbourne:	Revolutionary	Socialists,	February	1969),	accessed	5	May	2016,	http://www.reasoninrevolt.net.au/biogs/E000612b.htm.	
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Figure	5:	Front	page	of	the	first	edition	of	Half	Baked		 	
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The	program	of	the	abovementioned	classes	was	advertised	concurrently	in	a	flyer	authorised	by	Darce	Cassidy:	1.	The	State:	what	it	is	 	 	 	 March	3	 Alan	Roberts	2.	The	Role	of	Revolutionary	Violence		 March	10	 Humphrey	McQueen	3.	Historical	Experiences	with	the	State		 March	17	4.	Role	of	Reformism	and	the	State	 	 March	24	5.	Need	for	a	Revolutionary	Party	 	 March	313	In	the	spirit	of	the	youth	revolt	of	the	1960s,	those	who	entered	the	radical	movement	at	this	stage	may	have	been	wary	of	organised	political	classes	that	resembled	bureaucratic	indoctrination,	hence	the	choice	of	class	leader	and	class	content	needed	to	demonstrate	candour	and	directness.	Alan	Roberts	was	an	anarchist	socialist	lecturer	in	physics	at	Monash	University	and	a	strong	supporter	of	radical	causes.	Similarly,	Humphrey	McQueen	was	an	independent	Marxist	teacher	and	budding	historian	who	provided	much	support	to	the	fledgling	Revolutionary	Socialists	and	to	the	Monash	Labor	Club,	even	though	he	was	not	a	student	there	at	the	time.	While	Roberts	conducted	his	classes	“off	the	cuff,”	McQueen	meticulously	planned	in	the	manner	of	his	training	as	a	teacher.	Thus,	the	content	of	his	class	can	recovered	through	his	“lesson	plan,”	which	was	distributed	at	Monash	University,	at	Alice’s	Restaurant	and	at	demonstrations	and	meetings	at	which	interested	young	people	might	be	found.		McQueen	divided	the	content	of	his	class	on	“Revolutionary	Violence”	into	eight	sections,	each	one	to	be	taken	by	a	class	member	who	would	make	a	“few	remarks,	raising	issues	and	asking	questions	which	others	could	then	take	up.”	The	eight	sections	covered	the	then	popular	works	on	violence	and	human	nature	by	Konrad	Lorenz	and	Robert	Ardrey;	contestation	of	the	violence	of	capitalism	and	its	laws	versus	revolutionary	violence;	perils	of	anarchist	violence	or	“propaganda	by	deed”;	and,	finally,	discussion	of	“the	intensification	of	the	Class	Struggle	under	Socialism	and	the	Dictatorship	of	the	Proletariat.”	This	was	accompanied	by	an	extensive	reading	list	that	included	readings	from	many	different	trends	of	political	thought:	
																																																								3	Darce	Cassidy,	“REVOLUTIONARY	SOCIALISTS,”	flyer	(Prahran	Melbourne,	February	1969),	accessed	12	May	2016,	http://www.reasoninrevolt.net.au/biogs/E000612b.htm.	
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Rosa	Luxembourg,	Franz	Fanon,	Lorenz	and	Ardrey	as	well	as	Marx,	Engels,	Trotsky,	Georges	Sorel	and	Lenin.4		As	could	be	expected,	Monash	Labor	Club	members	predominated	at	first;	however,	within	a	short	space	of	time,	non-Monash	activists	began	to	appear	at	Bakery	activities.	On	1	May	1969,	the	Revolutionary	Socialists	announced	its	existence	to	the	world	beyond	the	orbit	of	the	Monash	Labor	Club	and	the	SID	Kids.	It	did	this	with	a	“May	Day	Manifesto”	authorised	by	“Tony	Brooks,”	which	was	a	pseudonym	sometimes	used	by	Monash	Labor	Club	members.	It	was	titled	The	Socialist	
Imperative	(Figure	6).5	
	
Figure	6:	The	Socialist	Imperative,	a	Revolutionary	Socialists’	leaflet,	1969	
																																																								4	Humphrey	McQueen,	“Revolutionary	Violence,”	a	lesson	plan	for	the	Revolutionary	Socialists’	Lectures	on	the	State,	no.	2,	(Prahran,	February	1969),	author’s	collection.	5	Revolutionary	Socialists,	The	Socialist	Imperative:	A	May	Day	Manifesto	(Prahran,	Melbourne,	May	1969),	accessed	12	May	2016,	http://www.reasoninrevolt.net.au/objects/pdf/d0667.pdf.	
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This	manifesto	was	handed	out	at	the	May	Day	march.	Its	main	article	scanned	the	evils	of	imperialism	“preparing	to	deepen	its	exploitation	of	the	underdeveloped	world	…	[while]	…	the	underdeveloped	world	is	preparing	to	feed	itself.	Within	this	conflict	lies	the	dynamic	for	revolution.”	This	theme	developed	into	an	argument	about	the	Vietnam	War:	“Let	us	send	aid	to	Asia	by	all	means.	But	let	us	ensure	that	it	aids	groups	such	as	the	South	Vietnam	National	Liberation	Front.”	The	text	continued	with	the	need	for	socialist	revolution	in	Australia,	touched	on	the	reactionary	role	of	television	and	the	“events	in	France	this	time	last	year	[1968],”	and	concluded	that	“a	revolutionary	socialist	strategy	in	Australia	today	adopts	policies	which	point	up	the	reality	of	Imperialism	and	which	establish	the	practical	basis	for	its	overthrow.”6	There	followed	three	examples	of	how	this	might	be	applied	in	Australia	given	the	conditions	of	working-class	life.	This	was	at	a	time	when	the	union	movement’s	campaign	against	the	Arbitration	Court’s	use	of	its	penal	powers—soon	to	culminate	in	the	gaoling	of	Tramways	Union	Secretary	Clarrie	O’Shea—was	gathering	steam.	The	manifesto	called	for	the	arbitration	system	to	be	bypassed	by	a	shop	committee	system	that	“fights	the	bosses	directly.	This	would	obviously	mean	an	entirely	new	form	of	union	organisation.”7	This	rejection	of	the	idea	that	unionism	was	the	vehicle	of	the	socialist	revolution	was	to	become	important	in	later	battles	that	the	Revolutionary	Socialists	and	its	descendants	were	to	have	with	the	CPA	and	the	Australian	Labor	Party	(ALP)	in	the	Moratorium	movement	and	in	the	union	movement	itself.	Two	other	examples	concerned	current	struggles	over	conscription	and	education,	which	the	manifesto	attempted	to	answer	by	providing	a	practical,	anti-capitalist	view	of	the	way	forward.	The	reverse	side	of	the	manifesto	contained	the	lyrics	of	workers’	songs	including	The	Internationale,	Solidarity	Forever	and	The	Red	Flag.	At	the	very	end	came	a	small	invitation	to	participate	in	the	Revolutionary	Socialists’	activities.	Interested	parties	were	advised	that	the	next	series	of	“discussion	evenings”	would	be	“held	at	the	Bakery	every	Monday	evening	at	8	p.m.”	The	topics																																																									6	Ibid.	7	Ibid.	
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of	discussions	for	May	followed:	“1.	France—A	year	later…	2.	The	Role	and	Nature	of	a	Revolutionary	Party	…	3.	The	Role	of	Students	and	Workers	…	and	4.	The	Opening	Perspectives	in	Australia.”8	Given	that	the	recipients	of	May	Day	leaflets	were	often	committed	to	the	Labor	Party	or	to	any	one	or	all	of	the	union,	peace	or	socialist	movements,	the	framing	of	these	items	is	not	exceptional.	It	indicates	that	the	members	of	the	new	organisation	had	confidence	enough	to	express	their	ideas	in	an	environment	in	which	the	likelihood	of	ideological	challenge	was	greatest.	
The	Young	Communist	League	
Throughout	1967	and	1968,	the	discourse	of	the	Monash	Labor	Club	had	increasingly	adopted	a	position	in	the	spectrum	of	political	attitudes	somewhere	to	the	left	of	the	CPA	but	eschewing	anarchism	and	Trotskyism.	Its	members	had	become	increasingly	identified	in	the	press	and	in	other	political	organisations	as	Maoist.	Through	their	sponsorship	of	the	Revolutionary	Socialists	organisation,	they	confidently	described	themselves	as	revolutionaries	and,	as	shown	in	publications	such	as	Print	and	Analysis,	the	word	“communist”	had	ceased	to	be	a	pejorative.	However,	even	though	there	were	CPA	members	within	the	Monash	Labor	Club	and	the	Revolutionary	Socialists,	that	party	was	often	the	target	of	derision	for	its	apparently	subservient	attitudes	towards	the	ALP	and	the	trade	union	bureaucracy.	Further,	according	to	Mansell,	the	CPA	“was	seen	as	moribund	dead-wood.	It	was	the	one	thing	that	the	Trotskyists,	Maoists,	Anarchists	and	the	‘New	Left’	had	in	common.”9	At	the	same	time,	the	increasing	use	of	Maoist	terminology,	the	frequent	quotations	from	Chairman	Mao,	and	the	adoption	of	the	ethos	of	the	Cultural	Revolution	in	China	had	moved	the	Monash	Labor	Club	closer	in	outlook	to	the	Communist	Party	of	Australia	(Marxist-Leninist)	(CPA	(ML)).	The	CPA	(ML)	was	not	easy	to	get	close	to,	as	it	operated	in	a	clandestine	way	and	only	a	very	few	of	its	leading	members	were	publicly	known.	These	included	Ted	Bull,	secretary	of	the	Waterside	Workers’	Federation	(WWF),	Clarrie	O’Shea	of	the	Tramways	Union,	Norm	Gallagher	of	the	Builders’	Labourers	Federation	and	chairman	of	the	party	and	leading	barrister,	Ted																																																									8	Ibid.	9	Mansell,	“The	Yeast	is	Red,”	73.	
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Hill.	Its	newspaper,	the	Vanguard,	often	carried	articles	about	“Mao	Tsetung	Thought”10	and	news	of	the	Cultural	Revolution	as	well	as	articles	that	were	critical	of	the	Soviet	Union,	the	ALP,	CPA	and	trade	union	politics.	It	was	a	polemical	paper	that	raised	questions	of	Marxism	and	Leninism	in	a	straightforward	way.	However,	students	often	criticised	it	for	its	plodding,	heavy	style	and	its	frequent	carrying	of	articles	of	Chinese	origin	that	seemed	to	lack	relevance	to	Australian	readers.	In	terms	of	“youth	culture,”	it	was	as	inappropriate	as	the	CPA	and	the	authoritarian	ALP.11	Nevertheless,	concurrent	avocations	of	the	politics	of	the	Cultural	Revolution	in	China	by	both	the	CPA	(ML)	in	the	Vanguard	and	members	of	the	Monash	Labor	Club	in	Print	and	elsewhere	led	to	understandable	assumptions	of	a	material	attachment	between	the	two	groups.	Albert	Langer	and	Michael	Hyde	had	taken	separate	trips	in	1967	and	1968	to	China	under	the	aegis	of	the	Australia	China	Friendship	Society	and,	although	both	eventually	became	more	closely	aligned	with	the	CPA	(ML),12	in	1969,	neither	had	had	formal	contact	with	the	CPA	(ML).	Langer’s	account	of	his	conversion	from	ALP	to	revolutionary	politics	in	his	May	1969	interview	with	Mungo	MacCallum	is	quite	clear	on	the	matter:	“I	was	involved	in	A.L.P.	politics	before,	but	this	[the	war	and	conscription]	is	what	made	me	a	revolutionary.”		His	[Langer’s]	theoretical	position	is	one	of	non-aligned	communism,	which	to	him	means	the	dialectic	of	Mao	Tse-tung.	But	he	is	not	a	member	of	the	Peking-line	Australian	Communist	Party	(Marxist-Leninist),	and	is	rather	sick	of	being	referred	to	as	a	“close	friend”	of	its	leader,	Ted	Hill.	
																																																								10	As	there	are	no	suffixes	in	Mandarin,	Maoism	is	written	as	“Mao	Tsetung	Thought”	(Máozédōng	sīxiǎng).	The	Vanguard	and	the	CPA	(ML)	followed	this	convention.	
11 The	ALP	is	“Authoritarian”	in	that	party	members	and	branches	lack	immediate	power;	policies	and	decisions	are	subject	to	federal	and	state	executive	intervention.	This	was	the	time	when	the	Victorian	ALP	was	under	threat	from	Federal	leadership.	In	1971,	this	was	summed	up	by	John	Sendy:	“The	Hartley-Hogg	forces	seized	the	time	of	undemocratic	and	unpopular	Federal	intervention	to	promote	a	struggle	for	democracy	in	the	party	and	for	a	more	challenging	anti-capitalist,	extra-parliamentary,	and	more	pronounced	socialist-inclined	program	than	has	been	witnessed	in	the	ALP	for	generations	—	this	at	a	time	when	there	is	an	escalation	of	leftwing	movements	of	all	kinds	and	a	pronounced	anti-authoritarian	and	anti-capitalist	trend	among	the	nation’s	youth.” John	Sendy,		“Socialism	and	the	ALP	Left,”	Australian	Left	Review																															
no.	29,	March	1971,	8.	 12	Michael	Hyde,	unnamed	interviewer,	Persons	of	Interest,	Street	Smart	Films,	(SBS	telecast,	9	March	2017)	https://www.smartstreetfilms.com.au/catalogue/persons-of-interest-dvd.	
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“I’ve	hardly	met	the	man,”	he	says	rather	plaintively.	“I’m	not	involved	with	linking	up	with	the	CP—people	who	aren’t	so	open	about	their	own	positions.”13	The	structure	of	the	CPA	(ML)	consisted	of	a	Central	Committee	whose	communication	with	members	mostly	occurred	in	one	on	one	discussion	in	a	vertical	line	of	contacts.	It	neither	issued	instructions	nor	conducted	classes	and	relied	mostly	upon	its	newspaper	the	Vanguard	to	publicise	its	political	line.	Public	oratory	in	which	the	party	made	its	policies	and	general	principles	known	was	invariably	the	preserve	of	its	chairman,	E.	F.	(Ted)	Hill.	Where	the	party’s	stance	on	practical	matters	such	as	demonstrations	was	concerned,	Ted	Bull	was	frequently	in	demand.	On	22	March	1967,	Ted	Hill	made	an	address	to	Monash	students	on	the	Chinese	Cultural	Revolution.14	Although	the	content	of	that	speech	contained	nothing	that	was	unavailable	in	other	sources,	the	fact	that	it	took	place	was	important.	Although	the	event	was	not	commented	upon	by	Print,	the	topic	struck	a	note	of	senior	endorsement	for	what	had,	until	then,	been	an	isolated	position	of	a	few	young	radicals.	What	came	to	be	understood	by	Monash	Labor	Club	members	as	“Marxism-Leninism”	occurred	through	the	agency	of	independent	students	attempting	to	analyse	their	own	increasingly	complex	and	contradictory	existence	and	using	the	analyses	and	experience	of	revolutionary	practitioners	and	theorists	both	present	and	past.	For	those	radicals	who	had	earlier	sought	support	in	the	Young	Labor	Association,	the	solutions	to	their	predicament	could	not	be	found	in	any	of	the	major	political	parties.	Despite	Arthur	Calwell’s	efforts,	the	ALP	was	compromised	over	the	Vietnam	War.	The	CPA’s	doubletalk	regarding	the	Soviet	Union,	its	apparent	subservience	to	trade	union	politics	and	its	subjection	of	the	anti-war	struggle	to	the	needs	of	the	ALP,	had	depleted	its	credibility.	This	view	of	the	development	of	the	ideas	of	the	Revolutionary	Socialists	is	reflected	in	the	abovementioned	Langer–MacCallum	interview:																																																									13	Mungo	MacCallum,	“The	Maoist	from	Melbourne,”	The	Australian,	14	May	1969,	11.	14	E.	F.	Hill,	Speech	to	University	Students	on	China’s	Proletarian	Cultural	Revolution	(Melbourne:	CPA	(ML),	22	March	1967),	author’s	collection.	May	be	accessed	from	http://www.marxistsfr.org/history/erol/australia/hill-cr.pdf	and	http://www.reasoninrevolt.net.au/objects/pdf/d0903.pdf.	
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“My	theoretical	position	then	[i.e.,	before	1966]	was	that	things	could	be	changed	by	a	socialist	A.L.P.,	and	I	worked	for	several	years	in	the	A.L.P.	“Then,	as	the	movement	developed	outside	the	A.L.P.	I	came	to	see	that	society	could	be	changed,	and	revolution	was	not	only	possible	but	inevitable.”	…	He	[Langer]	became	involved	with	the	Labor	Club,	watched	the	movement	grow	in	the	universities,	became	disillusioned	with	the	A.L.P.	during	the	1966	elections,	and	started	reading	the	Marxist	classics,	“because	of	what	I	saw	was	happening—I	was	looking	for	an	explanation.”	It	was	the	Vietnam	war,	and	its	escalation	which	led	him	to	his	present	position,	and	he	is	sure	that	the	event	crystallised	the	student	movement.15	In	the	absence	of	an	accessible	and	credible	communist	organisation	capable	of	developing	an	adequate	theoretical	and	practical	movement,	some	of	the	Monash	students	took	the	task	upon	themselves.	On	the	first	day	of	February	1969,	a	new	organisation	among	student	radicals	came	into	being.	This	day	marked	the	first	meeting	of	the	Young	Communist	League	(YCL).	This	body	preferred	to	operate	without	public	knowledge	and	its	papers	for	discussion	were	contained	in	an	internal	bulletin	that,	for	the	first	issue	only,	was	called	Bolshevik.16	Its	editorial	and	three	articles,	in	keeping	with	the	perceived	need	for	security	from	ASIO	(Australian	Security	Intelligence	Organisation)	snooping,	were	all	written	by	pseudonymous	authors:	“The	Need	for	Cells”	by	“Peter	Collins,”	“Student–Worker	Alliance”	by	“Len	Coleman”	and	“On	Theoretical	Study”	by	“Peter	Collins.”	In	the	editorial,	Collins	explained	that	the	purpose	of	Bolshevik	was	to	ensure	that	all	members	of	the	YCL	would	“think	carefully	about	the	points	at	issue	…	[because]	People’s	ideas	become	more	coherent	if	they	have	to	put	them	down	in	writing,”	and	that	there	probably	would	be	no	more	general	meetings	after	the	first	one	because	“this	bulletin	would	become	the	main	means	of	internal	communication.”17	YCL	members	were	called	upon	to	contribute	articles	about	how	the	YCL	should	be	organised	and	about	the	“general	line	to	be	taken.”18	This	is	the	type	of	structure	and	practice	that	would	be	expected	of	a	revolutionary	party	organisation;	yet,	the	YCL	was	an	amalgam	of																																																									15	MacCallum,	“The	Maoist	from	Melbourne.”	16	Bolshevik,	no.	1,	1	February	1969,	author’s	collection.	Also	available	at	http://www.reasoninrevolt.net.au/objects/pdf/d0655.pdf.	Subsequent	editions	were	called	The	
Red	Line.	17	Peter	Collins,	“Editorial,”	Bolshevik,	no.	1,	1	February	1969,	1.		18	Ibid.	
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individuals,	all	from	the	Monash	Labor	Club,	who	had	a	range	of	non-party	experiences	and	members	who	had	no	allegiance	to	either	the	CPA	or	CPA	(ML).	Unlike	the	CPA	and	CPA	(ML),	the	various	Trotskyist	youth	organisations	and	proto-parties	had	been	actively	recruiting	members,	but	with	very	little	effect.	Their	continual	switching	of	lines	and	allegiances,	their	opposition	to	Maoism	and	the	Cultural	Revolution,	and	their	insistence	upon	adherence	to	what	was	seen	as	a	dogma	arising	from	somewhere	other	than	local	experience,	were	cause	for	derision	rather	than	commendation.	Trotsky	and	his	works	were	sometimes	mentioned	in	Monash	Labor	Club	and	Revolutionary	Socialists’	discussions	and	in	their	publications	and	activities,	particularly	in	the	writings	of	Dave	Nadel	and	Humphrey	McQueen,	but	whether	by	design	or	inadvertence,	it	never	got	any	further	than	that.	
Spontaneity	Must	Go!	
The	advent	of	the	YCL	illustrates	a	point	that	needs	to	be	made	about	the	origin	and	generation	of	those	ideas	that	locate	political	insurgents	in	political	and	social	situations	of	opposition	to	the	dominant	discourse	or	established	order.	As	structures,	the	Monash	Labor	Club,	the	Revolutionary	Socialists	and	the	Worker	Student	Alliance	(WSA)	were	built	simply	to	serve	the	propaganda	and	agitational	needs	of	opponents	of	university	strictures,	the	Vietnam	War,	conscription	and	all	of	the	bourgeois	cultural	baggage	that	constituted	the	hegemonic	discourse.	However,	that	is	as	far	as	the	spontaneity	of	the	movement	could	take	it;	it	is	necessary	to	look	elsewhere	for	the	development	of	the	ideas	of	Maoism,	Marxism-Leninism	and	communist	revolution	that	became	the	watchwords	of	those	organisations.		In	Victoria,	the	political	spontaneity	of	movements	was	most	conspicuous	in	the	tactical	activities	of	practical	opposition	to	dominant	discursive	formations	such	as	conscription,	arrests	over	demonstrations,	restrictions	upon	unions	and	the	war.	While	necessary	undertakings	for	any	group	that	aspires	to	revolution,	without	a	theory–practice	nexus,	a	new	revolutionary	movement	would	need	to	be	regenerated	with	each	new	infliction	of	adverse	power	relations.	It	is	here	that	Antonio	Gramsci’s	formulation	of	the	problem	as	one	of	not	just	resisting	but	also	of	
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countering	the	hegemony	of	dominance	in	the	discursive	formation	is	a	useful	concept.		A	Gramscian	analysis	of	the	developing	consciousness	of	social	movement	members	would	describe	it	as	a	process	by	which	a	person’s	consciousness	develops	from	one	that	is	superficially	explicit,	verbal,	inherited	from	the	past	and	uncritically	absorbed	but	which	“produces	a	condition	of	moral	and	political	passivity.”19	What	converts	a	social	movement	from	one	that	is	implicitly	political	in	its	limited	objectives	into	one	that	is	explicitly	political	in	its	generalised	anti-hegemonic	endeavours	is	made	clearer	by	Gramsci’s	introduction	of	the	operation	of	conscious	intellectual	and	political	agency	in	the	construction	of	resistance	and	the	explicit	organisation	of	the	movement	for	those	ends.	This	intellectual	and	political	agency	would	take	the	form	of	what	Gramsci	called	“organic	intellectuals”	who	are	the	theorists	and	organisers	of	classes	or	groups	of	people	in	their	ideological	contestations.	The	difficulties	of	entering	the	often	hostile	world	of	politics	beyond	the	university	and	of	attracting	a	non-Monash	membership	made	the	creation	of	the	Revolutionary	Socialists	a	necessity.	Rather	than	ask	aspiring,	non-student	radicals	to	join	an	organisation	whose	vision	was	focused	on	university	battles	with	occasional	forays	into	the	campaigns	of	others,	it	was	necessary	to	create	one	whose	objectives	could	coincide	with	theirs.	Even	then,	as	a	creature	of	the	spontaneous,	directionless	generation	of	political	activism,	such	an	organisation	would	have	succumb	to	a	situation	of	political	passivity	and	disorder.	The	imperative	was	for	a	conscious	group	that	specialised	in	the	conceptual	and	philosophical	elaboration	of	ideas	of	revolutionary	endeavour.20	For	reasons	cited	above,	the	CPA	and	the	CPA	(ML)	could	not	provide	that	“specialised”	group.	Instead,	the	more	experienced	individuals	among	the	incipient	group,	such	as	Albert	Langer,	Dave	Nadel,	Kerry	Miller	and	Darce	Cassidy,	carried	out	the	task	of	providing	such	political	leadership	in	the	Monash	Labor	Club.	The	new	Revolutionary	Socialists	body,	having	a	few	practical	guidelines,	lacked	coherent	ideological	direction.	Hence	the	YCL	was	formed	within	it.																																																									19	Gramsci,	Selections	from	the	Prison	Notebooks,	333.	20	Ibid.	
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In	1969,	the	publication	of	Gramsci’s	works	in	English	was	at	a	very	rudimentary	stage.21	Thus,	it	is	unlikely	that	the	founders	of	the	YCL	were	inspired	by	them	to	organise	themselves	as	an	ideological	elite.	At	Monash	University,	a	source	of	Gramscian	ideas	was	Alastair	Davidson,	lecturer	and	member	of	the	CPA,	who	gave	a	series	of	lectures	on	the	subject.	Davidson’s	lectures	were	soon	published	in	the	
Australian	Left	Review.	On	Gramsci’s	view	of	the	nature	of	the	Communist	Party,	Davidson	wrote:;	“It,	unlike	the	Leninist	party,	concentrates	not	on	what	to	do	and	how	to	do	it	but	what	ought	to	be	done;	not	on	imparting	theory	and	tactical	directions	through	its	newspapers	but	on	imparting	moral	and	ethical	values.”22	In	the	same	lecture,	Davidson	stated	that:	“The	party	he	[Gramsci]	talked	about	was	the	‘organic’	party,	understanding	party	more	in	18th	century	sense	as	a	grouping	of	those	with	similar	interests	and	a	similar	world	view.”23	While	this	interpretation	of	Gramsci’s	views	fitted	neatly	into	the	policy	of	accord	with	the	ALP,	then	promoted	by	the	CPA,	it	conflicted	with	what	young	revolutionaries	were	reading	and	learning,	and	appeared	as	the	negation	of	the	role	of	communist	leadership	in	favour	of	dissolution	of	the	party	into	a	mass	of	like-minded	individuals.		Whether	this	was	a	correct	interpretation	of	Gramsci’s	views	is	not	important;	it	was	what	Davidson’s	words	sponsored	that	matters.	Davidson’s	words	clashed	with	what	young	Maoists	were	reading	at	the	time	in	Quotations	from	Chairman	Mao	
Tsetung,	known	as	the	Little	Red	Book	of	Chairman	Mao.	For	example:	Without	a	revolutionary	party,	without	a	party	built	on	the	Marxist-Leninist	revolutionary	theory	and	in	the	Marxist-Leninist	revolutionary	style,	it	is	impossible	to	lead	the	working	class	and	the	broad	masses	of	the	people	in	defeating	imperialism	and	its	running	dogs.24	In	a	marked	contrast,	Peter	Collins	in	The	Red	Line	(formerly	the	Bolshevik)	quoted	Mao	Zedong	to	support	the	direction	that	the	YCL	should	take:																																																									21	The	first	substantial	publication	in	English	of	Gramsci’s	Prison	Notebooks	was	in	1971,	edited	by	Quintin	Hoare	and	Geoffrey	Nowell	Smith.	Earlier	than	that,	in	1957,	some	of	the	essays	were	published	by	Lawrence	and	Wishart	and	translated	and	edited	by	Louis	Marks	under	the	name	of	
The	Modern	Prince	and	Other	Essays.	22	Alastair	Davidson,	“Gramsci:	On	the	Party,”	Australian	Left	Review	1	no.	15	(1968):	57.	23	Ibid.,	58.	24	Tse-Tung,	Quotations	from	Chairman	Mao	Tse-Tung,	1.	
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Policy	is	the	starting	point	of	all	the	practical	actions	of	a	revolutionary	party	and	manifests	itself	in	the	process	and	the	end	result	of	that	party’s	actions.	A	revolutionary	party	is	carrying	out	a	policy	whenever	it	takes	any	action.	If	it	is	not	carrying	out	a	correct	policy,	it	is	carrying	out	a	wrong	policy;	if	it	is	not	carrying	out	a	given	policy	consciously,	it	is	doing	so	blindly	…	Mao	Tse	Tung,	Selected	Works,	Vol.	IV	pp	204–205.	In	order	to	determine	the	correct	policies	we	need	a	revolutionary	organisation	that	has	cadres	linked	with	all	aspects	of	the	various	struggles	and	keeps	itself	fully	informed	of	the	situation.	In	order	to	implement	these	policies	effectively	we	need	discipline	and	a	high	level	of	political	consciousness	among	members.	The	YCL	should	aim	to	become	such	an	organisation.	We	cannot	and	should	not	attempt	to	build	a	new	revolutionary	party	capable	of	leading	the	working	class	to	victory	in	Australia’s	socialist	and	anti-imperialist	revolution,	after	all,	“we”	are	only	a	bunch	of	students	and	ex	or	semi	students;	but	we	can	and	must	build	a	revolutionary	organisation	capable	of	giving	correct	Marxist	leadership	to	the	various	student	and	youth	struggles	in	which	we	are	actually	engaged.25	It	is	notable	that	Collins	was	careful	to	steer	clear	of	usurping	the	role	of	a	revolutionary	party.	Hinting	that	Peter	Collins	was	a	pseudonym	for	Albert	Langer,	Mansell	takes	this	as	evidence	that	Langer	had	become	so	close	to	the	CPA	(ML)	that	he	saw	the	YCL	as	capable	of	becoming	the	youth	arm	of	the	party.26	It	is	clear	that	the	CPA	(ML)	had	had	some	influence	among	Monash	Labor	Club	members;	however,	its	mode	of	interaction	was	such	that	no-one,	including	Langer,	could	be	sure	of	when	decisive	contact	was	made.	As	well,	by	that	time,	the	Monash	Labor	Club’s	propaganda	and	agitation	had	become	so	besmirched	by	the	CPA	and	Trotskyists	that,	in	the	minds	of	students,	the	mystique	and	the	Maoist	language	of	the	CPA	(ML)	made	it	more	attractive.	By	February	1969,	the	YCL	had	changed	the	name	of	its	internal	bulletin	from	
Bolshevik	to	The	Red	Line.	Issue	no.	2	was	published	on	7	February	and	contained	ten	articles	by	eleven	different	authors	including	Gulliver	Hounyms	and	Molly	Bloom!	An	agendum	for	the	YCL	meeting	to	be	held	the	following	day	showed	that	the	organisation	still	revolved	around	the	Monash	Labor	Club.	Items	included	the																																																									25	Peter	Collins,	“Work	at	Monash	in	1969,	Perspectives,”	The	Red	Line,	no.	3,	15	February	1969,	7–8.	(Emphasis	in	original.)	For	further	information	about	The	Red	Line	see	below.	26	Mansell,	“The	Yeast	is	Red,”	58.	
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establishment	of	cells	in	the	history,	politics	and	science	faculties;	the	convening	of	Labor	Club	activities;	and	the	production	of	Print.	Matters	external	to	Monash	University	were	restricted	to	“Theoretical	Study”	and	the	“July	4	Riot	Trial”	of	Langer	and	Rubin	remaining	still	unheard	from	the	previous	year.27		This	second	issue	carried	only	one	article	on	the	Revolutionary	Socialists,	“The	Revolutionary	Socialists	and	League	Cells”	by	“Len	Esdaile,”	in	which	the	nature	and	mode	of	operation	of	the	Revolutionary	Socialists,	still	in	the	process	of	formation,	were	described	with	a	view	to	establishing	a	“relatively	large	[YCL]	cell,	[with]	four	or	five	people”	within	it.	The	Revolutionary	Socialists	were	to	have	a	decentralised	committee	structure	with	administration,	publications	and	premises	committees.	Its	role	was	described	as	“a	non	University	organisation	to	run	a	centre	in	competition	with	CDA28	and	to	act	as	a	bridge	between	student/professional	types	and	other	potentially	revolutionary	elements	including	workers,	migrant	groups	and	longhairs.”29	This	article	contained	no	lengthy	polemic;	clearly,	Esdaile	understood	that	the	YCL	would	have	no	difficulty	in	establishing	itself	in	the	new	Revolutionary	Socialists.	The	nature	and	content	of	the	other	articles	in	this	issue	demonstrate	that	the	YCL	was	far	from	a	cohesive	grouping	of	compatible	“organic	intellectuals.”	The	articles	included	four	that	concerned	activity	at	Monash	University	and	two	that	contained	homilies	about	revolutionary	morality,	political	work	with	the	masses,	not	just	students.	A	further	article,	by	“Richard	Dowe”	and	illuminated	with	the	title	“Let	Us	Prepare	for	Armed	Struggle,”	proposed	that	“US	imperialism	and	all	reactionary	systems	are	heading	for	total	collapse	…	[but]…	will	fight	to	the	death.	Only	the	armed	revolutionary	people	can	defeat	them.”30	The	three	articles	mentioned	here	
																																																								27	The	Red	Line,	no.	2,	7	February	1969,	author’s	collection.	28	CDA	was	the	Centre	for	Democratic	Action,	a	centre	for	radicals	in	the	suburb	of	Carlton	established	mainly	by	students	from	the	Melbourne	University.	It	offered	similar	services	to	that	envisaged	for	the	Bakery	and	even	though	it	often	bordered	on	pacifism,	relations	between	it	and	the	Bakery	were	usually	cordial.	29	Len	Esdaile	(pseudonym),“The	Revolutionary	Socialists	and	League	Cells,”	The	Red	Line,	no.	2,	7	February	1969,	3.	30	Richard	Dowe,	(pseudonym),“The	Revolutionary	Socialists	and	League	Cells,”	The	Red	Line,	no.	2,	7	February	1969,	13.	
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suffered	a	stinging	rebuke	from	the	editor	“Peter	Collins”	in	the	next	issue	of	The	Red	
Line.	The	third	issue	of	The	Red	Line,	published	on	15	February	1969,	was	largely	a	criticism	of	the	excessive	enthusiasms	of	some	of	the	articles	in	the	second	issue.	In	the	leading	article,	“Tactics	for	the	Peace	Movement,”	pseudonymous	Greg	McCrae,	using	the	language	of	Maoism,	reaffirmed	that	the:	Principal	contradiction	within	the	Peace	movement	is	between	those	who	are	simply	interested	in	peace	(i.e.	Capitalism	is	not	to	be	overthrown	but	reformed	…	)	and	those	who	realise	that	peace	is	only	possible	when	Capitalism	and	Imperialism	have	been	overthrown.31		McCrae	outlined	some	of	the	mistakes	that	comrades	had	made	in	assuming	that	the	work	of	the	Revolutionary	Socialists	and	the	Monash	Labor	Club	within	the	peace	movement	would	always	have	the	nature	of	contradictions	between	enemies.	This	article,	although	short,	carried	much	of	the	sentiment	that	conditioned	the	campaigns	that	the	Revolutionary	Socialists	and,	later,	the	WSA	conducted	within	the	peace	movement.	For	that	reason	it	is	worthy	of	closer	attention.	The	first	“wrong	assumption,”	according	to	McCrae,	was	that:	The	struggle	[in	the	anti-war	movement]	…	is	between	those	who	support	negotiations	and	those	who	demand	withdrawal.	[This]	…	fails	to	allow	for	tactical	considerations	[and]	bears	little	relation	to	ideological	positions.	“Progressive”	Capitalists	can	and	do	support	withdrawal	…	so	do	pacifists.	Communists	support	negotiations	…	(some	insignificant	[sic]	examples	might	be	the	North	Vietnamese	Government	and	the	National	Liberation	Front.)	This	particular	wrong	assumption	is	less	powerful	since	the	Paris	talks	began,	but	it	did	have	quite	a	lot	of	support	among	the	Gould	mob,	and	also,	to	a	degree	the	ML’s.32	“Wrong	assumption”	number	two	was	that	the	struggle	was	between:	Pacifists	and	supporters	of	National	Liberation	Movements	…	Wrong	…	Pacifists	are	our	“enemies”	in	the	peace	movement	but	they	can	still	be	worked	with	…	Many	supporters	of	Revolution	in	the	Third	World	do	not																																																									31	Greg	McCrae	(pseudonym	of	Dave	Nadel,	see	Mansell,	“The	Yeast	is	Red,”	58),	“Tactics	for	the	Peace	Movement,”	The	Red	Line,	no.	3,	15	February	1969,	1.	32	Ibid.	“Gould’s	mob”	refers	to	the	group	led	by	Bob	Gould	which	was	then	thought	of	as	Trotskyist.	“ML’s”	refers	to	the	CPA	(ML)	and	its	newspaper	the	Vanguard.	
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support	Socialist	Revolution	in	Australia	(most	of	the	non-Labor	Club	members	of	the	NLF	Aid	group	were	in	this	category).	Some	of	the	most	vocal	critics	of	our	action	on	July	4	are	probably	genuine	in	their	professed	support	of	National	Liberation	Movements	in	the	third	world.33	The	third	“wrong	assumption”	was	that:	The	struggle	is	between	those	who	support	violent	demonstrations	and	those	who	do	not	…	totally	erroneous.	Anarchists	support	violent	demonstrations	and	are	Pests	of	the	first	order	…	There	still	exist	a	reasonably	large	group	of	people	who	could	be	genuine	revolutionary	socialists	and	even	genuine	Communists	who	believe	that	violent	demonstrations	are	tactically	unwise	and	premature	…	We	must	not	treat	these	sort	of	people	as	opponents	to	be	struggled	against,	but	rather	as	people	to	be	convinced	and	won	over.34	After	McCrae’s	admonitions	to	the	Monash	Labor	Club	and	the	Revolutionary	Socialists,	and	following	his	formal	criticisms,	he	went	on	to	warn	against	taking	over	the	running	of	the	peace	movement,	even	though:	We	[have	the	power	to	take	over	a	demonstration]	…	(We	have	proved	this	repeatedly)…	We	do	not	have	the	resources	to	run	the	other	functions	(propaganda	etc.)	…	[And	even	though	this	was	the	case]	…	we	are	certainly	able	to	organize	our	own	mass	demonstrations.	The	article	ended	with	an	expression	of	confidence	in	the	ability	of	the	YCL,	SID	Kids	and	Revolutionary	Socialists	to	publicise	“demos”	at	the	three	universities	and	at	schools,	while	“Jean	McLean	and	the	rest	are	paper	tigers	…	[and]	Goldbloom	and	his	cronies	have	to	rely	on	paste-ups	to	contact	workers	almost	as	much	as	we	do.”35		The	assumption	in	McCrae’s	statement	that	allies	within	the	peace	movement	were	not	“opponents	to	be	struggled	against”	demonstrates	an,	as	yet,	underdeveloped	control	of	the	framing	language	of	ideological	and	tactical	analysis	that	might	be	expected	of	“organic	intellectuals”	of	the	revolution.	Nevertheless,	as	well	as	admonishing	radical	hotheads	within	the	peace	movement,	his	article	provides	us	with	evidence	that	radicals’	efforts	to	shift	the	peace	movement	from	the	reformism																																																									33	Ibid.	34	Ibid.	35	Ibid.	Jean	McLean	and	Sam	Goldbloom	were	leading	figures	in	the	Congress	for	International	Cooperation	and	Disarmament	(CICD)	and	Moratorium.	
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and	passivity	they	saw	in	the	Campaign	for	International	Cooperation	and	Disarmament	(CICD),	CPA	and	ALP	control	were	conscious	and	not	necessarily	driven	by	the	accidents	of	meeting	dynamics	or	clashes	of	personalities.	In	this,	the	third	edition	of	The	Red	Line,	an	article	by	“Peter	Collins”	entitled	“Comments	and	Criticisms”	offered	the	most	comprehensive	critique	of	YCL	ideas	and	operations.	Having	sharply	criticised	“Comrade	Frey’s”	article	on	communist	morality	as	evidence	that	“bourgeois	lines	of	thought	tend	to	creep	into	our	minds,”36	Collins	was	even	sharper	in	dealing	with	the	article,	“Let	Us	Prepare	for	Armed	Struggle”	by	“Richard	Dowe,”	describing	it	as	“divorced	from	reality”;	unsettling	with	“such	childish	phrase	mongering	as	‘Brandishing	the	gun	in	one	hand	and	Mao-Tse-tung’s	thought	in	the	other’”;	and	devoid	of	concrete	propositions	for	future	activities,	which	“would	be	a	great	deal	more	use	than	airy	waffle	about	‘struggle	on	all	fronts’.”37	In	a	further	criticism	of	an	article	with	the	long	title,	“We	Must	Do	Political	Work	Not	Just	With	Students	but	with	the	Masses	of	the	Australian	People,”	Collins	castigated	its	author,	“Norman	Melsm,”	for	taking	“this	correct	position	and	[turning]	it	into	its	opposite	by	belittling	work	among	the	students.”	After	quoting	Lenin	on	the	necessity	of	not	only	doing	work	among	the	proletariat	but	also	in	all	strata	of	the	population,	Collins	concluded	that,	because	most	YCL	members	were	students:	Our	main	work	among	students	must	be	to	oppose	petty-bourgeois	notions	of	“student	power”	etc.	and	demand	support	for	workers’	revolution.	This	is	quite	different	from	talking	about	“struggle	on	a	broad	front”	as	an	excuse	for	failing	to	struggle	on	any	front.38	Yet,	these	criticisms,	sharp	and	comprehensive	as	they	were,	failed	to	inspire	loyalty	to	the	organisation	or	to	renew	enthusiasm	for	new	initiatives.	It	had	become	obvious	that	the	YCL	did	not	have	the	internal	unity	of	purpose	needed	to	enable	it	to	fulfil	the	role	of	leadership	in	the	sphere	of	revolutionary	ideology.	Hence,	this	was	the	last	edition	of	The	Red	Line	and,	by	the	end	of	the	month,	the	organisation	had	ceased	to	meet.	For	the	whole	of	1969,	the	Revolutionary	Socialists	built	itself																																																									36	Peter	Collins,	“Comment	and	Criticisms,”	The	Red	Line,	no.	3,	15	February	1969,	6.		37	Ibid.,	7.	38	Ibid.	
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without	the	influence	of	a	young	communist	league.	This	changed	in	January	1970	when	a	new	YCL	was	founded	with	a	new	membership—based	not	in	the	Monash	Labor	Club,	but	in	the	radical	movements	associated	with	the	Bakery,	as	discussed	in	Chapter	5.39	In	the	work	of	the	Monash	Labor	Club,	and	in	the	process	of	building	the	Revolutionary	Socialists	beyond	the	confines	of	the	university,	the	appearance	and	disappearance	of	the	YCL	was	noticed	by	few	of	the	uninitiated.	Nevertheless,	it	had	been	a	collection	of	intellectuals	who	saw	themselves	as	an	elite	capable	of	giving	Marxist	and	Leninist	leadership	to	a	substantial	radical	cohort.		However,	the	cessation	of	meetings	and	publications	did	not	mean	that	the	solidarity	of	the	group	completely	disappeared.	The	members	did	not	depart	the	scene	and,	as	they	were	all	actively	involved	with	the	Revolutionary	Socialists	and	Monash	Labor	Club,	some	moral	discipline	remained.	Mansell	reports	that,	in	an	open	meeting	at	the	Bakery	to	discuss	the	Rubin/Langer	trial,	Matthew	Prescott,	a	Monash	Labor	Club	activist,	disagreed	with	the	overbearing	attitude	of	the	students	and	stated:	“I	was	then	reminded	by	Albert	of	the	oath	I	had	taken	at	the	secret	meeting	and	Mick	De	Young	pounced	on	this	and	said	‘what	is	this	secret	organisation?’	Its	unconstitutional	in	the	Labor	Club	anyway.”40	
4	July	1969	
The	repercussions	of	the	4	July	demonstrations	in	1968	(described	in	the	previous	chapter)	were	sufficiently	successful	for	the	anti-war	movement	to	stage	another	protest	in	1969.	The	VCC,41	accommodating	the	old	peace	movement	and	union	representatives	as	well	as	the	younger	draft	resisters	and	anti-war	activists	from	the	university	Labor	clubs,	announced	its	plans	for	that	year’s	demonstration	in	a	letter	to	constituents.	Following	a	brief	address	by	Arthur	Calwell,	the	demonstration	was	to	be	a	march	from	its	gathering	point	in	the	Treasury	Gardens	in	the	east	of	the	city	to	the	US	Consulate.																																																									39	Young	Communist	Bulletin,	no.	1,	9	January	1970,	1	(hereafter	YCL	Bulletin).	40	Mansell,	“The	Yeast	is	Red,”	58.	41	See	Chapter	4	above.	
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The	danger	of	a	violent	confrontation	consequent	to	a	repeat	of	“last	years	tactics	of	intimidation	and	harassment	with	riot	wagons,	horses	[and]	large	numbers	of	police	agents	within	the	ranks”	was	to	be	mitigated	by	tighter	organisation.	The	march	was	to	be	led	by	chief	marshalls	appointed	because	they	represented	“a	broad	cross-section	of	participants.”	They	were:	Rod	Quinn	as	spokesman;	Ted	Bull	(WWF	and	CPA	(ML));	Peter	Butcher	(Monash	Labor	Club);	Neville	Hill	(CPA,	Amalgamated	Engineering	Union	(AEU)	and	CICD);	Vic	Little	(Marxist	Workers	Group);	Roger	Wilson	(CPA	and	Seamen’s	Union);	and	Barry	York	(La	Trobe	University	Labor	Club).	To	ensure	that	the	marshalls	could	“carry	out	their	functions	effectively,”	the	march	was	divided	into	four	sections	and	participants	were	urged	to	“march	with	their	own	group”	in	the	following	order:	trade	unionists,	students,	peace	groups	and	“others”—that	is,	national	contingents,	political	organisations	etc.42		As	it	transpired,	the	result	of	these	preparations	had	little	effect	on	the	conduct	of	the	demonstration.	Demonstrators	claimed	to	have	been	attacked	by	police	several	times	on	the	march	from	the	city	assembly	point.	At	the	consulate,	the	police	erected	barricades	at	the	front	of	the	building,	which	they	defended	with	lines	of	officers.43	The	police	also	attempted	to	block	access	to	the	road	(Commercial	Road);	several	lines	of	police	with	flailing	truncheons	faced	a	front	line	of	demonstrators	who	urged	their	back	line	to	push	harder	while	they	fended	off	the	truncheons.	It	is	my	recollection	(as	a	bloodied	participant),	that,	in	the	tussle	between	police	and	demonstrators,	the	attempt	to	segregate	the	demonstration	into	its	constituent	groups	broke	down	completely	and	students	and	workers,	and	old	and	young,	pushed	and	shoved	together.	Despite	the	havoc	created	by	police	horses,	some	access	was	eventually	gained	to	Commercial	Road;	however,	the	consulate	remained	untouched	amid	a	sea	of	dark	blue	coats.	Several	demonstrators	were	taken	on	stretchers	to	the	emergency	department	of	the	Alfred	Hospital,	which	was	only	several	hundred	metres	up	the	road.44	
																																																								42	John	Layfield,	Independence	Day	1969,	leaflet	(Parkville:	Vietnam	Co-ordinating	Committee,	c.	May	1969).	43	Print,	no.	54,	7	July	1969.	44	This	is	from	my	memory	of	the	event.	I	was	one	of	the	bloodied	demonstrators	not	taken	to	hospital.	
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On	the	way	to	the	demonstration,	and	as	it	returned	to	the	city,	there	had	been	thirty-five	arrests;	there	were	also	nine	arrests	at	the	consulate	itself.	These	were	all	itemised	in	The	Sun	newspaper,	which	not	only	detailed	the	charges	but	gave	the	arrestees’	addresses.45	Speeches	were	delivered	at	the	consulate,	although	they	were	heard	by	very	few,	after	which	the	protesters	returned	to	the	city	in	a	running	demonstration	that	spread	out	over	several	blocks.	Police	were	unable	to	prevent	it	and	traffic	was	held	up	yet	again	as	they	tried.	A	short	time	later,	300	demonstrators	gathered	at	the	Southern	Cross	Hotel	where	the	traditional	Independence	Day	dinner	was	usually	held.	By	this	time,	the	police	had	caught	up.	Another	melee	ensued,	with	police	horses	and	nine	arrests.	The	Monash	University	Labor	Club	newsletter	Print	reported	this	incident:	At	9.15	p.m.	the	marchers	moved	back	to	the	city	where	300	of	them	gathered	outside	the	Southern	Cross.	The	police	immediately	moved	in	with	horses	and	truncheons,	attempting	to	beat	the	marchers	into	submission	rather	than	attempting	to	disperse	them	peacefully.	The	police	attack-riot	was	completely	unprovoked,	in	fact	the	demonstrators	had	shown	no	signs	of	approaching	a	provocative	or	militant	attitude.	The	crowd	scattered	and	the	cops	ran	after	them	like	mad	rabid	dogs,	lashing	out	at	anybody	who	happened	to	be	in	their	path.46	The	mainstream	anti-war	movement	supported	the	gist	of	this	interpretation,	as	shown	in	the	reported	comment	of	the	VCC	in	The	Age:		It	[the	VCC]	said	that	the	demonstrators	had	“expressed	in	a	militant	and	determined	manner	their	opposition	to	the	aggressive	policies	of	the	Australian	and	U.S.	Governments.	They	maintained	a	commendable	degree	of	unity	and	discipline	in	the	face	of	baton	wielding	police.”	Far	from	being	an	“angry	mob”	as	some	sections	of	the	press	have	claimed,	the	march	was	spirited	and	orderly.	The	brief	clash	at	the	barricades	in	Commercial	Road	was	certainly	not	an	attempt	to	storm	the	barricades.	If	the	500	marchers	had	really	intended	to	do	this,	the	police	would	have	been	unable	to	stop	them.47	
																																																								45	“44	Free	on	Bail,”	The	Sun	News	Pictorial,	5	July	1969,	5.	46	“Police	Riot	on	July	4th,”	Print,	no.	54,	7	July	1969,	http://www.reasoninrevolt.net.au/objects/pdf/d0668.pdf.	47	“Stones	Shatter	20	Consulate	Windows,”	The	Age,	7	July	1969,	3.	
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This	harmony	between	the	mainstream	anti-war	movement	and	the	students	did	not	extend	to	what	occurred	on	the	next	day,	5	July.	About	a	dozen	Monash	Labor	Club	and	other	young	radicals	met	on	that	Saturday	afternoon	in	Prahran	to	debrief	and	discuss	the	action	of	the	day	before.	It	is	my	recollection	that,	within	a	short	time,	the	meeting	decided	that	the	already	weak	reportage	of	the	action	would	soon	fizzle	out	and	it	would	not	receive	the	attention	that	it	deserved.	Some	intensification	was	needed;	the	target	should	be	hit	again,	now!	The	Age	newspaper	described	what	happened	next	(Figure	7):	A	barrage	of	stones,	bottles	and	an	iron	bar	shattered	20	windows	at	the	U.S.	Consulate	on	Saturday	…		First	Constable	Barry	Schultz,	who	was	on	guard,	said	that	he	saw	the	man	walk	past	the	consulate	at	about	5	p.m.	Seconds	later,	the	barrage	of	stones	was	hurled	at	the	building	…		Soon	after	the	incident,	a	man	claiming	to	represent	the	Melbourne	People’s	Liberation	Army,	dictated	a	message	by	telephone	to	“The	Age”	office	…	He	said	“Thirteen	members	of	the	Melbourne	People’s	Liberation	Army	this	afternoon	drove	up	outside	the	U.S.	Consulate	and	stoned	it.	“They	successfully	demonstrated	their	opposition	to	U.S.	imperialism	and	the	futility	of	simple	protest	and	legitimate	dissent.	“We	used	illegitimate	means	because	we	believe	in	class	struggle	through	protracted	war.”48	
																																																									48	Ibid.	
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Figure	7:	“Stones	Shatter	20	Consulate	Windows,”	The	Age,	7	July	1969,	3	Monash	Labor	Club’s	newsletter	Print	was	effusive:	“our	flat	footed	friends,	basking	in	their	glory,	were	outwitted.	A	so-called	‘Liberation	Army’	attacked	the	Consulate	successfully	…	Print	commends	and	congratulates	the	unknown	warriors	of	the	P.L.A.”	Print	also	estimated	that	what	prompted	the	Saturday	attack	was	“Friday’s	debacle.”49		The	muted	reportage	in	the	press	of	the	Friday	demonstration	was	transformed	by	the	shock	of	the	damage	of	Saturday’s	attack,	as	well	as	the	obvious	inability	of	the	police	to	prevent	it	or	catch	its	perpetrators.	Apart	from	the	reports	referred	to	above,	which	were	published	on	the	Monday	after,	The	Age	also	carried	an	editorial	entitled	“Price	of	Dissent”	in	which	it	affirmed	its	support	for	“the	majority	of	the	3000	people	who	converged	on	the	U.S.	Consulate	…	with	the	intention	of	exercising	a	democratic	right.”	It	went	on	to	denounce	the	minority	who	“came	with	rocks	in	their	hands	and	firecrackers	in	their	pockets.	The	ugly	scenes	…	were	entirely	of	their	making.”	After	giving	some	of	the	essentials	of	“Friday’s	lunacy”—"44	arrests	and	a	few	bloody	heads”—the	paper	turned	to	the	sequel:	“It	was	followed	up	on	Saturday	by	hoodlums	who	smashed	windows	at	the	Consulate.”	The	editorial	continued	with	a	discussion	of	the	foolishness	of	the	minority,	contrasting	them	with	the	“responsible	dissenters”	who	would	be	wise	to	“dissociate	themselves	from	the	violent	and	visionary	misfits.”	It	continued	its	condemnation	of	the	“misfits”	with	the	warning	that	“inevitably,	there	will	be	those	who	advocate	repressive	legislation	and	ruthless	police	action.	We	[The	Age]	believe	this	would	be	the	worst	possible	response	…	There	is	nothing	like	persecution	to	strengthen	the	revolutionary	backbone.”	Perhaps	inadvertently,	The	Age	had	confirmed	the	“radical	flank”	strategy	that	the	Revolutionary	Socialists	had	learned	from	the	Monash	Labor	Club’s	experience	of	attempting	to	raise	money	for	the	National	Liberation	Front	of	South	Vietnam.50	While	The	Age	railed	against	the	actions	of	the	“hoodlums”	and	“misfits,”	its	message	was	that	it	was	perfectly	alright—indeed,	praiseworthy—for	3000	people	to																																																									49	“PLA	Strikes	Back,”	Print,	no.	54,	7	July	1969.	50	See	Chapter	2	above.		
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converge	upon	the	US	Consulate	in	the	exercise	of	their	democratic	right	to	oppose	the	war.	The	Age	complimented	them	on	being	“responsible	dissenters”	and	gave	them	gratuitous	advice	about	dissociating	themselves	from	the	“violent	and	the	visionary.”	Readers	were	thus	given	“permission”	to	shun	the	“misfits”	and	to	identify	with	responsible	anti-war	dissenters.	Those	who	had	previously	wavered	about	the	war	could	now	oppose	it	because	it	was	their	“democratic	right”	and	the	“responsible”	thing	to	do.	
The	Prahran	People’s	Movement	
In	the	interest	of	widening	operations	beyond	the	university,	the	Revolutionary	Socialists	took	up	the	travails	of	local	people	in	the	suburb	where	the	Bakery	was	located,	Prahran,	then	a	working-class	area	in	inner	city	Melbourne.	Jill	Jolliffe	and	Michael	Hyde	headed	a	campaign	against	poverty	in	the	area	and	focusing	particularly	on	the	plight	of	pensioners.	Its	first	action	was	to	conduct	a	small	demonstration	on	Tuesday	22	July,	which	took	the	form	of	a	march	from	the	reputedly	richer	part	of	the	municipality	to	the	town	hall.	This	“March	against	Poverty”	was	associated	with	the	Vietnam	War	by	use	of	the	slogan	“Bring	the	War	Home	Now!”51	The	text	of	the	advertising	leaflet	was	repeated	in	the	next	edition	of	
The	Prahran	Worker,	a	newsletter	created	especially	for	this	campaign.	The	first	edition	of	vol.	2	of	The	Prahran	Worker	declared:	“The	real	war	is	here	in	Prahran,	and	in	Richmond,	Fitzroy,	Collingwood	and	Sunshine,	not	in	Viet	Nam.”	This	raw	statement	was	leavened	with	an	appeal	to	common	understandings	of	the	economics	of	local	politics:	“It	is	a	war	against	social	inequality	that	will	not	be	solved	by	Herald	Blanket	Campaigns,	Freedom	from	Hunger	Campaigns	or	Austcare.	Such	campaigns	only	work	to	make	poverty	an	accepted	part	of	Australian	life.”	Having	learned	from	the	Monash	Labor	Club’s	expertise	at	mobilising	large	numbers	by	narrowing	the	focus	to	recognisable	antagonists,	the	paper	wrapped	up	its	argument	by	starkly	contrasting	the	mayor	with	local	identity,	Fred	Farrall:	Earlier	this	year	Councillor	Fred	Farrall	made	a	public	protest	about	the	sumptuous	meals	the	Councillors	were	treating	themselves	to	at	the																																																									51	Revolutionary	Socialists,	“Bring	the	War	Home	Now!”	leaflet	advertising	“March	against	Poverty,”	July	1969.	Author’s	collection.	
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ratepayers’	expense.	To	this,	Mayor	Charles	Lux	retorted	that	the	only	people	complaining	were	those	who	didn’t	eat	so	well	at	home	and	that	the	Council	dinners	of	oysters,	chicken	and	champagne	were	an	average	meal	for	him	…	Lux	earns	his	money	in	the	clothing	trade,	notorious	in	Prahran	for	its	“sweated	labour”	conditions.52	As	it	turned	out,	the	march	failed	to	raise	newspaper	headlines,	but	that	was	not	the	point.	A	presence	in	the	locality	had	been	created.	Among	the	contacts	that	had	been	made,	that	with	Fred	Farrall	was	the	most	fruitful.	He	and	Hyde,	under	the	aegis	of	the	“Prahran	Peoples	Movement,”	ran	an	extended	campaign	that	had	Hyde	eventually	standing	as	a	“Revolutionary	Socialist”	candidate	in	the	Prahran	Council	election	of	1969.	In	a	mildly	satirical	article	about	Alice’s	Restaurant	in	Broadside,	writer	Bruce	Hanford	described	the	campaign:	The	Rev.	Soc’ist	candidate	for	Prahran	Municipal	Council	…	doesn’t	believe	in	that	participatory	democracy	crap,	but	a	true	dictatorship	of	the	proles	…	will	have	none	of	the	meliorist,	deviationist	Trots	and	CPs	trying	to	work	through	existing	structures	…	but	really	doesn’t	want	to	get	elected	to	Council,	definitely	not.	“Nhouuu!”	Hyde	declaims,	“no	worries.”	The	issues	are	Housing	Commission,	Factory	Conditions,	Education,	Pensioners	(who	have	no	labor	to	withdraw),	Abortion	Law	Reform	(in	class	terms)	…	Mike	Hyde	and	Steedman	are	arguing	[about	their	class	origin].53	After	stating	that	“we	have	ways	of	torturing	these	lefties,	we	of	the	capitalist	press,”	Hanford	revealed	that,	even	though	Hyde	claimed	otherwise,	the	thinking	of	the	Revolutionary	Socialists	and	the	Monash	Labor	Club	had	elements	of	Gramscian	theories	of	hegemony	in	it:	“Hyde	answers	the	reporter	with:	‘This	cultural	thing—sure	we	take	it	into	account	…	but	cultural	change	has	been	overemphasised.	sure																																																									52	“Where	is	the	War?”	The	Prahran	Worker	II,	no.	1,	July	1969.	In	author’s	collection.	See	also	http://www.reasoninrevolt.net.au/biogs/E000099b.htm.	Fred	Farrall	was	a	soldier	in	World	War	I.	He	worked	as	a	coachbuilder,	joined	the	Communist	Party	of	Australia	(CPA)	in	1930	and	was	active	in	the	Unemployed	Workers	Union	and	the	NSW	branch	of	the	Friends	of	the	Soviet	Union.	Moving	to	Melbourne,	he	was	elected	an	official	in	the	Federated	Clerks'	Union	in	the	1940s	until	the	1950s.	He	had	once	been	elected	mayor	of	Prahran	and	he	died	in	1991.		53	Bruce	Hanford,	“Alice’s	Restaurant	of	Prahran,”	Broadside	1,	no.	14,	4	September	1969,	8.	Original	punctuation.	Author’s	collection.	Broadside	was	a	fortnightly	magazine	containing	satirical	political	content.	It	was	founded	under	the	patronage	of	Ranald	Macdonald,	the	managing	director	of	David	Syme	and	Co.	Ltd.,	which	published	The	Age.	Broadside’s	founding	and	only	editor	was	Pete	Steedman,	ex-editor	of	the	Monash	student	newspaper	Lots	Wife	and	a	friendly	but	biting	disputant	with	the	Maoists	at	Monash.	Bruce	Hanford	was	an	American	writer	who	used	the	style	of	Hunter	S.	Thompson’s	gonzo	journalism,	hence	the	unfamiliar	appearance	of	his	report	above.	
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we	acknowledge	the	bourgeois	hegemony,	but	a	counter-hegemony	isn’t	the	answer	…	even	Albert	admits	hegemony.”54	Hyde’s	frail	parry	was	enfeebled	by	the	fact	that	he	and	these	organisations	were	embarking	upon	a	sizeable	campaign	to	effect	the	local	cultural	change	of	which	he	was	so	critical.	Those	tutorials	on	Gramsci	by	Humphrey	McQueen,	mentioned	above,	had	already	borne	fruit.	Jon	Piccini	describes	the	Prahran	People’s	Movement	as	going:	Beyond	mere	rhetoric,	with	spaces	like	the	Bakery	functioning	as	drop-in	centres	for	the	local	community,	serving	the	people	with	food	and	assistance	on	filing	tax	returns.	The	campaign	climaxed	[sic]	with	a	1969	“March	against	Poverty,”	which	sought	to	dramatise	the	clear	class	distinctions	between	“the	Toorak	poodles	and	the	Prahran	Pensioners.”	The	Labor	Club	and	its	successor	organisations	like	the	Worker	Student	Alliance	were	to	adopt	similar	programs	of	intervention	in	the	urban	fabric	for	years	to	come.55	The	“Prahran	People’s	Movement”	may	have	the	appearance	of	a	quick	dalliance	with	suburban	politics;	however,	in	the	context	of	learning	how	to	conduct	“intervention	in	the	urban	fabric,”	the	campaign	makes	perfect	sense.		
Relationship	between	Political	Groups	and	Their	Social	Milieu	
The	way	that	social	and	political	movements	develop	their	theoretical	or	ideological	identity	and	their	modes	of	operation	can	not	be	known	by	simple	description	of	either	their	internal	discourses	or	the	discourses	in	which	they	exist	and	within	which	they	contend.	Nor	is	description	of	the	psychology	and	power	motivations	of	the	major	players	within	them	likely	to	lead	to	anything	but	a	circular	litany	of	argumentation	between	personalities.	For	such	descriptions	to	be	given	analytical	power,	it	is	necessary	to	investigate	them	in	the	light	of	the	theoretical	constructs	of	the	individuals	and	groupings	that	built	and	refined	those	discourses.	Thus,	it	may	be	more	profitable	to	investigate	the	ways	in	which	such	movements	develop	their	identity	and	character	as	distinct	entities	that	need	their	separation	from	others	to	achieve	their	ends.																																																										54	Ibid.	55	Jon	Piccini,	“A	Whole	New	World:	Global	Revolution	and	Australian	Social	Movements	in	the	Long	Sixties”	(PhD	thesis,	University	of	Queensland,	2013),	82.		
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Maddison	and	Scalmer,	in	explaining	the	recognition	accorded	to	social	movements	built	by	activist	effort,	write	that:	Developing	a	coherent	sense	of	collective	identity	for	which	recognition	can	be	demanded	is	an	important	step	for	most	movements.	The	“content”	of	these	identities	needs	to	be	“adversarial”;	a	challenge	to	conventional	understanding,	in	order	to	“smoke	out	the	invisible	and	arbitrary	elements	of	the	dominant	cultural	codes.”56	The	movements	studied	in	this	thesis	are	contextually	different	from	the	social	movements	envisaged	by	Maddison	and	Scalmer.	In	1968,	the	anti-war	movement—a	social	movement—was	growing	to	accommodate	renewed	student	activism,	draft	resisters	and	an	increase	in	union	anti-war	militancy.57	This	growth	changed	its	character	and	it	became	necessary	to	breach	the	habitual	dominance	of	pre-existing	peace	groups	such	as	the	CICD	so	that	new	and	more	culturally	apt	initiatives	could	be	taken.	Coincidentally	but	not	accidentally,	the	newly	formed,	non-party	but	politically	disciplined	organisations,	such	as	the	Monash	Labor	Club,	Centre	for	Democratic	Action	(CDA)	and	the	Revolutionary	Socialists,	could	only	be	conceived	of	in	contradistinction	to	conventional	understandings.	The	anti-war	activities	of	the	older,	pre-existing	groups	had	been	directed	to	achieving	limited	reforms	such	as	ending	conscription,	ceasing	the	use	of	napalm,	or	even	withdrawing	Australian	troops	from	the	war.	However,	the	above	named,	politically	disciplined	organisations	promoted	all	of	these	reforms	but	sought	to	go	beyond	their	limits	to	remove	the	root	cause	of	the	war,	which	they	identified	as	imperialism	headed	by	the	US.	In	establishing	what	is	meant	by	“social	movement,”	Piven	and	Cloward	cite	the	definition	used	by	John	Wilson,	namely	“a	conscious,	collective,	organised	attempt	to	bring	about	or	resist	large-scale	change	in	the	social	order	by	noninstitutionalized	means.”58	The	established	anti-war	movement	was	a	social	movement	that	sought	to																																																									56	Maddison	and	Scalmer,	Activist	Wisdom,	192.	57	For	example,	in	1967,	the	Seamen’s	Union	of	Australia	banned	the	operating	of	the	Australian	National	Line’s	ship	Boonaroo	that	was	to	take	ordnance,	including	barbed	wire,	to	the	war	in	Vietnam.	This	was	followed	in	Sydney	with	a	similar	ban	on	the	Jeparit,	a	tank	carrier,	right	through	to	1969.	To	overcome	the	problem,	civilian	crews	were	sacked	and	the	ships	were	recommissioned	as	Navy	ships	under	naval	discipline.		58	Piven	and	Cloward,	Poor	People’s	Movements,	5.	
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gain	public	influence	over	those	who	wielded	power	over	the	issue	of	the	war.	Likewise,	the	newly	founded	political	groupings	under	scrutiny	in	this	thesis	had	a	wider	purview	and	sought	ideological	and	political	change	in	society	itself.	These	non-institutional	groupings	sought	change	in	the	social	order	and,	as	such,	were	social	movements	in	their	own	right.	The	same	cannot	be	said	for	political	parties,	which	may	have	the	same	aims	but,	by	definition,	pursue	them	via	institutional	means.	Nevertheless,	in	practice,	the	two	social	movement	types	rely	on	each	other.	The	establishment	of	a	collective	identity	through	the	adversarial	challenge	of	conventional	understanding	is	common	to	both.	Issue-based	social	movements	(for	example,	the	anti-war	movement)	seek	to	inspire	the	more	widely	influential,	political	parties	and	groups	to	garner	support	for	their	cause	in	locations	of	power,	such	as	parliament,	unions	and	student	cohorts.	Conversely,	explicitly	political	groups	(i.e.,	Revolutionary	Socialists)	seek	to	sway	single-issue	organisations	as	providers	of	recruits,	coordinated	actions,	propaganda	points	and	the	promulgation	of	their	policies	in	the	promotion	of	their	political	purposes.	In	these	two	differing	but	interdependent	movement	types,	changes	in	ideological	forms	and	understandings	can	only	come	through	the	resolution	of	contradictory	aspects	of	the	propositions	of	activists.	It	is	this	contest	between	activists	that	constitutes	the	discursive	contest	and	is	the	fount	of	ideological	change	and	development.	Since	the	single-issue	social	movements	mentioned	here	were	also	pressure	groups	trying	to	achieve	limited	practical	gains,	the	practical	parameters	for	achievement	were	set	to	those	limited	goals.	Political	and	social	movements,	seeking	broader	ideological	gains,	must	perforce	follow	suit.	Thus,	the	argumentation	must	be	profoundly	practical—that	is,	always	about	items	of	material	and	temporal	significance,	such	as	the	route	of	a	march,	the	slogans	of	a	demonstration,	or	the	timing	or	target	of	a	protest.	The	ideological	character	of	the	bodies	that	give	material	reality	to	both	social	and	political	movements	is	found	in	the	dialectical	interplay	that	forms	their	symbiosis.	In	this	light,	it	is	difficult	to	envisage	a	social	movement	as	the	unwitting	front	for	a	
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political	organisation,	as	has	been	claimed	by	some.	For	example,	writing	in	1970,	Norman	Lauritz	maintained	that:	In	fact	it	was	the	Viet	Cong	flag	carriers,	members	of	the	Communist	Party,	communist	front	organisations	and	communist-controlled	trade	unions—and	not	the	“flower	children”	and	men	of	genuine	conscience—who	were	the	hard-core	organisers	and	participants	in	the	Moratorium	demonstrations.	It	was	they	who	ran	it	and	controlled	it.	It	was	they	who	profited	most	from	it.59	Certainly,	the	Communist	Party	profited	in	recruitment	and	propaganda	terms	but	so	did	the	anti-war	movement	profit	in	the	same	interchange	by	using	the	contacts,	organisation	and	knowhow	of	the	communists.	This	was	not	a	case	of	one	using	the	other	at	will;	rather,	it	was	a	case	of	a	political	movement	cooperating	at	the	same	time	as	contending	with	a	social	movement	in	their	attempts	to	establish	an	identity	in	the	field.	The	above	relationship	provides	the	ground	for	a	unity	in	action	that	is	conditional	upon	the	process	having	a	practical	purpose.	It	is	here	that	another	issue	of	contention	arises;	the	political	movements	and	parties	that	a	single-issue	campaign	has	brought	together	have	their	own	internal	power	struggles	and	are	in	competition	with	each	other	as	well.	Each	seeks	to	gain	or	to	maintain	an	influential	position	in	the	campaign	and,	as	the	practical	needs	of	the	campaign	are	the	purpose	for	coming	together	in	the	first	place,	this	contention	must	be	about	tangibles	and	not	directly	about	ideology.	To	do	otherwise	would	be	to	risk	irrelevance	in	terms	of	the	conduct	of	the	campaign,	with	a	consequent	loss	of	influence.		The	practicality	of	the	contention	of	political	movements	for	hegemony	in	social	movements	has	little	to	do	with	power	struggles	over	seats	on	committees	or	control	of	some	activity	or	speech,	though	that	may	sometimes	be	an	effect	of	it.	It	is	the	changing	of	attitudes	and	conceptions	of	reality	through	the	attempt	to	change	that	reality	that	ideological	change	is	consciously	brought	about.	As	Gramsci	put	it:		Critical	understanding	of	self	takes	place	therefore	through	a	struggle	of	political	“hegemonies”	and	of	opposing	directions,	first	in	the	ethical	field	and	then	in	that	of	politics	proper,	in	order	to	arrive	at	the	working	out	at	a																																																									59	Norman	Lauritz,	The	Vietnam	Moratorium	(Melbourne:	The	Hawthorn	Press,	1970),	12.	
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higher	level	of	one’s	own	conception	of	reality.	Consciousness	of	being	part	of	a	particular	hegemonic	force	(that	is	to	say,	political	consciousness)	is	the	first	stage	towards	a	further	progressive	self-consciousness	in	which	theory	and	practice	will	finally	be	one.	Thus	the	unity	of	theory	and	practice	is	not	just	a	matter	of	mechanical	fact,	but	a	part	of	the	historical	process,	whose	elementary	and	primitive	phase	is	to	be	found	in	the	sense	of	being	“different”	and	“apart,”	in	an	instinctive	feeling	of	independence,	and	which	progresses	to	the	level	of	real	possession	of	a	single	and	coherent	conception	of	the	world.60	It	is	this	“single	and	coherent	conception	of	the	world”	that	political	parties	and	political	groupings	hope	to	impart	and	develop	in	issue-based	groupings.	As	well	as	a	genuine	concern	for	the	issue,	it	is	the	motive	for	connecting	with	them	in	the	first	place	or	for	generating	such	campaigns	where	none	existed	before.	It	is	this	that	will	determine	the	content	of	their	propositions	for	action	and	of	their	argumentation	with	each	other.	Thus,	even	though	the	topics	of	their	considerations	are	seemingly	pragmatic	and	sometimes	even	mundane,	they	are	ideologically	constructed	to	bring	the	social	activists	and	their	audiences	to	an	understanding	and	appreciation	of	their	particular	hegemonic	force.		The	root	purpose	of	all	political	parties,	whether	parliamentary	or	revolutionary,	is	the	assumption	of	state	political	power	in	part	or	in	whole.	Thus,	their	activities	will	always	be	arranged	to	sway	the	struggle	of	political	hegemonies	in	their	favour.	However,	the	contenders	in	the	hegemonic	struggle	will	not	always	be	rival	parties.	They	may	be	nonconformist	individuals	or	non-party	political	groupings	with	quite	coherent	ideological	stances	and	political	resolve	to	whom	the	hegemonic	struggle	is	as	important,	in	terms	of	the	maintenance	of	their	identity	and	purpose,	as	it	is	to	the	parties.	In	this	process,	because	of	their	superior	and	prior	organisation,	the	political	parties	may	sometimes	secure	power	positions	but	have	to	cede	the	ideological	leadership	to	match	initiatives	proposed	in	the	struggle,	both	to	their	prior	policies	and	to	their	relationships	with	other	forces.	In	this	respect,	the	parties	are	not	free	agents	but	have	histories	and	prior	stances	to	accommodate	to	any	new	initiatives	that	arise	in	the	course	of	campaigns.	As	well,	there	are	old	enmities	and	unfinished	arguments	between	parties	that	get	in	the	way	of	swift	resolutions	and	decisive	
																																																								60	Gramsci,	Selections	from	Prison	the	Notebooks,	333.	
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action	on	the	important	ideological	and	political	possibilities	opened	up	by	campaigns.	Conversely,	non-party,	politically	radical	groups—such	as	the	CDA,	WSA	and	the	FOCO	Club	in	Queensland—do	not	have	such	detriments.61	Their	smaller	size,	absence	of	organisational	history	and	much	simpler	structure,	whether	central	or	decentralised,	means	that	often	the	most	active	policy	advocates	constitute	their	ideological	and	political	leadership.	As	they	have	neither	the	prospect	nor	intention	of	governing,	there	is	no	need	for	a	comprehensive	appeal	on	all	fronts.	They	have	another	advantage	in	that	the	political	and	ideological	learning	of	the	political	parties	is	available	to	them.	Unencumbered	by	the	bureaucratic	structures	of	party	life,	they	can	more	quickly	and	more	completely	formulate	a	position	in	the	hegemonic	struggle.	It	is	also	possible	that	these	smaller	political	groupings,	lacking	experience	in	the	formulation	of	political	campaigns,	will	present	idealistic	plans	and	undertake	counterproductive	activities.	The	dynamics	of	the	social	campaign	and	the	struggle	for	hegemony	within	it	are	such	that	successive	defeats	or	effort	without	effect	will	quickly	lead	to	isolation	and	death	in	the	bypass	lane.	The	relationship	between	the	political	parties	and	the	non-party	political	groups	is	a	key	factor	in	exploring	how	political	and	ideological	understanding	develops	in	political	and	social	movements.	First,	the	Labor	Party	can	be	separated	from	the	two	communist	parties	by	the	fact	that	the	objective	that	overrides	all	others	is	the	need	to	get	into	government	by	being	elected	to	parliament.	As	such,	it	is	confirmative	of	the	ruling	hegemony	and	necessarily	must	seek	to	recruit	a	mass	membership	whose	intention	is	to	work	within	the	structures	of	the	state	rather	than	overthrow	them.	Hence,	the	Labor	Party	is	not	concerned	with	the	ideological	development	of	the	mass	but	with	absorbing	the	mass	in	the	“broad	church”	of	its	electoral	yet	authoritarian	machine.	Conversely,	the	communist	parties	and	the	political	groups,	being	devoted	to	overturning	the	dominant	hegemony	and	becoming	“the	
																																																								61	FOCO	was	not	an	abbreviation.	The	group	took	its	name	from	Che	Guevara’s	and	Regis	Debray’s	theory	of	localised	guerrilla	conflict	
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elaborators	of	new	integral	and	totalitarian	intelligentsias,”62	recruit	on	an	assessment	of	a	candidate’s	level	of	ideological	and	political	attitude.	When	Gramsci	wrote	of	the	“consciousness	of	being	part	of	a	particular	hegemonic	force	(that	is	to	say,	political	consciousness)”	as	being	the	first	stage	before	progressing	“to	the	level	of	real	possession	of	a	single	and	coherent	conception	of	the	world,”63	he	was	writing	as	secretary	and	founder	of	the	Communist	Party	of	Italy.	His	main	concern	and	duty	was	not	to	write	an	academic	treatise	but	to	maintain	the	battle	for	hegemonic	power	in	the	minds	of	party	members.	In	the	Elysian	language	forced	upon	him	by	his	gaolers,	these	were	the	“elite,”	and	if	they	were	to	provide	organic	leadership	for	the	active	mass,	they	should	innovate.	Indeed,	innovation,	at	least	at	the	beginning,	cannot	come	from	the	mass	“except	through	the	mediation	of	an	élite	for	whom	the	conception	implicit	in	human	activity	has	already	become	to	a	certain	degree	a	coherent	and	systematic	ever-present	awareness	and	a	precise	and	decisive	will.”64	This	view	of	how	a	revolutionary	political	consciousness	may	grow	within	a	mass	movement	through	the	mediation	of	political	parties	and	groups	is	a	restatement	of	Lenin’s	strictures	on	the	relationship	between	the	mass	and	revolutionary	intellectuals:		All	those	who	talk	about	“overrating	the	importance	of	ideology”	about	exaggerating	the	role	of	the	conscious	element,	etc.,	imagine	that	the	pure	working-class	movement	can	work	out,	and	will	work	out,	an	independent	ideology	for	itself	…	But	this	is	a	profound	mistake	…	we	shall	quote	the	following	profoundly	just	and	important	utterances	by	Karl	Kautsky,	“…	Modern	socialist	consciousness	can	arise	only	on	the	basis	of	profound	scientific	knowledge	…	The	vehicle	of	science	is	not	the	proletariat,	but	the	
bourgeois	intelligentsia	(K.	K.’s	italics):	it	was	in	the	minds	of	individual	members	of	this	stratum	that	modern	Socialism	originated,	and	it	was	they	who	communicated	it	to	the	more	intellectually	developed	proletarians,	who	in	their	turn,	introduce	it	into	the	proletarian	class	struggle...”65																																																									62	Gramsci,	Selections	from	the	Prison	Notebooks,	335.	The	following	is	the	footnote	from	page	335:	“intellettualitá	totalitarie.”	It	seems	certain	that	intelletualitá	here	is	a	concrete	noun	meaning	“intelligentsia”	rather	than	the	abstract	“intellectual	conception.”	“Totalitarian”	is	to	be	understood	not	in	its	modern	sense,	but	as	meaning	simultaneously	“unified”	and	“all-absorbing.”	63	Ibid.,	333.	64	Ibid.,	335.	Emphasis	in	the	original.	65	V.	I.	Lenin,	What	is	to	be	Done	(Peking:,	Foreign	Languages	Press,	1973),	46.		
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Lenin	recognised	the	need	to	cultivate	and	expand	an	intellectual	stratum	as	the	carriers	of	ideological	development	of	the	mass	under	the	conditions	of	an	eastern	autocracy.	Gramsci’s	concept	of	“organic	intellectuals”	extended	this	idea	in	the	conditions	of	a	developed	capitalist	society	in	which	the	overthrow	of	a	despot	is	not	part	of	the	revolutionary	process.	This	mechanism	for	the	development	and	spread	of	ideological	understanding	belongs	to	the	ideological	practices	carried	on	in	the	discourse	of	the	struggle	for	hegemony.	Commenting	on	Gramsci’s	contribution	to	revolutionary	theory,	Eric	Hobsbawm	characterises	this	mechanism	as	praxis	and,	in	a	paraphrasing	of	Marx,	as	similar	to	ideology	itself:		And	praxis,	the	history	that	men	make	themselves	…	is	what	they	do,	and	not	simply	the	ideological	forms	in	which	men	become	conscious	of	the	contradictions	of	society.	It	is,	to	quote	Marx,	how	they	“fight	it	out.”66		Foucauldian	concepts	of	discourse	are	valuable	in	the	description	of	ideological	contests	but	do	not	allow	for	the	expression	of	human	agency	and	conscious	action.67;	however,	it	is	in	Gramsci’s	concentration	on	ideological	practices,	even	individual	practices,	that	the	mechanism	for	the	development	of	ideological	consciousness	of	individuals	and	of	collectives	can	be	seen.		It	was	within	the	anti-war	movement,	particularly	the	Vietnam	Moratorium	movement,	that	the	struggle	for	hegemony	over	the	ending	of	conscription	and	war	spilled	over	into	contestation	about	the	causes	of	the	war,	imperialism	and	the	nature	of	Australian	and	US	society	and	war	politics.	The	political	parties	that	sought	to	influence	the	movement	were	the	ALP,	CPA	and	CPA	(ML).	The	ALP	and	CPA	had	open	and	direct	membership	of	the	anti-war	movement;	however,	the	CPA	(ML)	preferred	to	exert	its	influence	through	its	publications	and	its	unnamed	and	mysterious	supporters.	
																																																								66	Eric	Hobsbawm,	How	to	Change	the	World:	Tales	of	Marx	and	Marxism	(London:	Abacus—Little	Brown	Book	Group,	2012),	322.	(Emphasis	in	original.)	67	Michel	Foucault,	The	Archaelolgy	of	Knowledge,	(London,	Routledge,	1989),	181.	Michel	Foucault,	The	History	of	Sexuality,	Volume	1,	An	Introduction.	Translated	by	Robert	Hurley.	(New	York:	Pantheon	Books,	1978),5.	
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Summing	up	
This	chapter	has	explored	the	dynamics	of	decision-making	in	social	movements	such	as	the	anti-war	movement.	In	making	decisions	about	actions,	slogans	and	anti-war	movement	directions,	the	parties	involved	were	constrained	by	the	need	to	accommodate	their	own	institutional	policy	platforms	and	action	plans.	These	institutional	needs	were	formed	and	decided	on	prior	to,	and	outside	of,	the	anti-war	movement,	and	this	necessarily	introduced	a	layer	of	complication	in	their	consideration	of	adaptation	to	changing	political	conditions,	as	well	as	their	responses	to	new	strategies	and	ideological	propositions.	This	was	not	a	problem	for	politically	motivated	social	movements	such	as	Labor	clubs,	the	CDA	and	the	Revolutionary	Socialists.	Their	policy	platforms	and	action	plans	were	of	relatively	recent	origin	and	they	relied	on	movements	such	as	the	anti-war	movement	for	their	sustenance.	However,	this	does	not	mean	that	their	politics	were	frivolous	or	inconsequential.	The	Revolutionary	Socialists	at	least,	as	shown	in	this	chapter,	had	a	perspective	that	saw	further	than	the	immediate	needs	of	the	anti-war	movement	to	the	roots	of	war	in	the	hegemony	of	capitalism	itself.	In	this	way,	it	is	possible	to	see	their	political	study	groups	and	the	foundation	of	the	YCL	as	steps	in	ideological	learning	and	consolidation	made	necessary	by	the	absence	of	an	accessible	party	that	could	provide	that	perspective.	Thus,	Chapter	4,	has	concerned	itself	with	the	ideological	growth	of	a	movement—the	Revolutionary	Socialists—that	was	prepared	to	challenge	“left”	political	parties	for	their	ideological	positions.		
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Chapter	5:	Contention	and	Strife	Bring	Action	and	
Life	
This	chapter	examines	the	development,	dissemination	and	propagation	of	ideological	understanding	and	political	practices	among	young	radicals,	many	of	whom	had	had	several	years	experience	in	practical	political	actions	and	in	the	production	of	political	propaganda.	This	experience	had	been	directed	mainly	to	the	mobilisation	of	others	at	universities,	schools,	in	political	parties	such	as	the	Australian	Labor	Party	(ALP)	and	within	active	social	movements,	predominantly	in	the	peace	movement.	The	most	public	of	their	activities	outside	of	the	university	had	been	the	1968	and	1969	4	July	demonstrations	and	May	Day	marches.	What	is	shown	here	is	that,	rather	than	rely	upon	propaganda	and	the	wielding	of	influence	in	the	social	or	political	superstructures,	these	young	radicals	saw	physical	action	and	protest	as	the	most	effective	way	of	bringing	social	or	political	change.	This	chapter	demonstrates	the	growth	of	ideological	attachments	within	three	organisations:	the	Worker	Student	Alliance	(WSA)	as	it	developed	out	of	the	Revolutionary	Socialists,	the	reconstituted	Young	Communist	League	(YCL)	and	the	Vietnam	Moratorium	movement.	These	organisations	were	introduced	in	Chapter	4.		The	events	and	developments	chronicled	in	this	chapter	took	place	in	Melbourne	in	1969–1970	and	concern	the	organised	and	militant	members	of	the	generation	born	in	the	immediate	wake	of	WWII,	commonly	known	as	the	“baby	boomers.”	This	generation	had	passed	through	childhood	and	adolescence	during	the	ascendancy	of	liberal	democracy	and	the	welfare	state	in	a	material	and	moral	environment	that	differed	remarkably	from	that	of	their	parents’	generation.	This	and	“the	rapidity	of	technological	and	social	change	produced	a	profound	social	crisis,”	claimed	Barry	York.1	Television,	new	consumer	technologies	designed	for	the	youth	market,	a	massive	increase	in	the	provision	of	higher	education	and	the	advent	of	the	contraceptive	pill,	replaced	the	influence	of	the	Depression,	wartime	and	postwar	austerity.	It	is	hardly	surprising	that	the	activities	of	privileged	young	people	taking																																																									1	York,	Student	Revolt,	19.	
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advantage	of	the	new	developments	would	be	seen	as	generalised	rebellion.	As	the	Melbourne	Age	put	it	forty	years	later:	Filmmaker	Jean-Luc	Godard	called	the	new	generation	“the	children	of	Marx	and	Coca-Cola.”	Students	were	expelled	from	high	school	for	refusing	to	cut	their	hair.	They	smoked	pot,	tripped	on	acid.	They	had	the	pill.	They	questioned	the	monarchy,	the	family	and	the	Church.	They	protested	about	civil	rights	and	the	Vietnam	War.	A	secure	job	in	a	reputable	firm	held	no	interest.	It’s	fair	to	say	that	for	15	years,	most	parents,	who	had	lived	through	a	Depression	and	a	war,	were	simply	bewildered	by	their	children’s	behaviour.2	The	activities	of	young	people	between	the	ages	of	fifteen	and	twenty-five	have	become	conflated	in	the	public	imagination	with	images	of	sexual	liberation,	hippiedom,	marijuana,	LSD	and	rock-and-roll	music.	The	Beatles,	Bob	Dylan,	LSD	guru	Timothy	Leary	and	the	liberation	associated	with	the	civil	rights	movement	in	the	US	contributed	to	the	sense	of	rebellion.	In	1970,	Thunderclap	Newman’s	song	“Something	in	the	Air”	hit	the	top	of	the	charts	with	the	lyrics:	“Call	out	the	instigators	/	Because	there’s	something	in	the	air	/	We’ve	got	to	get	together	sooner	or	later	/	Because	the	revolution’s	here,	and	you	know	it’s	right.”3	This	is	not	to	say	that	all	baby	boomers	had	become	radicalised.	Keith	Moore,	in	attempting	to	deprecate	the	“myth”	of	the	1960s	youthful	protests,	quoted	the	editor	of	Farrago,	Melbourne	University’s	newspaper,	Peter	Steedman,	as	explaining,	on	11	June	1968:	“Most	students	have	no	time	for	the	Communist	Party	in	Australia—it’s	an	archaic	left-over	from	the	30s.”4	Here,	Moore	identifies	rejection	of	the	Communist	Party	as	evidence	of	his	point;	however,	this	may	be	interpreted	quite	differently,	for	the	Communist	Party	was	seen	by	students	as	representative	of	the	old	and	culturally	passé,	thus	not	worthy	of	their	time.		
																																																								2	Toby	Cresswell,	“Whatever	Happened	to	the	Teenage	Rebel?”	The	Age,	6	December	2003,	accessed	30	April	2017,	http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2003/12/03/1070351650943.html.	3	“Andy	'Thunderclap'	Newman,	pianist—Obituary,”	The	Telegraph,	London,	n.d.,	accessed	30	April	2017,	http://www.telegraph.co.uk/obituaries/2016/04/04/andy-thunderclap-newman-pianist---obituary/.	4	Keith	Moore,	“The	Vietnam	War	and	Youthful	Protest	during	the	1960’s—Challenging	the	Myth”	(transcript	of	speech	presented	at	Social	Change	in	the	21st	Century	Conference,	Queensland	University	of	Technology,	27	October	2006),	5,	accessed	30	April	2017,	https://eprints.qut.edu.au/6564/.	
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Moore,	in	attempting	to	argue	within	a	topic	that	is	falsely	dichotomised,	displays	a	problematic	use	of	statistics:	“despite	the	impression	that	the	percentage	[of	student	demonstrators]	was	substantial	…	A	poll	taken	at	the	University	of	New	South	Wales	in	March	1969,	at	the	height	of	the	anti-war	protests,	revealed	that	50%	of	students	favoured	the	Liberal	Party.”5	If	we	define	whether	a	historical	phenomenon	is	real	or	mythical	by	the	majority/minority	state	of	the	mass	at	the	time,	Moore	is	undoubtedly	correct	and	historians	are	mistaken.	However,	it	is	also	possible	to	characterise	a	historical	period	by	the	salient	features	of	what	makes	it	different.	This	is	especially	applicable	when	those	features	are	generated	by	a	minority	that	has	caught	the	popular	imagination.	Thus,	Barry	York	would	write:		We	are	dealing	with	a	social	movement	with	its	own	culture,	rather	than	simply	a	movement	of	political	dissent.	We	speak	of	the	“Sixties”	because	it	was	in	that	decade	that	“youth”	had	established	their	own	generational	consciousness,	and	that	its	merchandising	and	reproduction	in	various	forms	had	been	well	established.	It	was	also	in	this	period	that	a	brief	but	effective	marriage	of	“youth	culture”	and	political	dissent	took	place.6	The	involvement	of	Australia	in	the	Vietnam	War,	and	the	advent	of	conscription	for	that	war,	became	the	focus	of	political	dissent—the	gathering	point	at	which	those	young	people	who	had	already	developed	an	anti-capitalist	outlook	based	on	class	struggle	could	collate	and	turn	the	minor	mutinies	regarding	music,	clothing	styles,	marijuana	use,	hairstyles,	sexual	liberation,	equality	for	women,	educational	reform,	anti-nuclear	agitation	and	civil	rights	into	focused	support	for	their	cause.	Although	the	Monash	Labor	Club,	the	Revolutionary	Socialists	and	their	associated	organisations	conveyed	no	particular	antagonism	towards	most	of	these	instances	of	“youth	culture,”	those	that	presented	situations	of	resistance	to	bourgeois	hegemony	were	embraced.	In	doing	so,	even	though	they	had	no	intention	(nor	prospect)	of	seeking	state	power	themselves,	they	were	fulfilling	the	role	that	revolutionary	parties	would	normally	reserve	for	themselves.	Whether	consciously	or	not,	in	attempting	to	redirect	the	energies	of	at	least	a	section	of	the	so-called	“youth	culture”	against	the	power	of	the	state,	they	were	being	“organic	intellectuals.”	
																																																								5	Ibid.,	7.	6	York,	Student	Revolt,	21.	
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The	end	of	1969	and	the	first	few	weeks	of	1970	was	a	time	of	reflection,	reorganisation	and	rebirth	for	the	Revolutionary	Socialists.	As	a	new	body,	it	held	its	first	conference	at	Camp	Eureka7	where	it	transformed	itself	into	a	newly	structured	organisation,	the	WSA.	Concurrently,	the	YCL	that	had	existed	briefly	at	the	beginning	of	1969,	was	re-established	by	some	members	of	the	organisation.8		The	Monash	Labor	Club,	which	had	provided	impetus	for	the	establishment	of	the	Bakery,	was	in	recess	for	the	December–March	university	holidays.	When	it	resumed	its	operations	in	March	1970,	it	was	immediately	beset	with	the	need	to	fight	the	exclusion	from	courses	and	enrolment	of	some	of	its	members,	mainly	Albert	Langer,	Michael	Hyde	and	Kerry	Langer.	Using	the	tactic	of	large-scale,	on	campus	demonstrations	and	general	meetings	that	it	had	developed	over	the	preceding	three	years,	the	club	led	a	series	of	occupations	of	the	administration	offices	while	their	quasi-legal	trials	were	proceeding.	The	club’s	anti-war	activities	continued	throughout	1970,	leaving	the	university	in	uproar	once	again.	However,	at	the	same	time,	the	club	had	anticipated,	by	the	establishment	of	off	campus	operations	at	the	Bakery,	that	most	of	its	anti-war	action	would	shift	out	of	the	university	and	into	the	anti-war	movement	proper.	By	the	end	of	1969,	the	Revolutionary	Socialists	had	become	sufficiently	independent	to	operate	without	it.	
Young	Communist	League	Born	Again	
In	December	1969,	several	leaders	of	the	defunct	YCL,	including	Albert	Langer,	Darce	Cassidy	and	Michael	Hyde,	had	met	and	decided	that	the	organisation	should	be	revived	with	a	new	membership.	Preparations,	such	as	drafting	a	constitution	and	contacting	prospective	members,	had	begun	immediately.	On	5	January	1970,	a	general	meeting	took	place	and	a	Central	Committee	was	elected.	It	was	agreed	that	the	organisation	was	to	be	structured	on	the	basis	of	groups	of	six	members	whose	first	endeavours	would	be	to	discuss	the	draft	constitution	and	manifesto,	a	study	
																																																								7	Camp	Eureka	was	the	holiday	bush	camp	of	the	Eureka	Youth	League	(EYL).	It	is	situated	at	Yarra	Junction,	about	75	minutes	drive	north-east	of	Melbourne	and	was	built	by	volunteers	from	the	Communist	Party	and	the	trade	union	movement	just	after	WWII.	The	EYL	ceased	existence	in	1968	but	the	camp	was	available	for	other	“left”	groups	to	use.	8	See	Chapter	4	above	for	its	earlier	dissolution.	
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program,	current	activities,	and	articles,	which	would	be	published	in	the	YCL	
Bulletin	to	which	they	were	to	contribute	as	well.9		On	Friday	9	January	1970,	issue	no.	1	of	the	YCL	Bulletin	was	distributed	at	the	Bakery	and	at	the	three	universities.	It	was	an	internal	bulletin	meant	only	for	the	thirty	or	so	activists	who	had	been	approached	to	join	the	new	organisation.	Articles	in	the	first	edition	were	not	signed.	All	were	written	in	the	same	style	and	covered	the	same	type	of	content	as	the	bulletins	of	the	previous	organisation.	The	first	issue	posed	twenty	questions	for	members	to	consider	about	the	nature	and	structure	of	the	organisation:	“Is	it	a	youth	organisation,	should	it	aim	to	form	a	new	Communist	Party,	is	the	CPA	(ML)	already	one?”	Most	of	the	other	questions	concerned	organisational	matters,	such	as	the	meaning	of	“democratic	centralism,”	recruitment,	the	retention	or	not	of	general	meetings,	group	or	cadre	structure,	and	internal	elections.10	That	the	articles	concentrated	on	organisational	details	and	not	on	ideological	questions	is	probably	a	reflection	of	the	make	up	of	the	membership;	only	people	who	were	thought	to	be	already	ideologically	aligned	with	each	other	were	selected	for	membership.	Requirements	for	selection	became	clearer	in	an	article	that	was	critical	of	the	previous	YCL:		The	basis	of	selection	…	was	all	wrong.	Too	much	emphasis	was	placed	on	political	line	and	not	enough	on	experience,	activism	and	political	sophistication	of	cadres.	Although	several	tendencies	were	represented	members	were	selected	more	on	their	ability	to	profess	beliefs	common	to	the	organisers	of	the	group,	than	on	their	ability	to	apply	those	beliefs.11	The	leaders	who	drew	these	ideas	together	before	launching	the	new	YCL	were	the	same—“Peter	Collins,”	“Len	Esdaile”	and	“Greg	McRae”	who	featured	as	leading	members	and	contributors	to	The	Red	Line	bulletin	of	the	former	YCL.	Reflecting	on	the	old	YCL,	they	wrote:	“It	was	premature—there	weren’t	enough	Communists	around	then	…	[and]	compulsory	article	writing	…	[with]	an	enormous	amount	of	work	…	combined	with	a	heavy	program	of	theoretical	study	proved	too	much	for	
																																																								9	Young	Communist	League,	“Editorial,”	YCL	Bulletin,	9	January	1970,	1.	10	Ibid.,	3.	11	Young	Communist	League,	“The	Other	YCL,”	YCL	Bulletin,	9	January	1970,	8.	
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most	members.”12	This	implies	that	there	were	sufficient	numbers	of	communists	around	by	1970	to	allow	the	organisation	to	be	reconstructed.	These	technical	rather	than	ideological	reasons	were	modified	by	the	rider:	“Perhaps	the	primary	fault	was	a	failure	to	immediately	establish	a	frank	and	vigorous	discussion	of	policy.”13	In	a	further	article,	“The	YCL	of	Jan–Feb	1969,”	“Greg	McCrae”	took	a	harder	line,	describing	the	attitude	of	the	selectors	and	the	selection	process	of	the	former	YCL	as	based	more	on	members’	abilities	to	“profess	beliefs	common	to	the	organizers	of	the	group,	than	on	their	ability	to	apply	those	beliefs.”	Scathingly,	he	wrote	that	this	had	led	to	sterile	discussions	such	as	the	articles:	In	Red	Line	no.	2	written	by	Lou	Brown,	William	Frey,	Richard	Dowe	and	Norman	Melsm	…	it	is	obvious	that	none	of	[these]…	were	ready	to	join	an	organisation	such	as	the	YCL.	(None	of	them	are	members	of	the	new	organisation).14		In	terms	of	the	generation	of	ideological	initiatives,	the	new	organisation	still	looked	to	its	own	ranks	for	inspiration:		The	main	purpose	in	putting	out	a	bulletin	is	to	encourage	members	to	write	reports	and	analyses	of	important	problems	in	their	own	and	the	YCL’s	work	as	well	as	providing	a	medium	for	ideological	struggle	at	higher	level	than	may	be	possible	at	meetings.15		However,	and	despite	repeated	pleas,	as	the	year	progressed,	this	call	for	articles	reaped	very	few	responses.	When	the	election	of	a	Central	Committee,	numerous	sub-group	meetings	and	the	league’s	Congress	on	13	and	14	June	failed	to	stimulate	articles,	YCL	Bulletin	no.	8,	printed	on	26	July,	chastised	non-contributing	members:	“With	the	exception	of	the	SID	report	all	the	material	in	this	issue	is,	as	usual,	contributed	by	the	CC	[Central	Committee].	In	the	whole	period	since	the	Congress,	not	one	member	has	thought	it	
																																																								12	Ibid.,	7.	13	Ibid.	14	Ibid.,	8.	15	Ibid.,	1.	
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necessary	to	contribute.”16	This	long	editorial	went	on	to	attribute	these	failings	to	the	“liberalism”	running	rife	among	members	and	in	the	Central	Committee,	and	claimed	that	“some	…	people	are	using	their	membership	of	a	Communist	organisation	as	a	substitute	for	being	an	organised	communist.”17	After	quoting	Chairman	Mao	on	the	topic	of	liberalism,	the	editorial	asked:		How	many	of	us	can	meet	this	standard	for	being	“considered	a	Communist”	…	?	Obviously	none.	The	members	of	the	CC	cannot,	or	we	would	already	have	taken	the	lead	in	doing	something	about	the	study	program,	the	manifesto	and	the	disorganisation	of	groups.18		From	this	it	may	be	concluded	that	either	there	was	no	ideological	development	taking	place	in	the	organisation	or	that	the	main	form	of	ideological	development	among	YCL	members	was	through	discussion	at	meetings	and	in	action	groups	external	to	it	rather	than	through	the	Bulletin.	By	the	end	of	the	year,	some	contributions	from	members	had	been	elicited,	mostly	about	methods	and	practical	activities	rather	than	ideology.	By	the	end	of	1970,	the	situation	of	ideological	contributions	to	the	YCL	Bulletin	had	improved.	While	the	requests	for	ideological	articles	continued,	these	were	tempered	by	the	realisation	that	the	development	of	an	independent	position	in	the	hegemonic	battle	would	take	many	forms,	and	would	be	achieved	primarily	through	the	practices	of	members.	Written	for	a	YCL	Congress,	a	document	from	the	Central	Committee	entitled	“Document	1”	introduced	itself	as	“a	slightly	modified	version	of	a	document	concerning	the	ideological	struggle	in	the	league.”	Dated	30	November	1970,	it	stated:		It	[this	document]	is	also	self-criticism	and	criticism	of	the	contributors	and	of	the	CC	…	We	stand	for	active	ideological	struggle,	so	the	fact	that	criticism	has	been	made	and	debate	begun,	is	primary	at	this	stage	…	The	struggle	is	concerned	with	how	our	practice	measures	up	to	the	guidelines	for	the	orientation	of	the	youth	movement	expressed	on	p291	of	the	little	red	book;	for	the	application	of	the	mass	line—p.124;	other	subjects	of	debate	are	the	building	of	our	organisation	and	our	practice	of																																																									16	Young	Communist	League,	“Editorial,”	YCL	Bulletin,	no.	8,	26	July	1970,	1.	17	Ibid.	18	Ibid.,	2.	
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democratic	centralism,	and	the	eradication	of	the	remnants	of	economist	thinking.19	It	had	become	apparent	by	this	time	that	ideological	contestation	would	not	primarily	take	written	form,	but	would	take	other	forms.	This	is	shown,	in	part,	in	internal	discussion	about	the	growing	influence	of	the	Communist	Party	of	Australia	(Marxist-Leninist)	(CPA	(ML))	and	in	debates	that	led	to	the	departure	from	the	ranks	of	some	adherents	to	what	was	claimed	to	be	Trotskyism.	In	language	reminiscent	of	the	overblown	rhetoric	of	the	Chinese	Cultural	Revolution,	“Document	1”	explained:		The	organisational	line	they	propagated	was	in	favour	of	a	single	group,	oriented	towards	futile	debate	with	a	bit	of	local	and	peace	activity.	They	opposed	centralised	discipline	in	order	to	drive	their	own	subjective	ideas	through	the	group.	Through	correctly	handling	contradictions	we	were	able	to	expose	the	barren	counter-revolutionary	line	of	these	people	and	contrary	to	their	wishes	Marxism-Leninism-Mao	Tsetung	Thought	became	consolidated	and	our	understanding	of	it	greatly	enriched.	In	the	end	they	withdrew	and	have	since	been	revealed	as	complete	Trotskyite	renegades	and	opponents	of	revolutionary	activities.20	These	“Trotskyite	renegades”	were	Jill	Jolliffe	and	Rod	Quinn	whose	opposition	to	the	activities	and	stances	of	both	the	YCL	and	the	WSA	had	become	apparent	through	their	condemnation	of	WSA	tactics	in	the	Moratorium	movement.	This	is	referred	to	elsewhere	in	this	chapter.	In	his	book	on	the	history	of	the	Democratic	Socialist	Party,	John	Percy	confirms	that	Jolliffe	and	Quinn	had	Trotskyist	motives	in	their	attitudes	towards	the	YCL.	In	identifying	supporters	in	Melbourne,	Percy	remarks	that	Quinn	had	been	a	member	of	“the	old	Trotskyist	group”	and	that	Jolliffe	had	been	a	supporter	of	the	Trotskyist	“Socialist	Revolutionaries”	while	active	in	the	Maoist-dominated	WSA.21		
																																																								19	Central	Committee,	Young	Communist	League,	“Document	1,”	and	“On	Studying	‘The	Orientation	of	the	Youth	Movement’,”	YCL	Bulletin,	30	November	1970,	author’s	collection.	20	“Document	1,”	YCL	Bulletin,	30	November	1970,	4,	author’s	collection.	21	John	Percy,	A	History	of	the	Democratic	Socialist	Party	and	Resistance,	Volume	1,	1965–71,	(Sydney:	Angus	and	Robertson,	2008),	160.	The	“Socialist	Revolutionaries”	were	a	group	of	followers	of	Trotsky	based	in	Sydney	and	quite	distinct	from	the	“Revolutionary	Socialists,”	the	forerunner	of	the	Worker	Student	Alliance	(WSA).	
138	
The	contest	between	the	Maoists	and	the	Trotskyists	led	to	a	different	rift	that	ultimately	facilitated	the	YCL’s	movement	towards	the	CPA	(ML).	This	is	made	clear	in	“Document	1”:		Their	[i.e.,	the	Trotskyites’]	counter-revolutionary	line	was	even	strongly	rejected	by	another	small	group	of	people	who	withdrew	at	the	same	time	…	their	objection	was	that	the	organisation	would	become	the	tool	of	“an	already	existing	party,”	meaning	the	CPA	(ML).	Their	withdrawal	hastened	the	inevitable	process	of	gravitation	towards	the	CPA	(ML).22	The	movement	of	YCL	members	towards	the	CPA	(ML)	was	a	gradual	process.	All	political	parties,	whether	mainstream	or	communist,	maintain	a	level	of	secrecy	of	membership.	For	new	admissions,	the	CPA	(ML)	followed	the	process	that	it	had	inherited	from	before	its	split	from	the	CPA	in	1964.	Thus,	new	members	were	admitted	only	after	discussions	with,	and	an	invitation	from,	a	senior	party	member.		Even	so,	there	was	some	reluctance	on	the	part	of	some	members	of	the	YCL	to	become	involved	with	the	CPA	(ML)	because	of	cultural	differences	over	style	of	communication	and	operation.	This	emerged	most	strongly	in	criticisms	of	the	declamatory	and	detached	nature	of	articles	in	the	Vanguard,	which	often	used	the	stereotyped	form	that	had	emerged	out	of	China	during	the	Cultural	Revolution.	An	article	in	YCL	Bulletin	no.	2	made	this	clear:	There	are	of	course	many	things	wrong	with	the	Vanguard’s	style	which	should	be	criticised	but	if	the	question	was	just	one	of	style	it	would	not	be	an	explanation	for	the	fact	that	people	won’t	go	out	of	their	way	to	buy	Vanguard	but	will	only	read	it	if	it	is	stuffed	down	their	throat.	One	major	fault	in	Vanguard	is	that	articles	tend	to	be	too	abstract	and	there	are	not	enough	explanatory	comments	about	particular	struggles.23	In	admonishing	YCL	members	for	their	reluctance	to	take	CPA	(ML)	publications	seriously,	the	above	article	is	a	confirmation	of	the	clash	in	style	and	culture	that	eventually	kept	the	CPA	(ML)	and	the	WSA	apart.	Beyond	the	“baby	boomer”	irreverence	of	the	YCL,	WSA	and	Monash	Labor	Club	and	the	cautious	restraint	of	the	CPA	(ML)—whose	origins	lay	with	the	“baby	boomer’s”																																																									22	“Document	1,”	YCL	Bulletin,	30	November	1970,	4.	23	“Long	Live	Chairman	Mao,”	YCL	Bulletin,	no.	2,	26	January	1970.	
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parents’	generation—other	differences	were	evident	in	their	methods	of	protest.	An	example	of	this	can	be	seen	in	the	innovative	methods	of	insolent	and	risky	protest	such	as	“occupations”	and	“sit-ins”	promoted	by	the	Monash	Labor	Club	versus	the	Cold	War	conditioned	reserve	of	the	older	communists,	whose	main	public	action	seemed	to	rely	on	continued	influence	in	unions	(such	as	the	Builders’	Labourers,	Waterside	Workers	and	Tramways	unions)	and	who	otherwise	were	invisible.	“Baby	boomer”	impertinence,	as	described	at	the	beginning	of	this	chapter,	was	inevitably	reflected	in	the	activities	and	attitudes	of	the	YCL	and	WSA.	Humphrey	McQueen,	reflecting	on	this	matter	twenty-nine	years	later,	refers	to	this	attitude	as	entirely	consistent	with	Mao	and	Maoism:	The	scene	in	[the	Martin	Scorsese	film]	Kundun	where	a	waxworks	Mao	tells	the	young	Dalai	Lama	that	“Religion	is	poison”	was	risible	because	Mao	would	have	said	“Reincarnation	is	a	pile	of	yak	shit.”	My	comrades	in	the	Monash	Labor	Club	in	the	late	1960s	shared	the	irreverence	that	Mao	displayed	off	the	record,	as	evidenced	by	two	of	the	songs	we	sang	at	parties.	One	went	to	the	tune	of	the	Mickey	Mouse	Club	theme:	M-A-O	T-S-E	T-U-N-G Mao	Tse-tung,	Me	favourite	boong,	Ever	let	us	hold	his	banner,	High,	High,	High,	Come	along	and	sing	his	song	And	join	the	Red	CP,	M-A-O	T-S-E	T-U-N-G.24	Ken	Mansell	has	described	this	song	as	an	anti-Maoist	ditty	that	was	“subsequently	embraced	by	them	at	least	on	lighter	social	occasions.”25	By	the	end	of	1970,	YCL	Bulletin	articles	and	papers	for	YCL	congresses	spoke	of	close	connections	to	the	CPA	(ML).	At	the	second	congress	in	June	1970,	“a	leading	comrade	of	the	Communist	Party	of	Australia	(Marxist-Leninist)	addressed	the	meeting.	Topics	included:	The	CPA	(ML),	the	role	of	youth	in	the	revolutionary																																																									24	Humphrey	McQueen,	Where	Did	Correct	Ideas	Go	(1999),	accessed	1	April	2017,	http://surplusvalue.org.au/McQueen/philos/philos_correct_ideas.htm.	25	Mansell,	“The	Yeast	is	Red,”	69.	Mansell	remembers	the	ditty	with	slightly	different	words	as	do	I.	The	song	also	featured	in	the	Universities’	Song	Book	(National	Union	of	Australian	University	Students,	1967).	
140	
movement,	“left	colonies,”	relations	between	the	YCL	and	the	CPA	(ML).”	Subsequently,	the	first	motion	of	the	congress	was	carried	unanimously.	It	read	in	part:	No	1	…	The	YCL	affirms	its	political	solidarity	with	the	Communist	Party	of	Australia	(Marxist	Leninist)	while	retaining	an	independent	organisation	…	We	consider	that	a	strengthening	of	relations	with	party	members	in	the	course	of	various	struggles	can	help	consolidate	the	worker–student	alliance	and	help	both	the	YCL	and	the	party.	Further:	that	the	Central	Committee	arrange	for	regular	liaison	with	the	party.26	In	technical	terms,	the	YCL	retained	an	independent	organisation	and,	as	shown	above,	it	encouraged	the	writing	for	and	distribution	of	the	party’s	publications.	The	few	known	CPA	(ML)	members	were	increasingly	called	upon	for	open	support	in	the	practical	activities	of	league	members.	A	most	obvious	example	of	this	was	in	the	July	4	Committee.	CPA	(ML)	stalwart	and	secretary	of	the	Waterside	Workers’	Federation	Ted	Bull	joined	with	YCL	and	WSA	members	to	increase	their	influence	on	the	committee	and	was	elected	to	chair	its	proceedings;	Michael	Hyde	was	elected	president.27	By	early	1970,	the	YCL	had	reorganised	itself	into	working	groups	as	the	basic	structure	of	the	organisation.	The	first	functions	of	the	working	groups	were	to	formulate	a	constitution	and	manifesto,	commence	a	study	program	and	conduct	activities	within	their	respective	areas.28	The	groups	that	prepared	reports	for	the	June	congress	were	Tertiary	Education	(Technical	Education),	Teachers,	Women’s	Liberation,	Monash,	Industrial	Workers,	Anti-war/Prahran,	Students	in	Dissent	(Secondary	Students),	Adelaide,	and	La	Trobe	University.29	A	new	eight	member	Central	Committee	“based	on	political	reality	rather	than	factions”	was	elected.	One	of	the	new	Central	Committee	was	from	Adelaide	and	special	arrangements	were	
																																																								26	“Documents	of	the	Second	Congress	of	the	Young	Communist	League,	June	1970,”	YCL	Bulletin,	no.	8,	26	July	1970,	5.	27	July	4	Committee,	“Minutes	of	the	General	Meeting,”	5	June	1970,	1,	author’s	collection.	28	YCL	Bulletin,	no.	1,	9	January	1970,	1.	29	YCL	Bulletin,	no.	8,	26	July	1970.	
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made	regarding	attendance	at	meetings.30	Other	resolutions	of	this	congress	included	recognition	that	the	organisation	“sees	itself	as	a	Maoist	organisation	[as]	Maoism	is	the	Marxism-Leninism	of	our	era”;	support	for,	but	not	encouragement	of,	conscientious	objection	while	thinking	“seriously	and	constructively	of	army	infiltration”;	and	acknowledgment	that	“US	Imperialism	is	now	seen	[by	the	people]	as	the	number	one	enemy	of	the	people	of	Australia.”31	By	May	1970,	more	members	were	writing	ideological	pieces	for	the	YCL	Bulletin.	Simultaneously,	the	activities	of	the	WSA	expanded	rapidly	in	the	anti-war	movement,	spurred	by	the	advent	of	the	first	Moratorium	and	the	continuing	4	July	demonstrations.	The	WSA,	as	an	identifiable	and	accessible	shopfronted	organisation	with	a	known	record	in	student	and	anti-war	activity,	was	an	entry	point	to	radical	politics.	It	became	the	main	venue	for	the	activism	of	YCL	members,	particularly	in	the	lead-up	to	the	Moratorium.	For	example,	the	YCL	Central	Committee	reported	that:		Nearly	all	YCL	members	are	or	should	be	actively	involved	in	some	aspect	of	the	Moratorium	…	we	should	support	the	Moratorium	and	aim	to	get	as	many	people	as	possible	actively	participating	in	it.	At	the	same	time	we	are	opposed	to	the	reactionary	CP	–	ALP	–	Pacifist	leadership	of	it	and	the	efforts	of	Cairns	and	Co	to	make	it	respectable	and	confine	it	to	the	bounds	of	parliamentary	politics.32	As	the	first	Moratorium	approached,	the	total	resources	of	the	WSA	were	put	into	organising	and	influencing	its	political	direction,	both	at	the	local	level	and	on	a	broader	scale	through	the	Vietnam	Moratorium	Campaign	(VMC)	Committee.	The	
YCL	Bulletin	spoke	directly	to	its	members:	Thanks	to	the	hard	work	and	dedication	of	comrades	in	the	[YCL]	Anti-war	groups,	conditions	will	be	favourable	…	the	largest	concentration	of	anti-war	demonstrators	in	Melbourne,	and	the	availability	of	the	student–worker	forum	as	a	platform.	YCL	members	will	be	expected	to	take	the	initiative	away	from	the	reformists	and	counterrevolutionaries	in	all	forms	of	activity	on	the	day.	This	will	include	“marshalling,”	leafleting	and	speaking,	at	all	times	keeping	in	mind	the	necessity	to	raise	the	Moratorium																																																									30	“Documents	of	the	Second	Congress	of	the	YCL	June	1970,”	YCL	Bulletin,	no.	8,	26	July	1970,	5.	31	Ibid.,	12.	32	YCL	Bulletin,	no.	6,	17	April	1970,	3.	
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to	an	anti-imperialist	revolutionary	level.	This	can	only	be	done	if	comrades	act	in	a	disciplined	way	and	do	not	let	their	militancy	isolate	them	from	the	people,	but	rather	attempt	to	advance	the	consciousness	of	the	people	around	them.33	This	advice	drew	upon	the	experience	of	the	YCL’s	activities	at	the	May	Day	march	of	a	few	days	earlier:		On	May	Day	the	aim	[of	the	YCL]	was	to	distinguish	between	revolutionaries	and	revisionists	and	other	class	traitors—the	tactic	was	to	split,	and	was	successful	in	further	uniting	the	revolutionary	forces.	On	Moratorium	day	this	would	be	disastrous	as	insufficient	political	work	has	been	done	as	yet	to	give	reasonable	mass	support	for	this	move.34	This	statement	was	followed	by	a	series	of	requests	for	members	to	organise	their	participation	in	the	Moratorium	through	the	WSA	and	the	Bakery,	in	order	to	arrange	final	details	of	transport	and	equipment	and	to	“advance	[the]	Worker/student	forum	and	La	Mama	etc.	as	main	feature	of	the	march,	and	at	Forum	keep	up	lively	&	clear	anti-imperialist	discussion	for	as	long	as	possible.”35	In	the	YCL	Bulletin,	the	reports	from	YCL	groups	provided	(and	provide)	otherwise	unobtainable	insight	into	their	activities.	In	the	absence	of	general	meetings,	and	with	a	prohibition	on	public	discussion	of	YCL	affairs,	other	than	verbal	reports	of	Central	Committee	members,	they	were	the	only	substantial	means	that	the	organisation	had	of	understanding	the	state	of	internal	ideological	struggle.	From	the	vantage	point	of	the	present,	these	reports	provide	a	view	of	the	state	of	hegemonic	discourse	within	the	YCL,	WSA,	Labor	clubs	and	other	organisations	in	which	YCL	groups	operated.	Often,	Central	Committee	communications	and	editorials	railed	against	the	perceived	shortcomings	of	members:	liberalism,	“mountain-topism,”	gossip,	lack	of	(or	over)	emphasis	on	security,	and	failure	to	study	politics.36	These	criticisms	and	self-criticisms	were	argued	sharply	in	an																																																									33	“YCL	in	the	Moratorium,”	YCL	Bulletin,	no.	7,	May	1970,	1.	(Underlining	in	original.)	34	Ibid.	The	tactic	used	to	“distinguish	between	revolutionaries	and	revisionists”	was	to	take	the	procession	on	a	march	against	the	Vietnam	War	from	the	official	venue,	Flinders	Park,	to	the	US	Consulate.	It	included	a	largely	symbolic	“attack”	on	the	ASIO	headquarters,	then	in	St	Kilda	Road.	“Viet	March	Critics	‘Stir	Fear’,”	The	Age,	4	May	1970,	3.		35	Ibid.	36	For	example,	in	YCL	Bulletin,	no.	8,	26	July	1970,	the	four	page	lead	article	was	devoted	to	curing	“liberalism”	in	the	organisation.	This,	according	to	the	article,	was	manifested	in	a	slack	
143	
unqualified,	political	language	that	appears	arcane	today	and	apt	to	invite	offence	and	fracture.	Yet,	that	did	not	happen.	Rather	than	fracture,	the	groups	grew	in	number	and	often	answered	their	critics	with	equally	sharp	language.	Particularly	at	the	time	of	the	Moratorium,	the	group	reports	printed	in	the	YCL	Bulletin	reflected	members’	opposition	to	the	“revisionism”	of	the	old	Communist	Party	of	Australia	(CPA),	and	the	idea	that	identification	of	imperialism	as	the	main	enemy	was	taking	hold.	For	example,	in	the	May	1970	YCL	Bulletin,	the	Tertiary	Group	(with	members	in	all	senior	technical	colleges),	Teachers	Group,	Monash,	Industrial	Workers	Group	and	the	two	Adelaide	Groups	all	reported	an	excellent	situation	regarding	the	uptake	of	anti-imperialist	sentiment	in	their	field	of	contact.	The	Women’s	Liberation	Group	reported	that	they	were	involved	in	an	internal	ideological	struggle	with	the	WSA	group,	which	included	a	number	of	“new	left”	types,	and	complained	that	not	enough	internal	YCL	debate	on	the	issue	of	women’s	liberation	had	occurred.37	Far	from	grumbling	about	difficulties,	these	groups	reported	success	in	promoting	an	anti-imperialist	argument	in	the	Moratorium—even	though	their	slogans	had	not	yet	been	accepted	as	the	main	ones.	They	reported	more	success	in	promoting	anti–US	imperialist	policies	in	the	organisation	of	demonstrations	by	the	July	4	Committee.	The	main	blockers	to	the	achievement	of	their	objectives	in	this	respect	were	the	ALP	and	the	CPA.	They	saw	the	latter’s	vehement	opposition	to	raising	the	question	of	imperialism	as	the	main	culprit	holding	back	popular	analysis	of	imperialism’s	influence	in	Australia.38	The	YCL	continued	in	this	vein	for	the	remainder	of	1970	and	into	the	first	half	of	1971,	always	maintaining	its	clandestine	nature	and	seeking	to	assist	the	struggle	in	a	range	of	activities	and	venues	but	never	straying	very	far	from	its	roots	in	the	Monash	Labor	Club,	WSA	and	Bakery.	However,	anti-war	activities	remained	its	staple.	In	effect,	the	YCL	was	doing	the	job	of	the	CPA	(ML)	and,	as	more	young	communists	became	members	of	the	CPA	(ML),	the	party	increasingly	became	the																																																																																																																																																																						attitude	to	security,	excessive	conservatism	in	recruitment,	slack	organisation	and	lack	of	division	of	labour,	and	passivity	in	waiting	for	the	Central	Committee’s	judgement	rather	than	thinking	for	one’s	self.	37	YCL	Bulletin,	no.	7,	May	1970,	2–4.	38	See	earlier	in	this	chapter	for	confirmation	of	the	CPA	opposition	to	raising	the	question	of	imperialism	to	be	found	in	the	memoirs	of	Bernie	Taft.	
144	
focus	for	members’	ideological	education	and	discussion.	By	the	end	of	1970,	the	CPA	(ML)	was,	as	a	matter	of	course,	mentioned	in	YCL	papers	and	bulletins	as	the	leader	of	the	revolution.	For	example,	a	very	long	paper	entitled	“On	Studying	‘The	Orientation	of	the	Youth	Movement’,”39	dated	30	November	1970	and	published	as	a	contribution	to	debate	for	the	YCL	congress,	stated	in	part:	The	attitude	taken	by	the	Communist	Party	(Marxist	Leninist)	has	also	been	clear	cut.	Articles	and	editorials	have	frequently	appeared	in	“Vanguard”	giving	strong	and	unqualified	support	to	the	youth	and	students	…	to	the	demonstrations	against	U.S.	aggression	in	Vietnam,	to	the	anti-conscription	movement,	to	the	struggles	waged	for	democratic	rights	(handing	out	leaflets	in	the	city	etc.)	and	to	struggles	against	the	bourgeois	education	system	in	schools.	The	party	…	has	drawn	attention	to	the	courageous	vanguard	role	played	by	the	Australian	youth	in	all	sorts	of	struggles,	including	resistance	to	intimidation	by	the	State	authorities,	the	police,	law	courts	and	gaols	and	the	university	bosses	and	school	headmasters.40	At	the	same	time	as	the	YCL	acknowledged	the	CPA	(ML)	as	its	leading	influence,	that	party’s	publications	modified	their	assessment	of	the	young	radicals.	During	1970,	the	number	of	articles	in	the	Vanguard	supporting	the	radicalism	of	youth	increased	and,	in	two	long	pamphlets—Some	Ideological	Questions	and	More	on	
Ideological	Questions—the	party	chairman,	Ted	Hill,	expressed	confidence	in	the	new	radicalism	of	youth:	Within	Australia	there	has	been	a	very	big	upsurge	of	political	activity	by	young	people.	Particularly	is	this	so	of	students.	This	activity	is	of	really	outstanding	importance.	…	Their	ingenuity	is	tremendous.	Their	energy	is	tremendous.	They	really	hold	the	future	in	their	hands	…	Conditions	demand	the	utmost	unqualified	support	of	the	young	in	their	revolt.	In	the	past	Communists	attempted	to	prescribe	in	advance	forms	of	organisation	and	struggle	to	young	people.	Experience	has	shown	that	the	young	people	themselves	do	far	better	than	any	Communist	League	or	
																																																								39	The	Orientation	of	the	Youth	Movement	is	a	speech	by	Mao	Zedong	that	was	delivered	4	May	1939	at	a	mass	meeting	of	youth	in	Yenan	to	commemorate	the	twentieth	anniversary	of	the	May	4th	Movement.	40	“On	Studying	‘The	Orientation	of	the	Youth	Movement’,”	YCL	Bulletin,	30	November	1970,	1,	author’s	collection.		
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Eureka	Youth	League	ever	did.	There	are	better	ways	to	bring	revolutionary	consciousness	and	direction	to	youthful	rebellion.41	Without	naming	the	plethora	of	rebellious	activities	and	radical	organisations	then	functioning,	Hill	was,	by	virtue	of	the	timing	of	this	publication,	recognising	the	activities	of	the	Monash	Labor	Club,	anti-war	youth,	WSA,	Bakery	and	the	newly	organised	Adelaide	young	radicals,	as	being	different	in	nature	from	the	Communist	League	and	the	Eureka	Youth	League.	The	latter	two	groups,	which	had	operated	under	the	direct	tutelage	of	the	Communist	Party,	were	defunct	by	1968.	While	Hill’s	eschewal	of	past	prescriptive	forms	of	organisation	and	struggle	for	young	people	was	welcomed	by	the	young	revolutionaries	of	1970,	it	was	also	a	concession	of	ideological	leadership	to	them.	This	was	a	concession	that	Hill	may	have	regretted	in	the	mid-1970s	when	the	CPA	(ML)	took	on	a	more	nationalist	agenda	after	the	withdrawal	of	all	Australian	troops	from	Vietnam.		The	YCL	continued	in	a	diminished	form	during	1971;	however,	by	the	end	of	that	year	it	had	ceased	operation	without	any	terminal	fanfare.	The	CPA	(ML)	then	established	a	Youth	Commission,	which	consisted	of	two	senior	party	members	plus	Michael	Hyde	and	me.	This	commission,	which	always	met	in	an	empty	factory	after	work,	discussed	all	of	the	activities	with	which	this	thesis	is	concerned	and	concentrated	mostly	upon	the	WSA.	It	made	no	pronouncements	and	no	formal	reports	were	ever	written.	As	members	of	it,	Mike	Hyde	and	I	assumed	the	commission’s	role	was	advisory	and	that	the	senior	party	members	would	take	the	commission’s	advice	back	to	the	Central	Committee.42	The	purpose	of	examining	the	YCL	has	been	to	show	that,	at	least	among	the	radical	organisations	in	which	it	had	direct	influence,	the	rapid	rise	of	a	consciously	anti-capitalist	ideology	expressed	in	“left”	political	practices	was	the	result	of	purposeful	action	and	not	simply	a	spontaneous	response	of	mass	unrest.43	According	to																																																									41	E.	F.	Hill,	More	on	Ideological	Questions	(Melbourne:	A	Communist	Publication,	1970),	15.	A	longer	extension	of	this	quotation	was	printed	in	the	paper	“On	Studying	‘The	Orientation	of	the	Youth	Movement’,”	YCL	Bulletin,	30	November	1970,	referred	to	above.	42	Mike	Hyde,	interview	by	author,	4	March	2016.	43	The	organisations	in	which	the	YCL	had	influence	included	the	WSA,	Socialist	Teachers,	Students	in	Dissent	(SID),	Monash	Labor	Club,	La	Trobe	Labor	Club,	Adelaide	WSA	and	Ballarat	Moratorium	Committee.	See:	YCL	Bulletins,	nos.	3,	7,	and	8.	
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Gramsci,	such	spontaneous	responses	were	“not	the	result	of	any	systematic	educational	activity	on	the	part	of	an	already	conscious	leading	group,	but	[were]	formed	through	everyday	experience	illuminated	by	‘common	sense’.”44	That	the	initially	polymorphic	Monash	Labor	Club	could	transform	itself	and	its	associated	bodies	into	an	ideologically	and	politically	focused	force	without	the	guidance	of	an	“already	conscious	leading	group”	seems,	at	least	semantically,	to	contradict	this.	As	shown	earlier	in	this	thesis,	the	three	parties	that	were	in	a	position	to	provide	that	focus	were	the	ALP,	CPA	and	CPA	(ML);	however,	from	1967	through	to	at	least	the	end	of	1970,	the	ALP	was	not	capable	of	transcending	its	electoral	imperatives,	the	CPA	was	an	object	of	ridicule	and	derision,	and	the	CPA	(ML),	at	least	in	the	beginning,	was	too	remote	to	be	effective.	At	best,	the	educative	role	that	these	parties	played	was	indirect;	often	they	served	as	negative	exemplars.45	However,	in	the	absence	of	these	parties—and	perhaps	because	of	their	absence—a	core	of	political	leadership	emerged	that	coalesced	in	the	early	days	of	the	Monash	Labor	Club	and	continued	more	or	less	intact	for	most	of	the	next	decade.	While	no-one	claimed,	or	was	held	by	others	to	warrant,	the	charismatic	title	of	“leader,”	this	group	of	leaders	included	Darce	Cassidy,	Dave	Nadel	and	Humphrey	McQueen;	later,	Kerry	Miller,	Albert	Langer	and	Michael	Hyde	joined	their	ranks.46	That	the	theoretical	approach	of	this	“already	conscious	leading	group”	did	not	just	build	itself	was	recognised	in	their	frequent	references	back	to	the	classic	writings	of	Marx,	Lenin	and,	particularly,	Mao	Zedong.	Their	approach	to	the	theoretical	education	of	those	around	them	was,	as	would	be	expected	from	an	activist	body,	to	put	practice	first.	This	is	reminiscent	of	Mao’s	words	in	On	Practice,	which	was	a	feature	in	WSA	and	YCL	reading	lists:	
																																																								44	Gramsci,	Selections	from	the	Prison	Notebooks,	Antonio	Gramsci,	Selections	from	the	Prison	
Notebooks,	New	York,	International	Publishers,	1971,198.	45	An	early	example	of	non-organic	influence	from	these	parties	can	be	seen	in	the	Monash	Labor	Club’s	guest	speakers:	Jim	Cairns	(ALP),	(Print,	no.	4,	16	March	1967),	Max	Teichman	(CPA)	and	Ted	Hill	(CPA)	(Print,	no.	8,	6	April	1967).	Use	of	the	CPA	as	negative	exemplar	can	be	seen	in	
Print’s	announcement:	“TOMORROW	in	H	1	Laurie	Aarons	speaks	on	CPA	conference.	Crush	revisionism!	(Print,	15	June	1967).	46	As	the	WSA	expanded,	both	Nadel	and	McQueen	amicably	parted	company	with	it.	Nadel	joined	a	group	of	Trotskyites	and	published	Hard	Lines,	a	newssheet	at	Monash	University.	McQueen	moved	from	student	politics	altogether	to	write	his	book	A	New	Britannia.	
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The	active	function	of	knowledge	manifests	itself	not	only	in	the	active	leap	from	perceptual	to	rational	knowledge,	but—and	this	is	more	important—it	must	manifest	itself	in	the	leap	from	rational	knowledge	to	revolutionary	practice.	The	knowledge	which	grasps	the	laws	of	the	world	must	be	redirected	to	the	practice	of	changing	the	world.47		Building	on	the	obliquely	acquired	insights	of	previous	militants,	this	fortunate	coalescence	of	politically	aware	individuals	fulfilled	Gramsci’s	requirement	of	“the	theoretical	aspect	of	the	theory–practice	nexus	being	distinguished	concretely	by	the	existence	of	a	group	of	people	‘specialized’	in	[the]	conceptual	and	philosophical	elaboration	of	ideas.”48	
Why	Did	It	Happen	This	Way?	
Mention	was	made	above	of	the	sizeable	minority	of	students	in	the	“baby	boomer”	generation	who	adopted	left-wing	causes	and	developed	anti-capitalist	campaigns	in	the	midst	of	a	plethora	of	opportunities	and	expanding	economy,	and	without	the	perils	of	world	war	and	the	Depression	being	visited	upon	them.	Hobsbawn	points	out	that,	before	the	war,	“the	great	majority	of	students	in	central	and	western	Europe	and	North	America	had	been	non-political	or	Right-wing.”	Crediting	the	change	in	political	allegiance	to	the	“sheer	explosion	of	student	numbers,”	he	explains:		As	a	growing	proportion	of	the	age-group	had	the	chance	to	study—in	France	it	was	4	per	cent	in	1950,	15½	per	cent	in	1970—going	to	university	ceased	to	be	an	exceptional	privilege	which	was	its	own	reward,	and	the	constraints	it	imposed	on	the	young	(and	generally	impecunious)	adults	were	more	resented.	Resentment	of	one	kind	of	authority,	the	university’s,	easily	broadened	into	resentment	of	any	authority,	and	therefore	(in	the	West)	inclined	students	to	the	Left	…	Special	reasons	intensified	it	in	this	or	that	country—hostility	to	the	Vietnam	War	…	but	the	phenomenon	was	too	general	to	need	special	ad	hoc	explanations.49	This	account	is	only	partial;	it	does	not	explain	why	those	young	malcontents	who	gained	the	public	attention	and	were	so	troublesome	to	authorities	turned	to	the	left																																																									47	Mao	Zedong,	“On	Practice,”	in	Selected	Readings	from	the	Works	of	Mao	Tsetung	(Peking:	Foreign	Languages	Press,	1971),	76.	48	Gramsci,	Selections	from	the	Prison	Notebooks,	334.	49	Eric	Hobsbawm,	Age	of	Extremes:	The	Short	Twentieth	Century	1914–1991	(London:	Abacus	Books,	1994),	300–301.	
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rather	than	to	anarchism,	nihilism	or	indeed	to	the	radicalism	of	the	right.	Yet,	perhaps	it	is	in	the	framing	of	the	problem	that	the	germ	of	the	answer	may	be	found.		The	nihilism	of	the	hippie	movement	of	the	1960s	and	early	1970s	could	hold	no	ground	in	the	fundamentals	of	social	discourse.	It	was	ephemeral	and	its	catchwords	“tune	out,	turn	on,	drop	out”	meant	just	that.	That	movement	was	easily	coopted	into	the	world	of	advertising,	the	music	industry	and	fashion,	while	“alternative”	societies	like	Nimbin	could	be	dismissed	as	interesting	but	economically	inconsequential.	As	opposed	to	that,	the	students	that	turned	to	the	left	developed	ideas,	methods	and	activities	that	sought	to	overturn	life	as	it	“used	to	be.”	As	Hobsbawm	observes:	For	the	discontents	of	the	young	were	not	blanketed	by	the	consciousness	of	living	through	times	of	staggering	improvement	…	The	new	times	were	the	only	ones	that	young	men	and	women	who	went	to	college	knew.	On	the	contrary,	they	felt	things	could	be	different	and	better,	even	when	they	did	not	quite	know	how	…	But	the	explosion	of	student	unrest	erupted	at	the	very	peak	of	the	great	global	boom,	because	it	was	directed,	however	vaguely	and	blindly,	against	what	they	saw	as	characteristics	of	this	society,	not	against	the	fact	that	the	older	society	might	not	have	improved	quite	enough.	But,	paradoxically,	the	fact	that	the	impetus	for	the	new	radicalism	came	from	groups	unaffected	by	economic	discontent,	stimulated	even	the	groups	used	to	mobilize	on	an	economic	basis	to	discover	that,	after	all,	they	could	ask	for	far	more	from	the	new	society	than	they	had	imagined.	The	most	immediate	effect	of	the	European	student	rebellion	was	a	wave	of	working-class	strikes	for	higher	wages	and	better	conditions.50	It	was	slightly	different	in	Australia	in	that	there	was	no	wave	of	economic	strikes	to	follow	the	student	unrest.	However,	by	the	time	that	the	Moratorium	campaign	got	under	way,	the	phenomenon	of	anti-war	demonstrating	in	the	streets	and	ignoring	the	opposition	of	authorities	had	been	made	acceptable	to	many	workers	whether	in	unions	or	not.	There	had	been	some	earlier	union	actions	against	the	war,	notably	the	Seamen’s	Union	action	on	the	Jeparit	and	the	Boonaroo.51	However,	the	Moratorium	campaign	was	of	a	much	larger	scale	and	it	was	able	to	muster	workers	and	leaders	from	the	more	politically	aligned	unions	under	the	catchphrase	“Stop	Work	to	Stop	the	War.”	This	is	not	to	claim	that	the	student	movement	caused	the																																																									50	Ibid.,	301.	51	See	footnote	on	page	122	above.	
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unions	involved	to	mobilise	their	members;	rather,	that	by	the	time	of	the	Moratorium,	they	had	altered	the	radical	ambience	that	made	it	possible	to	do	so.		The	establishment	of	centres	such	as	the	FOCO	Club,	Centre	for	Democratic	Action	(CDA)	and	the	Bakery	was	recognition	that	the	actions	of	the	young	radicals	could	have	an	effect	on	other	groups	in	so	far	as	“they	could	ask	for	far	more	from	the	new	society	than	they	had	imagined.”52	In	so	doing,	they	challenged	those	parties	that	claimed	to	have	leadership	of	the	working	class—the	CPA,	CPA	(ML)	and	the	ALP.		
The	Worker	Student	Alliance	
Preparations	for	a	full	conference	of	the	Revolutionary	Socialists	had	been	made	in	the	last	months	of	1969	and	the	complex	of	rudimentary	huts,	cabins	and	meeting	spaces	of	Camp	Eureka,	the	“holiday”	camp	that	had	belonged	to	the	recently	wound	up	Eureka	Youth	League,	was	hired	for	the	purpose.	Despite	misgivings	about	it	being	the	geographical	territory	of	the	“revisionists,”	it	turned	out	to	be	an	appropriate	venue.	Sore	heads	notwithstanding	(some	participants	were	suffering	the	after-effects	of	New	Year’s	Eve),	the	conference	ran	between	1	and	4	January	1970.	It	started	with	an	account	of	the	activities	and	progress	of	the	previous	year.	In	my	memory	and	that	of	my	interviewees,	the	progress	and	outcomes	of	the	conference	were	well	represented	in	a	report	written	by	five	participants:	Mike	Hyde,	Megan	Durant,	Darce	Cassidy,	Jill	Cassidy	and	Ken	Gooding.	What	follows	relies	heavily	on	that	report.	In	summing	up	the	experiences	of	1969,	extensive	criticisms	were	made.	These	mainly	related	to	the	way	that	the	Revolutionary	Socialists	had	tended	to	take	on	every	issue	that	came	along	without	much	consideration	of	overall	direction.	This	had	led	to	confusion	about	the	organisation’s	political	line	and	position.	Where	some	had	seen	it	as	the	“Melbourne	branch	of	the	national	Revolutionary	Alliance,”	others	had	seen	it	as	the	“beginnings	of	a	disciplined	Marxist	party.”	Or	was	it	simply	a	postgraduate	or	off	campus	“adjunct	to	the	Monash	Labor	Club?”	Others	declared	that	the	organisation	had	become	“a	home	for	armchair	Marxists	and	worn	out	
																																																								52	Hobsbawm,	Age	of	Extremes,	301.	
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student	activists	attempting	to	take	student	politics	into	the	outside	world.”53	The	overall	assessment	of	the	conference	was	that	the	organisation	had	been	too	“inward	looking”	and	that	confusion	about	its	fundamentals	and	purpose	had	been	“reflected	in	the	work	of	the	organisation.”54	The	conference	decided	that	the	Bakery	should	remain	as	an	open	political	headquarters	with	a	“revolutionary	orientation.”	However,	a	note	of	caution	was	sounded:		We	reject	the	view	that	the	real	political	work	is	to	be	done	within	the	walls	of	the	Bakery	…	[it]	must	be	done	among	the	people	where	they	are	found	and	not	in	an	artificial	creation	like	the	Bakery,	or	Resistance	or	CDA.55		Discussion	papers	dealt	mainly	with	general	principles	and	political	directions.	Proposals	concerning	the	future	structure	and	operating	details	of	the	Revolutionary	Socialists	were	adjourned.	They	were	considered	at	a	special	meeting	at	the	Bakery	that	was	open	to	all	members	plus	members	of	kindred,	independent	organisations:	the	Monash	Labor	Club,	Socialist	Teachers	Association,	Students	in	Dissent	and	the	Prahran	Peoples	Movement.	Those	proposals	included	one	for	the	disbanding	of	the	Revolutionary	Socialists	and	formation	of	a	new	organisation,	the	“Worker	Student	Action	Movement”	(WSAM),	to	be	based	at	the	Bakery.56	Duly,	on	Sunday	11	January	1970,	the	Revolutionary	Socialists	was	disbanded	and	replaced	by	a	new	organisation,	the	Worker	Student	Alliance,	the	acronym	“WSAM”	having	been	rejected	on	the	grounds	that	it	sounded	like	something	out	of	a	Captain	Marvel	action	comic.	The	new	organisation	decided	that	its	functions	should	include:	Participation	in	working	class	struggles;	Political	agitation	among	the	working	class,	both	through	the	official	trade	union	movement	(but	with	the	object	of	thus	increasing	contact	with	workers,	not	with	the	object	of	building	up	trade	unions	or	…	supporting	
																																																								53	Mike	Hyde	et	al.,	“Report	on	the	Revolutionary	Socialist	Conference,	January	1–4,	1970,”	Prahran,	6	January	1970,	author’s	collection.	54	Ibid.	55	Ibid	56	Ibid.	
151	
trade	unionism)	…	direct	contact	with	the	working	class	independent	of	the	unions.	…	WSA	members	who	were	industrial	workers	should	immediately	establish	themselves	into	a	semi-autonomous	group	to	carry	out	political	work	on	the	job	site.	WSA	members	who	are	not	industrial	workers	are	to	carry	out	work	among	the	industrial	working	class	by	other	means	where	possible.	Political	education	of	WSA	members	and	others:	It	was	decided	to	establish	regular	discussion	groups	to	study	practical	problems	within	a	theoretical	framework.		As	well	there	were	to	be:	
• Films	of	Left	interest.	
• Saturday	lunches	to	continue	on	the	1969	pattern.	
• Action	meetings	to	be	held	every	second	Monday	at	8.00pm.	
• Action	within	the	anti-war	movement	on	the	Vietnam	Moratorium:	All	members	are	urged	to	attend	the	February	first	meeting	at	Richmond	Town	Hall.	
• Marxist	discussion	group	every	Thursday,	8.00pm.	This	report	reflects	the	experience	of	the	signatories	as	most	were	also	members	of	the	fledging	YCL	and	all	had	been	Monash	Labor	Club	members;	all	were	founding	members	of	the	Revolutionary	Socialists	and	of	the	Bakery	and,	since	the	membership	of	the	new	WSA	was	identical	in	the	first	instance	to	the	old	group,	attitudes	towards	Maoism	and	disdain	for	the	CPA	and	for	Trotskyites	were	taken	for	granted.	This	was	a	condition	that	could	not,	and	did	not,	last,	as,	one	by	one,	new	members	were	attracted	to	the	new	outlook	represented	by	the	organisation’s	new	name.	During	February	and	March	1970,	the	Bakery	was	given	over	to	building	the	new	organisation	and	defining	its	activities.	Funds	were	raised	through	members’	contributions,	the	usual	raffles	at	parties	and	functions,	and	a	very	modest	charge	of	50	cents	for	the	Saturday	morning	lunches.	With	some	extra	donations	from	some	individual	members,	Darce	Cassidy	organised	the	purchase	of	a	second-hand	printing	machine	to	be	installed	in	the	cellar	alongside	the	gestetners,	which	were	in	constant	use	for	the	printing	of	leaflets,	student	underground	newsletters	and	the	Monash	Labor	Club’s	Print.	In	the	first	weeks	of	March,	the	attention	of	WSA	members	who	were	also	Monash	Labor	Club	members	was	caught	up	in	intensified	activity	at	the	university	because	
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of	orientation	week	and	the	revivification	of	activity	on	campus.	The	bustle	of	Labor	Club	activity	at	Monash	University	was	extensive	and	required	considerable	labour.	As	well	as	distributing	Print	and	staffing	the	bookstall	and	the	recruitment	stalls,	there	were	films	to	show—The	War	Game	on	Thursday	5	March—and	speaking	engagements	to	run—Clarrie	O’Shea	of	the	CPA	(ML)	was	a	guest	speaker	on	Friday	6	March.57	There	were	also	new	campaigns	to	run,	including	protests	about	the	use	of	the	university	by	the	military	through	the	“Monash	University	Company,”	a	unit	of	the	Citizens	Military	Forces,	and	against	Albert	Langer’s	exclusion	from	all	courses	even	though	he	was	demonstrably	qualified	for	them.58	
Moratorium	
While	the	WSA	was	getting	itself	organised,	the	Moratorium	movement	began	to	take	shape.	In	the	US,	a	“Moratorium”	march	against	the	Vietnam	War	held	in	November	1969	proved	successful	in	mobilising	thousands	of	citizens	to	demonstrate	their	opposition	to	the	war.	In	Canberra,	on	25	November	1969—a	date	that	coincided	with	the	one-day	sitting	of	Federal	Parliament—some	members	of	the	Association	for	International	Cooperation	and	Disarmament	(AICD)	and	some	Labor	parliamentarians	met	together	and	“agreed	to	hold	an	Australian	‘Vietnam	Moratorium	Campaign’…	A	Sponsors	Statement	was	prepared,	which	was	immediately	signed	by	74	Labor	M.P.’s.”59	John	Lloyd,	secretary	of	the	Victorian	Campaign	for	International	Cooperation	and	Disarmament	(CICD),	was	appointed	to	convene	a	state	meeting	of	sponsors.	On	9	December	1969,	Lloyd	“called	a	meeting	of	Victorian	sponsors	in	the	Caprice	Restaurant	…	This	meeting	agreed	to	co-operate	in	the	national	venture.”60	The	sponsors	were	from	unions,	anti-war	groups,	ALP	branches,	the	CICD	and	some	student	groups,	including	from	Monash.	Their	meeting	formed	the	VMC.	Its	structure																																																									57	Print	4,	no.	1,	4	March	1970.	58	Ibid.	Langer	had	achieved	2b	Honours	in	4th	year	maths,	was	second	and	third	out	of	a	class	of	30	in	information	science	and	was	recommended	for	enrolment	in	MSc	(prelim),	which	the	Academic	Board	overruled.	59	Vietnam	Moratorium	Campaign,	A	Background	to	this	Meeting	(Richmond:	VMC,	n.d.).	A	single	page	leaflet	explaining	the	founding	of	the	VMC,	distributed	at	the	first	Richmond	Town	Hall	meeting.	60	Ibid.	
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consisted	of	an	elected	executive	and	a	council	to	be	made	up	of	delegates	from	affiliated	organisations	that	eventually	included	trade	unions,	church	groups,	student	organisations	and	pacifist	groups.	Lloyd	was	elected	secretary	of	the	VMC	Committee	for	Victoria	and	Jim	Cairns	became	its	chairman,	but	the	ultimate	policymaking	entity	was	to	be	mass	meetings	of	anti-war	activists.		The	first	of	these	mass	meetings	was	held	in	the	Richmond	Town	Hall	and	numbered	500–600	members.	It	was	a	boisterous	affair	in	which	principles,	major	slogans	and	policies	were	argued	out.	Although	these	arguments	were	not	completed,	the	meeting	managed	to	endorse	the	holding	of	a	Moratorium	march	in	April	1970.	After	the	US	escalated	the	war	by	bombing	neutral	Cambodia	in	March	1970,	the	date	for	the	first	demonstration	was	postponed	to	8	May.	Thus,	the	Melbourne	demonstration	took	place	just	four	days	after	the	infamous	killing	of	protesting	students	at	Kent	State	University	in	the	US.	By	some	estimates,	it	attracted	100,000	people.		Melbourne’s	second	Vietnam	Moratorium	march	was	held	on	18	September	1970	in	concert	with	the	national	movement.	It	was	smaller	and	there	were	violent	incidents	between	police	and	demonstrators.	Two	hundred	people	were	arrested	in	Sydney,	but	the	Melbourne	march	was	relatively	unscathed.	When	nearly	as	many	people	as	attended	the	first	Moratorium	descended	on	the	city	for	a	march	and	sit-down	protest	on	30	June	1971,	the	third	Moratorium	closed	the	centre	of	Melbourne.		In	preparatory	meetings	for	the	first	Victorian	Moratorium,	including	the	mass	meeting	in	the	Richmond	Town	Hall,	the	disputes	that	had	given	vitality	to	past	anti-war	campaigns,	such	as	the	4	July	rallies	of	the	VCC,	resurfaced.	These	disputes	arose	out	of	challenges	from	the	WSA,	university	labor	clubs	and	other	militants	against	the	ALP,	CPA	and	CICD’s	persistent	refusal	to	accept	that	a	feature	of	the	Australian	anti–Vietnam	War	movement	should	be	that	the	US	be	named	as	the	imperialist	aggressor;	that	the	war	was	not	a	civil	war	but	a	just	war	of	national	liberation;	and	that	the	campaign	should	support	the	National	Liberation	Front	of	South	Vietnam	
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(NLF).61	Victorian	radicals	were	encouraged	to	learn	that	this	disagreement	had	national	characteristics,	as	coincident	and	similar	complaints	about	ALP,	CPA	and	AICD	attitudes	arose	from	organisations	of	young	anti-war	militants	in	other	states,	including	Resistance	in	Sydney	and	the	Revolutionary	Socialist	Alliance	in	Brisbane.62	Of	the	ALP,	CPA	and	CICD,	only	the	first	two	were	numerically	separable.	While	some	CICD	adherents	were	formally	unaligned,	a	decisive	number	of	its	members	were	also	ALP	or	CPA	members.	To	the	extent	that	the	attitudes	and	influences	of	those	parties	were	reflected	in	CICD	propositions,	it	too	came	under	attack.	The	ALP’s	refusal	to	accept	the	argument	that	the	peace	movement	should	support	the	NLF	and	name	the	US	as	the	aggressor	was	easily	understood.	The	party	supported	the	US–Australia	alliance	as	expressed	in	the	Australia,	New	Zealand,	United	States	Mutual	Defence	Treaty	(known	as	ANZUS).	As	discussed	in	Chapter	5	of	this	thesis,	this	support	had	been	put	under	some	strain	by	the	stridently	anti-war	and	anti-conscription	statements	of	the	previous	ALP	leader,	Arthur	Calwell.	By	1967,	Calwell	had	been	replaced	by	Gough	Whitlam.63	The	party	then	found	itself	in	a	situation	of	indecision.	However,	by	1970,	whatever	the	view	held	by	Chairman	of	the	VCC	and	Shadow	Cabinet	member,	Jim	Cairns	MHR,	he,	as	with	all	ALP	members,	had	to	ensure	that	the	electoral	prospects	of	the	party	were	not	damaged	by	the	appearance	of	disunity	or	of	sudden	changes	in	policy.		Yet,	by	1970,	the	strength	of	the	anti-war	movement	had	grown	in	both	the	US	and	Australia.	Its	success	was	reflected	in	the	growth	of	popular	discontent	with	the	continuation	of	the	war	as	demonstrated	in	the	August	1969	Morgan	Gallup	poll,	which	showed	that	55	per	cent	of	Australians	wanted	the	troops	brought	home	from	
																																																								61	Darce	Cassidy,	“Political	Power	Grows	Out	of	the	Barrel	of	a	Gestetner,”	in	Brian	Laver,	The	
Communist	Party	is	behind	this	Moratorium—Way	behind	(Brisbane,	1970),	3.	A	four-page	broadsheet,	author’s	collection.	See	Appendix	1	for	an	enlarged	scan	of	this	article.	62	Ibid.	AICD	is	the	Association	for	International	Cooperation	and	Disarmament,	the	national	parent	of	the	CICD.	63	Whitlam	replaced	Calwell	in	February	1967.	National	Archives	of	Australia.	“Australia’s	Prime	Ministers,”	accessed	8	July	2018,	http://primeministers.naa.gov.au/primeministers/whitlam/before-office.aspx#section9.	
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Vietnam.64	Anti-war	demonstrations	were	not	the	only	factor	determining	this	discontent;	for	example,	the	success	of	the	Tet	Offensive	had	all	but	stifled	the	notion	of	the	war	being	“winnable.”	The	1969	ALP	Federal	Conference	decided	in	favour	of	phasing	out	troops	in	consultation	with	the	US	Government.	Soon	after,	in	his	1969	federal	election	campaign	speech,	Whitlam	reversed	his	previous	position,	stating	that	"under	Labor,	there	will	be	no	Australian	troops	in	Vietnam	after	June	1970."65	In	the	subsequent	election,	Labor	improved	its	performance	and	gained	eighteen	seats	and	a	seven	per	cent	increase	in	its	overall	electoral	standing.66	At	the	end	of	1969,	the	Gorton	Liberal	government	announced	a	phased	withdrawal	from	Vietnam,	beginning	in	mid-1970.67	Opposition	to	the	Vietnam	War	was	no	longer	the	electoral	poison	of	only	a	couple	of	years	previously.	Any	thought	of	the	VMC	explicitly	calling	for	the	defeat	of	the	US	as	an	imperialist	aggressor	was	easily	understood	as	an	ALP	taboo	in	the	context	of	parliamentary	objectives.	Since	seeking	a	change	in	ALP	policy	seemed	impractical,	the	ALP	avoided	being	the	main	target	of	student	and	other	activists’	vitriol.	The	same	could	not	be	said	for	the	CPA.	As	Cassidy	wrote	in	“Political	Power	Grows	Out	of	the	Barrel	of	a	Gestetner”:	In	this	debate	two	issues	continually	arise:	1.	The	issue	of	naming	the	aggressor	and	2.	Concern	for	the	electoral	prospects	of	the	ALP	…	differences	which	ultimately	boil	down	to	support	for	revolution	as	opposed	to	reform	of	the	existing	system.68		Although	Cassidy	specifically	mentioned	the	ALP	in	the	same	sentence	as	“revolution,”	it	was	not	his	target:		There	are	those	within	the	peace	movement,	particularly	the	so-called	Communist	Party,	who	purport	to	share	this	view	of	imperialism	as	the																																																									64	Vietnam	Veterans	Association	of	Australia,	Vietnam—Australia's	Longest	War,	A	Calendar	of	
Military	and	Political	Events,	accessed	25	May	2017,	http://www.vvaa.org.au/calendar.htm.	65	Gough	Whitlam,	“1969	Election	Policy	Speech,”	Sydney	Town	Hall,	1	October	1969,	accessed	24	June	2018,	http://whitlamdismissal.com/1969/10/01/whitlam-1969-election-policy-speech.html.	66	Ashley	Lavelle,	“Labor	and	Vietnam,	a	Reappraisal,”	Labour	History	20	(2006),	13,	accessed	25	May	2017,	https://research-repository.griffith.edu.au/handle/10072/13911.	67	Vietnam	Veterans	Association	of	Australia,	Vietnam—Australia's	Longest	War.	68	Cassidy,	“Political	Power	Grows	Out	of	the	Barrel	of	a	Gestetner,”	3.	See	Appendix	1.	
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cause	of	wars,	and	in	particular	the	Vietnam	war	…	The	sad	fact	is	that	not	only	do	many	of	these	pseudo-revolutionaries	not	put	forward	such	a	view	within	the	peace	movement,	but	they	actively	or	passively	prevent	others	from	raising	the	issue	…	If	the	Communist	Party	…	agrees	that	United	States	imperialism	has	been	responsible	for	the	war	in	Vietnam	why	has	it	always	been	up	to	us	(the	Worker	Student	Alliance,	Monash	Labor	Club	and	others)	to	oppose	the	view	that	war	is	due	to	“human	nature”	or	that	Vietnam	is	an	“aberration	of	the	great	American	democratic	tradition	…”	Do	they	all	go	along	with	the	ALP	policy	of	support	for	the	American	alliance?	…	Whatever	some	members	of	the	CPA	say	in	private	the	public	stand	of	others	like	Taft	Jr.	and	Carmichael	is	a	very	different	one.	They	publicly	accuse	the	Worker	Student	Alliance	and	the	Vietnam	Co-ordinating	Committee	of	manipulation.	They	do	this	knowing	that	militants	were	deliberately	excluded	from	the	initial	meetings	of	the	Moratorium,	that	organisations	not	informed	of	the	initial	meetings	include	the	Monash	Labor	Club,	the	Worker	Student	Alliance	and	the	Vietnam	Co-ordinating	Committee	in	Melbourne,	Resistance	in	Sydney	and	the	Revolutionary	Socialist	Alliance	in	Brisbane.	In	private	certain	[CPA]	members	concede	the	manipulation	but	in	public	they	say	nothing.69	This	assessment	of	the	CPA’s	attempts	to	block	all	attempts	to	put	a	radical	edge	on	Moratorium	actions	was	confirmed	by	Bernie	Taft,	state	secretary	of	the	CPA	and	VMC	Committee	member	when	he	wrote	in	his	memoirs:		The	problem	that	the	moratorium	movement	faced	at	this	time—1969–70—was	that	some	students	and	activists	had	come	under	a	very	strong	Maoist	influence.	A	group	at	Monash	University	in	Melbourne,	led	by	Albert	Langer,	took	extremist	positions	which	threatened	to	narrow	the	focus	and	appeal	of	the	movement.	Our	efforts	were	directed	at	preventing	them	from	dominating	the	campaign	…	Maoists	and	some	others	in	the	anti-war	movement,	regarded	themselves	as	revolutionaries,	and	campaigned	on	anti-imperialist	and	anti-American	slogans	which	they	regarded	as	a	prerequisite	for	participation	in	the	Vietnam	moratorium	movement.	But	the	vast	majority	of	Australians	who	were	opposed	to	the	war	in	Vietnam	did	not	see	it	as	a	war	against	imperialism—they	saw	it	as	an	unfair	and	unjust	war	in	which	they	should	not	be	involved	…	Whilst	it	was	perfectly	proper	for	every	group	to	put	
																																																								69	Ibid.	Note:	“Taft	Jr.”	was	Mark	Taft,	Victorian	State	Committee	member	of	the	CPA	and	son	of	Bernie	Taft;	“Carmichael”	was	Laurie	Carmichael,	also	of	the	CPA	and	a	leader	of	the	Amalgamated	Engineering	Union	and	vice-chairperson	of	the	VMC.	
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forward	their	own	views,	it	was	obviously	wrong	and	damaging	to	insist	that	the	most	extreme	views	be	imposed	on	the	whole	movement.70	Cassidy’s	accusations	pointed	also	to	what	he	considered	to	be	CPA	perfidy	in	manipulation	of	the	bureaucracy	of	Moratorium	processes	and	of	“stacking”	meetings;	for	example,	“militants	were	deliberately	excluded	from	the	initial	meetings	of	the	Moratorium,”	and	“the	heavy	hand	of	the	numbers	game	has	made	debate	organisationally	irrelevant.”71	The	latter	referred	to	the	first	Richmond	Town	Hall	meeting	of	the	VMC	at	which	a	compromise	resolution	moved	by	the	WSA	was	carried.	The	resolution	directed	“that	all	propaganda	issued	centrally	by	the	VMC	name	the	Americans	as	the	aggressor	in	Vietnam.”	However,	except	for	the	fine	print	in	one	broadsheet,	the	VMC	publicity	structures	ignored	the	directive.72		Once	again	confirming	Cassidy’s	accusations,	Taft	claimed	the	student	activists	were	not	as	good	at	the	numbers	game	as	the	CPA:	Running	the	moratorium	was	a	constant	battle.	There	were	Sunday	afternoon	meetings	open	to	all	activists	where,	based	on	the	principle	of	direct	democracy,	binding	decisions	were	made.	It	was	certainly	much	easier	to	attract	students	to	a	big	debate	on	a	Sunday	afternoon	than	it	was	to	attract	those	with	family	commitments.	Nevertheless,	in	co-operation	with	others,	the	Communist	Party	managed	to	contribute	enough	numbers	to	keep	the	Maoist	students	in	check.73	Cassidy	put	forward	some	reasons	for	the	behaviour	of	the	CPA:		A	long	history	of	working	through	the	institutions	of	capitalism	(like	parliament,	the	press	and	the	union	hierarchy)	rather	than	among	the	people	has	isolated	them	from	real	mass	contact.	Thus	the	view	that	“we	can’t	offend	the	Labor	Party”	or	“the	union	bureaucrats	won’t	come	at	that”	or	“that	will	scare	the	peace	parsons.”74	The	CPA’s	attitude	towards	the	ALP	(i.e.,	“we	can’t	offend	the	Labor	Party”)	grew	out	of	past	prospects	of	the	ALP	becoming	socialist.	John	Sendy,	a	long-time	member	of																																																									70	Bernie	Taft,	Crossing	the	Party	Line,	Memoirs	of	Bernie	Taft	(Newham,	Victoria:	Scribe	Publications,	1994),	246.	71	Cassidy,	“Political	Power	Grows	Out	of	the	Barrel	of	a	Gestetner,”	3.	72	Ibid.	73	Taft,	Crossing	the	Party	Line,	247	74	Cassidy,	“Political	Power	Grows	Out	of	the	Barrel	of	a	Gestetner,”	3.	
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the	CPA,	inadvertently	confirmed	this	when	he	wrote,	in	1971,	in	the	Australian	Left	
Review	that:	The	young	radical/revolutionary	attitude,	so	prevalent,	that	the	ALP	is	irrelevant,	that	revolutionaries	should	have	no	truck	with	it,	should	not	support	the	return	of	Labor	Governments	and	indeed	should	in	no	way	even	participate	in	parliamentary	activity,	contesting	elections,	etc.,	is	incorrect	and	should	be	combated.75	At	this	time,	the	CPA	was	in	the	throes	of	a	split	between	those	who	wished	the	party	to	reject	close	adherence	to	the	Soviet	Union	and	those	who	wished	the	opposite,	which	eventually	saw	the	formation	of	a	breakaway	group,	the	Socialist	Party	of	Australia	(SPA).	The	CPA	may	have	modified	its	stance	towards	support	for	the	ALP,	but	its	actions	in	the	preparatory	stages	of	the	Moratorium	seemed,	to	the	Melbourne	and	Brisbane	radicals,	to	suggest	otherwise.	How	else	could	it	explain	its	reluctance	to	challenge	the	US–Australia	alliance	or	to	support	the	NLF	in	any	material	way?	The	Melbourne	Maoists’	position	was	boosted	by	similar	clashes	in	other	Australian	cities.	The	most	robust	of	these	concerned	the	efforts	of	the	Brisbane-based	Revolutionary	Socialist	Students	Alliance	(RSSA),	led	by	Brian	Laver,	to	break	the	CPA’s	stranglehold	on	the	Moratorium	in	that	city	(Figure	8).	Laver’s	1970	account	became	the	lead	article	in	The	Communist	Party	is	behind	this	Moratorium—Way	
behind.76	
																																																								75	John	Sendy,	“Socialism	and	the	ALP	Left,”	Australian	Left	Review,	no.	29	(March	1971):	11.	76	Laver,	The	Communist	Party	is	behind	this	Moratorium—Way	behind.	See	above	for	Cassidy’s	contribution	to	this	publication.		
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Figure	8:	Brian	Laver	attempting	to	speak	at	Brisbane	Moratorium Cassidy	had	seen	the	events	in	Brisbane	as	important	for	the	young	Melbourne	Maoists	and	for	other	peace	activists	who	may	have	been	weighing	up	the	merits	of	the	arguments	of	the	various	activist	bodies—the	CPA,	WSA,	ALP	or	those	on	the	fringes	of	the	Moratorium.	Important	also	in	this	respect	were	the	events	concerning	the	first	Moratorium	action	simultaneously	occurring	in	Adelaide,	South	Australia.	In	that	state,	the	national	consultation	delegate,	Professor	Brian	Medlin,	had	established	the	VMC	in	the	same	fashion	as	in	all	the	other	states.	However,	most	of	the	VMC	organisation	was	handled	by	a	previously	existing	protest	body,	the	ALP	dominated	Campaign	for	Peace	in	Vietnam	(CPV).	The	Adelaide	WSA,	Medlin	and	others	had	argued	in	vain	that	the	VMC	should	adopt	an	anti–US	imperialist	line.	The	Adelaide	VMC	was	dominated	by	ALP	office	bearers	rather	than	CPA	organisers	and,	in	apparent	appeasement	of	the	demands	of	the	anti-imperialists,	a	specifically	anti–
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US	imperialist	march	was	planned	for	the	eve	of	the	big	march.77	South	Australian	VMC	leader	Greg	Stevens	writes:	Whilst	practically	all	of	the	events	leading	up	to	Moratorium	Day	went	relatively	smoothly	…	the	Anti-imperialism	Rally	held	the	evening	prior	to	the	day,	attended	by	about	2,000,	was	marred	by	violent	behaviour	against	marchers	and	an	apparent	lack	of	action	by	police	to	protect	the	marchers,	and	to	take	action	against	those	who	had	assaulted	them.	It	transpired	that	a	group	of	soldiers	dressed	in	civilian	clothes,	some	20	in	number,	made	repeated	assaults	on	the	marchers.	In	his	Report	on	the	September	Moratorium,	Justice	Bright	commented	on	the	matter.	He	wrote,	“I	am	uneasy	about	the	conduct	of	the	police	on	8th	May	…	It	seems	to	me	that	the	behaviour	of	some	counter	demonstrators	at	a	later	point	amply	justified	arrests	which	do	not	appear	to	have	been	made.”	78	Moving	the	anti-imperialism	rally	to	the	earlier	date,	and	the	violent	attack	on	it,	confirmed	what	the	WSA,	Laver	and	the	Adelaide	anti-imperialists	had	been	saying—that	is,	that	raising	anti–US	imperialist	slogans	would	attract	rather	than	repel	popular	support	for	the	Moratorium.	Confirming	this	view,	Stevens	notes:	Nonetheless,	the	following	day,	one	of	the	biggest	and	most	peaceful	street	marches	ever	seen	in	Adelaide	occurred.	Estimates	of	those	marching	ranged	from	5,000	to	10,000.	Although	composed	mainly	of	students	and	other	young	people,	[and	quoting	from	the	Sunday	Mail,	9	May	1970]	…	“most	sections	of	the	community	appeared	to	be	represented	in	the	march.”79	Despite	their	doctrinal	differences,	the	common	call	of	the	young	anti-imperialists	in	Brisbane,	Sydney,	Melbourne	and	Adelaide	that	the	Australian	peace	movement	reposition	itself	to	focus	on	US	imperialism	and	bypass	the	electoral	concerns	of	the	Labor	Party	amounted	to	a	national	demand	that	became	a	substantial	factor	in	plotting	the	course	of	future	activities.	The	experience	of	organising	the	May	and	September	1970	Moratoriums	revealed	a	need	for	clarity	and	vision	for	the	future	in	rapidly	changing	conditions.	Thus,	a	“National	Anti-War	Conference”	was	convened																																																									77	Greg	Stevens,	“Campaigning	for	Peace	in	Vietnam	The	Adelaide	Mobilization	1967-1972.”	(Paper	presented	at	the	14th	Biennial	Conference,	of	the	Australian	Society	for	Labour	History,	
Fighting	against	War,	Peace	Activism	in	the	Twentieth	Century,	Melbourne,	February	11-13,	2015).	In	1970,	Stevens	was	a	member	of	the	Executive	Committee	of	the	CPV,	the	first	chair	of	the	VMC,	an	industrial	officer	with	the	SA	Public	Service	Association,	and	a	member	of	the	State	Executive	of	the	ALP.	78	Ibid.	79	Ibid.	
161	
by	the	National	Co-ordinating	Committee	of	the	Moratorium	to	discuss	the	“forward	directions	…	nature	of	the	movement	…	relationship	to	emerging	forces	of	the	Third	World”	and	“how	it	should	react	to	increasing	political	oppression	at	home.”80	The	proceedings	of	the	conference	are	examined	in	the	next	chapter	of	this	thesis.	At	this	stage,	it	is	worth	noting	that	those	anti-imperialist	activist	groups	in	Brisbane,	Melbourne	and	Adelaide	that	have	been	discussed	in	this	chapter	were	joined	by	others	to	form	a	sizeable	“anti-imperialist	caucus”	at	the	conference.		Most	participants	who	responded	to	the	call	of	the	Moratorium	were	unaware	of	the	internal	arguments	in	the	central	VMC	committees.	The	proceedings	of	the	VMC	and	of	non-party	affiliates	were	open	for	the	world	to	see,	but	the	level	of	argumentation	was	too	often	esoteric	(and	about	the	trust	or	distrust	that	the	warring	factions	had	for	each	other)	to	be	of	interest	to	most	uninvolved	observers.	The	central	organs	of	the	Moratorium	issued	press	releases	and	some	official	materials,	such	as	posters	and	leaflets,	but	most	of	the	more	personal	contact	and	propaganda	was	handled	by	the	affiliates	to	the	VMC.	Since	there	was	no	prohibition	on	what	affiliates	could	write	in	their	own	promotional	material,	the	anti–US	imperialist	and	pro-NLF	affiliates,	such	as	university	Labor	clubs,	the	Schools	Moratorium	Committee,	WSA	and	others,	raised	those	issues	directly	within	their	own	Moratorium	propaganda.	Figures	9	and	10	are	extracts	from	explanatory	leaflets	from	two	of	these	affiliates.81	Of	course,	those	with	other	views	on	how	to	mobilise	against	the	war,	such	as	some	unions,	church	groups,	the	CICD,	ALP	and	CPA,	did	likewise.	
																																																								80	National	Co-ordinating	Committee	of	the	Moratorium,	National	Anti-War	Conference,	brochure	(Sydney,	1970).	81	“Propaganda	Piece	1”	Print,	Special	Edition,	7	May	1970;	and	“Propaganda	Piece	2,”	“Imperialism	the	Cause,”	leaflet	of	Schools	Moratorium	Committee,	May	1970.	Both	samples	are	in	author’s	collection.		
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Figure	9:	Print,	Special	Moratorium	Issue,	May	1970	
	
Figure	10:	Schools	Moratorium	Committee	leaflet,	May	1970	
July	4	and	the	Battle	of	the	Posters	
Across	Australia,	there	were	huge	attendances	at	the	first	Moratorium	campaigns:	“estimates	of	numbers	vary	from	30,000	to	100,000	in	Melbourne.	The	Age	suggested	70,000.”82	Among	activists,	there	was	little	point	in	extended	celebration																																																									82	Melbourne	Shrine	of	Remembrance,	Attitudes	to	the	Vietnam	War.		
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and	congratulation	at	having	run	such	a	well	orchestrated	campaign,	as	the	war	did	not	end	and	conscription	still	existed,	which	meant	that	the	campaign	would	have	to	continue.	Given	the	activity	of	promoting	and	running	the	8	May	Moratorium,	the	organisation	of	the	4	July	demonstration	had	been	largely	set	aside,	but	it	had	not	been	forgotten.		For	the	ALP,	the	success	of	the	Moratorium	was	that	it	demonstrated	the	popularity	of	its	peace	policies	to	the	voting	public.	Having	had	some	time	to	assess	the	Moratorium’s	effect	in	the	wider	community,	and	keeping	its	options	open	for	further	action,	Dr	Jim	Cairns,	in	a	statement	made	from	his	parliamentary	office	on	30	June	1970,	noted:		On	May	8	the	people	manifested	the	largest	public	expression	of	opposition	to	government	policy	in	Australian	history	…	The	government	was	narrowly	elected	last	year	…	It	cannot	claim	from	that	election	any	mandate	to	continue	the	war	in	Vietnam	or	to	continue	conscription	for	it.83		Cairns	foreshadowed	the	holding	of	a	further	Moratorium	demonstration	on	18,	19	and	20	September,	which	he	hoped	would	“extend	the	campaign	into	one	to	replace	it	…	[the	Liberal	government]	by	a	government	consistent	with	the	aims	of	the	VMC.”84	With	Cairns	and	the	ALP	taking	a	wait	and	see	attitude,	the	CICD	and	some	local	peace	groups	followed	suit.	For	the	parties	and	political	groups—such	as	the	CPA,	CPA	(ML),	WSA,	Monash	and	La	Trobe	Labor	clubs,	and	Students	for	a	Democratic	Society	(SDS)—whose	vision	reached	beyond	the	Vietnam	War	to	the	overturning	of	Australian	society	and	the	defeat	of	US	imperialism,	the	Moratorium	had	been	a	successful	campaign,	but	the	essentials	of	war	and	imperialism	remained.	The	US	Independence	Day	demonstration	had	become	an	institution	within	the	anti-war	movement;	however,	it	became	an	even	more	intense	contest	between	the	CPA	and	the	Labor	Club/WSA	camps.	The	belated	campaigning	began	with	the	calling	of	a	meeting	of	the	July	4	Committee	on	5	June	1970	at	the	Victorian	Railways	Institute.	The	meeting	was	open																																																									83	Jim	Cairns,	Statement	by	J.	F.	Cairns,	Issued	for	general	release	on	30	June	1970,	1.	University	of	Melbourne	Archives,	Congress	for	International	Cooperation	and	Disarmament	(CICD)	Collection,	1947,	File	5/5,	Box	22.	84	Ibid.,	2.	
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to	any	activist	and	advertisements	for	attendance	had	been	issued	to	all	peace	organisations	including	the	CICD	and	the	VMC	and,	while	these	two	organisations	did	not	seek	to	have	any	special	role,	some	of	their	ordinary	members	attended.	Among	the	180–200	people	who	attended	were	CPA	activists	(e.g.,	Bernie	Taft,	Roger	Wilson	and	George	Zangalis),	WSA	members	(e.g.,	Michael	Hyde,	Bevan	Ramsden,	Jim	Bacon,	Lyn	Butcher	and	myself),	militants	representing	several	Trotskyite	tendencies	(e.g.	Jill	Jolliffe,	Rod	Quinn	and	Dave	Nadel),	members	of	the	socialist	left	of	the	ALP	(e.g.,	Joan	Coxsedge)	and	independent	activists	(e.g.,	Lyn	Beaton,	John	Rutherford	of	the	Plumbers	Union	and	Ken	Mansell).	Marking	the	growth	of	radical	anti-imperialism	among	students	at	La	Trobe	University,	a	contingent	of	La	Trobe	WSA/Labor	Club	members	also	attended	(e.g.,	Fergus	Robinson,	Barry	York,	Dave	Muller	and	Ian	McDonald).85		The	dynamics	of	the	meeting	were	somewhat	different	from	that	to	which	peace	activists	had	become	accustomed.	Ted	Bull	of	the	Waterside	Workers’	Federation	and	CPA	(ML)	chaired	the	meeting.	The	WSA	camp,	represented	by	many	well-known	leaders,	was	the	largest	identifiable	grouping	in	the	room.	However,	even	with	the	mentor	for	many	WSA	members,	Ted	Bull,	in	the	chair,	the	WSA	did	not	take	the	initiative.	Instead,	ex-YCL	member,	Rod	Quinn,	seized	the	moment	and	moved	the	main	resolution	to	the	effect	that	the	4	July	demonstration	should	be	organised	around	demand	for	the	“immediate	and	unconditional	withdrawal	of	all	U.S.	imperialist	troops	and	their	allies	from	Indo-China,”	“recognition	of	the	Provisional	Revolutionary	Government”	of	South	Vietnam	and	“abolition	of	all	forms	of	conscription.”	Quickly,	George	Zangalis,	a	long-time	peace	activist	and	member	of	the	CPA	moved	an	amendment	to	add	the	clause:	“That	a	financial	appeal	be	launched	to	aid	the	National	Liberation	Front	and	money	should	be	collected	for	this	purpose	before	and	during	July	4th.”	When	Quinn	accepted	the	amendment,	it	appeared	that	all	of	the	political	aims	of	the	anti-US	imperialists	would	be	satisfied,	and	the	whole	motion	“received	almost	unanimous	support.”86																																																										85	Chris	Gaffney,	“Resolutions	and	Decisions	of	the	July	4th	General	Meeting	held	on	5th.	June	1970,	At	the	Victorian	Railways	Institute,”	July	4	Committee,	n.d.,	author’s	collection.	The	attendance	figure	of	180–200	is	from	Students	for	a	Democratic	Society	(SDS),	“They	Can	Do	Anything	We	Can’t	Stop	Them	Doing,”	Catch	22,	leaflet,	c.	10	June	1970.	86	Ibid.	
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However,	there	was	not	unanimity	about	the	timing	of	the	march	itself.	Quinn	moved	that	it	be	held	“on	the	morning	of	Saturday	July	4th.”	The	WSA	and	Monash	and	La	Trobe	students,	sensing	that	the	intention	was	to	hold	a	tame	rally	in	a	park	somewhere,	supported	an	amendment,	moved	by	Robert	Dorning,	that	the	demonstration	be	held	on	“July	4th	eve,	i.e.	the	Friday	evening,”	and	that	its	assembly	point	be	the	Treasury	Gardens	and	its	“destination	be	the	U.S.	Consulate.”	The	subsequent	debate	was	“keen	and	the	meeting	was	evenly	divided	but	the	amendment	was	passed.”87	The	Friday	it	was!		With	that	settled,	the	committee	elected	Michael	Hyde	as	its	chairman	and	Chris	Gaffney,	an	activist	from	the	Victorian	Labor	College,	as	its	secretary.	It	also	elected	an	organising	committee	and,	when	thirty-two	nominations	were	received,	“the	meeting	resolved	that	all	be	declared	elected.”	The	committee	met	four	days	later	on	Tuesday	9	June	1970	and	established	working	groups	to	prepare	posters,	badges,	clerical	assistance,	mailing	lists,	a	broadsheet	and	a	plan	for	the	demonstration.88	However,	amid	the	buzz	of	this	meeting	were	two	clear	signals	that	the	CPA	camp	would	attempt	to	recover	from	its	loss	over	the	date.	These	came	in	the	form	of	decisions:	first,	that	any	activities	planned	for	the	“Saturday	should	be	supported	so	long	as	they	were	in	line	with	the	decisions	taken	at	the	general	meeting	of	the	5th	June”;	second,	that	a	letter	received	from	the	Amalgamated	Engineering	Union	“expressing	reservations	as	to	the	date	of	the	demonstration	be	referred	to	the	general	meeting	on	the	18th	June	1970.”89	With	the	agreement	of	both	the	CPA	and	WSA	camps	that	US	imperialism	would	be	named	as	the	aggressor	and	that	finance	to	support	the	NLF	would	be	raised,	the	general	meeting	of	the	July	4	Committee	looked	set	to	be	a	harmonious	affair.	However,	preparations	for	this	meeting,	which	was	to	be	held	on	18	June	1970	at	Unity	Hall	(the	meeting	place	of	the	Victorian	Railways	Union	in	Bourke	Street,	Melbourne),	turned	into	a	scramble	for	voting	numbers	on	the	floor—a	“stacking																																																									87	Ibid.	88	Ibid.	Note:	The	Provisional	Revolutionary	Government	(PRG)	was	the	entity	established	on	8	June	1969	by	the	NLF	to	govern	South	Vietnam	during	the	war	and	after	the	American	withdrawal.	It	was	a	signatory	to	the	1973	Paris	Peace	Treaty.	89	Chris	Gaffney,	“Committee	Report	–	Meeting	held	9th	June	1970,”	July	4	Committee,	n.d.	Report	attached	to	the	minutes	of	the	5	June	1970	meeting	above.		
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match.”	The	point	at	issue	was	not	some	matter	of	high	principle	but	whether	the	march	should	be	held	on	the	eve	of	US	Independence	Day,	a	Friday,	or	on	the	day	itself,	a	Saturday.	On	12	June,	the	Monash	Labor	Club’s	newsletter,	Print,	took	up	the	story:		The	arguments	for	July	4th,	(i.e.	a	Saturday	morning)	are	tenuous	to	say	the	least!	They,	the	misleaders	of	the	CPA,	ALP	and	others,	feel	there	will	be	more	people	to	witness	the	demo	on	Saturday	morning	and	also	more	people	to	be	mobilised.	In	recent	years,	however	…[they]	have	never	been	so	successful	(militancy	and	mobilization–wize)	as	those	held	on	weekdays.	…	it	is	far	easier	to	mobilize	union	rank	and	file	support	for	demonstrations	on	weekdays	than	on	Saturday	morning.	This	attempt	to	change	the	date	can	only	be	seen	as	ridiculous	and	petty	sabotage	…	some	groups	have	hinted	that	if	there	is	no	demo	on	Saturday	then	they	certainly	won’t	participate	in	a	Friday	afternoon	demonstration.	This	looks	like	blackmail.	…	[they	have	argued]	that	we	…	want	it	to	be	a	small	super-militant	demo	…	but	the	aim	of	the	July	3rd	supporters	is	mass	mobilization	and	a	high	level	of	militancy.	To	carry	out	the	spirit	of	the	Moratorium	mobilisation	it	is	blatantly	obvious	that	it	is	better	to	again	have	the	march	on	a	Friday—against	those	businesses	who	have	continued	to	make	profits	from	the	war.	SMASH	IMPERIALISM	SUPPORT	JULY	3RD	COME	TO	TONIGHT’S	MEETING	AND	VOTE	FOR	JULY	3RD90	The	Monash	Labor	Club	and	WSA	believed	that	the	CPA	was	attempting	to	“stack	the	meeting,”	that	is,	to	flood	the	meeting	with	its	own	supporters,	and	there	was	some	evidence	that	this	was	so.	Three	days	before	the	above	issue	of	Print,	a	leaflet	entitled	July	4—What	Kind	of	Demonstration?	was	distributed	among	activists.	Its	signatories	were	forty-six	activists	from	the	losing	camp	in	the	debate	over	the	date	including	John	Halfpenny,	Bernie	and	Mark	Taft,	and	Roger	Wilson	of	the	CPA;	Wally	Curran,	Jean	McLean	and	Bob	Hogg	from	the	socialist	left	of	the	ALP;	Vera	Boston,	Diana	Crunden	and	Harry	Van	Moorst	of	the	CDA/SDS;	and	Jill	Jolliffe	and	Rod	Quinn	who	had	their	own	independent	grouping.	The	largest	number	of	signatures	came	from	the	CPA—too	many	to	maintain	interest	here.	The	two-page	leaflet	carried	arguments	for	changing	the	date	to	the	Saturday,	as	covered	in	the	issue	of	Print																																																									90	“Tomorrow	and	Tomorrow,	or	It’s	a	Friday	Kind	of	Saturday,”	Print,	18	June	1970,	1.	
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above.	Its	main	message	was:	“We	urge	you	to	attend	the	meeting	to	be	held	on	June	18th	…	[it]	will	be	a	referendum	amongst	the	more	active	elements	of	the	left	…	come	early	to	ensure	a	place	in	the	hall.”91		That	it	was	a	practice	of	the	CPA	to	gain	advantage	by	organising	numbers	is	confirmed	in	the	context	of	the	Moratorium	and	related	activities	in	Bernie	Taft’s	memoirs:	“Nevertheless,	in	cooperation	with	others,	the	Communist	Party	managed	to	contribute	enough	numbers	to	keep	the	Maoist	students	in	check.”92	While	this	could	equally	be	understood	as	an	exercise	in	representative	participation	or	simply	working	to	equalise	support,	it	is	clear	that	the	“Maoists”	thought	of	it	as	stacking.	However,	it	was	not	due	to	the	CPA	alone,	as	their	efforts	were	supported	by	the	SDS,	who	were	based	at	the	CDA	in	Palmerston	Street,	Carlton,	and	most	influential	at	Melbourne	University.	An	SDS	leaflet,	Catch	22,	was	devoted	entirely	to	the	debate	about	the	date	of	the	US	Independence	Day	protest;	it	stated	that,	at	the	general	meeting	on	18	June,	an	attempt	to	have	the	demonstration	“held	on	Saturday	July	4th,	assembling	at	10am	at	the	U.S.	Consulate”	would	be	made.	The	leaflet	informed	its	readers	of	the	time	and	place	of	the	meeting,	adding	“be	early	to	get	in.”93		At	the	meeting,	the	vote	on	the	date	was	so	evenly	split	that	a	“division”	was	needed	with	those	for	“Friday”	at	the	front	and	those	for	“Saturday”	at	the	back	of	the	hall.	The	final	count	revealed	a	victory	for	the	Saturday.	With	Michael	Hyde	still	in	the	chair,	the	result	was	announced	amid	much	clamour	and	the	meeting	officially	ended.	However,	that	was	not	the	end	of	the	matter.	As	soon	as	the	end	of	the	meeting	was	announced,	a	new	meeting	was	called.	All	those	who	supported	a	Friday	3	July	demonstration	met	at	the	front	of	the	hall.	In	this	way,	Melbourne	ended	up	with	two	4	July	marches.		At	Monash	University,	Print	reported	on	the	meeting	the	following	day:	It	was	ironic	that	last	night’s	July	4th	meeting	was	held	at	Unity	Hall.	There	was	unity	of	a	sort—the	“Communist”	Party	of	Australia	(Revisionist)	hasn’t																																																									91	Anon.,	July	4—What	Kind	of	Demonstration?	15	June	1970,	author’s	collection.	92	Taft,	Crossing	the	Party	Line,	247.	See	earlier	in	this	chapter	for	similar	references	from	this	source.	93	SDC,	“They	Can	Do	Anything	We	Can’t	Stop	Them	Doing.”	
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been	as	united	since	their	last	National	Congress.	Members	of	the	revisionist	party	who	hadn’t	been	seen	for	years	were	dug	up	and	given	the	“party	line.”	One	of	the	organizers	of	the	stack,	George	Zangalis	admitted	that	it	was	just	that	only	two	nights	previously.	Two	weeks	before	the	demonstration	the	“C.”P.A.	and	its	allies	forced	through	changes	in	date,	destination	and	route.	This	was	despite	the	previous	decision	for	July	3	and	the	existence	of	thousands	of	posters	with	July	3	and	Treasury	Gardens	emblazoned	in	big	black	letters	on	them	…	Twinkle,	twinkle	little	Tzars	…	Some	of	them	disagreed	with	speakers	who	called	for	an	anti-imperialist	march—despite	the	fact	that	this	was	and	is	the	official	basis	of	the	demo.	When	the	voting	was	over	fifty	middle-aged	short	back	and	sides	types	moved	out	of	the	hall—and	back	to	Walhalla!	They	had	served	their	purpose.	…	nothing	is	lost	or	won	at	stacked	meetings.	Realizing	this	another	meeting	was	held	at	which	it	was	decided	to	hold	the	demo	on	July	3	after	all—revisionists,	“Sir	Rod”	Quinn	and	other	traitors	notwithstanding.	With	several	more	expressions	of	spleen,	the	report	ended	with	references	to	the	Moratorium	and	a	“Stop	Press”	which	read	in	part:	*	STOP	PRESS:	The	official	July	4th	organizing	committee	issued	through	its	Chairman,	Michael	Hyde	(!!)	the	following	press	statement	early	this	morning:	The	July	4th	Protest	C’tee	plans	to	hold	an	anti-imperialism	demo	on	Friday	July	3—massing	at	the	Treasury	Gardens	at	4.00	and	marching	to	the	U.S.	consulate.	Another	march	will	be	held	on	the	Saturday	morning—assembling	10.00	at	the	consulate	and	marching	to	Pan	AM.94	Had	the	July	4	Committee	planned	to	have	the	two	demonstrations	as	a	protest	spread	over	two	days	in	similar	fashion	to	the	Moratorium	events	then	it	would	have	been	a	different	story.	However,	neither	side	had	formed	that	intention	and	the	antagonism	embedded	in	the	extended,	discordant	argumentation	made	the	bifurcated	outcome	the	topic	for	continued	rancour.	The	disharmony	created	by	the	attempt	to	change	the	date	is	made	even	stranger	by	the	SDS	and	CPA	in	Sydney	insisting	that	their	4	July	demonstration	be	held	on	the	Friday	night!	Darce	Cassidy,	writing	as	“an	anti-war	activist,”	reported	upon	the	Sydney	events:		Three	days	after	arriving	in	Sydney	I	attended	a	meeting	of	the	Sydney	July	4	Committee,	expecting	to	find	furious	opposition	to	a	confrontation	on	the	Friday.	To	my	surprise	I	found	the	CPA	not	only	supporting	Friday	(and																																																									94	“We	Were	Only	Taking	Orders,”	Print,	19	June	1970,	1.	
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confrontation)	but	actually	organising	it.	Most	of	the	work	done	for	the	Friday	demo	in	Sydney	was	done	by	Mike	Jones	(SDS)	and	Alec	Robertson	(Tribune).95	That	the	participants	at	the	Unity	Hall	meeting	in	Melbourne	were	not	free	voting	individuals,	but	were	starkly	identifiable	as	belonging	to	either	Melbourne	CPA	or	WSA/Labor	Club	circles,	indicates	that	there	was	more	to	the	story	than	a	simple	disagreement	about	tactics.	As	indicated	earlier	in	this	thesis,	the	distaste	that	the	WSA	and	Monash	and	La	Trobe	Labor	clubs	had	for	the	CPA	related	to	its	style,	its	relationship	with	ALP	electoral	politics,	its	earlier	refusal	to	publicly	name	the	US	as	the	aggressor	and	its	earlier	opposition	to	the	raising	of	money	for	the	NLF.	However,	both	sides	had	approved	the	anti–US	imperialist	aims	of	this	4	July	demonstration	and	the	CPA	had	belatedly	agreed	to	the	raising	of	money	for	the	NLF;	yet,	the	animosity	had	continued.	Some	clarification	of	the	continued	rancour	may	be	seen	in	the	different	ways	in	which	they	advertised	the	demonstration(s),	three	examples	of	which	are	reproduced	below.	Figure	11,	a	poster	prepared	by	the	Sydney-based	“Independence	from	America”	Day	Committee,	shows	most	strongly	the	influence	of	the	CPA.	It	advertised	the	Sydney	demonstration	for	the	Friday	and	the	Melbourne	demonstration	for	the	Saturday	only,	as	did	the	SDS’s	poster	(Figure	12).	Figure	13	is	a	poster	from	the	official	July	4	Committee;	issued	by	Michael	Hyde	prior	to	the	Unity	Hall	meeting	of	18	June,	it	shows	the	strong	influence	of	the	WSA.	
																																																								95	“Contradictions	among	the	CP,”	Struggle,	no.	1,	5	August	1970,	6.	Note:	Tribune	was	the	newspaper	of	the	CPA.	
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Figure	11:	Time	to	Resist	
Note:	Poster	prepared	in	Sydney.	Only	advertises	the	Saturday	4	July	demonstration	in	Melbourne.	
	
Figure	12:	The	Only	Reply	to	an	Aggressor	
Note:	Poster	prepared	for	the	"July	4th	Committee,	57	Palmerston	Street	Melbourne."	This	was	the	address	of	the	CDA/SDS.	Only	advertises	the	4	July	march.	
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Figure	13:	Down	with	US	Imperialism!	Support	the	NLF	
Note:	Poster	authorised	by	Michael	Hyde	for	the	“July	4th	Committee”	early	in	the	campaign	in	fulfillment	of	a	July	4	Committee	resolution.	Advertises	both	Friday	and	Saturday	demonstrations	in	Melbourne.	Each	of	these	posters	was	printed	on	the	reverse	side	of	a	broadsheet	that	carried	articles	supporting	their	producers’	political	stance	regarding	the	demonstrations.	The	articles	on	the	front	page	of	the	CPA-inspired	Time	to	Resist	(Figure	11)	dealt	with	conscription;	the	then	current	“Penal	Powers”	dispute;	US	influence	in	the	emerging	countries	of	Africa,	and	in	Greece	and	South	Africa	(apartheid);	and	the	US	student	and	Black	Panther	movements.	None	of	the	articles	mentioned	the	NLF.	However,	for	those	who	saw	the	peace	movement	in	terms	of	opposition	to	US	imperialism,	there	was	some	encouragement.	Several	attempts	were	made	to	explain	imperialism,	though	it	was	dealt	with	as	an	equal	evil	to	“Penal	Powers,”	apartheid,	attacks	on	black	Americans’	civil	rights	and	the	Greek	Junta.96	Unlike	Time	to	Resist	(Figure	11),	The	Only	Reply	to	an	Aggressor	(Figure	12)	and	
Down	with	US	Imperialism!	Support	the	NLF	(Figure	13),	focused	exclusively	on	the																																																									96	Time	to	Resist,	authorised	by	M.	Jones	for	the	“Independence	from	America”	Day	Committee,	Sydney	University,	c.	June	1970.	
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Vietnam	War,	its	cause	(i.e.,	US	imperialism),	use	of	conscription	and	remedy	(i.e.,	support	for	the	NLF).	Further,	unlike	Time	to	Resist,	both	used	terms	that	showed	that	they	expected	their	audience	to	be	familiar	with	the	ideas	they	presented	and	to	have	sided	against	the	war	already.	This	is	reflected	in	the	pictorial	representations	of	NLF	fighters	with	guns	and	military	paraphernalia.	There	is	nothing	pacifist	or	patronising	about	either	of	the	Melbourne-based	posters.	The	apparent	conundrum	of	having	two	posters	(Figures	12	and	13)	containing	similar	messages	with	respect	to	the	causes	of	the	war,	the	NLF	and	US	imperialism—especially	in	contrast	with	
Time	to	Resist	(Figure	11)—but	naming	different	dates	for	the	protest,	is	solved	by	the	assumption	that	the	CDA/SDS	group	(Figure	12)	was	genuine	in	opposing	the	Friday	evening	demonstration	on	the	grounds	of	practicality.	The	differences	between	the	CDA/SDS	and	the	CPA,	as	exemplified	by	their	posters	(Figures	11	and	12),	indicates	that	the	unity	between	the	two	on	this	question	was	also	based	on	practicalities	and	was	thus	temporary	and	conditional	rather	than	ideologically	driven.	Conversely,	the	Sydney	CPA’s	forceful	endorsement	of	its	Friday	demonstration	strongly	suggests	that	a	major	factor	in	the	Melbourne	CPA’s	anti-Friday	campaign	was	its	ability	to	retain	its	dominant	influence	in	the	peace	movement.97		As	it	turned	out,	the	conflict	over	the	two	demonstrations	was	enough	of	an	“angle”	to	generate	publicity.	For	example,	on	the	morning	of	3	July,	The	Age	newspaper	reported	that	“Now	They’ll	March	on	July	3	AND	4”	(Figure	14).98	Instead	of	shunning	such	publicity,	the	two	warring	factions	continued	their	battle	in	the	open,	where	it	would	most	effectively	reach	the	public.	The	Age	quoted	a	“member	of	the	July	4	Committee”	as	saying:	“The	issue	is	whether	you	confront	the	people	of	Victoria	or	you	confront	the	Police	in	the	dark	outside	an	empty	building	…	The	July	3	people	were	trying	to	contrive	violence	with	the	police.”99	The	next	paragraph	contained	a	riposte	from	Albert	Langer	(who	The	Age	quoted	as	having	written	in	
																																																								97	The	Only	Reply	to	an	Aggressor,	July	4	Committee,	Carlton,	c.	June	1970;	Down	with	US	
Imperialism!	Support	the	NLF,	authorised	by	M.	D.	Hyde	for	the	July	4	Committee,	Greensborough,	June	1970.		98	“Now	They’ll	March	on	July	3	AND	4,”	The	Age,	3	July	1970,	3.	99	Ibid.	
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the	Monash	University	student	newspaper	Lot’s	Wife)	that	“supporters	of	Saturday	morning	are	trying	to	sabotage	the	main	July	3	march.”	
	
Figure	14:	“Now	They’ll	March	on	July	3	AND	4,”	The	Age,	3	July	1970	Drama	and	a	hint	of	danger	was	added	to	the	same	Age	article	with	the	statement	that	Victoria	Police	had	announced	that	“leave	has	been	cancelled	and	every	available	policeman	[called	to	duty]…	the	entire	march	route	will	be	encircled	by	bus	loads	of	police	but	as	in	the	May	8	moratorium	demonstration	police	will	be	asked	to	act	with	restraint.”100	In	the	end,	both	events	attracted	about	1000	marchers	and,	as	predicted,	there	was	confrontation	with	the	police	at	both	events.	Michael	Hyde	convinced	his	father,	Reverend	Dudley	Hyde,	to	attend	both	demonstrations.	While	hardly	a	disinterested	observer,	Reverend	Hyde	wrote	an	indignant	letter	to	the	editor	of	The	Age,	which	was	printed	under	the	heading	“Police	Tactics	Anger	a	Man	of	Peace”:		Perhaps	if	you	only	saw	the	police	in	the	city	streets	on	Saturday	you	may	wonder	why	I	talk	about	police	aggression.	If	you	had	seen	them	along	St	Kilda	Road	on	Saturday	or	worse	still	at	Flinders	Street	station	on	Friday	you	would	know	why	I	ask.	…	Soon	after	5	p.m.	the	police	ordered	the	demonstrators	off	the	road	onto	the	footpath	…	As	we	began	to	disperse	the	mounted	police	suddenly	charged	along	the	footpath	through	the	crowd	of	demonstrators	and	the	public.	
																																																								100	Ibid.	
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Superintendent	Hickey	is	reported	in	“The	Age”	as	saying:	“there	were	hundreds	of	people	trying	to	get	home.	I	had	to	make	way	for	them.”	(No	one	authorised	this	kind	of	action	in	the	Moratorium—I	wonder	why?).101	
Struggle:	The	Revolutionary	Newspaper	
This	section	examines	the	WSA’s	fortnightly	newspaper,	Struggle.	A	detailed	record	of	the	activities,	trials,	internal	discourses,	misfortunes	and	treasures	of	the	organisation,	Struggle	constitutes	a	major	source	of	information	for	this	thesis	from	this	point	forward.	The	purpose	of	this	section	is	to	introduce	the	newspaper,	not	just	as	a	masthead	but	also	as	an	important	factor	in	the	dynamism	of	the	WSA.	It	shows	the	state	of	WSA	discourse	at	the	time,	the	type	of	actions	that	they	took	and	the	state	of	development	towards	the	goal	of	injecting	an	anti-imperialist	character	into	activist	social	movements.	On	Wednesday	5	August	1970,	issue	no.	1	of	Struggle	emerged	from	the	Rotaprint	machine	that	had	been	installed	in	the	cellar	of	the	Bakery	for	just	that	purpose	(Figure	15).102	The	newspaper	had	been	planned	for	some	time	and	was	to	be	produced	by	volunteer	members	of	WSA	at	all	stages	of	writing,	printing	and	distribution.103	The	editorial	in	the	first	edition	explained	that	“STRUGGLE	is	intended	to	be	a	revolutionary	socialist	newspaper	…	Our	basic	creed	is	that	IT	IS	RIGHT	TO	REBEL	and	we	will	carry	news	of	rebellion	wherever	it	is	found.”	Although	very	long,	this	editorial	quite	succinctly	covered	the	professed	essence	of	the	WSA	ideological	stance	and	the	spirit	and	practices	that	would	be	encountered	in	its	pages:	“We	are	opposed	to	the	‘law	and	order’	of	capitalism	because	it	is	used	to	uphold	a	system	based	on	exploitation	and	aggression.”	The	editor	used	the	imagery	of	the	Communist	Manifesto	to	identify	and	signal	the	WSA’s	Marxist	and	communist	roots,	to	distinguish	the	WSA	from	pacifism	and	reformism	and	to	establish	the	WSA																																																									101	Reverend	Dudley	Hyde,	“Police	Tactics	Anger	a	Man	of	Peace,”	letter	to	The	Age,	7	July	1970,	7.	102	Struggle,	no.	1,	5	August	1970,	author’s	collection.	103	The	Young	Communist	League	(YCL),	for	instance,	had	requested:	“All	people	who	promised	articles	for	the	YCL	magazine	“Struggle”	please	get	them	in.	Also	remember	that	this	is	only	number	1	and	further	issues	will	be	dependent	on	more	articles	continuing	to	flow	from	the	pens	of	members	…	LEARN	TO	WRITE	BY	WRITING!!!”	YCL	Bulletin,	no.	7,	c.	2	May	1970,	4.	The	identification	of	Struggle	as	a	YCL	magazine	did	not	last	beyond	the	next	YCL	Bulletin	in	which	it	was	referred	to	as	“a	WSA	newspaper.”	
175	
as	a	participant	in	the	eventual	victory	of	proletarian	revolution.	To	overcome	“bourgeois	law	and	order,”	Struggle	would	assist	working	people	to	build	“their	own	power—the	power	of	the	armed	workers	…	This	dictatorship	of	the	proletariat	will	be	the	most	democratic	society	that	ever	existed	and	will	pave	the	way	for	the	classless	society	of	communism.”104	The	newspaper	was	“not	intended	to	be	a	theoretical	journal”;	instead,	its	“main	focus	will	be	on	news	of	the	way	people	are	rebelling	against	capitalism.”	With	respect	to	the	daily	press,	it	stated:		To	them	a	demonstration	smashing	the	US	consulate	represents	“violence”	and	“anarchy”	while	dropping	napalm	on	a	Vietnamese	village	is	an	“Allied	victory.”	To	them	demonstrators	are	louts	and	hooligans,	strikers	are	manipulated	and	irresponsible,	radical	students	are	extremist	and	so	on	while	politicians	and	big	businessmen	are	the	cream	of	society	and	policemen	of	course	are	our	friends.	The	editorial	then	turned	to	some	of	the	practicalities	of	running	the	newspaper	and,	in	the	process,	drew	a	contrast	between	itself	and	the	CPA:		Our	paper	…	is	not	owned	by	big	monopolies	but	by	a	rather	impoverished	revolutionary	organisation,	the	Worker	Student	Alliance.	This	means	that	we	cannot	afford	to	produce	as	large	a	paper	as	the	dailies,	or	one	as	well	printed,	or	to	bring	it	out	as	often.	We	cannot	even	compete	with	the	Sunday	Observer	or	“Tribune”	on	this	basis.	But	we	can	challenge	the	bourgeois	press	politically	(and	Tribune	is	part	of	the	bourgeois	press).	We	can	challenge	them	by	printing	the	truth	about	revolutionary	struggle	(not	wishy-washy-revisionist	rubbish	about	“peaceful	transition	to	socialism”).	To	do	this	we	need	support—subscriptions,	money,	typists	etc	etc,	but	most	important,	articles	…	If	you	don’t	feel	up	to	writing	an	article	yourself	then	send	us	a	note	about	it	or	drop	in	a	clipping	or	write	a	letter	to	the	editor…	“Struggle”	the	newspaper	…	should	be	used	as	a	weapon	for	agitators,	an	aid	to	political	work	among	the	people	(and	not	a	substitute	for	it).	We	refuse	to	lower	the	political	level	of	this	paper	to	curry	favor	with	the	middle	class	radicals	and	we	will	not	resort	to	“sales	drives”	of	the	Tribune	type.105	
																																																								104	Karl	Marx	and	Friedrich	Engels,	The	Communist	Manifesto	(Beijing,	Foreign	Languages	Publishing	House,	n.d.)	105	Struggle,	no.	1,	5	August	1970,	3.	(Emphasis	in	original.)	
176	
	
Figure	15:	Front	page	of	Struggle,	no.1,	5	August	1970	The	use	of	the	newspaper	as	an	aide	for	other	“political	work	among	the	people,”	rather	than	merely	a	propaganda	sheet,	became	a	feature	of	the	distribution	of	
Struggle.	Coupled	with	the	strategy	of	wheedling	articles	out	of	WSA	members	and	other	readers,	this	gave	the	publication	a	practical	and	local	flavour.	This	became	important	when	Australian	involvement	in	the	Vietnam	War	was	beginning	to	wind	down.	Though	American	and	Australian	troops	had	begun	withdrawing	from	Vietnam,	the	war	continued	as	before	under	the	policy	of	“Vietnamization.”	Under	this	policy,	as	declared	by	US	President	Nixon	in	1969,	the	actual	fighting	was	to	be	done	by	South	Vietnamese	government	troops	so	that	the	US	could	withdraw	with	honour.106	This	signalled	that	the	anti-war	movement	would	perforce	diminish	in	importance	relative	to	the	reporting	on	current	struggles.	
																																																								106	On	20	April,	US	President	Richard	Nixon	announced	that	another	150,000	US	troops	would	be	withdrawn	within	the	year.	On	22	April,	Australian	Prime	Minister	John	Gorton	announced	the	reduction	of	Australian	forces	in	Vietnam;	one	battalion	of	the	three	then	serving	was	not	to	be	replaced	when	its	tour	of	duty	ended.	Melbourne	Shrine	of	Remembrance,	Attitudes	to	the	
Vietnam	War.	
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Even	in	the	very	early	stages	of	its	production,	Struggle	took	this	situation	into	account.	The	first	issue’s	headlines	included	“Government	Repression,”	“Monash	Occupation,”	“Which	Side	Are	They	On?”	(regarding	evictions	in	Sydney	by	the	Anglican	Church),	“Contradictions	Among	the	CP”	(i.e.,	CPA),	“Nurses’	Struggle,”	“Son	of	Moratorium,”	and	“Running	Dog.”	The	second	issue	showed	a	move	towards	expressly	working-class	activities	with	“Budget	Special—Working	Class	to	Pay	Again”	on	the	page	1,	and	“The	Budget—Parliamentary	Protest	or	Direct	Action?”	inside.	Other	articles	in	issue	no.	2	included	“Students	Join	Waterfront	Struggle,”	“Teachers	Reject	Arbitration,”	“Moratorium	Conference,”	“University	High”	(University	High	Socialist	Club),	“Railway	Workers	Fight	Union	Misleaders,”	“Brisbane	Report”	(RSSA),	“Glebe	Workers	Fight	Back,”	and	“Draft	Resisters.”		Responsibility	for	Struggle’s	editorial	policy	and	production	lay	in	the	lap	of	a	committee	that	operated	under	the	authority	of	the	WSA	Central	Committee.	Hence,	its	reportage	provides	fairly	accurate	insight	into	the	activities	that	the	organisation	became	involved	with	or	that	it	considered	necessitated	political	comment.	The	contrast	between	two	articles	(described	below)	shows	the	progression	of	thinking	on	events.	On	Wednesday	2	August	1970,	a	full	page	item	entitled	“Draft	Resisters”	had	draft	resister	Errol	Heldzingen	stating:	“It	is	not	at	all	surprising	that	the	boot-lickers	in	Canberra	‘offered’	to	send	young	Australian	workers	to	serve	the	Yankee	dollar	in	Indo-China.”107	By	contrast,	in	April–May	1973,	the	front-page	headline	article	declared:	“VIET	CONG	HERE;	BIG	WELCOME.”	A	large	photograph	of	a	delegation	from	the	Democratic	Republic	of	Vietnam	and	the	Provisional	Revolutionary	Government	of	South	Vietnam	in	a	meeting	with	the	Australian	Trade	Minister,	Dr	J.	F.	Cairns,	in	Sydney	accompanied	the	article.108	This	was	followed	on	the	back	page	by	the	regular	“Coming	Activities”	column,	which	carried	details	on	a	string	of	events	in	Melbourne	at	which	WSA	members	could	meet	the	delegation.	Yet,	even	though	the	ALP	was	in	government	and	the	topics	emphasised	by	Struggle	regarding	the	Vietnam	War	had	changed,	the	WSA’s	attitude	towards	the	ALP	and	the	ministers	of	the	new	Labor	government	had	not.	For	example,	in	“US	Bases,	the	
																																																								107	Struggle,	no.	2,	26	August	1970,	11.	108	Struggle,	no.	35,	29	April	–	13	May	1973,	1.	
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People	Zero	in	on	Whitlam,”	the	Labor	government	was	castigated	for	continuing	the	previous	Liberal	government’s	genuflection	to	US	strategic	interests:	Barnard	has	just	announced	that	it	is	the	government’s	wish	that	“the	top	person	or	next	in	control”	at	the	joint	US	bases	at	Pine	Gap	and	Woomera	should	be	an	Australian	…		Well,	whoopee!	…	the	new	“independent”	(sic)	ALP	government	has	bowed	to	Yankee	pressure.	In	short,	the	continued	presence	of	foreign	bases	in	Australia	remains	a	threat	to	this	nation’s	independence.109	The	words	“threat	to	this	nation’s	independence”	indicate	a	gradual	change	in	the	WSA’s	analysis	of	the	situations	of	concern	to	it.	By	1973,	instead	of	addressing	US	imperialism	exclusively	as	a	particular	form	of	capitalist	exploitation,	it	began	to	add	the	element	of	national	independence	to	its	grounds	for	action.	This	nationalism	was	apprehensive	about	the	nation’s	domination	by	foreign	imperialism	and	was	not	at	all	concerned	with	national	identity.	This	practical	nationalism	is	further	demonstrated	in	“The	Revolt	at	Eureka”	(Figure	16),	a	cartoon	series	on	the	Eureka	Rebellion,	which	concentrated	on	the	economic	and	class	forces	contending	on	the	goldfields	in	the	context	of	British	colonial	rule,	and	not	on	the	building	of	an	Australian	democratic	spirit	(as	exemplified	in	the	modern-day	Museum	of	Australian	Democracy	at	Ballarat	on	the	Eureka	site).110		
																																																								109	Struggle,	no.	32,	18	March	–	1	April	1973,	1.	(Parenthesis	in	original.)	110	“The	Revolt	at	Eureka,”	Struggle,	no.	34,	15–28	April	1973,	9.	This	was	an	unsigned	cartoon	series	explaining	the	Eureka	Rebellion.	
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Figure	16:	“The	Revolt	at	Eureka,”	Struggle,	no.	34,	9	
Note:	This	page	is	an	excerpt	from	a	serial.		It	is	important	to	note	that	this	form	of	practical	nationalism	emerged	with	the	growth	of	the	WSA	across	Australia;	thus,	it	grew	out	of	the	need	to	report	on,	and	state	a	position	on,	items	that	concerned	Australia	nationally.111	These	included	items	such	as	opposition	to	the	Aboriginal	Tent	Embassy,112	the	Springboks	Tour	anti-apartheid	campaign,113	International	Women’s	Day,114	and	the	policy	following	
																																																								111	In	no.	26,	Dec–Jan	1973,	Struggle	listed	20	branches:	two	in	NSW,	one	each	in	South	Australia	and	Western	Australia,	and	16	in	Victoria.	See	the	back	page	listing	of	branches	in	that	issue.	112	“Ningla	A-Na,”	Struggle,	no.	32,	18	March	–	1	April	1973,	12.	113	“Smash	Racist	Tours,”	Struggle	2,	no.	5,	14	June	1971,	14.	114	“Women	Picket	Housing	Commission	Office,”	Struggle,	no.	32,	18	March	–	1	April	1973,	7.	
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the	election	of	the	Whitlam	Labor	government.115	As	well	as	local	and	national	items,	
Struggle	carried	news	and	comment	on	rebellious	activities	in	countries	where	political	repression	had	become	evident.	These	were	countries	such	as	Northern	Ireland,	South	Africa,	Cambodia,	Palestine,	Vietnam,	the	US	and	Greece.	Regarding	the	last	of	these,	Struggle	sometimes	carried	Greek	language	articles.	However,	even	though	this	form	of	nationalist	influence	abjured	expressions	of	patriotism	or	“love	of	homeland,”	it	was	not	really	benign;	moreover,	it	made	the	leap	to	that	kind	of	patriotism	a	little	easier	to	make	when	it	came	to	winding	up	the	organisation	in	the	mid-1970s,	as	discussed	later	in	this	thesis.	
	
Figure	17:	WSA	branches,	Struggle,	no.	26,	December	1972	
																																																								115	“How	Far	Will	Murphy	Go?”	Struggle,	no.	33,	1–4	April	1973,	1.	This	was	a	front-page	article	about	the	Lionel	Murphy	raid	on	ASIO.	
181	
A	notable	shift	in	articles	chastising	political	parties	occurred	between	1970	and	1973.	There	was	little	quantitative	change	in	the	criticism	of	the	main	parliamentary	parties,	Labor	or	Liberal,	regardless	of	whether	there	were	in	power	or	in	opposition;	however,	whereas	the	CPA	bore	the	brunt	of	derision	in	the	first	issues	in	1970	(as	referred	to	earlier	in	this	chapter),	by	1973	reports	mentioning	the	CPA	were	scarce	and,	when	it	was	mentioned,	it	was	not	scorned	so	stridently.	One	report	about	continuing	the	Moratorium	in	1972	contains	a	clue	as	to	why.	The	report	states	that,	on	13	February,	a	mass	meeting	of	Moratorium	supporters	approved:	A	jointly	sponsored	proposal—WSA,	the	Diamond	Valley	Moratorium	Group	and	Roger	Wilson	of	the	Seamen’s	Union	to	broaden	the	aims	of	the	Moratorium	to		(a)	Continue	in	its	opposition	to	U.S.	aggression	in	Indo	China,	(b)	Oppose	the	US–Australia	Alliance,	(c)	Oppose	the	US	and	Japanese	domination	of	Australia,	(d)	Smash	Conscription.116	Roger	Wilson	was	named	as	a	co-sponsor	of	the	proposal.	This	was	significant	because,	as	a	prominent	and	well-known	CPA	member	and	exponent	of	CPA	policy	within	the	VMC	Committee,	he	was	expressing	the	thinking	of	his	party	at	that	time.	Had	the	CPA	finally	accepted	the	WSA’s	long-held	demand	that	the	US	must	be	named	as	the	aggressor	and	that	the	US–Australia	alliance	should	be	opposed?	Had	it	independently	reassessed	the	situation	and	found	these	demands	to	be	appropriate	now	or	had	it	decided	that	they	would	no	longer	damage	the	electoral	prospects	of	the	ALP?	There	may	be	other	explanations	too,	but	they	are	only	significant	for	this	thesis	to	the	extent	that	they	affected	the	young	anti-war	activists	who	are	the	subject	of	this	thesis.	What	was	significant,	at	least	to	Struggle,	was	that	the	WSA’s	major	antagonist	had	ceased	to	be	an	antagonist.	Another	factor	in	the	cessation	of	hostilities	between	the	CPA	and	WSA	was	the	winding	down	of	the	Vietnam	War.	Both	organisations	had	concentrated	their	leading	figures	into	the	same	anti-war	bodies;	however,	that	situation	no	longer	prevailed.	By	1971,	the	WSA,	for	its	part,	was	in	a	strong	enough	situation	to	initiate	
																																																								116	“Moratorium	Meeting,”	Struggle,	no.	8,	23	February	1972,	4.	
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action	and	sustain	campaigns	without	having	to	follow	other	organisations,	such	as	the	CICD,	onto	the	scene	of	action.	Those	activities	and	campaigns	are	covered	in	subsequent	chapters.
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Chapter	6:	The	WSA	Expands	and	La	Trobe	Takes	
the	Heat	
Chapter	6	concerns	the	growth	of	the	Worker	Student	Alliance	(WSA)	from	the	end	of	1970	to	the	end	of	1971.	Over	this	time,	the	WSA	became	an	entity	in	left-wing	politics	that	could	not	be	ignored.	It	closed	its	headquarters	at	the	Bakery	and	rearranged	itself	into	a	unitary	structure	of	a	Central	Committee/Council	with	locality-situated	branches	in	suburban	Melbourne	and	several	other	states.	A	major	conference	at	the	beginning	of	1971	set	its	course	according	to	the	tenets	of	what	its	members	understood	to	be	Marxism-Leninism	and	Maoism.	An	outlook	such	as	this	required	a	view	to	the	overturning	of	class	relations	in	the	whole	of	society—not	one	limited	in	scope	to	a	single	issue.	Recognising	that	activism	over	the	Vietnam	War	would	lose	its	political	heft	as	the	war	wound	down,	the	WSA	embarked	on	a	series	of	activist	campaigns	over	issues	both	local	and	national.	The	Monash	Labor	Club	renamed	itself	the	Monash	WSA	and	continued	to	mount	wage	campaigns	as	before;	however,	the	spotlight	on	radical	student	activism	swung	to	the	emerging	La	Trobe	University	Labor	Club	and	its	eventual	anti-imperialist	offshoot,	the	La	Trobe	WSA.	The	sharpening	and	consolidation	of	WSA’s	political	outlook	increasingly	occurred	within	emerging	social	movements.	However,	while	the	Vietnam	War	still	raged	the	Moratorium	movement	remained	its	major	field	of	ideological	ferment.	
Moratorium	September	
On	26	and	27	May	1970,	a	National	Consultation	Conference	of	the	Vietnam	Moratorium	Campaign	(VMC)	was	held	in	Melbourne	at	the	Wesley	Church.	A	total	of	eighty-two	representatives	from	peak	state	VMC	organisations	attended.	As	its	name	implies,	this	conference	had	the	status	of	a	“consultative	advisory	meeting”;	it	was	responsible	for	making	“recommendations	for	consideration	by	the	various	state	bodies.”1	It	recommended	that	the	next	coordinated	national	action	should	be	“a	moratorium	on	business	as	usual	to	bring	the	nation	to	a	standstill	…	in	the	week																																																									1	Decisions	of	the	National	Co-ordinating	Committee,	“Recommendation	1,”	Vietnam	Moratorium	
Campaign,	26	May	1970,	author’s	collection.	
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ending	September	18,	19,	20.”	The	meeting	also	confirmed	the	agreed	objectives	of	the	Moratorium	to	be	“immediate,	total	and	unconditional	withdrawal	of	Australian	and	American	troops	…	withdrawal	of	support	for	the	present	Saigon	Government”	and	“immediate	abolition	of	conscription	in	any	form.”2	The	chair	of	the	Consultation	Conference	was	Dr	Jim	Cairns.	In	his	summation	of	the	state	of	the	Moratorium	campaign,	Cairns	attempted	to	give	heart	to	any	who	might	have	expected	the	May	actions	to	end	the	war	forthwith:	“[the	aims	of	the	Moratorium]	may	be	achieved	if	the	existing	government	is	influenced	by	the	view	that	enough	people’s	minds	are	being	changed	towards	withdrawal	and	repeal	to	make	it	politically	wise	to	act	in	accordance	with	the	change.”3	The	remainder	of	the	document	itemised	achievements	and	shortcomings	and	gave	some	welcome	praise	to	draft	resisters	whose	non-compliance	had	“puzzled	and	embarrassed	the	government.	They	know	that	many	convictions	and	long	terms	of	imprisonment	imposed	upon	sincere,	intelligent	and	courageous	young	men	will	turn	many	people	against	the	government	and	system.”4	However,	when	it	came	to	his	recommendations	for	the	next	Moratorium	in	September	1970,	Cairns	did	not	extend	such	praise	for	other	forms	of	non-compliance.	Instead,	he	cautioned	against	action	that	might	be	seen	as	outlandish	or	too	radical:	“Such	things	as	‘sit	downs’	are	incidental	and	necessary	only	as	a	‘constructive	tension’	element	when	that	is	needed.”5	Cairns	stated	that	the	aims	of	the	Moratorium	may	be	achieved	“if	the	existing	government	is	influenced	by	the	view	that	enough	people’s	minds	are	being	changed	towards	withdrawal	[from	the	war]	…	and	repeal	[of	conscription]	…	to	make	it	politically	wise	to	act	in	accordance	with	the	change.”6	This	affirmation	of	reformism	could	only	strengthen	the	conservative	side	of	the	VMC	national	hierarchy.	Statements	such	as	this	also	ensured	that	Cairns’s	standing	within	the	Labor	Party																																																									2	Decisions	of	the	National	Co-ordinating	Committee,	“Recommendation	2	and	4,”	Vietnam	
Moratorium	Campaign,	26	May	1970,	author’s	collection.	3	Jim	Cairns,	Some	Results	and	Tasks	of	the	Vietnam	Moratorium,	1970,	1,	accessed	13	July	2017,	http://www.reasoninrevolt.net.au/objects/pdf/d0742.pdf.	4	Ibid.,	2.	5	Ibid.,	4.	6	Ibid.,	1.	
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would	belong	to	the	middle	ground	between	the	radicals	in	Victoria	(i.e.,	mainly	the	Maoists)	and	the	Labor	campaigners	who	saw	electoral	disaster	in	uncontrolled	street	action	or	any	identification	of	the	party	with	communism	or	the	Viet	Cong.	Much	of	the	statement	rephrased	what	Bernie	Taft	and	other	Communist	Party	of	Australia	(CPA)	activists	had	been	saying	and	it	contained	no	challenge	to	that	party.	However,	Cairns	did	attempt	to	pre-empt	attack	from	those	young	activists	not	beholden	to	any	party	by	quoting	Chairman	Mao	against	them:	A	leading	revolutionary	thinker	has	put	it	this	way:	The	revolutionary	party	must	identify	itself	with	the	masses,	and	according	to	their	present	level,	awaken	them	or	raise	their	political	consciousness	and	help	them	gradually	to	organize	themselves	voluntarily	and	set	going	all	essential	struggles	permitted	by	the	internal	and	external	circumstances	of	the	given	time	and	place.7	This	quotation	from	Mao’s	political	report,	On	Coalition	Government,	was	delivered	at	the	Seventh	Congress	of	the	Communist	Party	of	China	on	24	April	1945.	Cairns’s	use	of	it	in	this	way	betrays	his	deep	anxiety	about	the	influence	of	the	Maoists	and	their	allies	and	shows	the	extent	to	which	the	Moratorium	movement	was	a	site	of	contested	discourse	between	revolutionary	and	reformist	aims	and	means.	Cairns’s	admonition	that	the	demonstration	must	be	“orderly	and	powerful”	and	claim	that	“such	things	as	sit	downs	are	incidental”	was	a	form	of	framing	whereby	radical	actions	became	anomic	and	thus	deviant	and	not	acceptable	in	the	Moratorium	discourse.	Such	framing	would	make	punishment	of,	and	retaliation	against,	the	radicals	acceptable.	This	includes	police	retaliation,	which	Cairns	might	not	have	intended,	but	which	the	Maoists,	other	radicals	and	particularly	anti-war	student	protesters	from	La	Trobe	University,	experienced.	Yet,	as	will	be	seen	in	subsequent	chapters,	official	retributive	action	taken	against	radicals	could	be	turned	to	the	radicals,	benefit	too.	In	preparation	for	the	September	1970	Moratorium,	the	Maoists	within	the	La	Trobe	Labor	Club	proposed	that	a	special	“Anti-Imperialist	Week”	be	held	at	the	university	and	its	environs.	The	proposition	received	a	“lukewarm”	reception	that	Barry	York	blames	on	“the	division	…	between	Grant	Evans	and	his	New	Left	supporters	and	the																																																									7	Ibid.	The	emphasis	here	was	added	by	Cairns.	This	quotation	can	be	found	in	Mao	Zedong,	
Selected	Readings	from	the	Works	of	Mao	Tsetung,	316.	
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Maoists.	While	the	former	had	the	numbers,	the	latter	had	the	determination.”8	However,	the	Maoists	took	the	proposal	to	a	general	meeting	of	students	at	which	some	200	students	including	anti-Maoists	endorsed	it.	Three	days	later,	on	the	night	of	10	September,	several	students	painting	anti-war	slogans	on	commercial	buildings	near	the	university	were	arrested	after	being	shot	at	by	guards.9	With	the	shootings	at	Kent	State	University	still	fresh	in	the	minds	of	students,	this	was	a	propaganda	gift	for	Anti-Imperialist	Week.	On	the	next	day,	Friday	11	September,	about	seventy	students	assembled	at	the	La	Trobe	campus	to	join	a	Maoist	led	march	along	Waterdale	Road	to	the	Ivanhoe	shopping	centre	to	hand	out	leaflets	and	anti-war	propaganda.	This	was	despite	the	anti-Maoist	faction	of	the	Labor	Club	concurrently	showing	an	anti-war	film	at	the	university.	York	comments	that	“the	refusal	of	the	Evans	group	to	actively	support	the	demonstration	marked	its	end	as	a	central	force	and	paved	the	way	for	the	Maoist	ascendency.”10		Several	days	of	confrontation	between	students	and	police	began	with	the	11	September	march.	York	explains	that	the	cohort	of	seventy	students	had	not	marched	more	than	a	block	before	police,	with	their	cars	blocking	the	road,	moved	in	to	break	it	up.	It	became	a	melee	with	plain	clothed	“special	branch”	detectives	in	the	lead.	A	group	of	evangelical	Christians	who	participated	in	the	march	reported	that	an	officer	leapt	from	a	car	and	gave	an	order	like	“Batons,	break	it	up.”	The	demonstration	did	break	up	and,	with	some	students	quite	badly	injured,	retreated	to	the	university.	Over	that	weekend	the	La	Trobe	Maoists	made	plans	for	a	new	demonstration,	which	they	disseminated	through	a	special	issue	of	their	newsletter	
Red	Moat.11	This	time,	350	students	at	a	general	meeting	endorsed	the	plans	and	marshalls	were	appointed	to	ensure	that	traffic	and	pedestrians	were	not	hindered.	The	students	hired	buses	to	take	them	to	the	Northlands	Shopping	Centre	where	they	would	hand	out	Moratorium	leaflets	and	then	march	back	along	Waterdale	Road	to	the																																																									8	York,	Student	Revolt,	93.	The	“New	Left”	here	refers	to	the	grouping	holding	allegiance	to	the	CPA.	9	Ibid.,	94.	10	Ibid.	11	Ibid.	
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university.	On	16	September,	just	two	days	before	the	Moratorium	proper,	400	students	set	off	along	Waterdale	Road,	accompanied	by	some	academics	and	the	university	chaplain	as	observers.	Again	the	police	attempted	to	block	and	disperse	the	march	but	this	time—as	noted	by	the	observers—with	considerably	more	force	and	violence	(Figure	18).	York	quotes	observer	C.	D.	Starrs,	the	postgraduate	representative	on	the	University	Council,	who	issued	the	following	eyewitness	account:		Students	were	now	scattering	further	into	the	campus	…	Armed	policemen	leapt	out	of	cars	and	chased	students,	bashing	any	they	could	catch;	some	policemen,	unable	to	catch	the	students,	drew	their	guns	and	threatened	to	shoot.	At	least	one	student	was	arrested	at	gunpoint.	This	student	was	threatened	with	being	shot	so	that	a	policeman	could	make	an	arrest	for	the	heinous	crime	of	“offensive	behaviour.”12		
	
Figure	18:	Police	action	against	students,	Waterdale	Road,	16	September	1970	
Note:	Scanned	from	1971	leaflet	authorised	by	the	Free	All	Political	Prisoners	Committee.13	
																																																								12	Ibid.,	95–96.	13	The	“Free	All	Political	Prisoners	Committee”	was	a	short-lived,	ad	hoc	committee	established	by	members	of	Labor	Clubs,	some	unions,	WSA	and	individuals.	Its	main	purpose	was	agitation	around	the	questions	of	police	action	against	activists.	
188	
York	describes	more	of	the	police	activities	than	can	be	recorded	here;	however,	he	also	makes	the	point	that	the	demonstrations	had	the	effect	of	bringing	“moderates”	and	even	some	from	“the	Evans	camp	towards	the	Maoist	position.”	The	Students’	Representative	Council	(SRC)	called	a	special	general	meeting	of	students	on	the	day	after	the	second	demonstration.	It	had	asked	the	vice-chancellor,	Dr	Myers,	to	address	the	audience,	which	had	been	packed	to	capacity	into	the	Glenn	Dining	Hall.	Myers	did	not	make	the	mistake	of	opposing	the	student	activities,	as	the	hapless	Dr	Matheson	had	at	Monash	a	few	years	earlier.	Instead	he	“announced	that	he	had	written	to	Premier	Bolte	seeking	an	inquiry.”	This	was	applauded	all	round	but	it	was	not	sufficiently	soothing	and	the	meeting	“endorsed	another	Waterdale	Road	demonstration,	and	scheduled	it	for	23	[September].”14		York	reports	that	the	third	demonstration,	which	was	held	after	the	Moratorium,	was	even	bigger	than	the	first	two,	with	800	marchers	including	some	unionists	“(notably	members	of	the	Builders’	Labourers	Federation,	the	Plumbers	and	Gasfitters	Union,	and	the	Waterside	Workers’	Federation).”15	It	is	significant	that	these	were	the	unions	in	which	the	Communist	Party	of	Australia	(Marxist-Leninist)	(CPA	(ML))	had	decisive	influence	and	that	none	of	the	CPA-influenced	unions	were	identified	as	having	been	associated	with	the	march.	As	it	eventuated,	the	police,	who	had	floated	police	horses	in	for	the	purpose,	attempted	to	block	the	demonstration	but	when	the	marchers	massed	to	occupy	the	entire	Waterdale	Road,	they	made	a	tactical	decision	to	withdraw.	The	march	then	proceeded	in	triumph	to	the	university	grounds.16		A	pattern	in	the	development	of	radical	discourse	at	Monash	and	La	Trobe	universities	in	both	the	4	July	and	the	Moratorium	movements	was	becoming	clear.	This	comprised	the	Maoists’	practice	of	raising	maximal	demands	and	organising	provocative	actions	that	both	confronted	the	law	and	tradition	and	received	sharp	condemnation	from	their	“friendly”	opposition,	particularly	within	the	peace	movement.	This	pattern	was	reaping	rewards	that	the	Maoists’	CPA	and	Australian	Labor	Party	(ALP)	detractors	had	said	would	kill	the	movement.	Far	from	driving																																																									14	York,	Student	Revolt,	96–97.	15	Ibid.,	97.	16	Ibid.,	97–99.	
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people	away,	the	Maoist	strategy	had	drawn	greater	numbers	to	participate	in	mass	demonstrations.	Every	draconian	reaction	to	their	actions	only	served	to	build	the	movement	so	confrontation	paid.	Beginning	with	just	a	few	activists,	they	had	built	a	substantial	and	influential	force	in	left-wing	and	protest	movements,	not	by	accommodating	themselves	to	the	dominant	streams	in	those	discourses,	but	by	confronting	them.	Their	growth	was	not	just	numerical,	as	they	took	very	seriously	the	task	of	political	study	and	developed	a	characteristic	form	of	Marxism-Leninism	and	Maoism	that	was,	for	a	few	short	years,	acclaimed	by	the	CPA	(ML)	and	an	anathema	to	the	CPA.		With	the	arrival	of	the	La	Trobe	Maoists,	it	became	clear	that	the	challenge	of	the	newer,	more	ideologically	evangelical,	young	radicals	to	the	more	experienced,	philosophically	established	activists,	was	not	going	to	go	away.	This	was	principally	a	battle	of	ideas	and	ideology	within	the	discourse	of	the	peace	movement	and	while	it	was	opposition	to	the	Vietnam	War	that	united	the	two	sides,	their	proposals	for	action	divided	them.	The	WSA	camp,	seeing	imperialism	in	Leninist	terms	as	a	stage	of	capitalism	and	most	starkly	represented	by	the	US–Australia	alliance,	approached	the	war	from	the	point	of	view	that	defeat	for	the	US	would	be	a	step	forward	for	the	Australian	revolution.17	Conversely,	the	ALP,	being	a	party	that	relied	for	its	sustenance	on	being	elected	to	parliament	and,	given	its	history	as	the	founder	of	the	US–Australia	alliance,	had	a	stake	in	the	status	quo.	Its	leader,	Gough	Whitlam,	was	only	very	lately	converted	to	opposition	to	the	war.	As	such,	its	main	concern	lay	outside	the	peace	movement	and	it	did	not	need	to	openly	engage	in	polemics	with	the	anti-imperialists.	That	job	fell	to	the	CPA,	which	had	adopted	a	policy	of	a	“coalition	of	the	left”	at	its	1967	congress,	which	meant	that	its	best	interests	would	be	served	by	allying	itself	with	“left”	groups,	including	the	ALP.18	Decisions	of	the	CPA	congress	had	the	status	of	party	commandments;	it	was	the	duty	of	officials	like	
																																																								17	Lenin’s	booklet,	Imperialism,	the	Highest	Stage	of	Capitalism,	was	a	frequent	reference	for	WSA	and	the	YCL.	See	also	Cassidy,	“Political	Power	Grows	Out	of	the	Barrel	of	a	Gestetner.”	18	The	“Coalition	of	the	Left”	policy	was	adopted	by	the	1967	Congress	of	the	CPA.	See	Tom	O’Lincoln,	“Into	the	Mainstream,	the	Monolith	Cracks,”	https://www.marxists.org/subject/stalinism/into-mainstream/ch05.htm#36.	O’Lincoln	quotes	CPA	leader	Laurie	Aarons	as	explaining	that	the	coalition	“may	well	include	besides	trade	unions	and	other	people's	organisations,	other	political	parties	which	formed	to	represent	interests	of	classes	and	social	groups	other	than	the	working	class.”	
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Bernie	Taft	not	only	to	abide	by	them	but	also	to	seek	to	normalise	them	within	the	discourses	that	they	could	influence.	This	left	the	CPA	in	a	position	of	having	to	oppose	the	Maoists	and	anyone	else	whenever	they	proposed	anything	(such	as	support	for	the	National	Liberation	Front	of	South	Vietnam	(NLF))	that	would	put	their	“coalition”	in	jeopardy.		Technically,	the	CPA	had	the	advantage	over	the	Maoists;	they	had	long-standing	influence	in	the	active	union	movement;	a	well-established	structure	and	comparatively	large	membership;	permanent	paid	officials	and	organisers;	a	substantial	newspaper,	the	Tribune;	and	offices	and	bookshops.	The	young	anti-imperialists	had	organic	contact	with	large	cohorts	at	the	three	universities,	the	Bakery,	a	considerable	membership	basis	and,	by	1970,	a	few	years	of	experience	in	provocative	politics	coupled	with	the	acquisition	of	at	least	a	modicum	of	Marxist/Leninist/Maoist	theory.	By	September	1970,	the	editors	of	Lot’s	Wife,	Farrago	and	Rabelais	had	collaborated	to	produce	a	special,	28-page,	joint	Indo-China	Moratorium	Supplement,	which	was	to	be	distributed	at	all	universities	prior	to	both	the	May	and	the	September	Moratoriums.19	Its	editors,	Russell	Skelton	of	Monash,	Terry	Counihan	of	Melbourne	and	Grant	Evans	of	La	Trobe,	were	all	members	of	the	CPA.	Their	joint	editorial	expressed	support	for	the	Moratorium	and	opposition	to	US	aggression	in	Indochina.	It	also	swiped	at	the	proponents	of	more	militant	activities:	“The	tactics	of	ultra-left	adventurists	in	this	context	are	no	more	a	solution	than	those	of	the	liberals	or	conservatives	…	We	support	the	Moratorium	as	a	radical	peaceful	protest	against	the	U.S.	and	Australian	intervention	in	Indo-China.”20	The	rest	of	the	supplement	contained	long,	explanatory	articles	by	Professor	G.	Duncan	of	Adelaide	University,	Dr	J.	F.	Cairns,	Gordon	Barton,	convenor	of	the	now	defunct	Australia	Party,	and	leader	of	the	federal	Opposition,	Gough	Whitlam.	Other	articles	were	reprints	of	surveys	and	reports	from	Australian	and	US	sources.	
																																																								19	Indo-China	Moratorium	Supplement	in	Lot’s	Wife,	Farrago	and	Rabelais,	6	May	1970.	These	are	the	student	newspapers	of	the	three	universities:	Lot’s	Wife	(Monash),	Farrago	(Melbourne)	and	
Rabelais	(La	Trobe).		20	Ibid.,	3.	
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However,	one	page	carried	a	long	article	entitled	“Communists	and	the	Moratorium”	by	B.	Taft	and	J.	Sendy,	president	and	secretary	of	the	CPA,	respectively.21	This	article	was	quite	out	of	character	with	all	of	the	others	in	that	it	took	the	form	of	a	complaint:		At	the	last	Moratorium	delegates	meeting,	a	charge	was	made	that	the	Communist	Party	was	trying	to	water	down	the	Moratorium	campaign	…	This	is	the	second	time	that	attacks	of	this	nature	have	been	made	at	these	meetings	by	the	same	small	group	of	people.22		The	article	then	went	on	to	give	a	short	history	of	the	CPA’s	anti–Vietnam	War	campaigning	and	describe	the	praise	the	party	had	received	from	Vietnamese	communists	for	doing	so.	It	claimed	credit	for	supporting	a	“sit-down”	in	the	Moratorium,	which	had	been	troubling	to	Dr	Cairns	but	not	at	all	to	the	radicals,	and	then	added:		It	seems	some	people	can’t	or	don’t	want	to	be	convinced	about	the	good	will	of	the	Communist	Party.	Whatever	policy	we	put	forward,	no	matter	how	militant,	they	feel	it	necessary	to	go	one	better,	and	to	read	sinister	motives	into	it.23		Whether	or	not	it	garnered	any	sympathy	for	the	CPA,	the	article	was	a	sure	sign	that	the	sharp	persistence	of	the	Maoists	within	the	Moratorium	campaign	was	having	an	effect	and	could	no	longer	be	ignored	or	imperiously	dismissed.	With	complaints	such	as	those	of	Taft	and	Sendy	being	aired	in	the	student	press,	and	given	that	it	related	to	a	contentious	issue,	any	show	of	disunity	would	become	an	“angle”	for	the	mass	media.	On	the	day	before	the	September	Moratorium	in	Melbourne,	the	afternoon	daily,	The	Herald,	editorialised	about	the	danger:	In	mass	gatherings,	that	unstable	or	deliberately	disruptive	elements	may	get	out	of	hand	…	The	confusion	over	the	plans	is	not	a	good	omen	…	[citing	some	disunity	within	the	Labor	Party]	…	Neither	the	Labor	Party	nor	the	trade	unions	are	united	...	The	opposition	Labor	leader	in	New	South	Wales	has	angrily	repudiated	the	march	...	Mr	Kim	Beazley	…	told	the	Federal																																																									21	B.	Taft	and	J.	Sendy,	“Communists	and	the	Moratorium,”	in	Indo-China	Moratorium	Supplement,	12.	22	Ibid.	23	Ibid.	
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Parliament	last	night	that	“a	great	number	of	insincere	people	are	in	the	Moratorium	movement.”		Going	on	to	balance	the	democratic	right	of	peaceful	protest	versus	the	right	of	other	citizens	to	go	about	their	business,	the	editorial	added	that	there	needed	to	be	“commonsense	arrangements	reached	with	the	police	on	the	reasonable	limits	of	street	politics.	Otherwise	we	may	have	provocation	and	counter-provocation	setting	us	on	the	road	to	chaos.”24	While	the	editorial	writer	may	or	may	not	have	been	sympathetic	to	the	Moratorium,	concentrating	on	the	split	within	the	ALP	and	the	implied	threat	of	uncontrolled	violence	would	arouse	fear	and	insecurity	in	those	to	whom	demonstrating	on	the	streets	was	a	new	venture	while	also	absolving	the	police	from	blame	if	they	incurred	violence	in	the	name	of	the	law.	Adjacent	to	its	editorial,	The	Herald	ran	an	opinion	piece	on	the	Moratorium	entitled	“Who’s	Running	This	City?”	(Figure	19)	by	Paul	Ormonde	who	was	a	writer	for	the	
Catholic	Worker,	founder	of	the	Catholic	peace	group,	Pax,	and	supporter	and	campaigner	for	the	Moratorium.25	The	substance	of	Ormonde’s	article,	which	occupied	the	majority	of	the	broadsheet	page,	was	a	comparison	of	two	recently	published	books	on	the	Moratorium:	Dr	Jim	Cairns’s	Silence	Kills	and	The	
Moratorium	Movement	by	Moratorium	adversary	and	anti-communist	Mr	N.	E.	Lauritz	“of	the	DLP	[Democratic	Labor	Party]	oriented	National	Civic	Council.”26	The	central	theme	of	the	article	was	Lauritz’s	claim	that	the	main	issue	in	the	Moratorium	“is	not	violence	or	non-violence—it	is	one	of	authority.”	In	a	different	context	and	time,	the	article	could	only	be	seen	as	a	measured	account	of	different	approaches	to	authority.	However,	in	the	context	of	the	eve	of	the	Moratorium,	warnings	such	as	“tomorrow’s	Moratorium	…	could	disintegrate	into	violence	and	disorder”	signalled	impending	danger.27	This	may	not	have	been	Ormonde’s	intention;	certainly,	the	choice	of	headline	and	imagery	were	not	his	decisions	to	make.	The	piece’s	most	important	words—its	headline—were	only	marginally																																																									24	“Editorial,”	The	Herald,	Melbourne,	17	September	1970,	4.	25	Val	Noone,	“Melbourne	Catholics	and	the	Vietnam	War:	A	participant’s	study	of	peace	work	in	a	pro-war	church”	(PhD	thesis,	La	Trobe	University,	1991),	183,	301.		26	Paul	Ormonde,	“Who’s	Running	this	City,	Two	Views	on	M-Day,”	The	Herald,	17	September	1970,	4.	27	Ibid.	
193	
related	to	the	content	of	Ormonde’s	article.	The	inclusion	of	an	aerial	photograph	of	the	May	Moratorium,	with	its	confusion	of	banners	and	seemingly	directionless	movement,	added	an	impression	of	chaos	and	mayhem	on	the	streets.	The	headline	“Who’s	Running	This	City?”	refers	to	the	efforts	of	Moratorium	opponents,	particularly	Victorian	Liberal	Premier,	Sir	Henry	Bolte,	to	raise	the	spectre	of	violence	in	the	demonstration.	Bolte	had	warned	that	the	presence	of	1000	marshals	in	the	march	“could	only	serve	to	provoke	disorder,”	and	that,	“if	there	was	mass	occupation,”	“appropriate	action”	would	be	taken.28	Bolte	“would	not	say	what	the	action	would	be,”	but	The	Age	had	an	idea	of	what	he	meant	when	it	published	a	Tanner	cartoon	depicting	a	Moratorium	marshal	squaring	off	against	“policeman”	Bolte	(Figure	20).		
	
Figure	19:	“Who’s	Running	This	City?”	Herald,	17	September	1970,	3	
																																																								28	“March	Quietly	or	Else:	Bolte,”	The	Age,	17	September	1970,	3.	
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Figure	20:	Tanner	cartoon,	The	Age,	17	September	1970	As	it	turned	out,	the	18	September	Moratorium	was	much	smaller	than	the	first,	with	about	50,000	protesters	marching.	However,	it	is	doubtful	that	the	drop	in	attendance	was	due	to	threats	of	violence.	In	April	1971,	I	wrote	in	my	Convenor’s	Report	to	the	Schools’	Moratorium	Committee	and	to	the	VMC:		The	second	1970	moratorium	had	some	50,000	people	marching	but	there	evolved	a	feeling	of	downheartedness	and	a	tinge	of	defeat.	What	reasons	were	there	for	this?	(a)	Control	of	the	march	was	taken	by	the	police	who	managed	to	send	it	home	as	a	dejected,	scattered	rabble.	(b)	A	lesser	number	was	there	because	1.	The	short	time	which	elapsed	between	the	first	and	second	moratorium	2.	The	aims	and	strategy	and	slogans	of	the	second	were	not	in	any	way	different	from	or	advanced	from	those	of	the	first.	A	mass	movement	cannot	develop	unless	it	is,	and	is	seen	to	be,	moving	in	a	definite	direction,	and	can	make	definite,	material	advances.	Since	the	last	Moratorium	the	Vietnam	war	has	changed	into	a	war	against	the	three	Indo-Chinese	peoples,	the	Vietnamese,	the	Cambodians	and	the	Laotians.29	The	above	quotation	is	but	one	of	similar	contributions	from	the	WSA	camp.	Whatever	the	cause	of	the	diminished	numbers,	it	was	the	apparent	relinquishing	of																																																									29	Nicholas	Butler,	Convenor’s	Report	April	1971,	leaflet,	Schools	Moratorium	Committee,	April	1971.	(Underlining	in	original.)	
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control	to	the	Victoria	Police	that	signalled	to	WSA	that	it	certainly	was	a	“matter	of	authority,”	as	stated	by	Lauritz.		At	this	time,	a	peace	activist,	Mara	Hayler,	returned	to	Australia	from	Canada.	Regarding	her	knowledge	of	groups	other	than	the	WSA,	such	as	the	ALP,	CPA,	Campaign	for	International	Cooperation	and	Disarmament	and	unions,	she	stated:	I	didn’t	have	anything	to	do	with	those	other	groups	apart	from	seeing	them	in	meetings	and	things	like	that.	But	[what]	I	could	say	is	that	at	the	third	Moratorium	our	…	[WSA’s]	…	main	banner	was	agreed	to	as	being	“US	Imperialists	Out	Now.”	To	me	that	says	a	lot	about	WSA’s	work	to	educate	and	move	people	towards	a	progressive	viewpoint.	And	all	the	other	groups	were	quite	happy	with	that	and	there	was	no	vigorous	dissenting	group	against	that	slogan.	And	I	think	that	is	a	marked	event	that	was	different	from	all	the	others	…	I	remember	that	Sydney’s	…	[Moratorium]	…	was	“Bring	the	Boys	Home”	which	is	very	nice	but	it	says	nothing	whereas	the	one	here	was	pointing	the	arrow	at	the	target.30	
Monash	Occupations	
The	Monash	Labor	Club	had	long	maintained	that	the	root	of	its	opposition	to	the	administration	of	the	university	was	the	latter’s	support	for	capitalism	under	the	guise	of	academic	neutrality.	For	example,	in	a	report	of	a	meeting	decrying	the	exclusion	of	Albert	Langer	from	Monash,	the	2	April	1970	issue	of	Print	stated	that:		While	the	fundamental	issue	was	the	role	of	the	university	in	this	society	(i.e.	supporting	and	justifying	capitalism	and	thus	opposing	the	interests	of	the	majority	of	the	Australian	people)	the	escalation	of	this	political	repression	of	left-wing	or	anti-capitalist	views	had	to	be	vigorously	combatted.31	The	forthcoming	8	May	Moratorium	had	engendered	major	support	at	the	university	and	an	estimated	5000	staff	and	students	were	expected	to	join	it.	On	the	eve	of	the	event,	when	Professor	Herb	Feith,	addressing	a	graduation	ceremony,	called	on	students	to	attend	the	march,	the	question	of	the	university’s	neutrality	in	politics	again	came	to	the	foreground.32	Soon	after	the	Moratorium,	Vice-Chancellor	
																																																								30	Mara	Hayler,	interview	by	author,	17	April	2017.	31	“Are	You	in	Your	Office?”	Print,	no.	13,	2	April	1970,	1.	32	Hyde,	It	is	Right	to	Rebel,	116.	
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Matheson,	in	what	could	be	read	as	corrective	to	Feith,	wrote	a	letter	to	The	Bulletin	stating	that	he	had	felt	“qualified	disapproval”	of	the	cancellation	of	classes	on	Moratorium	day,	and	that	the	“university	as	a	whole	must	be	politically	neutral.”33	The	test	of	this	“neutrality”	came	soon	after,	when	representatives	of	the	US	arms	manufacturer	Honeywell	arrived	at	the	Careers	and	Appointments	(C&A)	office	on	a	recruiting	drive.	The	Monash	Labor	Club	distributed	a	leaflet	explaining	that	“Honeywell	was	making	40%	of	its	profit	from	supplying	the	U.S.	army	with	weapons,	in	particular	anti-personnel	bombs.”	A	rally	was	called	and	about	100	students	stormed	the	C&A	office	and	the	Honeywell	representatives	hastily	departed.34	Although	the	encounter	was	brief,	it	was	remembered	when	a	Monash	Association	of	Students	(MAS)	meeting	on	29	July	carried	resolutions	condemning	the	war	as	a	product	of	US	imperialism,	and	reaffirmed	support	for	raising	money	for	the	NLF	and	the	US	Independence	Day	demonstrations	on	3	and	4	July.	Following	the	meeting,	“about	fifty	students	occupied	the	Careers	and	Appointments	Office	with	the	intention	of	taking	it	over	until	the	3rd	July	and	using	it	as	an	anti-imperialist	organising	centre.”	This	was	no	spectacular	storming	of	the	barricades,	just	a	polite	occupation	that	lasted	for	three	days;	each	night	“all	the	duplicating	machines	of	the	C&A	student	counselling	offices	whirred	and	clacked	continuously	as	anti-imperialist	leaflets	were	stockpiled	in	preparation	for	the	‘lean	daylight	hours’.”35	The	occupation	lasted	until	3	July,	but	not	without	incident,	as	the	university	pursued	a	policy	of,	in	Matheson’s	words,	“non-violent	containment	of	invasion.”	This	meant	that	security	guards	were	posted,	day	and	night,	to	ensure	that	no-one	else	entered	and	that	no	unidentified	person	decamped.	The	telephones	were	cut	from	the	switchboard	but	some	“Labor	Club	technical	experts”	rewired	one	of	the	offices	and	the	occupiers	ended	up	with	their	own	private	phone	number.36	An	incident	on	the	second	day	is	indicative	of	the	mood	of	the	student	body.	Confronted	with	around	one	hundred	engineering	students	who	looked	like	they	wanted	to																																																									33	Ibid.,	116.	Quotations	from	The	Bulletin	are	as	contained	in	Hyde’s	book.	34	Ibid.,	117.	35	Ibid.,	118.	36	Ibid.	
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“physically	throw	them	out,”	the	occupiers,	after	a	brief	meeting,	decided	that,	because	of	their	own	“moral	correctness,”	they	should:	Open	the	doors	and	invite	these	students	in	for	a	look	around	the	place	and	a	discussion.	Accordingly	it	was	done,	and	the	vigilante	squad,	surprised	at	not	being	met	by	a	violent	mob	of	non-student	delinquents	whom	they	had	read	about	in	the	newspapers,	accepted	the	invitation	and	came	in	for	a	tour	of	inspection	followed	by	a	coffee	and	discussion.	This	was	perhaps	the	most	beneficial	afternoon	of	the	whole	occupation.37	After	that,	the	occupiers	invited	curious	students	to	defy	the	security	guards’	warnings	that	they	would	face	disciplinary	measures	and	come	in	for	a	tour	and	discussion.	However,	when	about	a	“thousand”	students	did	so,	the	security	guards,	with	photographers	handy,	blocked	every	entrance	and	exit	so	that	nobody	could	go	through	without	being	identified.	Thereafter,	it	was	decided	to	implement	the	“Labor	Club	Committee	policy	to	have	a	second	line	of	activists	not	as	open	to	repression	as	the	first.”	Some	twenty	of	their	number	made	paper	masks	for	their	faces	and	“rushed	out	of	the	offices	evading	the	feeble	attempts	at	capture	from	the	guards.”	Thus,	the	few	remaining	occupiers	were	nearly	all	“well-known	lefties”	who	knew	that	“admin	would	try	to	‘get’	them	after	the	occupation	anyway.”38	Those	remaining	inside	made	a	deal	with	the	university	administration	that	they	would	identify	themselves	in	return	for	the	security	guards	unblocking	the	doors	so	that	the	occupation	could	continue	as	before	until	3	July.	The	administration	agreed	and,	after	an	inspection	by	a	group	of	deans,	the	students	gave	their	names	and	the	expanded	occupation	continued	until	the	occupiers	left	the	offices	“spic	and	span”	to	join	the	3	July	demonstration.39	This	first	occupation	of	1970	had	the	support	of	the	MAS,	obtained	through	general	meetings	of	students	that	sometimes	numbered	in	their	thousands.	Even	so,	the	activists	were	mainly	members	and	sympathisers	of	the	Monash	Labor	Club.	This	was	to	change	with	the	new	round	of	occupations,	which	resulted	from	disciplinary	actions	taken	against	the	ringleaders	of	the	first	occupation.	These	later	occupations,	
																																																								37	Ibid.,	119.	38	Ibid.,	120.	39	Ibid.,	121.	
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populated	by	hundreds	of	previously	uncommitted	Monash	students,	were	generated	as	a	direct	result	of	disciplinary	action	taken	by	the	university.	On	7	July,	a	Discipline	Committee	of	four	professors	commenced	a	“trial”	of	nine	students	on	charges	of	failing	to	obey	a	reasonable	order	to	leave	the	C&A	building.	The	nine	students	who	had	been	so	charged	included	Labor	Club	leaders,	Jim	Bacon,	Michael	Hyde,	Kerrie	Miller	(Langer)	and	Ralph	Haddon.40	They	all	refused	to	attend	the	trial	on	the	grounds	that	it	would	not	consider	the	reasons	for	their	actions	and	that	it	consisted	of	“reactionary	Deans	who	had	no	right	to	‘judge’	them.”41	The	students	were	tried	in	absentia	and	their	penalties	were	announced	on	11	August	1970,	during	the	university	vacation.	Seven	of	the	students	were	expelled,	two	for	life,	one	for	two	years,	four	for	twelve	months.	The	remaining	two	had	their	sentences	suspended	or	adjourned.42	Anyone	who	hoped	that	the	looming	exam	period	would	quell	student	activity	in	response	to	the	expulsions	was	to	be	disappointed.	On	the	first	day	after	the	vacation	ended,	the	Monash	Labor	Club	held	an	anti-expulsions	rally	in	the	Union	Building	that,	Hyde	claims,	was	“attended	by	over	1000	people.”	On	the	next	day,	a	MAS	meeting	of	“approximately	3000	students”	carried	motions	to	continue	recognition	of	the	expelled	students	as	members	of	the	university.	Subsequent	MAS	meetings	called	a	lecture	boycott	to	coincide	with	the	University	Council	meeting	on	14	September;	authorised	$500	to	be	given	to	its	Anti-Expulsions	Committee,	which	consisted	of	the	expelled	students;	and	provided	an	office	in	the	Union	Building	for	the	purpose.43	Anti-expulsion	committees	were	formed	in	most	faculties	and	many	academics	expressed	their	opposition	to	the	sentences.	For	example,	a	staff	petition	read	in	part:	“We	condemn	the	savage	disciplinary	measures	…	we	deplore	the	
																																																								40	Public	Affairs	Committee,	Monash	University,	Transcript	of	Proceedings	before	the	Discipline	
Committee	at	Monash	University,	Melbourne,	23	July	1970,	15,	author’s	collection.	41	Hyde,	It	is	Right	to	Rebel,	122.	42	Ibid.	43	Ibid.,	125,	126.	The	attendance	figures	quoted	here	were	challenged	by	others,	for	example,	by	Professor	Selby	Smith	who	quoted	a	maximum	of	300	at	the	MAS	meetings.	See	Print,	3	September	1970,	1.	
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increasing	attempts	of	the	university	administration	to	stifle	dissent	…	We	call	upon	the	administration	to	set	aside	immediately	the	sentences.”44	The	MAS	had	requested	that	the	expelled	students	lodge	an	appeal	against	their	sentences.	On	16	September,	the	expelled	students	asked	that:	The	appeal	take	the	form	of	a	mass	democratic	hearing	on	which	the	whole	university	has	the	opportunity	to	vote	on	the	verdict	and	penalty	…	since	the	majority	of	Council	have	strong	links	with	big	business	…	they	therefore	cannot	be	expected	to	act	in	an	impartial	way.45		On	the	next	day,	17	September,	there	occurred	what	Hyde	calls	a	“turning	point”	in	the	campaign:	a	major	debate	on	the	occupation	question	between	MAS	representatives,	exclusive	of	all	expelled	students,	and	the	administration,	represented	by	Professor	Selby	Smith	and	Vice-Chancellor	Matheson.	The	debate	took	place	in	the	cavernous	Alexander	Theatre	and	was	relayed	to	other	lecture	theatres.	The	theatre	was	totally	filled	with	students,	academics	and	administrators.	Soon	after	the	debate	began	it	became	obvious	that	the	issue	was	not	as	dead	as	the	administration	may	have	wished.	The	debate	was	lively	and,	at	times,	came	to	clashing	accounts	of	violence	and	damage	from	both	sides.	It	turned	grave	for	the	administration	when	Matheson	was	quizzed	about	the	involvement	of	the	university	legal	officer	with	a	well-known	Special	Branch	policeman	called	Bob	Larkin.46	Matheson	became	“extremely	annoyed”	at	the	implication	and	called	on	the	legal	officer	to	refute	it,	which	he	could	not	do.	As	Hyde	reports,	“Mr	Stewart	(Legal	Officer)	then	stood	up	rather	embarrassedly	and	admitted	that	he	had	talked	to	‘a	man	known	as	Bob	Larkins’	but	had	not	realised	at	the	time	that	he	was	talking	to	a	Special	Branch	policeman.”47	The	debate	was	abruptly	ended	when,	upon	being	called	a	“fool,”	Vice-Chancellor	Matheson	announced	that	“he	refused	to	debate	further	with	such	rude	people”	and	left	the	stage.48	However,	even	though	the	official																																																									44	Print,	3	September	1970,	2.	45	Hyde,	It	is	Right	to	Rebel,	130.	46	The	Victoria	Police’s	Special	Branch	officer	Bob	Larkin	was	well	known	to	Monash	students	as	he	was	the	principal	participant	in	the	arrest	and	trial	of	Albert	Langer	at	a	May	Day	rally.	This	trial	is	explored	further	in	this	thesis.	47	Hyde,	It	is	Right	to	Rebel,	133.	48	Ibid.	
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debate	was	over,	a	proportion	of	the	audience	remained	behind	to	discuss	the	future	of	the	anti-expulsions	campaign.	A	further	occupation,	this	time	to	be	held	in	the	Administration	Building,	was	mooted	but,	as	the	next	day	was	Moratorium	day	and	the	university	might	have	been	deserted,	planning	for	the	second	occupation	was	delayed	until	after	the	weekend.	A	further	postponement	was	prompted	by	the	administration’s	announcement	that	the	appeals	of	the	expelled	students	would	be	heard	on	Thursday	24	September	1970.		A	subsequent	meeting	of	the	MAS	“voted	to	consider	direct	action	if	the	Appeals	results	had	not	been	announced	by	Monday,	28th	September.”49	When,	as	the	students	had	expected,	the	decisions	were	not	brought	down	by	that	date,	a	MAS	meeting	carried	the	necessary	motions	to	establish	an	indefinite	occupation.	Thus	began	not	only	a	second	but	also	a	third	occupation	as	well.	The	second	was	the	occupation	of	the	Administration	Building,	which	was	to	begin	on	29	September	1970	if	the	appeals	had	not	been	handed	down	or	if	they	were	unfavourable.	This	time,	the	students	acted	to	prevent	further	singling	out	of	“ringleaders”	by	having	“signed	statements	of	complicity	…	collected	from	as	many	students	as	are	willing	to	sign.”50	Signed	statements	were	collected	from	320	students	and,	on	29	September,	having	no	satisfactory	response	from	the	administration,	a	rally	of	students	was	held	followed	by	a	march	to	the	Administration	Building	for	the	occupation.	Finding	the	doors	unlocked	and	unguarded	except	for	a	small	sign	warning	against	unauthorised	entry,	about	500	students	entered	to	begin	the	direct	action.	As	soon	as	the	occupiers	were	inside	the	building,	some	of	the	MAS	executive	who	had	opposed	the	move	for	an	occupation	called	an	extraordinary	meeting	of	students	to	“decide	the	future	of	the	occupation.”51	Thus,	with	the	500	occupiers	inside	the	building	and	the	bulk	of	the	MAS	meeting	made	up	of	those	who	had	decided	not	to	participate	in	the	occupation,	a	motion	to	withdraw	support	for	the	occupation	was	carried.	Upon	hearing	of	the	withdrawal	of	MAS	support,	the	occupiers,	already	meeting	to	organise	their	activities,	debated	their	action.	By	a	“vast	majority,”	the	occupiers																																																									49	Ibid.	50	Occupation	Now,	a	broadsheet	printed	and	distributed	for	the	MAS	meeting.	See	Hyde,	It	is	
Right	to	Rebel,	135.	51	Hyde,	It	is	Right	to	Rebel,	139.	
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decided	not	to	leave	and	began	producing	propaganda:	broadsheets	for	campus	workers,	university	staff	and	the	daily	press;	the	usual	daily	Print;	and	leaflets	produced	by	faculty	groups	in	medicine,	economics	and	politics,	science,	and	engineering.	Hyde	claims	that	the	occupiers	had	become	so	energised	that	“at	general	meetings	of	the	occupiers	every-one	wanted	to	speak,	put	forward	ideas	and	the	‘old	guard’	activists	found	themselves	swamped	by	new	people,	all	prepared	to	play	a	leading	role	in	keeping	the	struggle	going.”52	On	the	next	day,	Friday	30	September,	with	a	weekend	and	a	deserted	university	campus	looming,	the	morning	meeting	of	occupiers	decided	that	the	occupation	should	end	at	1.00	pm	that	day	with	a	mass	rally	in	the	Alexander	Theatre	and	a	resolution	to	reoccupy	to	be	put	to	the	following	Tuesday’s	MAS	meeting	if	the	expelled	students	had	not	been	readmitted	by	then.53	Late	on	5	October	the	results	of	the	appeals	were	announced:	two	students	were	exonerated	on	the	grounds	of	insufficient	evidence;	three	had	their	sentences	suspended	from	the	first	day	of	the	1971	academic	year;	and	the	remainder,	who	had	been	expelled	for	one	or	two	years	or	for	life,	had	no	change	in	their	sentences.	The	MAS	meeting	the	next	day,	Tuesday	6	October,	was	attended	by	about	3500	students.	The	meeting	passed	a	resolution	for	an	indefinite	reoccupation	of	the	Administration	Building.	According	to	Hyde,	as	soon	as	the	meeting	ended,	“about	3000	students	plus	some	Administration	observers	went	straight	to	the	Administration	building.”54	A	Lot’s	Wife	reporter	described	what	happened	next:		On	Tuesday	6,	Dr.	Matheson	started	his	much	publicised	lunch	time	talks	to	students.	However,	his	efforts	failed	to	produce	results	because	a	fairly	large	student	meeting	voted	to	occupy	the	Administration	Building.	As	hundreds	of	students	surged	towards	the	Administration	Dr.	Matheson	and	other	of	his	colleagues,	stood	abreast	the	main	doorways.	This	action	necessarily	heightened	the	high	feeling	and	the	scuffles	which	followed	seemed	inevitable	…	
																																																								52	Ibid.,	142.	53	Ibid.	Note,	the	constitution	of	the	Monash	Association	of	Students	(MAS)	required	that	principal	MAS	decisions	must	be	made	by	general	meetings	of	students	and	that	members	of	the	MAS	executive	could	not	alter	or	reverse	those	decisions.	54	Ibid.,	143.	
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After	late	night	negotiations	Dr.	Matheson	finally	persuaded	the	students	to	leave	the	building	they	had	smashed	a	door	to	enter,	saying	he	would	ask	Chancellor	Sir	Douglas	Menzies	to	call	an	extraordinary	meeting	of	the	Council	to	consider	pleas	of	clemency.	It	is	reported	that	he	also	said	he	would	argue	that	Council	should	exercise	at	least	some	degree	of	leniency.55	Not	mentioned	by	the	Lot’s	Wife	reporter	was	that,	on	that	afternoon,	Matheson	had	sought	and	received	an	interlocutory	injunction	from	the	Supreme	Court	barring	“named	individuals	and	their	agents”	from	entering	the	building.	As	an	injunction	could	facilitate	police	action	and	gaol	sentences	for	contempt	of	court,	the	occupiers	held	a	meeting	to	discuss	their	position.	Hyde	notes	that	“the	vote	in	favour	of	outright	defiance	was	overwhelming.”56	In	the	early	evening,	the	seven	named	students	received	the	injunctions,	which	were	“ceremonially	burned”	and	the	occupation	continued.	With	the	failure	of	his	injunction	tactic,	Vice-Chancellor	Matheson	had	only	two	courses	open	to	him:	bring	in	the	police	or	negotiate	a	deal.	He	chose	the	latter	and,	at	8.30	pm,	he	entered	the	building	and	secured	an	agreement	that	the	students	would	leave	the	building	immediately	in	return	for	the	holding	of	a	referendum	of	the	whole	university	on	the	expulsions	issue,	with	the	results	presented	to	an	“emergency	Council	meeting.”57	Thus	ended	the	shortest	and	mildest	of	all	the	occupations.	After	more	argumentation	about	the	wording,	and	after	calling	a	massive	meeting	of	the	whole	university,	including	campus	workers	who	were	given	time	off	work	to	attend,	Matheson	held	the	referendum	on	8	October	1970.	Amid	a	plethora	of	leaflets	and	dramatic	press	coverage,	the	referendum	results	were:	 	
																																																								55	Lot’s	Wife	10,	no	16,	15	October	1970,	1,	accessed	10	August	2017,	http://lotswife.com.au/.	56	Hyde,	It	is	Right	to	Rebel,	144.	57	Ibid.,	145.	
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Table	1:	Results	of	referendum	on	penalties	for	occupation	of	buildings,	
Monash	University,	8	October	197058		 Votes	cast	 Result	of	referendum	Students	 5881	 67%	for	some	reduction	of	penalties	 51%	for	fines	only	or	no	penalty	Staff	 1739	 51%	wanted	the	penalties	to	stand	Total	 7620	 61%	for	some	reduction	of	penalties	
The	University	Council	met	on	the	night	of	the	referendum	and	one	student	from	a	delegation	was	allowed	in	to	address	it.	If	any	student	had	thought	that	Matheson	would	press	their	case	for	clemency,	they	were	to	be	disappointed.	The	council,	which	included	its	newest	member	and	future	prime	minister,	Bob	Hawke,	unanimously	carried	the	motion:	“The	Council	will	not	interfere	with	the	penalties	imposed	by	the	Appeals	Committee.”59	The	disappointed	occupiers	did	not	give	up.	Within	a	day,	the	“biggest	[MAS]	meeting	ever	held	(5–6000)	and	comprising	over	70%	of	the	student	body”	carried	motions	condemning	the	council,	calling	for	the	withdrawal	of	the	injunctions,	condemning	the	press	coverage	of	the	whole	affair	and	voting	money	and	support	for	the	continuation	of	the	campaign.60	However,	exams	were	looming	and	the	campaign	was	drawn	to	an	official	close	on	13	October	1970.	As	if	to	guarantee	that	Matheson’s	trouble	with	the	radicals	would	not	end,	his	office	sent	notices	on	23	November	to	“thirty-two	students	informing	them	that	they	were	to	be	charged	for	participating	in	the	occupations	of	1st	and	6th	October.”61	This	occurred,	perhaps	by	design,	in	the	“long	vacation	time,”	which	made	it	difficult	for	students	to	mobilise	opposition	to	these	latest	charges.	Nevertheless,	several	sufficiently	large	meetings	of	approximately	200	staff	and	students	were	held	and	gained	the	support	of	the	MAS	through	its	Political	Affairs	Committee	(PAC),	the																																																									58	Ibid.,	148.	59	Ibid.	60	Ibid.,	149.	61	Ibid.,	153.	
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Waterside	Workers’	Federation	and	other	unions,	the	Australian	Union	of	Students	and	Lot’s	Wife,	which	was	very	important	for	disseminating	news	of	the	charges.	The	hearing	for	these	belated	charges	was	set	for	Tuesday	15	December.	Reasoning	that	a	delay	until	the	first	term	of	1971	would	benefit	the	student	campaign,	PAC	engaged	a	Queen’s	Counsel	to	seek	a	Supreme	Court	injunction	that	would	prevent	the	hearing	from	proceeding	at	that	time;	it	failed	and	costs	were	awarded	against	the	students.62	The	hearing	dealt	with	only	one	of	the	accused	students	who	received	a	reprimand	for	his	actions.	Hyde	reports	that	at	one	stage	in	the	proceedings,	Matheson	had	forgotten	who	the	students	were	and	could	not	identify	them	without	his	notes,	at	which	point	the	accused	asked	if	they	would	be	able	to	see	them:	“‘Of	course’,	said	Mr.	Williams	(the	Committee’s	Legal	Adviser).	The	Prosecutor	(Mr.	Stewart)	then	immediately	withdrew	Dr.	Matheson	as	a	witness.”63		No	more	accused	students	were	“tried”	in	1970.	Moreover,	as	Hyde	reports,	“on	4th	January,	1971,	Dr.	Matheson	sent	a	letter	to	the	accused	informing	them	that	the	hearings	were	to	be	discontinued.”64	With	that	concession,	one	might	have	expected	that	the	whole	issue	of	occupations	and	expulsions	would	die	away	and	that	1971	would	begin	with	a	“clean	slate.”	It	did	not.	Instead,	the	Monash	Labor	Club	ensured	that	it	flared	again	to	become	a	campaign	of	almost	simultaneous	uproar	in	the	three	Victorian	universities.	This	is	covered	in	the	next	chapter.	
The	Bakery	Closes,	the	Organisation	Grows	
The	YCL	Bulletin	no.	8,	dated	26	July	1970,	had	carried	a	small	report:	“At	the	last	WSA	meeting	it	was	decided	not	to	renew	the	Bakery	lease	at	the	end	of	the	year	and	to	gradually	decentralise	activity.”65	With	this	decision,	the	WSA	set	itself	on	a	course	of	action	that	would	see	it	transform	into	a	more	expansive	organisation.	Even	before	this	decision,	some	suburban	area	groups	or	affiliates	had	been																																																									62	Ibid.,	154–156.	63	Ibid.,	157.	64	Ibid.	65	YCL	Bulletin,	no	8,	26	July	1970,	3.		
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established.	To	prepare	for	the	loss	of	a	physical	centre,	it	was	“decided	to	set	a	regular	series	of	forums	and	discussions,	preferably	together	with	CDA	[Centre	for	Democratic	Action].”66	This	decision	reflects	the	growth	of	good	relations	between	the	two	radical	organisations,	which,	although	they	had	differences	on	many	issues	of	practice,	as	shown	by	the	4	July	1970	arguments	alluded	to	earlier,	shared	an	anti-imperialist,	socialist	position,	as	well	as	a	distrust	of	the	CPA	and	of	Trotskyism.		In	a	series	of	conferences	and	general	meetings	during	1970,	a	consensus	was	reached	that	“area	groups	form	the	basic	structure	of	WSA	together	with	an	elected	executive	composed	of	office	bearers	and	organisers.”67	The	Steering	Committee,	which	operated	as	an	executive	committee	until	the	next	conference,	coopted	other	members	for	specific	tasks.	Thus,	plans	for	the	ongoing	publication	of	Struggle,	the	relocation	of	the	printing	press	to	the	garage/shed	at	Darce	Cassidy’s	house	in	Shirley	Grove,	East	St	Kilda,	and	the	production	of	literature	for	associated	radical	organisations,	such	as	the	Draft	Resisters	Union	and	the	Socialist	Secondary	Students	(SID	Kids).	The	establishment	of	new	rules	for	new	area	groups—“four	active	organisers	and	at	least	one	representative	to	the	executive”—ensured	that	the	organisation	could	continue	without	a	geographical	centre.68	The	technicalities	of	moving	the	printer	to	a	new	location,	as	well	as	the	dilapidated	state	of	the	machine	caused	by	“too	many	unqualified	operators	…	inadequate	supervision,	care	and	maintenance,”	meant	that	it	could	not	be	operated	until	all	of	those	problems	were	remedied.69	Thus,	between	the	end	of	August	and	the	end	of	1970,	Struggle	failed	to	appear.	However,	the	operations	of	the	WSA	continued	as	before.	Its	major	campaigns	in	1970	were	the	Moratorium	and	the	4	July	anti-war	protests,	both	of	which	would	continue	into	1971.	On	the	campuses,	the	expansion	in	activity	at	La	Trobe	and	Monash	universities,	reported	above,	using	the	tactic	of	occupying	strategic	buildings	would	also	continue	into	the	next	year.	By	then,	Melbourne	University	had	added	itself	to	the	list	of	institutions	suffering	student																																																									66	Ibid.	Note,	CDA	was	the	“Centre	for	Democratic	Action”	in	Carlton.	67	WSA	Newsletter,	December	1970.	This	Gestetner	printed	newsletter	is	in	the	author’s	collection.		68	Ibid.		69	WSA	Bulletin,	skeleton	edition,	10	September	1970,	1.		
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invasions.	Despite,	or	perhaps	because	of,	its	practice	of	sharp	and	sometimes	scathing	opposition	to	ALP,	CPA	and	other	organisations	that	constituted	the	“anti-war	establishment,”	the	WSA	had	constructed	itself	as	a	body	that	had	to	be	considered	when	any	activities	of	a	radical	nature	were	mooted.	By	the	end	of	1970,	the	new	structure	of	the	WSA	had	been	established	with	new	branches	adding	to	the	spread	of	the	organisation	from	east	to	west—from	Dandenong	to	Sunshine	and	into	the	centre	of	the	city	at	Carlton.	Branches	or	cells	had	also	been	established	in	the	technical	colleges	(Technical	and	Further	Education),	at	the	Royal	Melbourne	Institute	of	Technology	and	at	the	Footscray	Institute	of	Technology.	SID	Kids	continued,	though	precariously,	as	their	most	active	and	older	members	graduated	and	left	school;	however,	there	remained	sufficient	younger	secondary	student	activists	to	regenerate	their	organisation	for	the	coming	years.	On	the	weekend	of	7	September	1970	a	minor	WSA	conference	was	held	to	establish	practical	organisational	and	operational	matters	for	the	group	once	it	had	no	physical	centre.	In	the	absence	of	Struggle,	a	newsletter,	Worker	Student	Alliance	
Bulletin	(WSA	Bulletin),	was	established	to	conduct	necessary	WSA-wide	communications.70	In	a	further	sign	that	the	relationship	between	the	WSA	and	CDA	had	improved,	the	first	or	“Skeleton	Edition”	of	the	WSA	Bulletin	announced	the	formation	of	a	study	group	and	a	discussion	group	to	be	held	fortnightly	on	alternate	Wednesday	evenings	at	Melbourne	University’s	undergraduate	lounge.	The	first	study	group	session,	scheduled	for	16	September,	had	Lenin’s	pamphlet,	Karl	Marx,	to	study	and	discuss,	while	the	first	discussion	group,	scheduled	for	23	September,	considered	“the	place	of	social	democratic	parties	within	the	capitalist	system	and	the	attitude	which	revolutionaries	should	take	to	them	at	this	stage.”71	Other	items	in	the	first	WSA	Bulletin	referred	to	failure	in	the	simple	things	of	political	organisations;	the	working	bee	to	clean	the	Bakery	prior	to	vacating	had	been	a	dismal	flop	and	fundraising	had	fallen	to	a	low	ebb.	It	was	also	noted	that	“during	the	
																																																								70	Ibid.	71	Ibid.,	2.	
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last	six	months	the	WSA	has	been	disintegrating	…	in	part	due	to	the	lack	of	bureaucracy	[and]	lack	of	procedure	by	which	to	take	decisions.”72	These	were	problems	that	the	organisers	of	any	group	with	voluntary	memberships	would	find	familiar;	yet,	the	WSA	did	not	approach	them	in	a	familiar	way.	Instead	of	attending	to	the	bureaucracy,	the	Central	Executive	called	a	conference	for	21–22	November	1970,	at	which	the	suggested	agenda	would	be:	1. The	working	class	and	revolution.	2. The	principal	contradiction	in	Australian	Society…	Is	it	the	proletariat	and	the	bourgeoisie?	or	is	it	U.S.	imperialism	and	the	Australian	people?	3. How	do	we	fight	for	a	Socialist	Australia?	...	this	will	examine	the	role	and	nature	of	a	Worker–Student	Alliance,	and	will	examine	our	method	and	style	of	work	in	the	light	of	past	and	present	experience.	It	will	also	discuss	the	role	of	propaganda.73	The	process	of	solving	bureaucratic	problems	by	relegating	them	while	promoting	matters	of	principle	and	ideology	was	a	common	practice	in	WSA	and	Labor	Club	discourse.	This	conference	is	examined	in	the	next	chapter.	As	this	chapter	has	shown,	the	change	of	name	and	format	was	effective	in	attracting	new	members	for	the	WSA.	This	transformation	was	completed	without	any	concessions	made	to	those	who	maintained	that	strident	militancy	would	repel	possible	recruits.	Simultaneously,	the	WSA’s	operations	at	both	Monash	and	La	Trobe	universities	escalated	and,	for	a	time,	the	La	Trobe	University	Labor	Club/WSA,	then	under	attack	from	the	police	and	university	authorities,	became	the	focus	for	radical	actions.	In	the	midst	of	its	growth,	and	as	if	in	response	to	the	dilution	of	ideological	resolve	that	such	growth	implied,	members	who	saw	themselves	as	communists	called	like-minded	WSA	members	together	to	form	the	very	secretive	Young	Communist	League.	Although	this	body	had	no	physical	presence	and	was	attached	to	no	political	party,	it	was	influential	in	ensuring	that,	what	it	thought	to	be	a	Marxist/Leninist/Maoist	political	line	permeated	the	whole	of	the	WSA.																																																								72	WSA	Bulletin,	no.	2,	16	September	1970,	1.	73	WSA	Bulletin,	no.	3,	October	1970,	1.	The	numbering	of	this	bulletin	was	haphazard	and	this	issue	is	the	third	one	in	a	series	leading	to	the	end	of	1970.	
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Chapter	7:	Reorganisation	and	Reorientation	
In	the	last	half	of	1970,	the	Worker	Student	Alliance	(WSA)	had	begun	its	reconstruction	from	a	centrally	focused	activist	body	into	a	decentralised	but	unitary	body	with	widely	distributed	membership	and	resources.	Inevitably,	discussion	and	debate	about	the	ideological	stance	of	the	organisation	had	become	more	difficult.	In	the	absence	of	general	meetings	and	with	no	newspaper	or	journal	to	carry	their	ideas,	WSA	members	resorted	to	writing	their	opinions	down	as	leaflets	or	papers	which	the	Central	Executive	then	distributed	in	the	form	of	a	bulletin	without	editing—except	for	the	occasional	addition	of	a	critical	comment.		By	the	end	of	1970,	the	Central	Executive	had	successfully	re-established	the	WSA	
Bulletin.	On	19	January	1971,	WSA	Bulletin	no.	1	published	a	collection	of	argumentative	papers	under	the	heading	“Polemics	on	Orientation	of	the	Youth	Movement.”1	These	represent	some	of	the	ideological	arguments	that	became	uppermost	in	the	organisation’s	framing	of	the	discourse	during	the	time	of	its	restructure.	To	some	extent,	the	reconfiguration	of	the	relationships	of	the	individual	to	the	organisation	triggered	these	discussions.	The	WSA	had	already	taken	to	wearing	the	mantle	of	Marxism;	therefore,	it	was	axiomatic	that	all	politics	was	an	expression	of	the	struggle	between	classes	that	would	end	only	with	the	victory	of	the	proletariat.	For	those	members	who	were	still,	or	had	recently	been,	students,	the	previous,	centralised,	single-body	structure	had	served	to	integrate	them	with	the	working	class	by	proxy;	as	long	as	the	organisation	was	involved	in	working-class	campaigns,	these	took	the	place	of	personal,	proletarian	experience.	However,	as	the	new	structure	was	to	have	no	physical	centre,	involvement	with	working-class	campaigns	had	to	be	at	the	personal	and	local	level	or	not	at	all.	In	the	period	of	September	1970	to	May	1971	the	ideas	driving	the	discourse	of	the	WSA/Labor	Club	entity	were	in	flux.2	After	the	frenetic	activity	of	the	previous	year																																																									1	WSA	Bulletin,	no.	1,	19	January	1971,	items	11,	12,	14	and	15.	The	numbering	system	of	WSA	Bulletins	differed	from	usual	publishing	practice.	Issue	numbers	began	again	with	each	new	year	without	volume	numbers	or	series	indications.	2	At	this	stage,	the	Monash	and	La	Trobe	Labor	Clubs	and	the	WSA	had	such	interlocking	memberships	that	they	were	indistinguishable	as	separate	groups.	
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had	subsided,	WSA	activists	re-examined	the	successes	and	failures	of	their	activities.	This	brought	their	position	in	the	then	current	political	discourses	and	the	nature	and	policies	of	their	own	organisation	to	the	fore.	Their	accumulation	of	considerable	experience	in	political	practices	enabled	them,	in	their	own	argumentation	at	least,	to	articulate	more	clearly	their	views	of	the	world	and	the	place	of	their	politics	in	it.	In	this	period	of	ideological	clarification	and	renewal,	identifying	what	it	meant	for	students	and	WSA	to	be	“oriented	to	the	working	class,”	or	“integrated	with	the	masses”	to	put	it	in	Maoist	terms,	meant	asking	“who	are	the	masses”	and	“what	is	the	nature	of	the	work	to	be	done	with	and	among	them”?	Questioning	why	this	work	was	important,	how	it	was	to	be	done	and	who	should	do	it	constituted	a	return	to	the	question	of	working	within	all	strata	of	society	that	Lenin,	Mao	and	Gramsci	had	written	about	and	which	is	touched	upon	later	in	this	thesis.	In	addition,	there	was	the	question	of	what	to	do	about	“Soviet	Social	Imperialism”	as	the	rising	and,	therefore,	aggressive	“superpower”	raised	its	head.	In	October	1970,	WSA	Bulletin	no.	3	reported	that:		Over	the	past	few	months,	the	WSA	has	ceased	to	function	as	a	fighting	organisation	…	there	has	been	generally	a	lack	of	involvement	in	WSA	affairs	…	ALL	groups	should	start	discussing	the	problems	of	WSA	as	a	whole.3	The	article	called	for	all	branches	to	discuss	the	matter	in	preparation	for	the	conference	that	was	to	take	place	on	21–22	November.	The	need	for	a	conference,	the	call	for	general	discussion	about	“problems”	and	the	negative	statements	about	malaise	in	the	organisation	reflect	the	changing	number	and	nature	of	opportunities	for	radical	political	activities.4	The	disconnection	of	the	WSA	from	its	home	at	the	Bakery,	as	discussed	in	the	previous	chapter,	created	the	conditions	in	which	a	sense	
																																																								3	WSA	Bulletin,	no.	3,	October	1970,	1.	4	Changed	opportunities	for	radical	political	action	included	the	changing	nature	of	the	Vietnam	War	and	the	Moratorium	movement,	the	need	to	oppose	the	growing	neo-Nazi	movement,	the	mooted	tour	of	the	Apartheid	favouring	Springboks	team,	actions	of	the	“rebel”	unions	in	Victoria,	the	rise	of	the	women’s	movement	and	the	mooted	escalation	of	activities	at	all	three	universities.	
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of	anomie	could	grow	and	thus	build	apprehension	about	the	organisation’s	operation.	In	the	abovementioned	WSA	Bulletin,	an	article	entitled	“Mass	Work”	by	a	member	named	“Latrobe	Comrade”	held	that	the	solution	to	the	organisation’s	lassitude	was	to	clarify	“what	mass	work	means.”	To	Latrobe	Comrade,	the	“forms	of	mass	work	vary	…	[e.g.,]	broadsheets,	pamphlets,	speaking	at	forums	and	meetings	…	discussions	…	carrying	placards	at	demonstrations.”5	The	article	gave	several	instances	in	which	the	“Mass	Line”	had	been	applied	with	varying	results	but	provided	little	in	the	way	of	ideological	significance.	For	this,	the	article	was	later	criticised	in	the	WSA	Bulletin	because,	on	the	“important	question	[of]	integration	…[with	the	masses,]	…	the	Latrobe	comrade	misses	this	point.”6	This	does	not	appear	to	be	a	consequential	disagreement;	however,	it	is	indicative	of	the	seriousness	with	which	such	issues	were	treated.		
The	Orientation	of	the	Youth	Movement	
An	early	contribution	to	the	WSA	Bulletin,	a	reprint	of	the	Young	Communist	League	(YCL)	document	On	Studying	“The	Orientation	of	the	Youth	Movement”7	was	distributed	on	30	November	1970.	This	long	paper	of	fourteen	closely	typed	pages	left	bureaucratic	or	organisational	requirements	aside	and	asserted	the	characteristics	young	people	would	need	to	possess	if	they	were	to	be	revolutionaries.	As	its	title	declares,	this	was	a	reflection	on	one	of	Mao’s	works;	therefore,	much	of	its	argument	referred	to	Mao’s	works	and	to	other	writings	of	the	communist	movement.	Drawing	mainly	on	Mao’s	paper	The	Orientation	of	the	Youth	
Movement,	Lenin’s	What	Is	to	Be	Done	and	several	of	E.	F.	Hill’s	books,	including	
Looking	Backward,	Looking	Forward	and	More	on	Ideological	Questions,	the	paper	started	from	Mao’s	premise	that	“the	dividing	line	between	revolutionary	and	non-revolutionary	or	counter-revolutionary	intellectuals	is	whether	or	not	they	are	
																																																								5	WSA	Bulletin,	no.	3,	October	1970,	2.	(Underlining	in	original.)	6	“Mass	Work—A	Reply”	(by	a	group	of	workers	in	WSA),	WSA	Bulletin,	no.	1,	19	January	1971,	12.	7	WSA,	On	Studying	“The	Orientation	of	the	Youth	Movement,”	unsigned	gestetnered	leaflet,	30	November	1970.	This	is	a	second	version;	the	previous	version	was	published	by	the	YCL.	
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willing	to	integrate	themselves	with	the	workers	and	peasants	and	actually	do	so.”8	Without	the	redundant	reference	to	“peasants,”	the	paper	took	“integration	with	the	workers”	as	its	theme	and	elaborated	on	what	that	meant	for	the	organisation	and	the	political	discourse	within	it.		Responding	to	a	perceived	trend	that	belittled	the	role	of	students	because	they	were	not	sufficiently	proletarian,	the	author	sought	some	redress:	Because	…	communist	work	among	the	workers	is	the	most	important	task	…	these	people	conclude	that	work	among	other	sections	of	the	people,	particularly	students	is	“secondary,”	…	they	call	upon	revolutionaries	working	among	the	students	and	the	youth	protest	movement	to	leave	this	work	and	“go	to	the	workers.”	In	appearance	this	stand	is	super	militant	and	very	“working	class.”9	The	rebuttal	of	this	view	involved	a	complex	validation	of	the	change	from	a	single,	anti-war	activist	and	mainly	student	organisation	to	a	dispersed,	activist	body.	Such	a	body	could	then	take	up	causes	other	than	opposition	to	war	and	operate	politically	among	many	classes	and	social	strata.	Effectively,	the	mechanistic	view	of	proletarian	politics	whereby	the	physical	integration	with	workers	was	supposed	to	bring	revolution	closer	was	rejected	in	favour	of	a	concerted	effort	to	take	working-class	politics	to	the	masses.		Quoting	from	communist	authority	figures	supported	this	view.	Thus,	from	Lenin:		WE	must	train	our	…	practical	workers	to	become	political	leaders	…	able	at	the	right	time	to	“dictate	a	positive	program	of	action”	for	the	restless	students,	the	discontented	Zemstiev	Councillors,	the	incensed	religious	sects,	the	offended	elementary	school	teachers	etc.	etc.”10		Quoting	from	closer	to	home,	the	author	cited	Chairman	of	the	Communist	Party	of	Australia	(Marxist-Leninist)	(CPA	(ML)),	E.	F.	Hill’s	comment	that:		
																																																								8	This	quotation	can	be	found	in	Mao	Zedong,	“The	May	4th	Movement,”	in	Selected	Works	of	Mao	
Tse-Tung,	vol.	2	(Beijing,	Foreign	Languages	Press,	1965),	237.	Most	WSA	members	were	students	and	in	Mao’s	paper	“student”	and	“intellectual”	are	synonyms.	9	WSA,	On	Studying	“The	Orientation	of	the	Youth	Movement,”	2.	10	This	quotation	was	from	Lenin,	What	is	to	be	Done?	53.	It	can	be	found	at	https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/download/what-itd.pdf.	Capitalised	emphasis	is	in	the	document,	not	in	Lenin.	
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Communists	in	any	sphere	of	life	must	aim	to	win	that	sphere	or	the	members	of	it	to	Communism	and	the	leadership	of	it,	doing	it	appropriately,	carefully,	patiently	…	to	win	the	workers	to	revolution	in	the	factories;	amongst	the	farmers.”11		This	approach—using	the	authority	of	Lenin	and	Hill—achieved	three	ends:	a	vindication	of	the	restructuring	of	the	WSA	into	suburban	branches	without	necessarily	having	a	working-class	base;	a	compensation	for	this	in	terms	of	avocation	of	working-class	or	communist	politics;	and	a	validation	of	work	in	campaigns	that,	while	not	traditionally	“of	the	working	class,”	would	help	WSA	members	to	formulate	a	positive	program	and	develop	political	leadership.		With	its	imagery	of	revolutionary	heroes	and	language	of	communism,	the	semiotics	of	this	paper	transmuted	the	discussion	of	the	future	of	the	WSA	from	the	realm	of	practical	activism	and	organisation	to	the	realm	of	revolutionary	theory.	It	framed	its	readers	as	already	convinced	communists,	undoubtedly	in	advance	of	the	politics	of	some.	The	use	of	Hill’s	words,	as	well	as	the	content	of	its	own	text,	signified	approval	by	the	CPA	(ML)	and	associated	the	new	WSA	with	that	organisation.	This	position	was	previously,	and	secretively,	held	by	the	YCL.	Ironically,	such	open	espousal	made	the	continued	existence	of	that	body	redundant;	even	so,	it	continued	for	several	months	more.	Whereas	earlier	WSA	and	YCL	writings	had	frequently	chosen	quotations	from	the	classics	of	Marxism-Leninism	to	underpin	their	views	about	a	campaign	or	policy,	the	above	paper	did	the	reverse	and	used	a	work	by	Mao	as	a	benchmark	against	which	WSA	policy	and	practices	could	be	judged.	While	those	previous	writings	had	come	to	perfectly	reasonable	conclusions,	the	extent	to	which	they	had	simply	selected	classic	statements	as	proofs	was	a	measure	of	their	philosophical	idealism	with	respect	to	the	analysis	of	their	own	society	and	the	action	they	might	take	to	remedy	it.	According	to	this	view,	if	the	extant	political	and	social	situation	resembled	the	experience	of	a	Marxist	champion,	then	the	propositions	and	remedies	of	the	present	could	safely	be	derived	from	the	propositions	and	remedies	of	the	past.	In	general,	such	argumentation	was	consequent	upon	an	insufficient																																																									11	This	quotation	has	been	truncated	by	this	author.	It	is	from	E.	F.	Hill,	Looking	Backward,	
Looking	Forward,	2nd	ed.	(Melbourne:	Communist	Party	of	Australia,	1968),	155.	
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analysis	of	social	and	political	life	and	is	quite	understandable	given	the	youth	and	inexperience	of	the	WSA/Labor	clubs	cohort.	Antonio	Gramsci	used	the	term	“mechanical	determinism”	to	describe	the	practice,	not	as	necessarily	leading	to	perdition,	but	as	understandable	especially	in	the	early	stages	of	an	organisation’s	life:		When	you	don’t	have	the	initiative	in	the	struggle	and	the	struggle	itself	comes	to	be	identified	with	a	series	of	defeats,	mechanical	determinism	becomes	a	tremendous	force	of	moral	resistance,	of	cohesion	and	of	patient	and	obstinate	perseverance	…	Real	will	takes	on	the	garments	of	an	act	of	faith	in	a	certain	rationality	of	history.12	The	new	and	enthusiastic	WSA	or	Labor	Club	ideologue,	without	the	benefit	of	any	“Marx	School”	or	Communist	Party	of	Australia	(CPA)–led	“Eureka	Youth	League”	must	necessarily	fill	the	gaps	in	her	or	his	knowledge	with	the	experiences	and	expressions	of	comrades	and	of	venerated	past	leaders.13		
On	Studying	“The	Orientation	of	the	Youth	Movement”	was	not	a	seminal	document	that	changed	the	direction	of	the	WSA	discourse;	however,	it	was	representative	of	it.	By	1971,	sufficient	experience	and	study	had	occurred	for	the	WSA	to	have	outgrown	the	excuse	of	naivety	as	it	sought	to	deal	with	new	opportunities	arising	from	its	new	structure,	its	rising	credit	in	the	“left-wing”	movement	and	its	perspective	of	exercising	influence	in	the	multiplicity	of	campaigns	then	emerging.	Had	they	been	reading	Gramsci,	WSA	theorisers	might	have	recognised	themselves	in	“when	the	‘subaltern’	becomes	directive	and	responsible	for	the	economic	activity	of	the	masses,	mechanicism	at	a	certain	point	becomes	an	imminent	danger	and	a	revision	must	take	place	in	the	modes	of	thinking.”14		It	is	significant	that	Hill’s	avocation	of	a	conservative	mode	of	activism—that	is,	“doing	it	appropriately,	carefully,	patiently”—was	contrary	to	the	WSA’s	and	the																																																									12	Gramsci,	Selections	from	the	Prison	Notebooks,	336.	13	The	“Marx	School”	and	the	“Eureka	Youth	League”	were	bodies	associated	with	the	Communist	Party	of	Australia	that	provided	training	in	socialist	and	communist	politics.	By	1970,	both	organisations	had	been	dissolved	without	descendants.	14	Gramsci,	Selections	from	the	Prison	Notebooks,	336.	Note:	because	of	the	conditions	of	Gramsci’s	incarceration,	under	Fascist	censorship	the	word	“subaltern”	is	taken	to	mean	“communist”	or	progressive	activist	and	the	words	“economic	activity”	are	taken	to	mean	“political	activity.”	See	note	on	Gramsci’s	terminology,	p.	xiii.		
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Monash	Labor	Club’s	way	of	operation.	With	the	CPA	(ML)	still	building	its	membership	among	activist	youth	organisations,	such	differences	could	be	overlooked	as	minor	issues.	Within	On	Studying	“The	Orientation	of	the	Youth	
Movement,”	the	issue	was	gently	broached	with	reference	to	Mao:	“Mao	Tsetung’s	mass	line	is	not	one	of	trailing	behind	the	masses	but	of	leading	them	in	the	spirit	of	daring	to	struggle,	daring	to	win.”15	Although	indicative	of	the	style	of	argumentation	within	the	WSA,	some	of	the	allusions	to	internal	WSA	dynamics	were	more	subtle	than	most.	For	example,	the	paper	circumvents	putative	accusations	of	secret	YCL	or	CPA	(ML)	manipulation	of	the	new	WSA	by	reference	to	the	concept	of	leadership	as	a	product	of	young	activists’	own	efforts:	It	is	inevitable	that	as	the	struggle	develops	the	possibility	and	necessity	of	a	mass	revolutionary	anti	imperialist	Youth	organisation	under	Communist	leadership	will	arise.	Such	an	organisation	will	not	be	an	artificial	straightjacket	imposed	from	above	and	seeking	to	confine	the	youth	within	boundaries	of	parliamentarism,	trade	union	politics,	“student	power”	and	so	on,	but	a	vigorous	vanguard	growing	from	and	leading	the	anti	imperialist	struggles	of	the	youth.16	An	implied	warning	against	any	CPA	or	CPA	(ML)	attempt	to	interfere	by	imposing	structures	on	young	radicals	is	contained	in	these	words.	Yet,	at	the	same	time,	the	young	activists’	development	of	their	own	path	of	anti-imperialism	was	not	to	extend	to	the	path	of	countercultural	individualism.	The	paper	denounces	“reformists,	revisionists,	New	Leftists,	Trotskyites,	Guevarists,	Anarchists,	student-power	advocates,	hippy	drop	outs	and	so-on.”	The	first	three	of	these	were	simply	unacceptable	on	ideological	grounds	and	the	last	were,	by	definition,	opposed	to	worker–student	unity	and,	thus,	held	to	oppose	revolution	of	the	type	envisaged	by	the	writer.	The	paper	continued	in	this	vein,	nominating	the	enemy	as	the	“bourgeoisie,”	which	“seeks	to	divert	the	anti-imperialist	class	struggle	of	the	youth	into	harmless	‘conflict	between	generations,’	‘youth	culture,’	demands	for	‘student	power’	within	capitalist	universities	…		or	just	‘drop	out’	and	‘turn	on	with	drugs	etc’.”	According	to	the	author:																																																									15	WSA,	On	Studying	“The	Orientation	of	the	Youth	Movement,”	5.	16	Ibid.,	5.	
215	
This	is	the	line	that	in	a	hundred	different	and	subtle	ways	is	spread	by	the	bourgeoisie	among	the	radical	youth.	It	starts	from	the	proposition	that	…	they	(and	not	the	system)	are	peculiar	freaks	and	oddities	seeking	to	overthrow	an	all	embracing	and	permanent	social	system	that	has	the	support	of	the	masses.	Fake	lefts	like	Marcuse	promote	this	line	in	“Marxist”	clothing	and	centrist	groupings	aid	the	spread	of	defeatism	by	saying	that	capitalism	is	quite	“healthy”	and	refusing	to	fight	the	anti-working	class	New	Left	bullshit.17	The	publication	of	On	Studying	“The	Orientation	of	the	Youth	Movement”	is	an	indication	that	its	writer	and	the	WSA	felt	confident	that	the	terminology	and	theoretical	constructs	of	Marxism-Leninism	would	not	frighten	even	the	most	recent	WSA	adherent.	It	made	no	concessions	to	readers’	level	of	political	understanding	but	presumed	that	its	readers	had	sufficient	enough	desire	for	a	revolutionary	explanation	of	society	to	suspend	judgement	until	clarification	came.	It	conceived	of	the	revolutionary	youth	movement	and,	hence,	the	WSA,	as	a	practical	necessity	rather	than	a	good	in	itself:	“We	stand	for	a	youth	movement	which	is	against	imperialism	and	capitalism	and	for	socialism	and	national	independence,	not	just	a	“youth	movement”	in	general.”	The	words	of	Mao	about	young	people,	which	often	played	a	vanguard	role	in	the	revolution,	were	used	to	boldly	claim	that	“the	central	task	must	be	to	take	the	anti-imperialist	struggle	to	the	workers	and	working	people	and	to	build	a	firm	alliance	between	workers	and	students	in	all	forms	of	struggle.”18		An	article	entitled	“Suggestions	towards	Re-orientation,”	reproduced	in	the	haphazardly	numbered	WSA	Bulletin	no.	1,	1971,	continued	the	same	theme.19	This	article	treated	the	CPA	(ML)	in	more	reverent	terms,	describing	it	as	“the	Party	of	the	working	class.”20	It	agreed	that	the	working	class	had	allies	among	other	classes	and	that	campaigns	such	as	the	Moratorium	made	possible	a	broad	united	front	against	US	imperialism	and	for	“national	liberation,”	but	argued	that	“the	position	of	leadership	of	this	united	front	must	rest	firmly	with	the	proletariat	and	its	vanguard	party	CPA	(ML).”21	The	article	constituted	an	oblique,	rather	than	direct,	criticism	of																																																									17	Ibid.,	7.	(Underlining	in	original.)	18	Ibid.,	8.	19	WSA	Bulletin,	no.	1,	19	January	1971,	item	14.		20	“Suggestions	towards	Re-orientation,”	WSA	Bulletin,	no.	1,	19	January	1971,	item	14,	1.	21	Ibid.	
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the	writer	of	On	Studying	the	Orientation	of	the	Youth	Movement	over	the	vanguard	role	of	students.	Its	unremarked	insistence	upon	the	leadership	of	the	CPA	(ML)	shows	the	growth	of	influence	of	that	party	among	activist	youth	at	that	time.	The	final	article	bracketed	as	part	of	the	“Polemic	on	the	Orientation	of	the	Youth	Movement,”	concerned	the	policy	of	the	yet	to	re-emerge	Struggle.	According	to	the	writer,	it	“should	be	an	anti-imperialist	newspaper	aimed	primarily	at	youth	…	it	should	attack	reformism	and	revisionism.	It	should	demonstrate	the	need	for	a	Communist	Party	to	lead	the	working	class	in	the	making	of	a	socialist	revolution.”22	Polemical	articles	by	individuals	may	represent	the	direction	in	which	a	political	group	is	moving;	however,	it	is	in	officially	announced	policy	and	in	organisational	items	that	the	state	of	collective	thinking	can	be	glimpsed.	Although,	in	this	article,	identification	of	the	WSA	as	part	of	the	communist	movement	was	obvious,	it	stopped	short	of	ceding	leadership	to	the	CPA	(ML).		This	polemic	and	the	WSA	Bulletin	writings	that	followed	it	were	attempts	to	digest	the	experience	gained	in	the	previous	three	years	of	frenetic	activism	and	to	fuse	it	with	a	body	of	theory	to	produce	a	considered	political	and	ideological	position.	This	was	expressed	in	the	second	edition	of	the	WSA	Bulletin	as:		We	hope	that	articles	appearing	in	the	bulletin	spark	off	a	lot	of	debate	in	WSA	groups	and	that,	in	turn,	debate	in	area	groups	is	brought	back	to	WSA	as	a	whole—via	the	bulletin.	Writing	articles	shouldn’t	be	looked	upon	as	an	exercise	in	dealing	“mortal	blows”	to	one’s	opponents,	but	rather	as	a	way	in	which	the	level	of	our	understanding	of	U.S.	imperialism,	the	growth	of	fascism,	the	treachery	of	revisionism	and	so	on	can	be	raised	and	the	revolutionary	movement	impelled	forward.23	Previously,	the	discourse	of	these	young	activists	had	been	about	actions	against	the	evils	visited	upon	society	by	capitalism	and,	to	this	extent,	they	focused	on	the	struggle	itself,	but	with	a	generalised	and	largely	unwritten	notion	of	ultimate	purpose.	The	experiences	and	achievements	that	involved	the	WSA	and	Monash	Labor	Club	grouping	were	many	and	included	the	anti-hanging,	anti-Bolte	campaign,	the	Marshall	Ky	and	President	Johnson	demonstrations,	university	occupations,	and																																																									22	Ibid.,	item	17,	1.	23	“Preamble,”	WSA	Bulletin,	no.	2,	May	1971,	2.	
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4	July	and	Moratorium	movements.	Often	these	had	been	treated	as	separate	things	in	themselves	while	merely	keeping	the	ultimate	goal	of	socialism	or	communism	as	a	vague	statement	of	intent.	For	the	new,	distributed	structure,	this	was	no	longer	sufficient	and	it	became	important	to	develop	a	more	coherent	idea	of	how	the	ultimate	goals	were	integral	to	the	means	of	achieving	them.		As	demonstrated	in	articles	in	the	WSA	Bulletin,	the	WSA	and	the	Labor	clubs	increasingly	saw	themselves	as	having	become	a	considerable	part	of	the	Australian	left-wing	movement	in	their	own	right,	with	or	without	the	CPA	(ML)	and	definitely	without	the	CPA.	At	the	beginning	of	1971,	the	WSA	focused	on	assessing	campaigns	and	activities	against	the	tests	of	revolutionary	ideals	expressed	in	the	revolutionary	classics	of	Lenin	and	Mao.	At	this	stage,	neither	of	the	communist	parties	had	very	much	traction.	The	WSA	discourse	insisted	on	active	and	uncompromising	anti-imperialism	in	opposition	to	accommodation	with	reformism	as	represented	by	the	CPA	in	the	peace	movement.	Despite	the	explicit	calls	of	some	WSA	members	for	CPA	(ML)	leadership,	despite	their	concurrence	of	policy	with	respect	to	Maoism	and	anti-revisionism,	and	despite	some	member	contact	and	common	actions	between	them,	that	party	was	still	in	the	process	of	establishing	an	authoritative	presence	in	WSA	discourse.	In	practice,	the	CPA	(ML)	had	come	late	in	the	progress	of	WSA	discourse	and	had	merely	been	the	éminence	grise	during	the	early	campaigns	against	the	hanging	of	Ronald	Ryan,	the	growth	of	the	peace	movement	and	the	many	smaller	campaigns	with	which	the	WSA	had	been	involved.	This	began	to	change	when	cooperation	between	the	two	bodies	became	more	overt,	as	will	be	seen	later	in	this	chapter.	
Statement	of	Aims	and	Activities	
Debate	on	the	orientation	of	the	youth	movement	within	the	WSA	showed	increasing	acceptance	of	the	CPA	(ML);	however,	the	WSA’s	leading	body,	the	Central	Committee,	was	more	circumspect.	An	editorial	in	the	same	WSA	Bulletin	as	“Suggestions	towards	Re-orientation”	was	titled	“Draft	Statement	of	WSA	Aims	and	Activities”	and	was	for	dissemination	and	comment	“among	radical	youth.”24	Its	first																																																									24	“Draft	Statement	of	WSA	Aims	and	Activities,”	WSA	Bulletin,	no.	1,	19	January	1971,	item	2,	Preamble.	
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words,	a	“nutshell”	description	of	the	WSA,	defined	the	organisation	as	a	“revolutionary	anti-imperialist	youth	organisation	which	seeks	to	unite	young	workers	and	students	in	the	struggle	to	overthrow	capitalism	and	imperialism	and	build	a	new,	socialist	society	free	from	class	oppression	and	the	exploitation	of	man	by	man.”25	The	WSA	was	beginning	to	see	itself	as	mainstream:	“We	belong	to	the	labour	and	socialist	movement	which	has	existed	since	capitalism	began	and	which	traces	its	roots	back	to	the	earliest	people’s	struggle	against	oppression	and	tyranny.”	It	rejected	the	idea	of	being	separate	from	the	“old	left	with	no	more	important	objectives	than	the	promotion	of	youth	culture	and	dropping	out	of	society.”26	In	its	identification	with	a	proletarian,	revolutionary	tradition	and	rejection	of	the	“counterculture,”	the	WSA	showed	that	it	had	become	sufficiently	aware	that	its	frenetic	and	frequent	radical	campaigning	and	appeals	to	external	sources	of	authority	such	as	the	CPA	(ML)	were	not	sufficient	to	maintain	the	life	of	the	organisation.	A	Red	Guard	and	Cultural	Revolution	slogan	heard	by	WSA	members	who	had	visited	China	in	this	period	was	“Fight	self,	repudiate	revisionism.”	It	was	in	that	spirit	that	the	editorial	invited	members	to	look	to	their	own	motivations:27		The	ruling	class	and	its	mass	media	treats	the	revolutionary	youth	movement	as	something	strange,	unprecedented	and	unique,	isolated	from	all	other	historical	times	and	from	all	other	forces	in	contemporary	society.	It	focuses	obsessively	on	the	“newness”	of	the	“new	left”	while	trying	to	make	its	leftness	go	away.28	After	generalising	the	cultural	effects	of	the	bourgeois	upon	the	radicalism	of	youth	organisations,	the	editorial	narrowed	its	focus	to	the	cultural	influences	of	bourgeois	society	that	threatened	the	individual,	revolutionary	mindset:	
																																																								25	Ibid.,	item	2.	26	Ibid.,	1.	27	See	Wheelwright	and	McFarlane,	The	Chinese	Road	to	Socialism,	(New	York,	:	Monthly	Review	Press,	1970),	18.	28	“Draft	Statement	of	WSA	Aims	and	Activities,”	item	2,1.		
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Bourgeois	thought	consciously	or	unconsciously	tries	to	make	each	actual	or	potential	young	radical	feel	like	an	isolated	kook,	a	sideshow	exhibit	and	unnatural	freak	…	Those	who	advocate	hippiedom	and	“building	a	counter-culture”	movement	promote	precisely	this	bourgeois	culture	they	claim	to	be	opposing.29	Advocating	revolution	and	the	overthrow	of	bourgeois	society	is	semantically	a	countercultural	act;	yet,	the	editorial	rejected	the	idea	that	hippiedom	and	the	counterculture,	both	of	which	appeared	regularly	in	the	media,	had	anything	to	do	with	the	WSA’s	purposes.	Quite	the	opposite;	they	were	seen	as	diversions	into	decadent	and	weak	lifestyles,	including	benumbing	drug	taking,	that	were	merely	weird	appendages	of	bourgeois	culture	itself.	The	editorial	also	railed	against	that	other	manifestation	of	bourgeois	counterculture,	the	respectable	armchair	revolutionary:	We	know	that	it	is	far	easier	to	be	cynical,	to	“drop	out”	or	to	look	on	with	a	superior	smirk	while	others	make	mistakes	in	their	struggles	…	this	alternative	means	ultimately	to	knuckle	under	and	accept	the	system	…	to	find	a	cosy,	armchair	radical	niche	from	which	to	pontificate	while	Vietnamese	are	being	bombed,	Black	Americans	are	being	gunned	down	and	Australian	workers	and	students	bashed	and	intimidated.30	This	discussion	of	armchair	radicalism	was	made	in	the	light	of	experiences	of	university-based	academic	critics;	nevertheless,	it	was	a	warning	to	WSA	adherents	who	may	have	had	leftist	pontification	in	mind.31	In	a	further	explanation	of	WSA	mentality,	the	editorial	exclaimed	that:	Opponents	will	say	that	we	have	a	simplistic	view	of	the	world,	in	a	certain	sense,	this	is	true.	We	see	Australia	and	the	world	as	being	divided	into	two	opposing	camps	and	view	political	events	and	ideas	in	terms	of	their	relation	to	this	class	struggle.32	This	statement	was	followed	by	a	page	of	dichotomies:	imperialism,	both	American	and	Russian	versus	“the	people”;	the	Gorton	government	versus	Australian	workers,	
																																																								29	Ibid.	30	Ibid.,	4.	31	For	an	example,	see	the	treatment	of	Monash	University	lecturer	Alastair	Davidson	in	Chapter	6	above.	32	“Draft	Statement	of	WSA	Aims	and	Activities,”	item	2,	2.	(Underlining	in	original.)	
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students,	pensioners,	farmers,	defiance	of	the	Arbitration	Court,	and	anti-war	and	anti-conscription	demonstrations;	fascism	versus	militant	resistance;	and	reformism	of	the	Australian	Labor	Party	(ALP)	and	revisionism	of	the	CPA	versus	revolution.	This	litany	of	oppositions	centred	on	a	statement	of	how	WSA	saw	the	current	situation:	The	struggle	against	repression	cannot	be	confined	within	the	“democratic	system”	of	parliament,	the	Labor	Party	and	so	on	because	it	is	precisely	within	the	framework	of	bourgeois	democracy	that	the	more	open	fascist	variety	of	bourgeois	dictatorship	is	being	prepared	and	extended.	We	see	that	this	struggle	is	NOT	being	confined,	that	it	is	breaking	the	boundaries	of	“law	and	order”	and	challenging	the	capitalist	system	itself.33	Again,	the	language	and	content	of	the	editorial	made	no	concession	to	the	level	of	understanding	of	new,	and	especially	young,	recruits.	This	was	no	gentle	introduction	to	a	progressive	club.	Instead,	a	certain	leap	of	faith	was	required	for	new	members,	the	WSA’s	explicit	rejection	of	any	thought	of	indoctrination	or	pledges	notwithstanding:	“Membership	[of	the	WSA]	is	open	to	all	who	broadly	agree	with	this	movement	and	is	not	limited	to	people	who	agree	with	everything	in	this	statement,	toe	the	‘correct	line’	or	are	prepared	to	be	active	cadres.”34	As	it	eventuated,	membership	did	increase	at	this	time	and	the	reorganisation	of	the	movement,	the	tasks	of	building	new	locality	branches,	imminent	new	campaigns	and,	particularly,	the	re-establishment	of	the	newspaper	Struggle,	were	sufficient	to	occupy	the	members	and	to	see	problems	worked	out	in	practice.35	
The	Sydney	Anti-War	Conference—the	Anti-Imperialist	Caucus	
By	the	end	of	1970,	there	had	been	some	changes	in	the	government’s	attempts	to	manage	the	Vietnam	War	effort	but	the	conflict	continued	and	the	Vietnam	Moratorium	Campaign	(VMC)	needed	to	resolve	questions	that	continued	to	be	raised:	What	is	the	nature	of	the	movement	and	what	way	will	take	it	forward?	From	where	can	the	movement	draw	continued	support?	What	is	its	relationship	to																																																									33	Ibid.,	4.	(Emphasis	in	original.)	34	Ibid.	35	Struggle	was	to	recommence	on	4	February	1971.	WSA	Bulletin,	no.	1,	19	January	1971,	item	17.	
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emerging	forces	of	the	“Third	World”?	How	should	it	react	to	increasing	oppression	at	home?36	To	answer	these	questions,	the	National	Co-ordinating	Committee	of	the	VMC	convened	a	five-day	conference	in	Sydney	from	17–21	February	1971.	Participation	in	the	conference	was	“open	to	any	individual	and	groups	who	pay	the	delegate’s	registration	fee.”	It	had	three	themes:	“Australia	and	the	World”	(e.g.,	US–Australia	alliance,	imperialism	and	the	current	state	of	the	war);	“The	Australian	Anti-War	Movement”;	and	“Strategies	and	Tactics”	(e.g.,	pacifism	and	reformism	versus	revolution).37	The	WSA	was	wary,	noting	that	“the	dominant	faction	among	the	conference	organisers	have	done	their	best	to	keep	anti-imperialist	ideas	out	of	the	anti-war	movement	and	this	conference.”	Nevertheless,	the	WSA	executive	called	upon	members	to	attend	and	speak	at	the	conference	and	to	write	papers	for	it,	because	otherwise	“a	substantial	section	of	the	anti-war	movement	will	continue	to	be	diverted	away	from	effective	struggle	against	imperialist	wars.”38	At	the	conference,	some	delegates	whose	non-CPA,	anti-imperialist	leanings	were	known	to	each	other	formed	an	impromptu	“Anti-Imperialist	Alliance.”	This	consisted	of	individuals	from	NSW	and	Queensland	and	South	Australian	and	Victorian	organisations:	the	Adelaide	Worker	Student	Alliance	and	State	Moratorium	Campaign,	Melbourne	WSA,	Socialist	Secondary	Students,	Socialist	Teachers,	Draft	Resisters’	Union	and	the	Monash	and	La	Trobe	Labor	clubs.39	Although	it	had	no	official	status,	as	a	sizeable	and	active	group,	the	Anti-Imperialist	Alliance	could	influence	views	and	opinions	and	go	some	way	to	countering	the	CPA	block	of	speakers	and	voters.	A	survey	of	the	conference	program	of	sessions	and	papers	shows	that	the	majority	of	papers	were	from	ALP	or	CPA	sources	and	a	small	number	of	religious	and	pacifist	sources.	By	way	of	contrast,	the	smaller	number	of	papers	from	the	anti-imperialist	caucus	postulated	that	the	anti-war	movement	was	
																																																								36	National	Co-ordinating	Committee,	“National	Anti-War	Conference,”	Vietnam	Moratorium	
Campaign,	official	invitation	and	registration	pamphlet,	1970,	2,	author’s	collection.	37	Ibid.	38	WSA	Bulletin,	no.	1,	19	January	1971,	item	5.	39	National	Anti-War	Conference,	“Submissions	to	Business	Session—Supplement,”	Vietnam	
Moratorium	Campaign,	21	February	1971.	
222	
part	of	the	Australian	revolutionary	movement	and	raised,	with	some	force,	one	of	the	most	important	issues	in	the	context	of	the	Vietnam	War:	the	US–Australia	alliance.40	In	the	“business	sessions”	that	concluded	the	conference,	and	in	which	the	aims	of	the	Moratorium	movement	were	settled,	the	CPA	and	the	two	Trotskyite	groups,	the	Socialist	Youth	Alliance	and	Revolutionary	Socialists,	moved	resolutions	that	were	to	alter	the	Moratorium	slogans	by	adding	calls	for	“recognition	of	the	Provisional	Revolutionary	Government	of	South	Vietnam”	and	removal	of	support	for	the	Lon	Nol	government	of	Cambodia.41	Added	to	these	was	a	resolution	from	the	Victorian	secretary	of	the	Amalgamated	Engineering	Union,	VMC	Committee	member	and	CPA	State	Executive	member,	Laurie	Carmichael,	that	read	in	part:	“In	furtherance	of	the	aims	of	the	Moratorium,	a	wide	campaign	to	…	expose	specifically	the	role	and	nature	of	U.S.	imperialism	and	Australia’s	role	in	it.”42	These	resolutions	proposed	a	minor	shift	in	Moratorium	policy	towards	the	aims	of	the	Anti-Imperialist	Alliance,	which,	in	seeing	the	earlier	“Aid	the	NLF”	campaigns	of	the	Monash	Labor	Club	partly	vindicated,	escalated	its	demands	by	moving	for	the	addition	of	two	further	slogans:	“Oppose	US	and	Australian	Aggression	in	Vietnam	and	Indochina”	and	“Oppose	the	US–Australia	Alliance	and	US	domination	of	Australia.”43		While	delegates	attached	to	the	CPA	had	all	of	their	resolutions	carried,	all	of	the	Anti-Imperialist	Alliance’s	resolutions	were,	as	expected,	lost.44	However,	the	WSA	objective	of	attending	the	conference	was	not	to	win	the	vote	but	to	“spread	anti-imperialist	ideas	in	the	organised	anti-war	movement.”45	
																																																								40	National	Anti-War	Conference,	“Programme,”	Vietnam	Moratorium	Campaign,	17	February	1971.		41	The	Provisional	Revolutionary	Government	of	South	Vietnam	was	the	political	face	of	the	Viet	Cong	or	National	Liberation	Front	(NLF).	42	National	Anti-War	Conference,	“Submissions	to	Business	Session—Supplement.”	43	Ibid.	44	Ibid.	45	WSA	Bulletin,	no.	1,	19	January	1971,	item	5.	
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May	Day	and	the	Langer	Trial	
From	the	beginning	of	1971,	the	WSA	had	been	reconstructing	itself	as	a	radical,	Maoist	force	of	some	substance	within	the	anti-capitalist	and	anti-war	movements.	This	was	shown	in	a	variety	of	instances:	continued	action	of	the	WSA/Labor	Club	entities	at	Monash	and	La	Trobe	universities	with	the	addition	of	new-found	solidarity	with	the	radicals	of	Melbourne	University;	the	WSA’s	establishment	of	campaigns	about	issues	other	than	the	Vietnam	War;	the	outward	expression	of	solidarity	by	some	of	the	most	active	unions,	notably	the	Waterside	Workers’	Federation	and	the	Builders’	Labourers	Federation	(BLF);	and	the	WSA’s	dogged	refusal	to	accommodate	reformism	and	parliamentarism.	While	other	activist	organisations	were	either	splitting	or	struggling	to	attract	members,	the	WSA’s	rapid	growth	and	frequently	reported	addition	of	new	branches,	gave	an	impression	of	success	and	popularity	that	could	not	be	ignored.		The	1971	May	Day	march	and	the	charges	and	trial	that	arose	from	it	tested	the	respect	that	the	WSA	had	earned	to	this	date.	An	annually	re-formed	committee	of	delegates	from	unions,	social	activist	groups	and	political	groups	and	parties	organised	May	Day	marches	in	Melbourne.	The	committee’s	function	was	to	decide	the	route	of	the	march,	its	speakers,	publicity	and	how	the	march	was	to	be	organised.	Each	year	it	composed	a	May	Day	greeting	or	message	that	was	supposed	to	encapsulate	the	meaning	and	history	of	May	Day.	It	was	used	for	advertising	purposes	in	organisations	like	unions	and	political	parties	and	was	for	distribution	among	May	Day	marchers.	In	previous	years,	the	WSA	had	seen	itself	as	the	excluded	outsider	and	resorted	to	disruptive	tactics,	such	as	organising	an	alternative	platform	for	anti-imperialists	and	leading	rebel	marches	to	targets,	as	occurred	in	the	1970	May	Day	march.46	However,	in	1971,	the	WSA	and	several	of	its	closely	associated	groups—the	Labor	clubs	and	the	Socialist	Teachers—joined	the	May	Day	Committee.	Combined	with	delegates	from	unions	led	by	the	CPA	(ML)	and	others	
																																																								46	See	Chapter	5	above.	
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led	by	the	Marxist	Workers	Group,	and	with	the	widely	respected	Flo	Russell	in	the	chair,	the	anti-imperialists	had	the	upper	hand	at	last.47	With	such	a	composition	it	was	not	difficult	to	gather	agreement	about	opposition	to	US	imperialism	and	to	secure	criticism	of	reformism	and	parliamentarism.	In	the	discussion	and	the	voting,	the	CPA	delegates	also	supported	the	naming	of	US	imperialism	as	the	foe.	A	compromise	was	reached	over	who	was	to	speak	from	the	official	platform:	Jean	McLean	(Save	Our	Sons	and	Moratorium),	Ted	Hill	(chairman	of	the	CPA	(ML)),	George	Lees	(president,	Technical	Teachers	Association	and	CPA	member),	Albert	Langer	(WSA	and	Monash	Labor	Club),	and	the	chairperson	was	to	be	Marco	Masterson	(BLF).48	For	the	first	time,	the	WSA	seemed	to	be	in	the	driver’s	seat	and	that	meant	doing	the	mundane	secretarial	tasks	of	advertising,	publishing	the	May	Day	statement,	contacting	officials	from	unions	and	community	groups,	and	arranging	peripheral	activities	such	as	the	“wreath	laying	ceremony	at	the	8	Hour	Monument,”	the	Worker–Student–Pensioner	forum	and	the	May	Day	Ball	at	the	Brunswick	Town	Hall.	While	I	can	find	no	record	of	WSA	members	attending	the	ball,	the	WSA	printing	machine	had	been	repaired	and	was	used	to	print	much	of	the	advertising	and	organising	material,	including	the	May	Day	message.49	The	growth	in	the	influence	of	the	WSA	in	the	May	Day	Committee	signified	also	a	growth	in	the	acceptance	of	WSA	and	Maoist	politics.	Here	was	one	of	the	oldest,	most	established	institutions	of	the	labour	movement	adopting	the	most	radical	form	of	anti-imperialism	and	placing	the	most	notorious	Maoists,	Albert	Langer	and	Ted	Hill,	on	its	official	platform.	The	WSA	compiled	and	printed	the	May	Day	message	in	the	form	of	a	broadsheet.	This	broadsheet	also	advertised	the	march	and	included	articles	such	as	“Free	Australia	from	U.S.	Grip,”	“Capitalism	in	Chaos”	and	the	didactic	“What	Is	Imperialism?”	The	May	Day	message	was	a	pastiche	of	issues	from	health	care	to	the																																																									47	The	Marxist	Workers	Group	(MWG)	was	made	up	of	older	ex-CPA	Maoists	who	had	broken	from	the	CPA	along	with	Ted	Hill	but	had	subsequently	formed	their	own	group.	Their	union	influence	was	in	the	Plumbers	Union,	Printing	and	Kindred	Industries	Union,	and	the	Telecommunications	Union.	Flo	Russell	was	an	independent	Maoist	who	had	also	broken	with	the	CPA	in	which	she	had	been	a	party	functionary	in	charge	of	trade	union	work.	48	Jim	Bacon,	“Langer	Gaoled,”	Lots	Wife,	7	October	1971,	5.	49	May	Day	Committee,	May	Day	Programme,	double-sided	broadsheet,	Worker	Student	Alliance,	April	1971.	
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abolition	of	“Penal	Powers”	and	the	war	in	Indochina.	In	the	spirit	of	the	united	front,	the	WSA	also	carried	advertising	for	the	CPA	and	Centre	for	Democratic	Action	bookshops	as	well	as	for	the	Maoist,	East	Wind	Bookshop.50	The	ascendancy	of	the	WSA/Labor	Club	grouping	and	the	growing	acceptance	of	its	stance	on	imperialism	were	also	noticed	by	the	police.	The	Monash	Labor	Club	was	conscious	of	increased	police	attention	at	demonstrations	and	at	the	trials	of	radicals,	notably	two	Special	Branch	officers,	Detective	First	Constables	Alan	Maskiell	and	Robert	(Bob)	Larkins.	Larkins	was	especially	well	known.	On	30	April	1971,	just	before	the	May	Day	march,	he	attended	a	minor	demonstration	against	the	charging	of	a	Monash	University	student	and	was	accused	by	demonstrators,	including	Albert	Langer,	of	spying.	He	was	then	the	subject	of	jeers	and	accusations	of	harassment	to	the	extent	that	he	hastily	left	the	scene.	On	2	May	1971,	the	May	Day	march	from	the	Trades	Hall	to	the	Yarra	Bank	was	completed	successfully	without	incident.	However,	during	the	speeches,	and	before	Albert	Langer	had	delivered	his	main	speech,	marchers	at	the	edge	of	the	crowd	vociferously	objected	to	the	activities	of	police	who	were	taking	down	demonstrators’	car	number	plates	and	making	notes	of	who	was	there.51	Larkins	was	among	the	police	officers	surveilling	the	crowd	and,	once	again,	he	was	driven	from	the	crowd.	At	the	time,	Langer	was	on	the	official	dais	waiting	for	his	turn	to	speak;	yet,	he	was	the	one	eventually	charged	with	incitement	“to	unlawfully	fight	and	make	an	affray.”52	Jim	Bacon,	writing	in	Lots	Wife	described	the	event:	The	people	at	the	demonstration	who	had	had	long	experience	with	Larkins’	intimidating	activities,	decided	he	should	be	driven	out	of	the	meeting.	This	was	duly	done.	When	Larkins	had	been	driven	well	away	from	the	meeting	Albert	was	asked	by	the	Chairman	of	the	meeting	…	to	explain	to	the	crowd	what	had	happened.	He	spoke	for	about	30	seconds.	This	speech	was	taped	by	Maskiell,	and	was	produced	in	court.	The	cop’s	evidence	was	that	Albert	spoke	and	then	the	crowd	turned	into	an	uncontrollable	mob	which	then	drove	Larkins	away.	They	put	most	emphasis	on	the	sentence—“The	only																																																									50	Ibid.	51	The	“Yarra	Bank”	is	the	common	name	of	the	area	officially	known	as	“Flinders	Park.”		52	Senior	Detective	Cutler,	summons	for	Albert	Langer	to	appear	on	incitement	charge,	Melbourne,	2	June	1971,	author’s	collection.	
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way	you	can	fight	the	copper	bastards	is	the	same	way	that	we	fought	the	Nazis,	and	that’s	by	punching	the	shit	out	of	them.”	This	sentence	does	not	fit	in	with	the	descriptive	tone	of	that	speech—and	in	fact	there	is	considerable	evidence	that	it	was	“lifted”	from	a	[scheduled]	speech	Albert	made	later,	and	placed	in	the	first	speech.53	In	both	the	pre-trial	hearing	and	in	the	trial	itself,	in	keeping	with	radical	contempt	for	unctuous	legal	niceties,	Langer	mounted	his	own	impertinent	defence.54	Under	the	headline	“Langer	Tells	of	His	‘Contempt’,”	The	Age	reported	some	of	the	cross	examination:	Questioning	Langer	about	his	feelings	towards	Larkins,	Mr.	Howse	said:	Do	you	think	you	might	even	hate	him?	Langer:	Yes,	I	would	say	it	as	strongly	as	that.	I	hate	all	fascists.	Mr.	Howse:	Did	you	hate	Larkins	on	May	2?	Langer:	In	a	general	sense,	it	was	more	contempt.55	In	conducting	his	own	defence,	Langer	was	continuing	the	attitude	shown	by	the	defendants	in	the	Monash	University	exclusions	“trial”	before	a	quasi-legal	panel	in	the	previous	year,	except	that,	in	that	case,	the	defendants	did	not	appear	before	their	“judges.”56	Recognising	the	power	of	the	court	to	compel	and	punish—and	that	the	verdict	would	be	guilty—the	entire	purpose	of	mounting	a	defence	was	to	expand	upon	the	political	reasons	for	the	defendant	being	in	that	predicament	in	the	first	place.	This	is	something	that	a	defence	lawyer	is	incapable	of	doing—indeed,	prohibited	from	doing—because	of	their	position	as	a	recognised	and	privileged	element	in	the	court	structure.	At	the	trial,	the	police	admitted	that	Langer’s	speech	at	the	Yarra	Bank	was	the	only	one	recorded,	a	fact	that	seemed	to	indicate	that	the	WSA	or	Langer	himself	was	seen	as	the	most	important	target	for	police	surveillance	and	prosecution.	He	was	found	guilty	and	sentenced	to	eighteen	months	in	prison.57	However,	that	was	not																																																									53	Bacon,	“Langer	Gaoled.”		54	For	example,	see	Public	Affairs	Committee,	Monash	University,	Trial	Notes,	extracts	from	Albert	Langer’s	pre-trial	transcript,	September	1971.	55	“Langer	Tells	of	His	‘Contempt’,”	The	Age,	23	September	1971,	5.	56	See	Chapter	6	above.	57	Bacon,	“Langer	Gaoled.”	
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the	end	of	the	matter.	Langer	conducted	his	own	appeal	and,	on	16	November	1971,	
The	Age	reported,	“he	discussed,	debated	and	argued	with	some	of	the	best	legal	brains	in	Australia	including	Victoria’s	Chief	Justice	(Sir	Henry	Winneke).	And	once	more	he	won.”58	More	details	of	the	appeal	judgement	emerged	in	a	further	article,	to	wit,	at	the	original	trial,	the	success	of	the	prosecution	had	been	gained	on	the	basis	of	inadmissible	evidence.	The	full	court	said:	“We	are	far	from	satisfied	that	his	conviction	on	the	lesser	charge	of	attempt	to	incite	was	not	influenced	by	the	contents	of	the	inadmissible	document	being	wrongly	communicated	to	the	jury.”	Even	though	Langer	had	put	many	more	appeal	grounds,	the	court	found	that	the	one	mentioned	here	was	sufficient	to	show	that	a	miscarriage of justice had occurred.	
Intensification	of	Reaction	
It	is	shown	elsewhere	in	this	chapter	that,	in	demonstrations	in	which	the	WSA	was	involved,	conflictual	situations	had	appeared	to	increase	in	severity	and	frequency	by	mid-1971.	In	May	1971,	an	article	in	WSA	Bulletin	no.	2	entitled	“The	Demonstration	Rut”	noted	a	change	in	the	attitudes	of	both	police	and	demonstrators	in	this	period.	While	a	perceived	increase	in	police	“brutality”	had	angered	the	mass	of	demonstrators,	it	had	also	intimidated	them:	This	unsatisfactory	situation	has	its	roots	in	the	attitudes	taken	to	demonstrations	some	time	ago,	and	under	different	conditions	of	growing	political	awareness	and	in	opposition	to	the	pacifist	“respectability”	pushed	by	the	C.P.A.,	C.I.C.D.	and	A.L.P.	spokesmen.	Then,	the	struggle	was	to	break	from	that	“respectability”	and	the	ideology	that	promoted	it,	by	pointing	out	just	how	easily	the	ruling	class	could	accommodate	it	and	how	it	was	hindering	the	development	and	growth	of	the	movement	…	Since	then,	however,	the	political	militancy	of	demonstrations	…	has	not	been	the	issue	of	concern	to	most	revolutionaries.	Militant	slogans,	speakers,	leaflets,	chants	etc.	are	accepted	and	the	pacifists	are	much	less	a	problem	than	some	of	[the]	anarchists	we	see	in	action.59		For	social	movements	such	as	the	Labor	clubs,	WSA,	and	anti-war	and	anti-apartheid	organisations,	demonstrations	were	not	ad	hoc	assemblages	but	were	calculated	actions.	Their	planning	was	necessarily	twofold:	it	involved	the	propagation	of	their																																																									58	“He	Fought	with	the	Best—and	Won,”	The	Age,	16	November	1971,	5.	59	WSA	Bulletin,	no.	2,	May	1971,	item	4,	1.	
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protest	discourse	among	their	supporters	and	the	audience	at	the	protest	action	and	the	construction	of	a	performance	that	would	extend	the	discourse	of	their	causes	into	distant	audiences	via	the	media.	As	both	purposes	involved	a	confrontation	with	state	power,	however	mild	or	ferocious,	they	most	often	needed	the	symbols	of	hegemonic	power,	such	as	the	US	Consulate,	to	unequivocally	deliver	their	meaning.	Within	the	WSA,	the	first	of	these	purposes	is	exhibited	in	the	“The	Demonstration	Rut,”	which	explained	how	to	generate	and	prepare	demonstrations:		Objectives	[of	a	demonstration]	…	must	remain	clear	and	paramount	throughout	the	demonstration.	Investigation,	study,	debate	and	agitation	should	be	carried	out	beforehand	to	win	people	to	these	stated	objectives	…	Most	important	is	the	involvement	of	hundreds	and	hundreds	of	people	in	various	activities—not	as	bystanders	to	punch-ups	between	cops	and	radical	youth.	Any	activity	which	promotes	mass	involvement	generally	leads	to	a	raising	of	consciousness	and	the	creation	of	a	sense	of	unity	necessary	for	future	militancy	and	armed	resistance.60		As	the	performative	characteristics	of	a	demonstration	designed	for	the	media	were	also	the	aspects	most	likely	to	provoke	police	action,	the	author	of	“The	Demonstration	Rut,”	“a	comrade	in	the	Prahran	ghetto,”	felt	that	it	was	vital	that:	“Political	objectives	should	be	clear	to	all,	demonstrators,	cops,	reporters,	onlookers,	T.V.	viewers,	and	should	be	maintained	throughout	the	demonstration.”61	Whether	or	not	the	media	were	present,	the	likelihood	of	police	action	against	demonstrators	who	occupied	contested	public	spaces	or	challenged	too	sharply	the	symbols	of	power,	such	as	flags,	or	threatened	the	property	of	the	powerful,	had	to	be	considered.	While	the	deliberate	provocation	of	police	action	could	have	been	seen	as	a	tactic	for	the	attraction	of	media	attention,	the	writer	of	“The	Demonstration	Rut”	saw	this	as	a	disorderly	distraction	from	the	central	theme	of	the	action:	We	…	must	wage	ruthless	political	war	against	the	cops	instead	of	super-militant	heroics.	We	should	guard	against	minor	“distracting”	provocations,	&	be	prepared	to	meet	major	assaults	that	try	to	crush	the	political	objective,	with	as	much	unity	of	action	as	possible.	Such	major	assaults	we	
																																																								60	“The	Demonstration	Rut,”	WSA	Bulletin,	no.	2,	May	1971,	item	4,	2.	61	Ibid.,	item	4,	1.	
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should	go	all	out	to	win,	especially	as	backing	away	from	minor	provocations	can	be	demoralising	to	some	of	our	newer	comrades.62	Describing	face-to-face	confrontations	with	police	lines	as	having	a	“military	nature,”	the	article	noted:	“We	should	bring	into	play	those	advantages	we	do	have.	These	are,	numbers,	a	sense	of	comradeship,	agility,	courage,	belief	in	the	justice	of	our	cause	&	moral	weakness	of	our	opponents.”63	After	a	list	of	“weapons”	available	to	demonstrators,	the	writer	advised:	“once	the	cops	have	made	up	their	minds	to	attack,	I	would	advocate	…	a	general	practice	of	protecting	the	edges	of	the	demonstration	with	long	poles,	flags	and	banners	carried	sideways.…”64	This	piece	of	advice	is	mentioned	here	because,	unlike	the	list	of	“weapons,”	this	it	was	not	seen	as	fanciful	but	was	often	adopted	in	demonstrations	organised	by	the	that	WSA	organized	from	this	time	on.		Labor	Club	and	WSA	members	were	not	averse	to	using	overblown	phrases	and	while	such	rhetoric	may	have	revealed	inexperience,	we	would	be	in	error	to	conclude	that	these	activists	did	not	understand	their	situation.	Although	there	exists	no	definitive	document	that	explains	their	understanding,	insight	can	be	gleaned	from	the	interplay	of	argumentation	within	their	leaflets	and	bulletins.	For	example,	the	editorial	in	WSA	Bulletin	no.	1	included	the	statement:	“We	believe	that	we	are	not	fighting	an	omnipotent	government	based	on	universal	consensus.”65	This	received	a	sharp	rebuke	in	WSA	Bulletin	no.	2:	“I	totally	reject	the	idea	that	‘we	are	not	fighting	an	omnipotent	government	based	on	universal	consensus’	…	It	is	not	a	question	of	fighting	a	government;	it	is	a	question	of	fighting	the	consensus	itself.”	The	author	of	the	rebuttal	went	on	to	explain	that	what	permits	the	Australian	ruling	class	“to	exercise	uncontested	control	over	the	police,	military	and	judicial	organs	of	the	State	is	both	its	control	of	the	means	of	production	and	the	whole	conformist	ideology	and	culture	which	the	relations	of	production	create.”66	Applying	this	to	WSA	attitudes	to	demonstrations	shows	that	they	were	not	seen	as	mere	media																																																									62	Ibid.,	item	4,	3.	63	Ibid.	64	Ibid.,	item	4,	4.	65	WSA	Bulletin,	no.	1,	19	January	1971,	item	2.		66	WSA	Bulletin,	no.	2,	May	1971,	Item	3,	3.	
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events	in	which	performances	were	staged	to	advertise	a	cause.	A	demonstration	was	a	part	of	the	class	struggle	itself	wherein	the	power	of	the	state	was	to	be	confronted	and	political	power	relations	laid	bare.	In	short,	human	bodies’	seizing	and	holding	the	demonstration	space	represented	the	central	point	of	revolution;	the	seizure	of	state	power.	When	the	bodies	of	demonstrators	occupy	public	spaces	in	defiance	of	state	norms	and	rules	such	that	police	action	may	be	taken	against	them,	demonstrations	constitute	a	challenge	to	the	legitimacy	of	the	state	and	its	forces.	That	both	sides	in	Victoria	understood	this	in	1971	is	amply	shown	in	this	short	extract	from	the	transcript	of	Albert	Langer’s	pre-trial	hearing	that	year.67	In	questioning	Constable	Darley,	Langer	asked:	[AL]	What	were	you	there	for?	[CD]	I	was	there	to	supervise	the	march—it	was	a	direction	from	…	Russell	Street	…	[AL]	Were	there	any	breaches	of	the	peace	during	the	march?	[CD]	Not	to	my	knowledge.	[AL]	Was	there	any	obstruction	during	the	march?	[CD]	No.	[AL]	So	it	was	not	really	necessary	for	you	to	be	there?	[CD]	I	consider	it	was.	[AL]	Why	didn’t	you	go	home	when	the	march	got	to	the	Yarra	Bank?	[CD]	We	didn’t	go	home	for	a	similar	purpose.	[AL]	Were	they	obstructing	traffic	in	Flinders	Park?	[CD]	They	were	not.	[AL]	Was	there	any	danger	of	breach	of	the	peace	in	Flinders	Park?	[CD]	I	considered	it	a	possibility	…	[AL]	In	what	respect	did	you	fear	that	there	could	possibly	be	a	breach	of	the	peace	in	that	park?	[CD]	This	meeting	is	…	of	a	political	nature.	[AL]	And	you	regard	a	political	meeting	as	inherently	leading	to	the	possibility	of	a	breach	of	the	peace?																																																									67	“Russell	Street”	was	the	police	headquarters,	the	“Yarra	Bank”	was	a	small	“speakers	corner”	by	the	Yarra	River,	“Flinders	Park”	was	adjacent	to	the	Yarra	Bank.	Russell	Street	and	Flinders	Park	are	at	opposite	ends	of	Melbourne’s	central	business	district.	
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[CD]	I	believe	a	political	meeting	is	a	meeting	where	there	could	be	divisions	of	opinion.	[AL]	Did	you	see	any	divisions	of	opinion	at	that	meeting?	[CD]	As	far	as	I	could	ascertain	there	were	not.	As	writers	for	their	Bulletin	show,	members	of	the	WSA	were	not	only	well	aware	that	the	organisation	of	demonstrations	involved	confronting	the	power	of	the	state,	but	also	that	confrontation	constructed	the	message	and	purpose	of	the	demonstration	itself.	
Broadening	the	Ambit	
The	WSA’s	acceptance	as	a	major	player	in	the	anti-war	movement	by	activist	organisations,	unions	and	parties	meant	that	it	was	able	to	effect	its	planned	broadening	beyond	opposition	to	the	Vietnam	War.	As	well	as	polemics	on	revolutionary	theory	and	practice,	the	May	1971	issue	of	the	WSA	Bulletin	carried	one	article	on	May	Day,	three	articles	taking	different	sides	in	arguments	about	the	formation	of	Bangladesh	by	splitting	East	Pakistan	from	West	Pakistan	and	about	China’s	role,	and	a	special	insert	urging	WSA	members	to	support	Palestinian	liberation	by	marching	on	“Gaza	Solidarity	Day”	on	6	June.68	The	latter	was	signed	“Yasser	Habash,”	a	pseudonym	constructed	from	the	names	of	the	leaders	of	the	two	major	insurgent	groups	in	the	Palestine	Liberation	Organisation.	By	the	end	of	June,	WSA	activists’	sense	of	authority	among	social	and	radical	movements	had	grown	sufficiently	for	it	to	declare,	in	a	publicity	broadsheet,	that	the	next	month	would	be	the	“July	Assault	on	Imperialism.”	This	would	comprise	a	series	of	demonstrations:	3	July,	anti-apartheid	rally;	4	July,	US	Independence	Day	demonstration;	8	July,	support	Albert	rally;	10	July,	Palestine	march;	and	25	July,	Pensioners’	rally.69	Beyond	simply	advertising	the	demonstrations,	the	broadsheet	provided	succinct	explanations	of	WSA	positions	on	the	main	conflict-ridden	social	and	political	discourses	that	featured	in	Victorian	politics	at	the	time.	The	following	are	the	salient	selections:																																																									68	WSA	Bulletin,	no.	2,	May	1971,	items	13,	14,	15.		69	July	Assault	on	Imperialism	(Melbourne:	Worker	Student	Alliance,	c.	June	1971).	This	is	a	four-page	broadsheet.	
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Apartheid	“Smash	Apartheid”	Protest	against	…	the	all-white	South	African	rugby	team.	The	unions	involved	in	boycotting	the	South	African	Rugby	team	have	taken	a	correct	stand	and	should	be	supported	by	all	working	people	…	Our	Government	is	bound	hand	and	foot	to	the	American	Government—but	the	people	of	Australia	should	not	be	…	[A	sporting	tour]…	is	as	good	as	a	statement	of	support	which	it	is	for	our	Government.	We	must	however	show	that	the	people	of	Australia	are	totally	opposed	to	fascism	in	all	of	its	forms.	Demonstration	on	Sat.	July	3rd.	
July	4	Down	with	US	imperialism.	To	march	in	the	moratorium	is	to	oppose	the	war	in	Indo-China:	to	march	on	July	4th	is	to	recognise	the	cause	of	war	and	Australia’s	involvement	in	it	…	Why	did	the	Australian	government	obey	these	U.S.	orders	[to	send	troops	to	Vietnam]	…	because	Australia,	like	Vietnam,	is	not	INDEPENDENT.	…	increasingly	[U.S.	monopoly	companies]	control	the	major	sectors	of	the	Australian	economy,	and	as	a	result	they	also	increasingly	control	all	aspects	of	our	society	…	March	on	the	U.S.	Consulate—July	4th	2.00pm	from	the	City	Square.	
Palestine	The	enemy	of	the	Palestinian	and	other	Arab	peoples	is	Zionism	and	not	the	Jewish	people	…		What	Zionism	stands	for	is	the	formation	of	a	secular	Jewish	state	ON	ARAB	LAND.	The	Palestinian	National	Liberation	Movement	(Fateh)	fired	the	first	shot	in	the	Galilee	area	and	lit	the	torch	of	armed	struggle	…	Since	launching	the	U.S.–Israeli	war	of	aggression	in	June	1967,	the	Palestinian	peoples’	armed	struggle	has	developed	rapidly.	…	Oppose	Zionism,	Arab	reaction	and	imperialism	in	all	its	forms.	March	on	July	10th.	
Repression	…	Albert	Langer	has	recently	been	charged	with	two	indictable	offences	arising	out	of	Mayday	…	
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This	year	the	slogans	for	May	Day	in	Australia	were	“defeat	U.S.	Imperialism—Fight	for	Socialism!”	and	the	demonstration	was	much	larger	and	more	militant	than	previous	ones.	Support	Albert	Langer.	Demonstrate	outside	Melbourne	Magistrate	Court,	July	8th	10	a.m.	
Pensioners	…	the	three	most	“miserable”	[spenders	on	social	services]	…	are	the	U.S.A.	and	her	two	lackeys	in	Vietnam	…		The	Australian	government	which	facilitates	the	exploitation	of	imperialist	firms	…	is	content	to	spend	millions	of	dollars	of	taxpayers	money	supporting	American	genocide	in	Indo-China,	whilst	letting	our	pensioners	live	below	subsistence	level.	Join	the	Cavalcade!	July	25th.70	This	broadsheet	served	two	purposes:	publicity	and	education.	It	both	publicised	the	protest	actions	of	the	WSA’s	“July	Assault	on	Imperialism”	and	provided	information	about	the	issues	and	the	WSA’s	attitude	towards	them.	These	five	articles	contained	summarised	histories	of	sufficient	substance	to	enable	radical	inferences	to	be	drawn.	However,	as	each	writer	attempted	to	associate	their	topic	with	the	main	WSA	point	of	demarcation—that	is,	opposition	to	US	imperialism—some	of	their	arguments	became	somewhat	strained.	This	was	particularly	so	when	dealing	with	the	topics	of	“apartheid”	and	“repression,”	as	while	a	connection	with	US	imperialism	existed,	it	was	secondary	and	lacked	palpable	relevance.	This	may	demonstrate	some	fragility	in	the	analytic	confidence	of	the	writers	themselves,	in	terms	of	their	apparent	desire	to	conform	to	the	dominant	WSA	discourse.	However,	more	than	that,	it	shows	the	hegemonic	strength	of	the	WSA	discourse	in	being	able	to	exert	such	pressure	in	the	first	place,	an	important	consideration	in	that	participation	in	WSA	actions	was	increasingly	diversified	and	fractional,	which	resulted	in	a	weakening	of	the	power	that	single-issue	politics	had	previously	bestowed.	The	building	of	the	WSA	as	more	than	a	doggedly	narrow	apparatus	for	opposing	US	imperialism	was,	appropriately,	left	to	the	branches.	Decisions	on	which	the	organisation	needed	to	speak	as	a	whole—such	as	policy	on	participation	in	the																																																									70	Ibid.,	2–4.	(Emphasis	in	original.)	
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Moratorium—were	the	preserve	of	the	council	and	the	executive.	By	contrast,	the	generation	of	new	campaigns	and	involvement	in	the	protests	and	actions	of	non-WSA	individuals	and	social	groups	was	most	often	in	the	hands	of	the	branches	and	associated	action	groups.	For	example,	the	development	of	the	organisation’s	policy	on	Palestine	was	generated	in	the	Hawthorn	branch	and	the	Socialist	Teachers	organisation.71	That	members	of	those	organisations	had	close	contact	with	activist	Palestinians	in	their	workplaces	and	suburbs	encapsulated	the	worth	of	the	new	WSA	structure.	Previously,	new	recruits	and	contacts	had	had	to	summon	their	own	courage	to	approach	the	organisation;	however,	with	the	changed	structure,	the	organisation	could	reach	them	on	a	basis	of	attending	to	their	political	and	even	social	needs.	This	new	pattern	of	organic	and	local	contact	facilitated	the	continually	evolving	content	of	WSA	activities.	Thus,	the	Carlton,	Heidelberg,	Richmond	and	Hawthorn	branches	generated	activity	about	the	federal	budget	and	the	parlous	state	of	pensions	and	pensioners;	the	Sunshine	branch	railed	against	unemployment	and	the	pitiful	state	of	the	dole;	the	Fitzroy–Collingwood	branch	conducted	a	minor	campaign	against	a	spate	of	repossessions	by	hire	purchase	companies,	particularly	“Waltons	Finance	Company,”	in	the	month	before	Christmas;	and	the	Draft	Resisters	Union	“rank	and	file”	group	organised	summer	tours	of	beach	areas	called	the	“Summer	Offensive”	to	agitate	against	the	continuation	of	conscription.72		Reliance	upon	the	branches	to	initiate	activities	and	to	formulate	their	own	versions	of	revolutionary	policy	was	not	seen	as	an	abdication	of	leadership	by	the	central	and	leading	bodies.	Rather,	it	was	seen	as	giving	effect	to	the	policy	of	integration	of	its	members	with	the	“masses.”	The	Central	Executive	report	of	May	1971	devoted	almost	three	of	its	four-page	report	to	this	question.	Citing	the	Carlton	branch	as	an	exemplar,	it	stated:	“[Carlton]	has	led	the	way	in	forging	real	links	with	the	people	in	their	area	over	the	struggle	against	the	construction	of	the	Kleenex	factory	[warehouse]	on	land	that	the	residents	wanted	for	a	park.”73	The	land	where	the	Kleenex	warehouse	was	to	be	built	was	unused	Victorian	Railways	land	and	the	
																																																								71	“Gaza	Solidarity	Day,”	special	insert,	WSA	Bulletin,	no.	2,	May	1971.	It	was	signed:	Yasser	Habash,	Hawthorn	WSA.	72	WSA	leaflets	signed	by	those	branches	and	organisations,	in	the	collection	of	the	author.	73	“Central	Executive	Report,”	WSA	Bulletin,	no.	2,	May	1971,	item	1,	2.	
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Carlton	branch,	working	within	the	Carlton	Association,	had	fostered	demonstrations	there.	When	Norm	Gallagher,	head	of	the	BLF,	led	the	Victorian	Trades	Hall	Council	to	place	a	black	ban	on	the	site,	Kleenex	capitulated.	In	the	process,	Gallagher	was	gaoled	for	fourteen	days	for	assault	when	he	confronted	the	developer	over	“scab”	labour	on	the	site.74	The	land	was	saved	as	open	space	and	is	now	known	as	the	“Hardy–Gallagher	Reserve.”75		Another	result	of	decentralisation	and	the	subsequent	encouragement	of	branches	to	use	their	own	initiative	was	that	countervailing	discourses	could,	in	the	absence	of	disciplinary	rules,	excite	local	opposition	to	the	dominant	aspect	of	the	WSA’s	political	discourse.	Since	the	WSA	was	not	a	political	party,	it	did	not	require	the	maintenance	of	a	public	image	of	monolithic	unity.	In	fact,	as	mentioned	above,	its	members	were	not	required	to	“agree	with	everything	…	[in	the	Statement	of	WSA	Aims	and	Activities],	toe	the	‘correct	line’	or	[be]	prepared	to	be	active	cadres.”76	In	its	effects,	this	diffuse	and	ostensible	lack	of	disciplinary	capability	turned	out	to	be	an	organisational	strength	rather	than	a	point	of	fracture.	For	example,	in	April	1971,	some	members	of	the	La	Trobe	University	Labor	Club	had	issued	a	leaflet	condemning	the	three	universities’	“Campaign	Against	Repression,”	which	had	“proposed	[a]	joint	invasion	of	the	Melbourne	University	Council	chamber,”	as	reflecting	“petty	bourgeois	concepts	of	Student	Power.”77	Their	main	target	was	the	La	Trobe	Labor	Club	and	they	headed	their	broadsheet	“Labor	Club	or	Worker	Student	Alliance?”	The	leaflet	was	authorised	by	a	“Committee	to	establish	a	La	Trobe	University	branch	of	W.S.A.”	Its	text	contained	arguments	from	previous	WSA	articles,	particularly	those	that	had	referred	to	the	need	for	student	integration	with	the	working	class.	The	WSA	executive	responded	by	stating	that	the	actions	proposed	for	the	Campaign	Against	Repression	had	its	full	support	and	that,	“if	such	attacks	are	to	be	made	publicly	they	must	not	be	made	in	the	name	of	W.S.A.	
																																																								74	Carlton	Northern	Suburbs	Branch	WSA,	Support	Norm	Gallagher,	4	February	1971.	This	is	a	single-sided	leaflet.	75	Carlton	Community	History	Group,	Princes	Hill	Heritage	Walk,	brochure,	accessed	2	December	2017,	http://www.cchg.asn.au/princes-hill-walk.pdf.	76	“Draft	Statement	of	WSA	Aims	and	Activities,”	2.	77	“Labor	Club	or	Worker	Student	Alliance,”	WSA	Bulletin,	no.	2,	May	1971,	item	7.	
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as	they	do	not	reflect	the	views	of	W.S.A.”	Then,	after	small	praise	for	the	authors	for	raising	the	“question	of	the	leading	role	of	the	working	class	and	the	need	to	combat	‘student	power’	ideas,”	the	Executive	called	upon	the	whole	of	the	WSA	to	study	those	ideas	and	to	treat	the	matter	as	a	“contradiction	among	the	people.”	Rather	than	turn	an	internal	dispute	into	a	public	attack,	“the	question	at	issue	should	be	handled	through	the	democratic	method	of	discussion	and	persuasion.”78	In	this	case,	the	absence	of	a	book	of	rules	enabled	the	issue	to	be	defused	and	to	become	one	for	solution	at	the	local	level.	The	maintenance	of	an	open	policy	with	respect	to	membership	and	contribution	to	political	discussion	in	the	manner	of	Mao’s	“let	a	hundred	flowers	bloom”	meant	that	political	differences	remained	at	the	level	of	skirmishes	rather	than	existential	extirpation.79	With	neither	the	inclination	nor	the	power	to	expel	members,	the	leading	members	and	proponents	of	the	WSA’s	prevailing	philosophy,	which	remained	consistently	Maoist,	were	necessarily	reliant	upon	the	strength	of	their	arguments,	their	control	of	the	bureaucratic	machinery	and	the	inertial	mass	of	the	organisation—or	a	combination	of	all	three.	Although	they	might	have	tried	heroically,	proponents	of	the	ideas	of	Gramsci,	Rosa	Luxembourg,	anarchism,	Stalin,	and	Trotsky	had	very	little	chance	of	breaching	the	Maoist	grip	on	the	organisation.	Even	when	the	usual	process	of	presenting	criticisms	and	new	ideas—that	is,	through	the	WSA	Bulletin	or	in	practical	preparations	for	protest	actions—was	bypassed,	the	internal	flexibility	of	the	organisation	made	the	likelihood	of	a	successful	putsch	vanishingly	small.	An	example	of	this	occurred	mid-1971	when	the	“Croydon–Ringwood	WSA	area	group”	produced	a	twenty-page	document,	which	included	the	introductory	words:		Comrades,	…	This	bulletin	has	been	written	due	to	our	area	group’s	realisation	of	the	importance	of	internal	theoretical	bulletins	…	Subsequently	…	[to	the	late	notification	of	the	bulletin’s	deadline]	we	considered	[it]	of	extreme	importance	to	discuss	some	of	the	issues	that	the	WSA	are	confronted	with	…																																																									78	Statement	by	the	WSA	Executive	published	together	with	“the	broadsheet	it	refers	to.”		79	The	clause	“let	a	hundred	flowers	bloom”	references	Mao	Zedong’s	1957	speech	“On	the	Correct	Handling	of	Contradictions	among	the	People.”	
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If	any	group	of	members	or	individuals	would	like	to	discuss	one	of	the	articles	…	contact	this	area	group	through	[a	name	and	address	were	supplied].80	The	document	contained	six	articles:	1)	“Honesty	is	Revolutionary,”	2)	“Consideration	of	the	Article	on	‘The	Origins	of	Male	Chauvinism	and	its	Effects	on	the	Revolutionary	Movement’,”	3)	“The	Rise	of	Fascism	in	Australia,”	4)	“Stalinism	and	its	Repercussions,”	5)	“Towards	Establishing	a	Revolutionary	Theory”	and	6)	“Economic	Imperialism	in	Australia.”	With	the	exceptions	of	articles	3	and	4,	they	were	similar	in	manner	and	content	to	articles	that	were	commonly	published	in	the	WSA	Bulletin;	in	fact,	the	second	was	a	response	to	an	article	previously	published	there.	Articles	3	and	4	were	slightly	different	in	that	they	attacked	some	of	the	sacred	cows	of	the	WSAs	existence:	the	nature	of	the	revolution,	the	united	front,	the	course	of	the	Chinese	revolution	and	the	CPA	(ML).	Even	so,	these	two	articles	did	not	raise	anything	that	had	not	already	been	raised	in	previous	bulletins	and	publications.	Judging	by	past	experience	of	the	publication	of	similar	articles,	their	authors	could	have	expected	sharp	rejoinders	in	subsequent	issues.	However,	the	document’s	introductory	words	invited	members	to	bypass	WSA	forums	and	to	hold	discussion	of	the	issues	that	it	raised	in	local	area	groups.	Although	Trotsky’s	name	was	not	used	in	either	article	3	or	4,	both	carried	the	unmistakable	stamp	of	a	Trotskyist	canon.	For	example,	article	3	opposed	the	idea	that	revolutionaries	could	work	with	or	within	“largely	middle-class”	organisations	like	the	Carlton	Association	because	it	“can	be	seen	as	potentially	fascist”	and	its	“prime	concern”	is	not	for	“the	workers	who	are	being	brutally	turfed	out	of	their	homes.”81	At	this	time,	as	mentioned	above,	the	Carlton	WSA	branch	was	working	with	the	Carlton	Association.	Article	3	railed	against	cooperation	with	anything	tainted	with	nationalism:		Issues	of	foreign	domination	of	capital,	Save	our	Kangaroos,	Conservation,	Keep	Australia	Beautiful	…	are	all	movements	which	are	instilling																																																									80	Untitled	20-page	document,	Croydon–Ringwood	WSA	area	group,	c.	August	1971,	1,	author’s	collection.	81	Ibid.,	8.	
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nationalist	sentiments	and	any	movement	which	does	that	must	be	regarded	as	dangerous	and	as	aiding	the	rise	of	fascism.82		Article	4	carried	an	even	heavier	load	of	phraseology	commonly	found	in	orthodox	Trotskyist	literature;	for	example,	the	accusation	that	“Stalin’s	method	led	him	…	to	his	idea	of	(socialism	in	one	country).	This	idea	is	in	its	entirety	anti-Marxist	and	anti-Leninist.”83	Later,	the	article	pointed	to	“Stalin’s	betrayal	of	working	class	revolutions	[in]	Britain	and	China”	through	his	control	of	the	Communist	International.	It	stated	that	he	forged	an	alliance	between	“the	Soviet	Trade	Unions	and	the	General	Council	of	the	British	TUC.	This	alliance	merely	acted	as	a	left	cover	for	the	reactionary	and	right	elements	of	the	TUC.”	On	the	Chinese	revolution,	the	article	went	even	further,	allowing	the	Chinese	communists	no	place	in	determining	their	own	affairs:	“Stalin’s	merging	of	the	Chinese	Communist	Party	[CCP]	with	the	Kuomintang	forced	the	CCP	to	accept	the	reactionary	nationalism	of	the	Kuomintang.”84	This	was	clearly	a	digest	of	Trotsky’s	writings	on	the	topic,	particularly	his	introduction	to	The	Tragedy	of	the	Chinese	Revolution.85	Given	the	circumstances	of	its	publication,	the	distribution	of	this	“area	group”	bulletin	was	limited	to	the	number	of	copies	produced	by	its	authors	(who	retained	possession	of	the	stencils).	Thus,	the	issues	that	they	raised	received	only	limited	discussion	and	disappeared	into	the	mist	of	unread	articles.	They	received	no	reply	or	response	in	the	WSA	Bulletin.	However,	in	December	1971,	the	leading	article	in	
WSA	Bulletin	no.	6,	which	ran	to	fourteen	pages,	was	both	a	critique	of	and	warning	about	Trotskyism.	Its	title—“Smash	the	Rightist	Deviation	of	Reckless	Co-operation	with	the	Trotskyites!”—was	a	parody	of	the	Cultural	Revolution’s	style	of	headlining.86	Ostensibly,	it	was	a	response	to	an	unnamed	treatise	in	the	radical																																																									82	Ibid.	83	Ibid.,	9.	The	parentheses	are	in	the	original.	84	Ibid.	My	purpose	here	is	not	to	argue	the	merits	of	either	side	in	this	debate	but	to	indicate	why	the	arguments	in	this	document	would	be	identified	with	Trotskyism.	The	markers	of	Trotskyism	that	I	have	used	here	are:	Trotsky’s	opposition	to	the	possibility	of	building	“socialism	in	one	country”;	his	opposition	to	Stalinism	(characteristic	of	other	trends	too);	and	his	critique	of	the	popular	front,	which	he	described	as	class-collaborationism.	85	Leon	Trotsky,	“Introduction,”	in	Harold	R.	Isaacs,	The	Tragedy	of	the	Chinese	Revolution	(London,	1938),	accessed	7	December	2017,	https://www.marxists.org/archive/trotsky/1938/xx/china.htm.	86	WSA	Bulletin,	no.	6,	December	1971,	item	1,	1–14.	
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newsletter	Tocsin,	which,	in	this	treatment,	was	referred	to	as	“Toxin,”	but	its	content	related	to	the	arguments	that	had	featured	in	the	Croydon–Ringwood	bulletin.	From	the	outset,	its	author	used	a	style	calculated	to	jolt	rather	than	ease	its	readers	into	taking	notice:	“Recently	we	have	tolerated	a	whole	heap	of	Trotskyite	dogshit	in	WSA	bulletins	and	in	Toxin	articles	and	pamphlets.”87	Its	argument	also	matched	that	of	the	Croydon–Ringwood	area	group	in	that	it	was	widely	researched,	reliant	upon	significant	utterances	of	leaders	like	Lenin	and	Stalin,	and	given	to	pejorative	extrapolation	from	events	and	statements	taken	out	of	context.	Its	content	covered	theories	of	the	rise	of	fascism,	the	united	front	and	the	problems	of	the	Chinese	revolution.	Of	the	two	sides	in	this	contest	it	is	not	possible	to	identify	a	winner.	After	the	publication	of	WSA	Bulletin	no.	6	there	were	no	expulsions,	reorganisations,	heroic	speeches,	or	condemnatory	orations	at	conferences	or	meetings.	The	organisation	simply	left	it	up	to	practical	organisational	activities,	such	as	participation	in	Moratorium	or	anti-Apartheid	committees,	to	resolve	any	differences.	The	Maoist	ascendancy	remained	intact.	
Demonstrations	and	Occupations	
The	political	calendar	of	1971	was	replete	with	opportunities	in	which	the	performative	language	of	physical	protest	actions	was	used.	Protesters’	presence	in	the	streets,	playing	fields,	universities	and	other	public	places	challenged	the	hegemony	of	authorities	by	establishing	the	right	to	repurpose	those	places.	Such	protests	included	occupations	of	administration	buildings	at	universities;	May	Day	marches;	anti-Apartheid	demonstrations;	small-scale	actions	on	the	environment,	poverty	and	unemployment;	support	for	draft	resisters;	the	4	July	demonstration;	and	the	ongoing	Vietnam	Moratorium	movement.	This	thesis	cannot	and	does	not	examine	all	of	these	protests.	Instead,	the	4	July	demonstrations,	the	Moratorium	movement,	and	the	separate	occupations	at	La	Trobe,	Monash	and	Melbourne	universities	convey	the	nature	of	all.	
																																																								87	Ibid.,	1.	(Emphasis	in	original.)	
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In	all	its	demonstrations	and	physical	protest	actions,	the	WSA	sought	to	establish	a	presence	and	ensure	that	its	politics	of	anti-imperialism	prevailed.	By	persisting	in	the	use	of	novel	tactics	and	actions	that	confronted	the	right	of	the	state	to	control	public	spaces,	it	ensured	that	the	state	would	retaliate.	By	this	time,	it	had	become	clear	that	state	retaliation	in	the	form	of	police	action	provided	opportunities	for	short	campaigns	and	single	events,	such	as	the	May	Day	march,	to	become	extended	in	terms	of	media	exposure	and,	therefore,	public	attention/interest.	However,	this	extension	of	time	meant	that	radical	and	“left”	organisations	had	to	maintain	their	solidarity	and	the	integrity	of	their	resolve.	This	chapter	has	shown	that	the	WSA	determined	to	achieve	this,	not	by	propaganda	and	motivational	speeches,	but	by	internal	argument	and	discussion.	.
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Chapter	8:	War’s	End,	the	Struggle	Continues	for	a	
Bit		
This	chapter	covers	some	of	the	actions	and	writings	of	the	Worker	Student	Alliance	(WSA)	in	the	period	1972–1974.	The	WSA	and	its	associated	branches,	along	with	its	sister	student	organisations	in	the	universities,	had	matured	sufficiently	to	lead	and	initiate	campaigns	without	needing	to	attach	themselves	to	other	organisations	or	parties.	The	WSA’s	success	increasingly	attracted	the	interest	of	the	Communist	Party	of	Australia	(Marxist-Leninist)	(CPA	(ML)),	which	was	welcomed	by	at	least	the	most	active	members.	This	chapter	discusses	the	actions	that	the	WSA	developed	as	the	Vietnam	War	came	to	an	end,	including	its	anti-Nazi	campaign	and	its	attempts	to	stymie	the	completion	of	the	Omega	Base	in	Western	Australia.	This	chapter	highlights	the	central	argument	of	this	thesis		and	concludes	with	discussion	of	the	abrupt	and	deliberate	ending	of	the	organisation,.	By	the	end	of	1972,	the	WSA	had	grown	to	the	extent	that	its	membership	was	able	to	form	itself	into	sixteen	mainly	suburban	branches	in	Victoria,	three	university	student	branches,	one	each	at	La	Trobe,	Monash	and	Melbourne	universities,	a	branch	in	South	Australia	and	another	in	Western	Australia,	and	two	branches	in	NSW,	one	at	Sydney	and	one	at	Newcastle.1	It	had	closely	associated	and	contributing	organisations	among	teachers	and	secondary	school	students,	several	rank	and	file	union	groups,	and	a	well-established	network	of	activists	within	social	groups	such	as	the	Moratorium	movement.	The	WSA	had	prepared	itself	for	the	time	when	the	war	would	cease	to	be	a	rallying	cause	by	raising	other	campaigns	to	replace	it.		The	complexity	and	scope	of	WSA	mobilisations	had	increased	and	there	was	no	shortage	of	issues	to	keep	members	active	and	involved.	The	back	page	of	each	issue	of	its	newspaper,	Struggle,	had	a	section	on	“Coming	Events.”	For	1973,	that	column	listed	some	hundred	issues	and	the	actions	that	sprang	from	them.	These	included	draft	resistance;	the	Aboriginal	Tent	Embassy;	Aboriginal	land	rights;	the	Sunbury																																																									1	“WSA	Branches,”	Struggle,	no.	27,	27	November	–	11	December	1972,	16.	
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pop	festival;	an	anti-Suharto	rally;	anti-apartheid	meetings	and	demonstrations;	the	Vietnam	Moratorium;	pirate	radio	3PR;	the	gaoling	of	Brian	Pola,	Barry	York	and	Fergus	Robinson;	Gurindji	stock	purchases;	and	the	future	of	freeways.2	Some	of	these	campaigns	have	already	been	described	in	this	thesis.3		With	its	ability	to	mobilise	really	large	numbers	for	militant	actions	over	a	wide	range	of	social	and	political	issues,	the	WSA	had	become	a	force	to	be	considered	when	social	and	political	protest	was	called	for.	In	its	own	right,	it	was	also	an	initiator	of	campaigns.	This	chapter	focuses	on	a	campaign	that	involved	the	whole	of	the	organisation:	the	anti-Nazi	campaign.	It	was	a	WSA-initiated	action	that	defied	the	application	of	the	power	of	the	state	and	mobilised	otherwise	inactive	sections	of	the	community.	Beginning	in	1972,	it	is	the	one	campaign	that	stands	out	as	unequivocally	having	been	developed	and	led	by	the	WSA.	With	drawn-out	trials,	the	campaign	lasted	until	the	last	months	of	1973.		
Anti-Nazi	Campaign	
During	1971,	the	Australian	National	Socialist	Party	or	Nazi	Party	had	become	more	prominent	throughout	Australia.	Much	of	this	is	documented	in	David	Harcourt’s	book,	Everyone	Wants	to	Be	Fuhrer.4	In	Victoria,	it	gained	notoriety	for	attempting	(unsuccessfully)	to	conduct	its	own	propaganda	distribution	in	the	city,	attacking	Moratorium	and	other	anti–Vietnam	War	marches,	smashing	up	left-wing	bookshops	and	the	conduct	of	its	armed	training	camps	in	the	hills	around	Melbourne.5	As	opposition	to	the	Nazi	emergence	grew,	the	WSA	joined	Jewish	youth	groups,	other	left-wing	organisations	and	the	Association	of	Ex-Victims	of	Nazi	Persecution,	in	massing	opposition	to	Nazi	activities	and	congresses.	Notable	among	these	was	a	rally	in	opposition	to	a	planned	public	address	by	the	Nazi	leader,	Cass	Young,	at	Melbourne’s	version	of	“Speakers’	Corner”	on	the	Yarra	Bank	
																																																								2	Selected	from	“Coming	Events,”	Struggle,	nos.	5–25,	3	January	–	11	December	1972.	A	more	complete	listing	is	contained	in	Appendix	2.	3	For	example,	see	York,	Student	Revolt.	4	David	Harcourt,	Everyone	Wants	to	Be	Fuhrer	(Cremorne,	New	South	Wales:	Angus	and	Robertson,	1972),	43–52.	5	Ibid.,	44–46,	50,	51.	
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on	31	January	1971.6	When	the	Nazis	failed	to	appear,	about	a	thousand	of	their	assembled	opponents	marched	to	the	North	Carlton	headquarters	of	the	Nazi	Party;	however,	no	confrontation	occurred,	as	the	Victoria	Police	engineered	an	escape	for	the	right-wing	group.7	From	the	beginning	of	1972,	the	Nazi	Party	in	Melbourne	continued	to	attempt	to	create	a	uniformed	and	orderly	appearance	in	public	places	but	was	constantly	thwarted	by	public	opposition	that	sometimes	resulted	in	violence.	The	Nazi	Party’s	campaign	changed	tack,	reaching	a	peak	when,	over	the	course	of	one	night	in	May,	its	members	set	fire	to	the	East	Wind	Bookshop,	the	Centre	for	Democratic	Action	in	Carlton,	the	Source	Bookshop	and	the	Chinese	Fellowship	Club.8	The	WSA’s	reaction	was	to	escalate	its	anti-Nazi	campaigning.	In	an	article	titled	“Cops	Stand	by	with	Arms	Folded	…	BUT	…	NAZIS	WILL	PAY!!,”	Struggle	reported	the	fires	and	some	similar,	slightly	earlier	attacks	on	the	“revisionist	party	headquarters”	and	the	East	Wind	Bookshop	in	Brisbane.	Elaborating	on	its	headline,	the	article	declared	that:	“Indeed	the	Nazis	have	openly	boasted	of	the	protection	they	receive	from	the	police	in	their	attempts	to	break	up	demonstrations.	They	are	also	openly	conducting	training	camps	in	hand-to-hand	combat	and	in	firearms—with	ex	army	instructors.”9	Continuing	in	this	vein	and	adding	what	could	easily	have	been	seen	as	idle	or	“grandstanding”	threats,	the	article	advocated	taking	the	matter	of	curbing	the	Nazi’s	activities	out	of	the	hands	of	state	authorities:		WSA	believes	that	last	Thursday’s	bomb	attacks	are	partly	our	own	fault.	We	should	have	reacted	more	strongly	…	The	Melbourne	Nazis	are	delighted	with	the	“success”	in	Brisbane—their	magazine	“stormtrooper”	published	glowing	accounts.	Their	enthusiasm	would	have	been	somewhat	moderated	if	they	had	known	that	every	outrage	they	perpetrate	would	be	immediately	followed	by	a	reprisal.10	
																																																								6	“Speakers’	Corner”	is	a	now	disused	reserve	on	the	bank	of	the	Yarra	River	near	the	Melbourne	central	business	district.	7	Harcourt,	Everyone	Wants	to	Be	Fuhrer,	47.	8	Ibid.,	44–45,	51.	9	“Cops	Stand	by	with	Arms	Folded	…	but	...	Nazis	Will	Pay,”	Struggle,	29	May	1972,	3.	10	Ibid.,	3.	
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In	framing	the	anti-Nazi	campaign	as	a	somewhat	physical	contest	in	which	the	police	would	not	or	could	not	act,	the	WSA	positioned	itself	to	act;	in	so	doing,	it	made	it	clear	that	it	was	prepared	to	exercise	the	coercive	power	of	the	state	if	required.	The	article	continued:	“We	can	imagine	what	the	authorities	would	say	if	the	Worker	Student	Alliance	organised	training	camps	in	firearms,	etc.	Yet	the	Nazis	are	doing	this	and	openly	declaring	that	they	intend	to	bash	and	murder	Australian	citizens.”	Then,	at	the	very	end	of	the	article,	came	an	invitation:	“On	Queen’s	Birthday	weekend	Nazis	from	all	over	Australia	are	going	to	hold	a	conference.	The	address	will	be	published	by	WSA	as	widely	as	possible.	Be	there	and	bring	your	friends.”11	In	the	week	before	the	Queen’s	Birthday	holiday,	the	WSA	and	the	Australian	Building	and	Construction	Workers’	Federation	(Builders’	Labourers	Federation	(BLF))	jointly	produced	a	leaflet	headed	Nazis	and	Fascists	of	All	Kinds	Must	Be	
Annihilated.	It	warned	that,	on	this	long	weekend,	the	National	Socialist	Party	of	Australia	(NSPA)	would	be	“attempting	to	hold	a	conference.	THIS	CONFERENCE	MUST	BE	STOPPED.”	The	leaflet	lauded	the	action	against	the	NSPA	conference	in	the	previous	year,	which	followed	its	spate	of	arson	attacks,	culminated	“in	the	driving	of	the	Nazis	from	their	headquarters.	Up	until	this	conference	we	have	had	no	trouble	from	them.	…	THE	NAZIS	MUST	BE	DRIVEN	OFF	THE	STREETS.”12	In	1972,	the	Queen’s	Birthday	long	weekend	fell	on	10–12	June.	The	Nazi	Party’s	National	Conference	had	begun	in	a	church	hall	in	South	Melbourne.	However,	unable	to	discover	the	venue,	the	WSA	had	organised	an	anti-Nazi	rally	and	leafleting	event	at	the	City	Square	on	11	June	instead.	The	rally	coincided	with	a	special	meeting	of	the	Jewish	Society	of	Melbourne	University,	held	to	“formulate	strategy	to	foil	an	Australian	Nazi	group’s	push	into	Federal	electioneering.”13	The	crowd	at	the	City	Square	gathered	with	high	expectation	of	a	march	on	the	Nazi	conference,	similar	to	that	which	had	occurred	in	North	Carlton	on	31	January	1971.																																																									11	Ibid.	12	Nazis	and	Fascists	of	All	Kinds	Must	Be	Annihilated,	leaflet	(Melbourne:	Worker	Student	Alliance	and	Australian	Building	and	Construction	Workers’	Federation,	6	June	1972),	reproduced	in	Struggle,	no.	16,	12	June	1972,	5.	13	Sun-Herald	(Sydney),	11	June	1972,	quoted	in	Harcourt,	Everyone	Wants	to	Be	Fuhrer,	52.	
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Without	any	intelligence	about	the	conference	venue,	the	next	best	thing	was	the	Nazi	Party	headquarters	in	Beaver	Street,	St	Albans,	an	outer-western	suburb	of	Melbourne.	Albert	Langer	and	a	range	of	speakers	urged	the	audience	to	go	there	straightaway	and,	after	short	interchanges	about	the	violence	that	that	implied,	no	further	instructions	were	needed.14	The	rally	folded	within	minutes	and	the	City	Square	emptied	as	participants	made	for	their	cars.	Harcourt,	mainly	using	newspaper	reports	from	The	Sydney	Morning	Herald,	The	
Daily	Telegraph	(Sydney),	The	Australian,	The	Herald	(Melbourne)	and	The	Age	(Melbourne),	describes	the	St	Albans	events	in	detail.15	As	a	participant	in	the	event,	I	can	confirm	the	gist	of	his	account,	the	salient	points	of	which	follow.	The	first	to	arrive	at	the	Nazi	headquarters	was	a	contingent	of	mainly	young,	Jewish	students	who	proceeded	to	break	into	the	building	and	to	cause	as	much	mayhem	as	possible.	The	party	headquarters	building,	which	was	also	used	as	the	home	of	Nazi	leader,	Cassius	Young	and	his	wife	Katrina,	had	its	locks	and	windows	broken	and	party	files	strewn	in	disorder.	The	Herald	reported	that	the	demonstrators:	Most	claiming	to	be	Jews,	hurled	bricks,	rocks	and	metal	through	the	windows.	Some	…	carrying	red	flags	broke	into	the	house	and	smashed	everything	inside	…	an	office	with	a	padlocked	door	was	broken	into.	Files	were	thrown	out.	Interviewed	after	viewing	television	footage	of	the	event,	Katrina	Young	claimed	that	the	crowd	carried	“Worker	Student	Alliance	banners	and	many	more	badges	with	‘WSA’	on	them.	At	least	ten	percent	of	the	crowd	wore	those	little	yamulkes	or	whatever	you	call	those	Jewish	hats.”16		When	I	arrived,	there	were	what	looked	like	smouldering	sleeping	bags	at	the	door;	perhaps	they	had	belonged	to	conference	delegates	from	other	states.	I	found	my	brother,	Dale,	stamping	out	the	flames	of	burning	files	that	threatened	to	ignite	the	curtains.	He	was	muttering	about	the	idiocy	of	burning	things	that	could	provide	usable	intelligence	for	the	anti-Nazi	cause.	I	felt	that	I	had	missed	the	action																																																									14	Phillip	Court,	interview	with	author,	2	May	2017.	15	Harcourt,	Everyone	Wants	to	Be	Fuhrer,	52–54.	16	Katrina	Young,	interview	quoted	in	Harcourt,	Everyone	Wants	to	Be	Fuhrer,	53.	
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somewhat.	On	the	way	out,	I	was	given	a	neat	pile	of	index	cards	with	the	names	and	other	details	of	about	sixty	NSPA	members	and	supporters	in	Victoria.	They	were	given	to	me	on	the	understanding	that,	as	a	Central	Committee	member	of	the	WSA,	I	would	know	what	to	do	with	them.	Phillip	Court	confirms	that	WSA	members	were	a	little	late	for	the	action.	When	he	arrived	at	Beaver	Street	“banners	were	hastily	being	unfurled”	but	the	building	had	already	been	broken	into.	Someone	emerged	with	a	framed	portrait	of	Hitler,	which	Court	took	hold	of	and,	jumping	up	on	the	brick	gatepost	with	the	megaphone,	announced:	“This	is	the	house,	this	is	the	house,’	[or]	something	along	those	lines.”17	Although	a	Channel	9	television	crew	had	arrived	at	Beaver	Street	before	any	of	the	demonstrators,	the	police	did	not	arrive	until	later,	when	the	demonstrators	were	beginning	to	go	home.	Thus,	there	were	no	arrests	on	the	day	and	no	personal	violence	was	visited	upon	anyone.	While	the	WSA	had	made	its	anti-Zionist	and	pro-Palestine	Liberation	stance	widely	known,	that	did	not	prevent	cooperation	with	Jewish	activists	on	the	day.	The	fact	that	there	were	so	many	Jews	in	the	WSA	may	have	facilitated	communication	between	the	WSA	and	the	Jewish	students.	In	an	interview	with	Hew	Evans	for	the	Australian	Broadcasting	Corporation’s	radio	program	PM,	Cassius	Young	said	“the	party	[NSPA]	held	the	SDS	(Students	for	a	Democratic	Society)	and	the	Worker	Student	Alliance	responsible	for	the	attack.”18	While	this	was	blame	that	both	the	SDS	and	WSA	could	bear	with	pride,	such	statements	reframed	the	discourse	from	a	dispute	between	Nazis	and	the	community	to	one	between	the	radical	left	and	the	radical	right.	Police	action	against	the	perpetrators	thus	became	easier	to	contemplate.	However,	that	is	only	the	start	of	the	story.	“No	one	has	been	arrested	over	the	attacks	but	the	police	have	been	telling	us	that	they	have	six,	sometimes	ten	suspects—just	something	to	keep	us	happy,”	Katrina	Young	complained.19	During	December,	the	arrests,	all	of	which	occurred	early	in	the	morning,	were	completed.	Pam	Dahl-Helm	and	I	were	arrested	early	on	the	morning	of	my	graduation	as	a	
																																																								17	Phillip	Court,	interview	with	author,	2	May	2017.	18	Harcourt,	Everyone	Wants	to	Be	Fuhrer,	54.	19	Ibid.,	52.	
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Technical	Teacher	on	7	December	1972.20	In	total,	seven	WSA	members	were	arrested	and	charged	with	unlawful	assembly	and	the	more	serious	charge	of	riotous	assembly,	which	would	have	brought	long	prison	sentences.	Those	arrested	were	Pam	Dahl-Helm,	Jim	Bacon,	Phillip	Court	and	his	wife	Margaret	Court,	Michael	O’Donnell,	Bruce	Cornwall	and	me,	Nicholas	Butler.	Most	were	Central	Committee	members	of	the	WSA.	No	arrests	of	participants	from	the	Jewish	youth	groups	were	made.	Those	arrested	had	been	well	schooled	in	the	technique	of	handling	police	interrogation,	which	was	to	simply	answer	“I	have	done	nothing	wrong	so	I	have	nothing	to	say	to	you	in	this	matter,”	or	words	to	that	effect.21	All	of	the	arrestees	complied	with	that	advice	and,	at	the	actual	hearings	(committal),	the	police	could	tender	no	admissions	of	any	kind.	In	their	interrogation	at	Russell	Street	police	headquarters,	the	arrestees	were	shown	a	film	that	police	alleged	showed	“events	at	St	Albans	on	June	11th.”	The	seven	were	“released	on	$300	bail	each	to	appear	in	Sunshine	Court	on	February	26th	1973.”22		The	WSA	newspaper,	Struggle,	reasoned	that	the	arrests	were	an	attack	on	the	WSA	itself.	In	issue	no.	26,	the	paper	declared:	“The	purpose	of	this	attack	is	two-fold.	Firstly	it	is	hoped	that	current	police	action	will	intimidate	WSA	members.	Secondly,	it	is	an	attempt	to	smash	the	organisation.”	Citing	instances	of	WSA	campaigns	against	US	monopolies	and	the	Vietnam	War,	the	article	went	on	to	(not	altogether	successfully)	reframe	the	discourse	of	anti-Nazism	in	the	context	of	anti-imperialism:		These	are	the	real	powers	behind	the	attack	on	WSA.	The	Nazis	are	merely	tools	in	the	hands	of	these	main	enemies	…	The	Worker	Student	Alliance	will	certainly	not	be	intimidated	or	crushed	by	these	attacks.	We	will	vigorously	defend	our	organisation,	as	well	as	to	build	a	mass	struggle	
																																																								20	ASIO	Phone	Intercept,	Albert	Langer	call	to	Mara	Hayler	informing	her	of	the	arrests,	Reference:	I.E.	Vic.	W/14/72/26.	AW.	41	of	7-12-72,	in	my	ASIO	file,	NAA:	A6119,	6446.	A	copy	of	this	page	is	included	in	Appendix	3.	21	This	is	reflected	in	the	telephone	call	made	by	Langer	to	Hayler,	ASIO	Phone	Intercept,	Albert	Langer	call	to	Mara	Hayler,	see	Appendix	3.	22	“We	Will	Not	be	Intimidated,”	Struggle,	no.	26,	11	December	–	1	January	1973,	3.	Sunshine	is	a	suburb	of	Melbourne.	
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against	US	domination	of	our	country	…	See	you	at	Sunshine	Court	on	26th	Feb,	next	year!23		Whatever	the	aim	of	the	police	action,	they	were	operating	in	ground	that	was	familiar	to	the	WSA—that	is,	using	startling,	radical	and	disruptive	action	to	provoke	a	punitive	reaction	that	could	result	in	escalation	of	the	campaign.	This	process	extended	the	length	of	time	to	attract	the	media	and	keep	the	issue	alive	in	the	public	eye.	This	was	a	process	that	had	been	polished	regularly;	for	example,	in	campaigns	such	as	raising	money	for	the	National	Liberation	Front	of	South	Vietnam	and	the	4	July	demonstrations.	Phillip	Court	remembers:	That	there	were	meetings	of	the	seven	…	to	work	out	how	we	should	act	together	as	a	group.	People	went	on	paint-ups	and	I	did	too.	You	know	the	paint-up	“Free	the	Anti-Nazi	Seven”	and	what	not.	There	were	pamphlets	and	campaigns—some	attempts	to	curry	favour	with	the	RSL,	after	all	they	hate	Nazis—an	opportunity	to	stand	on	common	ground.	Various	public	meetings	at	which	one	or	more	of	us	might	have	been	speakers.	Pamphlets	and	the	press	and	Struggle.	It	was	clear	that	the	court	cases	…	the	committal	needed	to	be	a	public	affair	to	highlight	what	was	going	on.	So	there	was	an	organised	involvement	of	people	from	the	Waterside	Workers—presumably	organised	by	the	Maoist	party—the	CPA	(ML).24	My	own	recollections	confirm	those	of	Court;	for	instance,	Jim	Bacon	and	I	addressed	a	job	delegates	meeting	of	the	Australian	Railways	Union	at	one	stage.	All	seven	appeared	on	stage	at	Wilson	Hall,	Melbourne	University,	for	a	fundraising	pop	concert	and	a	“Free	the	Anti-Nazi	Seven”	paint-up	that	appeared	on	the	silo	walls	in	Punt	Road	under	the	landmark	Nylex	clock	and	remained	there	until	well	into	the	1990s.	I	remember	one	delegation	to	discuss	the	issue	with	Senator	Brown	who	promised	to	take	the	issue	up	with	others	in	the	Whitlam	government.	In	addition,	and	most	importantly,	WSA	branches	conducted	rallies	and	public	meetings	in	their	
																																																								23	Ibid.	24	Phillip	Court,	interview	with	author,	2	May	2017.	
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localities,	such	as	those	held,	according	to	a	photo	caption	in	Struggle,	“in	Northcote	and	at	Preston	Market	last	week	in	support	of	the	Anti-Nazis.”25	Part	of	the	approach,	mentioned	by	Court,	of	keeping	the	seven	together	to	operate	as	a	group	included	the	engagement	of	legal	representation.	The	president	of	the	Australia	China	Society,	Jack	Lazarus,	a	leading	QC,	offered	his	services	pro	bono.	It	had	been	a	growing	practice	for	arrested	WSA	members	to	shun	legal	representation	on	principle;	however,	the	charges	in	this	case	carried	such	severe	penalties	that	Lazarus’s	offer	was	accepted	on	the	basis	that	he	would	lead	the	defence	and	that	some	of	the	accused	would	conduct	their	own	defence.	Court,	Bacon,	Dahl-Helm,	O’Donnell	and	I	conducted	our	own	defence	in	close	concert	with	the	others.	Lazarus	was	famous	enough	as	a	defence	barrister	that	Magistrate	Loader	deferred	to	him	on	matters	of	procedure	while	those	conducting	their	own	defence,	in	their	“naivete”	could	question	witnesses	in	ways	that	were	barred	to	barristers.	This	proved	to	be	useful	in	several	instances,	such	as	when	I	was	able	go	off	topic	to	ask	the	“Führer”	of	the	Nazi	Party,	“wasn’t	the	name	of	your	dog,	Zyklon	B	Dog,	the	name	of	the	gas	used	in	the	Nazi	gas	chambers?”	He	replied	by	describing	the	stories	of	the	Holocaust	as	based	on	lies.	When	the	hearing	was	adjourned	for	that	day,	several	defendants	and	I	walked	across	the	road	from	the	courthouse	to	a	cafe	at	which	journalists	gathered	to	write	their	copy.	There	we	attempted,	successfully,	to	ensure	that	Cassius	Young’s	holocaust	denial	featured	in	their	reports.	It	was	an	opportunity	to	influence	the	framing	of	the	event	in	the	hope	that	some	support	would	come	from	the	Jewish	and	European	migrant	communities	and	the	Returned	Services	League.	It	was	duly	reported	in	The	Age	the	next	day.26	In	accordance	with	the	WSA’s	approach,	and	as	Court	mentioned	above,	“the	committal	needed	to	be	a	public	affair.”	To	this	end,	demonstrations	were	organised	to	take	place	at	the	Sunshine	Court	on	the	first	day	of	the	hearings.	The	February	issue	of	Struggle	devoted	its	front	page	and	two	other	pages	to	the	arrests	and	the	committal.	It	indicated	that	early	support	had	come	from	the	Young	Labor	Association,	Waterside	Workers’	Federation	(WWF)	and	BLF.	It	explained	the																																																									25	“People	Want	Nazis	Gotten	Rid	Of,”	Struggle,	no.	23,	18	March	–	1	April	1973,	4.		26	“Nazi	in	Court	Tells	of	Dog,”	The	Age,	27	May	1973,	5.	
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significance	of	the	charges	as	being	precedence	for	police	action	against	demonstrations	in	general	and	evidence	of	the	police	force’s	active	assistance	to	Nazism.	The	paper	stated:	“It	is	important	that	this	opposition	continues	to	grow—to	a	stage	where	the	government	sees	that	it	is	impossible	to	continue	with	the	trials.”27	The	first	day	of	the	committal	proceedings	began	in	a	small	room	at	the	back	of	the	Sunshine	Court	building	that	had	previously	been	used	as	a	storeroom.	It	was	so	small	that	only	two	or	three	members	of	the	public	could	be	present	along	with	the	defendants,	Lazarus,	the	police	prosecutor	and	his	witness,	the	magistrate	and	six	policemen.	Denied	access	to	the	court,	the	crowd,	which	included	some	of	the	teachers	from	the	school	at	which	I	taught,	milled	outside;	four	uniformed	Nazis	were	only	barely	separated	from	it	by	the	police	line.	Soon,	the	scene	descended	into	melee	and,	by	the	end	of	the	day,	eighteen	anti-Nazi	demonstrators	and	one	Nazi,	Ross	May,	had	been	arrested.	Those	arrested	included	Claude	Bradley	and	Harry	Bocquet	whose	membership	of	the	WWF	served	as	a	reason	for	that	organisation	to	take	it	further.	Bocquet,	who	was	also	a	WWII	veteran,	was	eventually	sentenced	to	two-months	gaol	for	assaulting	police	in	the	course	of	“ripping	a	swastika	armband	from	a	Nazi.”28	It	was	in	the	process	of	Bocquet’s	trial	that	police	witness	Detective	Winn	admitted	that	he	was	“shaking	hands	with	Nazi	Ross	May	inside	the	police	station	at	the	time.”29	Here	was	another	useful	point	in	framing	the	anti-Nazi	campaign	as	a	struggle	of	the	people	against	fascism	in	the	face	of	police	support	of	Nazis.	The	WSA	campaign	had	its	friendly	detractors;	it	was	criticised	for	being	overly	bellicose	and	uncritical	and	insincere	with	regard	to	the	encouragement	of	violence	towards	the	Nazis.	Critics	views	were	reported	in	Struggle	and	taken	on	board	and	one	such	critic	took	exception	to	the	editorial	on	the	front	page	of	the	previous	issue	of	Struggle:	
																																																								27	Struggle,	no.	30,	18	February	–	3	March	1973,	1,	4,	5	and	16.	28	Anti-Fascist	Committee,	Fascism	Alert,	no.	1,	3.	This	was	an	undated	leaflet	published	by	the	Anti-Fascist	Committee.	“Anti-Nazis	Clash	with	Police,”	The	Herald,	26	February	1973,	5.	29	“People	Want	Nazis	Gotten	Rid	Of,”	4.	
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Because	of	this	incident	certain	local	Nazis	are	going	to	get	beaten	up.	If	they	do	it	again,	they	are	going	to	get	beaten	up	again,	only	more	severely.	If	they	succeed	in	murdering	anybody,	they	are	going	to	get	killed.	We	now	believe	that	this	statement	reflects	a	poor	understanding	of	how	the	anti-fascist	campaign	should	be	waged.	It	provides	fuel	for	the	reactionary	fires	of	pseudo	left	newspapers	like	the	“Nation	Review.”30	WSA	leaflets	and	articles	toned	down	their	language	from	that	point	on	but	the	campaign	spread	further	as	those	arrested	outside	the	first	hearing	came	to	trial	themselves.	Since	two	of	its	members,	Bocquet	and	Bradley,	were	involved,	the	WWF	was	able	to	gain	support	from	other	unions	including	the	Amalgamated	Metalworkers	Union,	led	by	CPA	officials,	and	Meat	Workers	Union,	led	by	ALP	officials.31	At	one	point,	they	shut	down	the	port	of	Melbourne.	Vanguard	reported:		Last	Thursday,	August	23,	Wharfies	went	on	strike	until	the	following	Monday	morning	to	protest	against	the	re-emergence	of	Nazism	in	Australia	and	the	jailing	of	one	of	their	workmates	H.	Bocquet	who	participated	in	an	anti-fascist	demonstration	outside	Sunshine	Court.32	Apart	from	union	action,	the	WSA	conducted	a	campaign	based	on	the	localities.	WSA	Chairman	Michael	Hyde	produced	a	press	release	that	described	the	arrests	of	the	seven	and	the	nature	of	the	charges	as	“striking	directly	at	freedom	of	assembly.”	Hyde	quoted	directly	from	several	clauses	of	the	United	Nations’	1971	resolution	2839	(XXVI),	which	“appeals	to	all	States	to	prohibit	activity	by	organisations	propagating	concepts	of	Nazism	and	racial	superiority	[Clause	6].”	According	to	Hyde,	the	failure	of	the	authorities	to	act	against	the	Nazis	was	“in	contempt	of	international	law.”33	His	press	release	provided	sufficient	information	for	the	mounting	of	a	leafleting	campaign	and	the	conduct	of	a	campaign	to	gain	signatures	
																																																								30	Ibid.,	5.	31	“25	People	Now	Face	Gaol	for	Acting	against	Nazis,”	leaflet	of	19	unions	publicising	the	Sunshine	Court	appearances	and	blaming	“Big	Monopolies”	for	fostering	fascism.	Re-published	in	Struggle,	no.	36,	21	May	–	4	June	1973,	4.	32	“Melbourne	Wharfies	Act	Vigorously	against	Fascism,”	Vanguard,	30	August	1973,	1.	33	Michael	Hyde,	“Press	Statement,”	WSA,	18	January	1973.	This	version	taken	from	the	ASIO	records	of	Phillip	Court	and	Nicholas	Butler,	and	labelled	“PPS	WSA	(Vict)	HQT	71/348”	and	“PPS	WSA	(Vict)	B/77/60,”	respectively.	United	Nations	resolution	2839	(XXVI)	is	headed:	“Measures	to	be	taken	against	Nazism	and	other	totalitarian	ideologies	and	practices	based	on	incitement	to	hatred	and	racial	intolerance.”	
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for	the	implementation	of	the	United	Nations’	resolutions	by	action	against	the	Nazis.	The	WSA	rarely	used	petitions;	however,	in	this	case,	they	seem	to	have	been	a	method	of	raising	the	issue	in	local	areas,	as	shown	in	a	report	in	Struggle:	“Four	of	us	have	collected	well	over	200	names	…	[in]	the	Sunshine	shopping	area	…	Almost	everyone	was	enthusiastic	in	their	support	for	the	Anti-Nazis.”	The	petitioners	changed	venue:	“Reaction	was	pretty	much	the	same	on	Monday	when	we	talked	to	people	at	Moomba	and	got	more	signatures	…	Going	around	with	a	petition	is	a	good	way	of	raising	the	issue	with	people.”34		Indications	that	the	campaign	was	working	came	when	the	Premier	of	Victoria,	Rupert	Hamer,	addressed	the	Jewish	Board	of	Deputies	on	2	April	with	the	words:	“I	am	totally	opposed	to	everything	the	Nazis	stand	for.	The	mere	fact	that	they	carry	on	as	they	do	must	be	offensive	to	people.”	Hamer’s	non-committal	statement	was	taken	further	in	an	editorial	in	a	local	Sunshine	newspaper,	The	Sunshine	Advocate:	“The	indication	given	by	the	Premier	…	that	he	would	be	receptive	to	banning	the	uniform	and	insignia	of	the	National	Socialist	(Nazi)	Party,	will	be	welcomed	by	most	fair	minded	people.”	The	paper	ended	its	editorial	with	reference	to	the	strong	showing	of	the	Labor	Party	in	opinion	polling	prior	to	the	state	election	on	19	May:	“one	is	moved	to	wonder	if	Hamer	WILL	make	it	(the	banning	of	the	Swastika)	happen	before	the	people	of	Victoria	cast	their	votes.”35	Although	the	anti-Nazi	campaign	lasted	until	the	end	of	1973,	the	committal	of	the	seven	was	heard	over	four	separate	days	of	prosecution	testimony	until	31	May,	when	it	came	to	an	abrupt	halt.	The	admissibility	of	the	Channel	9	film	of	the	event	at	Beaver	Street	had	been	a	feature	at	the	26	March	hearing.	Struggle	carried	a	report	of	the	prosecution’s	case	that	accords	with	my	recollection	of	the	prosecution’s	position.	In	summary,	Detective	Sergeant	Cutler	showed	the	film	and	had	to	admit	that,	while	the	film	was	sitting	at	Russell	Street	police	headquarters,	someone	unknown	had	“cut	200	feet	from	it.”	He	could	not	explain	how	that	had	occurred.	The	cameramen	and	the	lead	presenter	of	Channel	9’s	program	A	Current	
Affair,	Graeme	Coddington,	were	called	to	attest	to	the	film’s	validity	as	evidence.																																																									34	“People	Want	Nazis	Gotten	Rid	Of,”	4.	35	“Editorial,”	The	Sunshine	Advocate,	12	April	1973.		
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Under	examination,	they	“agreed	that	the	film	as	shown	in	court	was	chronologically	inaccurate,	generally	jumbled	and	deliberately	biased”	by	the	addition	to	it	of	extraneous	material.36	Upon	completion	of	the	police	case,	the	hearing	was	adjourned	until	31	May.	The	31	May	hearing	was	very	short.	My	recollection	is	that	Magistrate	Loader	asked	the	prosecution	if	they	had	additional	evidence	to	present	apart	from	the	film.	Upon	receiving	a	negative	response,	Loader	checked	again,	telling	the	police	prosecutor	that,	if	he	ruled	the	film	inadmissible,	the	police	would	have	no	evidence	and	their	case	would	collapse.	The	prosecutor	agreed,	the	magistrate	so	ruled	and	dismissed	the	case.	Commenting	on	the	reasons	for	the	collapse	of	the	police	case,	Phillip	Court	said:	It	was	fashionable	for	us	to	think	at	the	time	that	this	was	political	persuasion,	that	ASIO	had	something	to	do	with	it,	that	the	fact	that	the	Wharfies	were	flexing	their	muscles	showed	the	power	of	the	working	class,	the	ruling	class	had	decided	they	had	bitten	off	more	than	they	could	chew	and	it	would	be	better	to	bury	it.	As	time	goes	on	I	think	that’s	all	us	getting	a	little	ahead	of	ourselves	I	tend	to	think	it	was	probably	much	more	a	matter	of	dry	legal	argument	about	the	technicalities	of	admissibility	of	evidence.37	The	WSA’s	confidence	that	the	case	would	go	its	way	was,	perhaps,	best	expressed	in	a	phone	call	that	Albert	Langer	made	to	Mara	Hayler	on	the	first	day	of	the	arrests	that	was	intercepted	by	the	Australian	Security	Intelligence	Organisation	(ASIO):		LANGER	referred	to	the	arrests	that	were	made	this	morning	and	asked	if	HAYLER	had	been	contacted	about	them	…	LANGER	said	that	he	had	been	thinking	about	the	arrests	and	what	sort	of	trial	they	would	have	and	apart	from	the	fact	that	they	are	trying	to	intimidate	everyone	…	could	be	that	they	will	have	virtually	no	evidence	for	a	trial	like	this—apparently	there	were	no	Police	at	the	demonstration—and	they	will	be	relying	on	films	and	verbal	admissions.38		
																																																								36	“Sunshine	Trial	Adjourned,”	Struggle,	no.	33,	1–14	April	1973,	2.	37	Phillip	Court,	interview	with	author,	2	May	2017.	38	ASIO	Phone	Intercept,	Albert	Langer	call	to	Mara	Hayler,	NAA:	A6119,	6446.	See	Appendix	3.	(Capitalisation	in	original.)	
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Certainly,	the	WSA	played	up	the	meaning	of	the	acquittal	as	Court	has	indicated.	To	do	otherwise	would	have	been	to	miss	an	opportunity	to	consolidate	its	driving	of	the	Nazi	Party	from	the	streets	of	Melbourne.	
Going	Out	on	a	High	
The	anti-Nazi	operation	was	one	of	the	highlights	of	the	last	years	of	the	WSA,	but	there	were	other	campaigns	that	rivalled	it	in	importance.	However,	to	describe	them	here	would	be	to	risk	repetition	of	the	points	already	made	above.	Some	of	these	campaigns	were	ultimately	unsuccessful:	for	example,	the	Anti-Freeways	campaign	to	stop	the	Eastern	Freeway	from	being	built;	and	the	Anti-ESSO	Bay	Pipeline	campaign	against	the	building	of	a	pipeline	to	take	gas	from	Bass	Strait	to	a	new	gas-fired	power	station	in	Newport,	a	suburb	of	Melbourne.	These	campaigns	suffered	from	the	fact	that	they	contained	elements	of	“nimbyism”	and	could	not	attract	solid	support.39	Of	all	the	WSA’s	other	campaigns,	its	organised	opposition	to	the	existence	of	foreign	military	bases	in	Australia,	the	“Stop	Omega	Campaign,”	fits	the	pattern	of	WSA	operations	very	well.	A	small	Anti-US	Bases	Committee	consisting	of	peace	movement	activists	had	existed	for	some	time;	to	make	itself	formal,	it	convened	a	“public	meeting	to	get	the	anti-US	bases	off	the	ground,”	scheduled	for	Wednesday	21	March	1973	at	Assembly	Hall,	Collins	Street.40	From	this	meeting	emerged	the	idea	of	a	campaign	to	prevent	the	construction	of	a	US-controlled	“Omega”	base	in	Victoria.41	When	the	location	of	the	base	was	shifted	to	the	North	West	Cape	near	Exmouth	in	Western	Australia,	the	WSA	took	on	the	role	of	organising	the	“Long	March	to	North	West	Cape.”	This	was	a	mobile	demonstration	of	some	200	activists	from	every	Australian	state	that,	on	19	and	20	May	1974,	invaded	the	US	base.	US	navy	guards	arrested	forty-two	of	them,	mostly	WSA	members,	and	they	were	handed	over	to	the	West	Australian	police	for	processing.42	Again,	the	pattern	of	using	the	reaction	of	officialdom	to	keep	the	issue																																																									39	NIMBY	is	an	acronym	for	“Not	in	my	back	yard.”	40	“Coming	Events,”	Struggle,	no.	32,	18	March	–	1	April	1973,	16.	41	An	Omega	base	was	a	radio	facility	transmitting	in	the	long	wave	radio	spectrum	for	communicating	solely	with	submerged	nuclear	submarines.	42	ASIO	report	on	Nicholas	Butler,	NAA:	A6119,	6446,	142–143.	This	is	a	list	of	those	arrested.	
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in	the	public	view	showed	itself.	This	action	clearly	demonstrates	the	method	of	political	organisation	that	the	WSA	had	developed	over	the	years	of	its	existence.	The	target,	US	imperialism,	was	one	of	its	own	choosing	and	not	merely	a	reaction	to	a	transitory	and	objectionable	assertion	of	hegemonic	power.	It	was	one	that	was	able	to	motivate	many	who	had	previously	been	inactive	to	take	radical	and	public	action.	With	this	program	of	prominent	activity	and	growing	credibility	as	an	organisation	of	the	“left,”	the	incongruity	of	1974	being	the	last	year	of	the	WSA’s	existence	cannot	be	explained	with	reference	to	the	external	social	or	political	pressures	upon	it.	The	organisation	thrived	on	external	pressure,	as	has	been	shown	above.	It	needed	the	pressure	of	arrests	or	controversies	with	other	political	parties	or	the	uncertainties	of	mobilising	thousands	for	demonstrations	to	build	confidence	and	membership.	What	problems	there	were	lay	in	the	internal	discourses	that	gave	the	WSA	its	character	and	determined	the	way	that	it	dealt	with	those	external	pressures.	The	ending	of	Australia’s	role	in	the	Vietnam	War	and	the	drawn-out	defeat	of	the	American	war	machine	at	the	hands	of	the	Viet	Cong	and	Viet	Minh	armies	removed	an	issue	over	which	the	WSA	could	mobilise.43	This	was	a	major	condition	that	affected	the	focus	of	the	WSA;	however,	in	their	responses	to	my	questions	on	this	point,	former	WSA	members	ignored	it	as	a	causative	factor.	All	spoke	about	ideological	confusion	at	the	time,	from	which	it	may	be	concluded	that,	although	the	organisation’s	termination	came	as	no	surprise,	it	was	not	widely	discussed.44	Michael	Hyde	and	Phillip	Court,	in	separate	interviews,	took	the	issue	of	ideological	confusion	further	than	others.	When	reminded	that	the	CPA	(ML)	had	criticised	him	at	a	Youth	Commission	meeting	for	winding	up	the	WSA,	Hyde	personalised	the	issue:		
																																																								43	On	7	November	1971,	the	4th	Royal	Australian	Regiment	was	the	last	unit	to	leave	Nui	Dat.	By	November	1972,	the	last	Australian	“advisors”	had	left	Vietnam.	For	the	remaining	US	troops,	a	ceasefire	took	effect	on	27	January	1973	but	it	was	not	until	30	April	1975	that	Viet	Minh	troops	captured	the	capital	of	the	south,	Saigon.	The	Fifth	Royal	Australian	Regiment	Association,	accessed	26	May	2018,	https://www.5rar.asn.au/history/cronicle.htm.	44	The	persons	questioned	on	this	topic	were	Elizabeth	Gooding,	Les	Barnes,	Mara	Hayler,	Michael	Hyde,	Victor	Zbar	and	Darce	Cassidy.	
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I	can	now	remember	me	having	to	defend	it.	People	didn’t	like	it,	it	may	well	have	come	about	because	I	was	exhausted,	I	couldn’t	think	of	what	else	to	do.	It	[WSA]	seemed	to	be	stagnating.	It	seemed	to	be	at	a	stalemate	as	I	recall.	And	in	one	of	my	ASIO	files	it	says	the	Fergus	Robinson	said	that	Mike	Hyde	was	being	sent	mad	by	all	of	the	divisions	in	WSA	and	I	don’t	think	I	could	really	handle	it	…	I	couldn’t	handle	a	movement	with	so	many	divisions	in	it	and	I	can	remember	there	being	a	lot	of	divisions.45	However,	Court	credits	the	influence	of	the	CPA	(ML)	as	the	crucial	factor.	Although	not	directly	involved	in	the	dissolution	decision,	he	remembers:	That	there	was	an	attempt	to	replace	WSA	with	another	organisation,	son	of	WSA,	that	wouldn’t	be	specifically	branded	as	the	Worker	Student	Alliance	but	more	branded	as	national	independence	…	from	the	superpowers	that	kind	of	thing	…	I	definitely	believe	that	it	was	connected	to	the	way	the	party	line	in	the	CPA	(ML)	was	changing	from	the	immediate	objective	being	class	war,	bloody	revolution	and	a	proletarian	dictatorship,	and	all	the	horrors	that	that	entails,	to	a	sort	of	stepped	process	and	that	we	should	be	uniting	with	patriotic	capitalists	and	I	think	the	concept	of	a	Worker	Student	Alliance	was	a	little	out	of	step	with	the	idea	of	trying	to	get	into	bed	with	patriotic	capitalists	or	others—farmers.	So	I	think	that	was	the	fundamental	idea	as	to	why	the	WSA	had	reached	the	end	of	its	shelf	life	in	the	eyes	of	the	CPA	(ML)	…	I	might	also	say	that	I	think	WSA	was	not	really	the	youth	arm	of	the	CPA	(ML)	or	even	a	normal	sort	of	puppet	type	front	of	the	CPA	(ML)	…	an	adopted	wild	child	rather	than	something	that	was	conceived	by	the	CPA	(ML).46	While	Hyde	takes	the	blame	for	the	organisation’s	demise,	he	still	refers	to	the	stagnation	and	“divisions”	and	“stalemate”	that	abounded.	For	Court,	the	main	issue	was	that	a	change	of	political	discourse	was	required,	which	the	WSA	could	not	undertake	without	drastic	changes	in	the	nature	of	the	organisation.	Both	refer	to	the	influence	of	the	CPA	(ML),	but	neither	provide	details	of	the	arguments	and	divisions	that	brought	the	WSA	to	the	end	of	its	“shelf	life.”	Kerry	Craig’s	memory	gets	to	the	heart	of	the	practical	argument:	“My	memory	is	that	the	overarching	political	reason	…	was	a	desire	to	avoid	being	sucked	into	imaginary	party-building,	
																																																								45	Michael	Hyde,	interview	by	author,	4	March	2016.	46	Phillip	Court,	interview,	2	May	2017.	The	emphasis	shown	by	bold	letters	indicate	emphasis	by	the	speaker.	
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play-acting	etc.	It	seemed	pretty	clear	that	there	was	no	real	basis	for	any	real	mass	organisation	and	we’d	just	be	tolling	the	bell.”47		The	Monash	Labor	Club	had	founded	the	WSA	as	a	means	to	spread	its	radical,	left-wing	stance	out	of	the	campus	and	into	the	general	public.	In	the	eight	years	of	its	existence,	the	WSA’s	social	composition	had	changed	and,	by	1971,	it	was	no	longer	dominated	by	the	needs	of	the	student	cohort.	Its	political	environment	had	developed,	largely	through	its	own	efforts	but	also	in	relation	to	the	Vietnam	War.	Yet,	the	nature	and	role	of	the	WSA	as	it	evolved	had	never	been	conclusively	determined.	Attempts	to	do	so	had	played	out	in	ongoing	discussion	over	the	manifesto	or	political	platform	of	the	organisation.	This	discussion	never	ended	and,	even	by	1973,	no	definitive	document	had	been	adopted.	Even	though	the	CPA	(ML)	had	taken	a	keen	interest	in	the	organisation,	it	refrained	from	giving	publicly	known	advice.	Any	advice	that	it	had	proffered	was	to	individual	members	and	not	to	be	shared	as	party	advice	with	anyone	else	either	in	the	party	or	in	WSA.48		As	referred	to	by	Court	above,	in	the	years	prior	to	the	dissolution	of	the	WSA,	the	CPA	(ML)	newspaper,	Vanguard,	had	begun	reframing	the	nature	of	the	revolution.	This	was	to	transform	it	from	a	direct	socialist	revolution	to	a	two-stage	revolution	requiring	the	achievement	of	an	independent	Australia	as	a	prerequisite	for	socialism.	This	reframing	occurred	with	increasing	frequency	in	Vanguard,	as	the	following	example	from	September	1972	demonstrates:	People’s	Movement	for	National	Independence	Grows	Stronger	[Headline]	…	Ever	wider	sections	of	the	Australian	people	are	coming	into	the	struggle	against	the	domination	of	the	country	by	U.S.	imperialism	and	for	real	national	independence	…		Sections	of	the	capitalist	class	have	now	entered	the	struggle.	While	they	join	the	battle	for	their	own	class	reasons	nevertheless	they	objectively	assist	the	broader	people’s	movement	in	this	period	against	the	U.S.	overlords.49	
																																																								47	Kerry	Craig	(Langer),	email	message	to	author,	14	May	14,	2018.	48	For	example,	the	existence	of	the	party’s	Youth	Commission	that	Mike	Hyde	and	I	sat	on	was	to	remain	unknown.	49	“People’s	Movement	for	National	Independence	Grows	Stronger,”	Vanguard	9,	14	September	1972,	8.	
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Despite	retaining	the	words	“For	a	Socialist	Australia”	in	its	masthead,	Vanguard	increasingly	used	the	language	of	nationalism	and	patriotism	so	that,	by	23	August	1973,	in	an	editorial	about	the	federal	attorney-general’s	raid	on	ASIO,	it	stated:	“The	people	need	the	destruction	of	ASIO	to	further	the	great	patriotic	cause	of	smashing	U.S.	domination	and	achieving	real	independence.”50	The	CPA	(ML)’s	emphasis	on	patriotism	and	independence	was	reflected	in	some	articles	in	the	internal	bulletins	of	the	WSA	and	discussion	of	an	Australian	identity	and	culture;	for	example,	the	reintroduction	of	the	Eureka	flag	into	radical	and	working-class	actions	increased.	However,	overall	policy	and	directions	did	not	change	and	even	the	prestige	of	the	CPA	(ML)	was	insufficient	to	quell	the	disquiet	about	the	proposed	changes.	In	this	context,	Hyde’s	comments	about	“so	many	divisions”	in	the	organisation	begin	to	make	more	sense.	As	far	back	as	1971,	the	WSA	Conference	held	at	Melbourne	University	on	3	September	that	year	carried	resolutions	that	fudged	the	notion	of	the	two-stage	revolution	but	retained	the	socialist	objective	and	the	primacy	of	working-class	leadership:	Motion	One	That	WSA	in	its	propaganda	should	emphasise	that	Socialism	will	only	succeed	in	Australia	when,	not	only	has	U.S.	Imperialism	been	defeated	but	also	when	Capitalism	in	all	of	its	manifestations	has	been	smashed,	with	the	overthrow	of	the	ruling	class	and	the	working	class	seizing	state	power.	Motion	Two	The	development	of	capitalism	into	its	Imperialist	stage	continuously	adds	to	and	intensifies	the	contradictions	in	Capitalist	society	…	On	the	basis	of	its	social	practice	W.S.A.	adopts	as	the	principal	contradiction	in	Australian	Society	is	that	between	Australian	people	and	imperialism	and	its	local	policeman,	with	U.S.	imperialism	as	the	main	enemy;	and	that	in	the	struggle	of	the	Australian	people	against	imperialism	the	working	class	must	have	leadership	and	this	struggle	can	only	be	finally	successful	with	the	establishment	of	working	class	state	power.51	
																																																								50	“Use	ASIO	Row	to	Advance	Struggle	for	Independence,”	Editorial,	Vanguard,	23	August	1973,	1.	51	WSA	Conference	Bulletin,	n.d.,	gestetner	printed	document	reporting	resolutions	carried	on	the	second	day	of	the	WSA	conference	held	at	Melbourne	University	on	3	September	1971,	author’s	collection.	(Capitalisation	and	grammar	in	original.)	
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Comparing	the	WSA’s	policy	with	the	statements	made	in	Vanguard	in	September	1972,	it	is	clear	that	the	CPA	(ML)’s	framing	of	the	revolutionary	struggle	as	primarily	one	of	“national	independence”	could	be	rephrased	to	fit	with	the	WSA’s	framing	of	the	same	concept.	Thus,	it	was	not	the	immediately	observable	or	obvious	concept	that	was	at	issue;	rather,	what	prevented	the	WSA	from	taking	up	the	CPA	(ML)’s	view	of	revolution	was	the	subtext	of	its	descriptions.	In	writing	of	the	pragmatics	of	the	language	of	politics	and	“the	meaning	beyond	what	has	been	said,”	Sara	Thorne	observes	that	“language	influences	thought:	therefore	if	language	is	to	be	manipulated,	so	are	the	very	processes	of	thought.”52	Vanguard’s	use	of	words	and	phrases	such	as	“great	patriotic	cause”	and	“real	national	independence”	carried	imagery	that	was	quite	alien	to	young	people	schooled	by	1960s	rebellious	cultures.	Towards	the	end	of	1972,	the	Council	of	the	WSA	carried	a	motion	for	discussion	by	the	whole	organisation:	“That	the	organisation	Worker	Student	Alliance	disbands	itself	and	that	a	new	‘wholly	and	solely	anti-imperialist’	organisation	(with	a	change	of	name	to	reflect	a	change	of	policy)	is	set	up	in	its	place.”53	This	resolution	called	upon	the	whole	organisation	to	discuss	its	future,	which	it	did	throughout	1973	and	1974,	at	meetings	fitted	in	between	the	many	campaign	activities.	At	one	such	meeting	on	19	November	1972,	called	specifically	to	discuss	the	future	of	the	organisation,	Fergus	Robinson	spoke	to	a	paper	entitled	“On	Broadness,	Transformation	and	Patriotism.”	In	the	paper,	which	was	reproduced	in	WSA	
Bulletin	no.	12,	Robinson	stated	that	he	and	a	number	of	comrades	in	WSA	believed	that:	The	main	aspect	of	the	revolution	in	Australia	will	be	its	national	liberation	character.	This	immediately	raises	the	question	of	patriotism	…	The	historically	useful	function	of	…	[the]	…	rupture	with	any	form	of	nationalism	is	now	complete	…	we	should	proclaim	our	patriotism	far	and	wide	to	the	Australian	people.54	
																																																								52	Thorne,	Mastering	Advanced	English	Language,	368.	53	WSA	Bulletin,	no.	12,	December	1972,	item	2.	The	meeting	referred	to	here	occurred	earlier	than	the	date	of	its	publication	in	the	WSA	Bulletin.	(Parenthesis	in	original.)	54	Fergus	Robinson,	“On	Broadness,	Transformation	and	Patriotism,”	WSA	Bulletin,	no.	12,	December	1972,	item	5.	
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Other	parts	of	Robinson’s	paper	advocated	the	dissolution	of	the	WSA	and	its	replacement	by	a	broader	organisation	of	“Young	Patriots”	for	national	independence,	which	would	drop	socialism	from	its	objectives.	It	is	my	recollection	that	his	paper	received	a	mixed	reception	and	this	is	confirmed	by	an	ASIO	report	of	the	same	meeting	that	noted:		Albert	Langer	stated	that	he	agreed	with	the	general	principles	outlined	in	the	paper	but	considered	that	the	continuance	of	a	unified	WSA	was	of	paramount	importance	…	Although	Robinson’s	article	received	support,	most	of	those	present	were	too	hesitant	to	commit	themselves.55		It	was	not	as	if	the	new	line	had	the	field	all	to	itself.	Two	of	the	WSA’s	rank	and	file	group’s	newsletters	were	reprinted	in	the	same	WSA	Bulletin	that	carried	Robinson’s	paper.	These	argued	for	a	two-tiered	structure	for	the	WSA	in	which	there	would	be	both	area-based	and	“rank	and	file”–based	branches.	In	relation	to	the	CPA	(ML),	they	put	the	view	that	“we	do	not	deny	the	leadership	of	the	CPA	(ML)	but	we	would	envisage	the	workplace	based	section	of	W.S.A.	taking	a	simplified	line	and	style.”	56	Their	view	of	what	WSA	stood	for	was	summarised	in	several	dot	points:	
• We	are	fighting	for	independence	
• We	aim	for	the	control	of	industry	by	the	working	class	
• We	make	up	a	major	part	of	the	united	front	against	foreign	domination	BUT	we	also	fight	for	socialism57	Although	this	formulation	could	be	read	as	conforming	to	the	two-stage	revolution	model,	it	also	failed	to	inspire	the	WSA	organisation	to	adopt	it	as	a	reformed	political	platform.	Instead,	the	organisation	continued	to	participate	fully	in	the	panoply	of	radical	and	extra-parliamentary	protest	politics.	The	internal	arguments	were	sufficiently	civil	for	the	actions	that	the	WSA	joined	or	generated	to	be	actively	supported	by	all	sections	and	branches.	Both	sides	had	estimated	that	the	worst	possible	outcome	would	be	a	split.	The	most	prominent	article	in	WSA	Bulletin	no.	12,	which	was	by	an	unnamed	author,	expressed	this	view:		
																																																								55	ASIO	report	20	November	1972.	NAA:	A6119,	6446,	39.	56	“The	Worker,”	WSA	Bulletin,	no.	12,	December	1972,	item	9.	The	rank	and	file	groups	had	long	had	a	presence	in	WSA.	“The	Worker”was	produced	mainly	by	the	Broadmeadows	WSA	branch.	57	Ibid.	
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I	am	not	for	a	split,	that	is	to	say,	I	am	only	for	splitting	with	old	ways	and	not	with	the	comrades	who	go	by	old	ways	…	Unless	we	take	the	initiative	in	deepening	principled	debate	and	relying	on	discussion	within	W.S.A.,	the	organisation	will	divide	into	two	halves.	Maintaining	unity	is	not	only	a	good	thing	subjectively,	but	it	is	essential	objectively.58	This	sentiment	reflects	the	fact	that	the	concept	of	a	split	in	the	organisation	was	not	considered	seriously	by	either	side.	Hence,	the	question	of	the	future	of	the	organisation	continued	for	another	year	and	a	half	after	December	1972,	when	the	above	was	written.	However,	the	situation	could	not	continue	forever.	Michael	Hyde’s	memories	of	the	actual	end	are	hazy,	as	are	the	memories	of	other	ex-WSA	members	interviewed	for	this	thesis.	Fortunately,	the	ever-watchful	ASIO	has	provided	some	of	the	detail.	In	1983,	an	ASIO	informant	was	requested	to	provide	an	evaluation	of	the	CPA	(ML)’s	influence	in	the	Australian	Independence	Movement,	a	body	that	formed	following	the	dissolution	of	the	WSA.	That	evaluation	said	in	part:	It	[the	Australian	Independence	Movement]	sort	of	came	from	the	rank	and	file	who	had	been	in	WSA	…	We	believed	WSA	had	gone	to	the	dogs	by	1973,	Vietnam	was	over	and	there	was	a	transitional	body	called	the	WSA	Coordinating	Committee	set	up.	It	comprised	delegates	from	all	the	former	WSA	branches.	In	1974	at	a	Coordinating	Committee	meeting,	it	was	suggested	that	there	wasn’t	much	point	in	keeping	the	CC	going	because	WSA	was	finished.	Surprisingly,	Michael	HYDE	agreed.	After	this	suggestion	was	accepted	an	article	in	the	Australian	Communist	appeared.	I	think	someone	must	have	had	talks	with	HILL,	because	the	article	said	there	must	be	a	Party	youth	group,	and	so	HYDE	promptly	changed	his	mind	about	folding	up	the	Coordinating	Committee.	Soon	after,	a	meeting	was	held	to	which	about	40	people	turned	up,	and	WSA	was	officially	dissolved.	However,	at	that	meeting	it	was	proposed	that	a	new	organisation	with	a	new	emphasis	be	formed,	that	would	be	patriotic	and	anti-Imperialist.59	The	sequence	provided	in	this	evaluation	is	deficient	only	in	its	reasoning	for	Hyde’s	change	of	mind.	In	fact,	Hyde’s	support	for	ending	the	WSA	was	directly	condemned	by	senior	party	member	Rick	Oke	at	a	meeting	of	the	Youth	Commission	of	the	CPA																																																									58	“Explanation	of	Motion	Accepted	by	Council,”	WSA	Bulletin,	no.	12,	item	2.	59	ASIO	file	B/77/60	of	Nicholas	Butler,	NAA:	A6119,	6448,	69.	(Grammar	and	capitalisations	in	the	original.)	
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(ML).60	By	that	time,	it	was	too	late	for	the	decision	to	be	reversed.	The	WSA	had	been	killed	off	and	resuscitation	was	out	of	the	question.	That	the	prolonged	demise	of	the	WSA	concluded	with	a	sudden	and	complete	full	stop	with	no	decision	as	to	a	replacement	is	an	indication	that	the	argumentation	within	the	organisation	had	never	been	resolved.	It	was	better	to	end	the	WSA	rather	than	split	it.	This	left	the	field	open	for	the	construction	of	a	replacement	unencumbered	by	the	enmities	and	resentments	that	splits	create.		
																																																								60	Michael	Hyde,	interview	by	author,	4	March	2016.		
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Conclusion	
This	conclusion	reflects	on	the	practices	of	the	controversial	group	of	highly	motivated,	radical	young	people	that	began	as	the	Monash	Labor	Club	and	ended	as	the	Worker	Student	Alliance	(WSA).	It	draws	conclusions	about	political	and	social	developments	in	the	group	and	the	meanings	that	their	actions	had	for	“left”	activism	and	for	the	authorities	whose	power	it	sought	to	disrupt.	This	conclusion	covers	four	aspects:	disruption	and	defiance,	Maoism,	challenges	to	the	“old	left”	and	the	sustaining	role	of	radical	causes.		
Disrupting	the	State	
As	shown	in	Chapter	3,	this	group’s	favoured	modes	of	campaigning	were	public	demonstrations	and	physical	protest	actions.	Unlike	other	organisations,	it	rarely	used	propaganda	and	did	not	rely	on	seeking	influence	in	centres	of	nominal	power,	such	as	unions,	councils	or	parliamentary	parties.	Sean	Scalmer	categorises	protest	actions	and	political	demonstrations	as	having	three	levels:	“staging”	in	the	theatrical	sense;	“contest”	between	protesters	and	authorities;	and	“disruption”	that	“draws	direct,	reported,	negative	reaction	from	the	police.”1	However,	there	is	need	for	a	fourth	level	of	“extended	disturbance.”	The	movement	at	the	centre	of	this	thesis	repeatedly	showed	that	punitive	reaction	by	authorities,	including	consequent	arrests,	could	be	manipulated	to	extend	the	time	and	reach	of	the	action	and	to	stimulate	further	protest.	By	this	extension	of	time	and	reach,	new	forms	of	representation	of	the	central	message	arise.	In	terms	of	increasing	the	complexity	of	physical	protest,	Mona	Lilja	writes		The	different	symbols	produce	extra	meaning	through	resemblance	–	something	is	similar	to	something	else.	Different	representations	(bodies,	vocalised	messages,	posters)	repeat	a	similar	standpoint,	but	through	slightly	different	means	and	expressions.	It	is	an	establishment	of	patterns	and	a	steady	return	to	what	is	already	stated	but	with	a	new	kind	of	representation.	
																																																								1	Scalmer,	Dissent	Events,	64-65.	
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Mixing	different	kinds	of	representation	also	adds	complexity	to	the	political	message	that	is	being	forwarded.2	This	prolongation	and	escalation	of	instances	of	defiance	of	the	state’s	coercive	forces	corroded	zones	of	the	hegemonic	discourse	of	state	power	itself.	The	capacity	to	do	this	was	explored	in	Chapters	1	and	7	in	reflections	upon	the	works	of	Erving	Goffman	and	Judith	Butler,	both	of	whom	hold	that	demonstrations	and	protests	in	which	people	occupy	public	spaces	show	“their	opposition	to	the	legitimacy	of	the	state	…	[while	their	presence]…	calls	that	legitimacy	into	question.”3	Since	the	purpose	of	revolution	is	the	overthrowing	of	state	power,	it	is	hardly	surprising	that	the	Monash	Labor	Club	and	WSA	conceived	of	their	active	campaigns	of	physical	protest	and	demonstration	in	exactly	these	terms.	The	actions	of	the	police	force	in	targeting	WSA	members	for	arrest	in	demonstrations	can	be	read	as	their	recognition	of	this	too.	
Adopting	Marxism-Leninism	and	Maoism	
Like	all	university	clubs,	the	Monash	Labor	Club	imposed	no	formal	requirements	for	membership.	Likewise,	the	WSA’s	open	recruitment	policy	had	anti-imperialist	sentiment	as	the	only	requirement.	However,	the	content	and	tone	of	their	internal	discourse	and	political	study	was	Marxist-Leninist	and	Maoist	and	recruits	quickly	imbibed	the	patois	if	not	the	thinking.	Thus,	the	WSA	remains	within	the	usual	definition	of	a	social	movement.	Its	objectives	were	political,	in	the	sense	of	opposing	imperialism	and	defying	state	power,	but	it	had	neither	the	perspective	nor	program	of	seeking	power	for	itself.	Opposition	to	imperialism	was	a	highly	political	concept.	Workers	and	students	in	the	WSA	readily	accepted	Lenin’s	formulation	of	imperialism	as	the	“highest	stage	of	capitalism.”	If	they	were	to	study	imperialism,	they	also	studied	capitalism	and	its	nemesis,	communism.	Such	ideas	were	made	real	by	the	fact	that	the	Viet	Cong,	which	they	supported	so	strongly,	was	seen,	at	least	in	the	media,	as	the	frontline	of	the	“communist	bloc.”	Simultaneously,	the	Cultural	Revolution	in	China,	with	its																																																									2	Mona	Lilja.	“Dangerous	Bodies,	Matter	and	Emotions:	Public	Assemblies	and	Embodied	Resistance.”	Journal	of	Political	Power,	(Routledge,	25	September	2017),	7.	3	Butler,	Bodies	in	Alliance	and	the	Politics	of	the	Street,	4–5.	
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encouragement	of	young	people	to	rebel	against	authority	and	its	targeting	of	state	hierarchies,	resonated	with	many,	especially	those	who	had	travelled	to	China.	With	Mao	Zedong’s	encouragements	of	rebellious	young	people	and	his	revolutionary	writings	so	easily	accessible,	his	theories	and	explanations	became	a	staple	of	WSA	study	groups	and	discussion.	The	ideologues	who	led	the	Monash	Labor	Club	off	campus	in	1968–1969	were	acutely	aware	that	they,	the	students,	were	in	a	very	privileged	position	with	respect	to	the	working	class	in	whose	interests	they	advocated	revolution.	They	had	time,	access	to	resources,	an	atmosphere	of	free	discussion	and	an	absence	of	family	dependents;	they	were	also	secure	in	the	knowledge	that	they	would	not	lose	their	livelihood	for	political	transgressions.	The	club	consciously	and	deliberately	sought	to	associate	student	members	with	working-class	experiences	and	culture.	This	is	reflected	in	the	renaming	of	its	off	campus	entity	as	the	WSA	and	its	political	and	often	physical	alignment	with	the	most	militant	of	unions.	Whether	by	accident	or	design,	that	these	turned	out	to	be	led	by	the	Maoist	Communist	Party	of	Australia	(Marxist-Leninist)	(CPA	(ML))	confirmed	their	adoption	of	Maoism.	As	discussed	in	Chapter	5,	a	number	of	members	formed	the	clandestine	Young	Communist	League	(YCL)	within	WSA	and	Monash	Labor	Club	memberships.	One	of	the	tasks	it	set	itself	was	to	ensure	that	communist	ideas	framed	WSA	discourses.	However,	by	1972,	the	WSA’s	propaganda	and	discussion	documents	clearly	branded	it	a	communist	youth	group,	rendering	the	YCL	redundant.	It	had	done	its	job.	
Challenging	the	Old	Left	
The	anti-imperialist	discursive	position	of	the	WSA	was	strengthened	by	the	storms	of	debate	it	had	with	leading	Australian	Labor	Party	(ALP)	and	Communist	Party	of	Australia	(CPA)	organisers	over	the	political	positions	and	slogans	to	be	adopted	for	demonstrations	such	as	the	4	July	and	Moratorium	marches.	CPA	organisers	were	the	principal	target;	WSA	members	criticised	their	“revisionist”	tailing	behind	the	ALP,	opposition	to	supporting	the	National	Liberation	Front	of	South	Vietnam	(NLF)	and	refusal	to	name	US	imperialism	as	the	aggressor.	These	controversies	raged	
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from	1969	until	the	last	Moratorium	in	June1971,	when	anti-imperialist	slogans	were	grudgingly	included	in	official	Moratorium	propaganda.	When	working	within	organisations	such	as	the	July	4	Committee	or	the	Moratorium	campaign,	the	WSA’s	startling	proposals	for	policy	and	action	were	often	condemned	as	unnecessarily	subversive	or	provocative	or	for	courting	press	accusations	of	inciting	violence.	As	shown	in	Chapters	5	and	6,	the	leaders	of	the	peace	contingents	of	the	CPA	(Bernie	Taft)	and	the	ALP	(Dr	Jim	Cairns	MHR)	levelled	such	accusations	at	the	WSA.	In	particular,	they	claimed	that	the	WSA’s	avocation	of	slogans	targeting	“US	imperialism”	or	supporting	victory	for	the	Viet	Cong	would	drive	the	general	public	away	from	the	movement.	Yet,	as	the	anti-war	movement	continued,	the	numbers	of	demonstrators	that	it	attracted	increased	from	year	to	year.	This	increase	was	multi-causal.	The	factors	included	more	extensive,	everyday	groundwork	by	union,	church	and	suburban	peace	movement	activists;	the	continued	atrocity	of	the	US	and	Australian	war	effort;	the	deaths	of	Australian	conscripts;	and	the	reassurance	that	comes	from	participating	in	something	as	large	as	the	Moratorium.	However,	the	excitement	promised	by	immoderate,	subversive	slogans	and	actions	that	challenged	the	law	and	risked	arrest	and	state	violence	may	also	have	played	a	role,	providing	sufficient	motivation	for	some	to	attend	demonstrations.	Regardless,	it	is	clear	that	militant,	anti-imperialist,	pro-NLF	slogans	and	actions	did	not	deter	the	crowds.	The	growth	of	the	WSA	over	the	same	period,	from	a	few	tens	of	people	at	the	Bakery	to	having	to	break	itself	into	a	dozen	branches	in	Victoria	plus	a	half	dozen	in	other	states,	is	further	evidence	of	this.		
Sustained	by	Radical	Causes	
The	genealogy	of	the	WSA—from	its	genesis	in	1960s	student	politics	to	its	evolution	in	the	social	and	political	discourses	of	local	and	national	protest	movements	to	its	dissolution	in	1974—shows	that	the	causes	that	it	fought	provided	its	vital	spark:	In	its	early	struggles,	the	Monash	Labor	Club	challenged	the	hegemonic	discourse	of	the	university	through	an	essentially	liberal	campaign	of	objection	to	the	execution	of	Ronald	Ryan	by	attacking	the	university’s	obsequious	
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attitude	to	the	premier	of	Victoria.	In	this,	their	campaign	was	little	different	from	similar,	student	campaigns	at	other	institutions.		However,	the	symbolism	of	targeting	the	most	vicious	exercise	of	state	power	led	the	student	radicals	into	further	confrontations.	Chapter	2	examined	how	their	experience	facilitated	the	reassignment	of	energy	and	effort	to	the	causes	of	most	concern	to	students:	the	Vietnam	War	and	conscription.	Their	campaign	of	support	for	the	communist	NLF	framed	the	notion	of	“enemy”	as	the	reverse	of	the	hegemonic	discourse	that	sustained	the	war	effort	and	marked	their	entry	to	the	peace	movement	beyond	the	university.		With	the	excitement	generated	by	its	rebellious	and	uncompromising	confrontations	against	authority,	the	Monash	Labor	Club	grew	to	a	very	large	size;	its	action	program	went	beyond	student	politics	and	the	need	for	an	off	campus	presence	became	apparent.	The	Bakery,	initially	established	as	the	home	of	their	off	campus	body,	the	Revolutionary	Socialists,	later	the	WSA,	eventually	became	obsolete.	As	the	peace	movement	expanded,	so	too	did	the	WSA.	The	WSA	had	long	framed	itself	as	a	“united	front”	organisation;	yet,	it	also	presented	itself	as	if	it	were	a	fully	fledged	Marxist-Leninist	party.	The	ending	of	Australia’s	involvement	in	the	Vietnam	War	curtailed	opportunities	for	the	organisation	to	bring	Maoist	ideas	to	“united	front”	activities	in	which	non-communists	participated.	Therefore,	it	had	to	raise	its	own,	which	it	did	with	the	Anti-Nazi	and	Anti-Omega	Base	campaigns.		These	were	causes	that	had	limited	duration.	In	the	interstices	between	campaigns,	question	about	the	policies,	program	and	structures	of	the	organisation	could	no	longer	be	set	aside.	As	early	as	1970,	the	CPA	(ML)	had	begun	to	reframe	its	own	discourse	in	terms	of	a	“united	front	for	Australian	national	independence,”	rather	than	for	direct	socialist	revolution.	Within	a	short	time,	activists	from	La	Trobe	University	brought	this	reframing	into	the	WSA.	They	argued	that	the	organisation	should	drop	“socialism”	from	its	platform,	cease	acting	as	if	it	were	a	communist	party	in	its	own	right	and	reorganise	itself	as	a	militant	advocate	of	national	independence.	Discussions	and	conferences	over	this	issue	failed	to	achieve	resolution.	Without	an	all-consuming	cause	to	unify	the	group,	the	prospect	of	
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having	to	repeatedly	regenerate	united	front	campaigns	was	an	exercise	in	futility.	Splitting	the	organisation	into	two	factions	was	just	as	futile;	therefore,	against	the	advice	of	the	CPA	(ML),	the	WSA	ended	its	existence	in	1974.		This	genealogy	may	be	explained	as	a	Gramscian	form	of	discourse.	The	hegemony	of	bourgeois	rule,	demonstrated	most	brutally	in	the	exercise	of	its	right	to	send	citizens	to	war,	would	remain	unaffected	by	spontaneous,	reformist	or	scattered	oppositions	that	substituted	effects	for	causes.	For	example,	in	the	peace	movement,	slogans	such	as	“give	peace	a	chance”	turned	war	into	a	diffuse	abstraction	that	could	be	supported	by	war’s	proponents	as	much	as	by	war’s	opponents.	As	discussed	in	Chapters	2	and	6,	a	Gramscian	approach	would	insist	that	the	spontaneous	movement	would	inevitably	end	in	disillusion	and	inertia.	Therefore,	it	was	necessary	that	a	grouping	of	politically	conscious,	“organic”	intellectuals	should	form	a	leadership	capable	of	reformulating	that	opposition	and	redirecting	it	towards	the	bourgeois	hegemony	itself.		The	Monash	Labor	Club	and	WSA	adopted	a	practice	in	which,	in	the	absence	of	such	leadership	by	either	of	the	established	communist	parties,	it	attempted	to	be	that	group	of	“organic	intellectuals.”	The	words	“organic	intellectuals”	were	Gramsci’s	code	for	“communist	activist,”	so	the	work	of	giving	working-class	leadership	had	to	be	carried	out	within	all	classes	and	in	all	situations	of	resistance	to	bourgeois	hegemony.	However,	the	WSA	and	all	of	the	Victorian	university	Labor	clubs	and	WSA	branches	had	neither	the	intention	nor	prospect	of	seeking	state	power	themselves.	Individual	causes	were	the	sites	in	which	WSA	politics	were	applied	and,	when	these	were	completed,	successfully	or	not,	the	need	for	a	group	of	“organic	intellectuals”	ceased.	So	too	did	the	organisation.	In	the	rather	fatuous	terms	of	success	or	failure,	the	WSA,	as	a	movement,	certainly	“failed”:	the	revolution	did	not	come	and	the	state	power	was	not	overturned.	The	WSA	had	no	intention	of	seizing	that	power	in	its	own	right.	It	had	been	formed	with	the	objective	of	ensuring	that	spontaneous	movements	of	protest	were	informed	by	the	politics	of	anti-imperialism.	Its	“success”	lay	in	playing	a	role	in	shifting	the	beliefs	and	attitudes	of	other	social	movements	and	many	young	Australians	with	respect	to	a	communist	antidote	to	imperialism,	war	and	fascism
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Appendix	1		 Power	Grows	out	of	the	Barrel	of	a	Gestetner	
Copied	from	flyer,	The	Communist	Party	is	Behind	this	Moratorium	–	Way	Behind		
		
	
270	
	
			
271	
		
272	
		
							
 	  
273	
Appendix	2		 Timeline	of	events	1972	
Date	of	
event	
Event	 Struggle,	Number,	CE	=	Coming	Events	Jan	1972	 Long	March	to	the	countryside,	a	month	long	WSA	investigation	of	rural	conditions;	 Struggle	5,	(CE)	Jan	‘til	15th	 Draft	Resisters	Union	Summer	Offensive;	 Trugg	5	CE	Jan	27	 Draft	Resisters	Rally	City	 Struggle	6	CE	Jan	28	 Black	Panther	manifesto	(printed	in	Struggle);	 Struggle	7	Jan	29	 Sunbury	Pop	Festival	DRU	presence;	 Struggle	6	CE	Feb	5	 Anti	Suharto	Rally;	 Struggle	7	CE	Feb	7	 VMC	general	committee	meets	 Struggle	7	CE	Feb	13	 VMC	Richmond	Town	Hall	Meeting	 Struggle	7	CE	Feb	20	 Palestine	Australia	Solidarity	Committee	(PASC)	 Struggle	7	CE	Feb	27	 Mtg	to	establish	Black	Panthers	Melbourne	Chapter	 Struggle	8	CE	Mar	4	 Mass	Mtg	of	Sec’y	Students	-	estab	Socialist	SS	org	 Struggle	8	CE	Mar	21	 Anti-Apartheid	Rally	and	march	 Struggle10	CE	March	24	 PASC	Rally	against	Zionism	 Struggle	7	CE	Apr	21	 Moratorium	Rally		 Struggle	8	CE	May	5	 Social	Services	Moratorium	march	(VAC)	 Struggle	13	centre	pp	May	7	 May	Day	march	 Struggle	8	CE	May	19	 Rally	at	Supreme	Court	re	Pola	&	Robinson	arrests	 Struggle	14,	15th	May	May	28	 CDA,	East	Wind,	and	Third	World	Bookshops	firebombed	by	Nazis;		 Struggle	15,	29th	May	Jun	8	 Official	IRA	talk	at	Monash		 Struggle	15,	29th	May	Jun	10	-	 Rally	against	Nazi	Party	Conference	in	Beaver	St.,	St	Albans;	 Struggle	15,	29th	May	Jun	16	 China	Tour	talk	on	‘Women	in	China’;	 Struggle	16		Jun	18	 Banana	Republic	Day,	Mordialloc,	against	ESSO	gas	pipeline;	 Struggle	16	Jun	26-	 Rally	in	Canberra	–	SEATO	biennial	conference	 Struggle	16	July	14	 Land	Rights	Moratorium	 Struggle	17	July	15,	28	 Nat’nl	Mob’n	ag	Conscription,	Don’t	Register	cam.	 Struggle	18	July	17	 3PR	goes	to	air	 Struggle	19,	p.	2	July	30	 Re-establishment	of	Aboriginal	Embassy	in	Canberra;		 Struggle	20,	p.4	Aug	26	 Simultaneous	suburban	demonstrations	over	gaoling	of	Brian	Pola,	Barry	York,	and	Fergus	Robinson;		 Struggle	19	Aug	13	 Pram	Factory	workshop	on	street	theatre	 Struggle	20	Aug	18	 ‘State	of	the	War’	report	on	visit	to	North	Vietnam	by	Harry	Van	Moorst;		 Struggle	20	Sep	8,9,-	 Australia	China	Society,	Photographic	Exhibition,	 Struggle	20	
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Films	and	talk	by	Dr.	Joshua	Horne;		Sep	10	 Public	Meeting	at	Unitarian	Church	On	Fascism	in	Australia	(Ustasha),		 Struggle	21	Oct	2	 Esso	Bay	Pipeline	trial	of	Paul	Byrne,	also	Nov	1	 Struggle	22	Nov	12	 Teach	in	on	Palestine	 Struggle	23	Nov	18	 Moratorium	 Struggle	24,	p.1	Dec	8	 Meeting	on	future	of	the	Moratorium;		 Struggle	24	Nov	28	 Public	Meeting	on	the	Recognition	of	China;		 Struggle	25	Dec	2	 Federal	election;		 Struggle	25,	p.1	Dec	2	 Pottery	Sale	to	aid	Gurindji	stock	purchase;		 Struggle	25	Dec	11	 Mass	meeting	on	future	of	freeways	(UMFAG)	 Struggle	25			 	
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Appendix	3		 ASIO	phone	intercept,	December	1972	
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